This paper gives an account of proxy agency in the context of collective action. It takes the case of a group announcing something by way of a spokesperson as an illustration. In proxy agency, it seems that one person or subgroup's doing something counts as or constitutes or is recognized as (tantamount to) another person or group's doing something. Proxy agency is pervasive in institutional action. It has been taken to be a straightforward counterexample to an appealing deflationary view of (...) collective action as a matter of all members of a group making a contribution to bringing about some event. I show that this is a mistake. I give a deflationary account of constitutive rules in terms of essentially collective action types. I then give an account of one form of constitutive agency in terms of constitutive rules. I next give an account of status functions—of which being a spokesperson is one—that also draws on the concept of a constitutive rule. I then show how these materials help us to see how proxy agency is an expression of the agency of all members of the group credited with doing something when the proxy acts. (shrink)

This paper clarifies Searle's account of we-intentions and then argues that it is subject to counterexamples, some of which are derived from examples Searle uses against other accounts. It then offers an alternative reductive account that is not subject to the counterexamples.

What is the ontology of collective action? I have in mind three connected questions. 1. Do the truth conditions of action sentences about groups require there to be group agents over and above individual agents? 2. Is there a difference, in this connection, between action sentences about informal groups that use plural noun phrases, such as ‘We pushed the car’ and ‘The women left the party early’, and action sentences about formal or institutional groups that use singular noun phrases, such (...) as ‘The United States declared war on Japan on December 8th, 1941’ and ‘The Supreme Court ruled that segregation is unconstitutional in 1954 in Brown vs. Board of Education’? 3. Under what conditions does it make sense to speak of a group doing something together, and what, if anything, is a collective action? In this paper, I argue that a) understanding action sentences about groups does not commit us to the existence of group agents per se, but only to the existence of individual agents; b) there is no difference in this regard between sentences which attribute actions to informal groups on the one hand and institutional groups on the other; c) collective action can be both intentional and unintentional; d) any random group of agents each of whom does something is also a group which does something together; e) while there is a sense in which groups per se perform no primitive collective actions, and therefore no actions at all, f) there is a sensible extension of talk of actions to groups, though it should be treated strictly speaking, like talk of group agents, as a façon de parler, for g) the only agents per se are individuals and the only actions are theirs. -/-. (shrink)

Sometimes the thesis has been put forth that the languages of 3- Dimensionalism and 4-Dimensionalism are completey translatable into each other without any loss of meaning. Prominently, this thesis has recently been defended by Jonathan Lowe and Storrs McCall. A global inter-translatability would show that there is no deeper systematic or even ontological difference between these philosophical positions despite that both are using a different vocabulary to describe the same features of reality. In this paper, I want to argue that (...) the thesis of 3D-4D-Equivalence covers some interesting aspects of the discussion between 3-Dimensionalists and 4-Dimensionalists, but is not able to grasp fully the ontological intuitions of both positions. At the end of the day, it seems necessary to refute the thesis that 3-Dimensionalism and 4-Dimensionalism are eqivalent in the sense that both are completely translatable into each other. (shrink)

We have previously proposed that mothers and infants co-regulate one another’s autonomic state through an autonomic conditioning mechanism, which starts during gestation and results in the formation of autonomic socioemotional reflexes following birth. Theoretically, autonomic physiology associated with the ASR should correlate concomitantly with behaviors of mother and infant, although the neuronal pathway by which this phenomenon occurs has not been elucidated. In this paper, we consider the neuronal pathway by which sensory stimuli between a mother and her baby/child affect (...) the physiology and emotional behavior of each. We divide our paper into two parts. In the first part, to gain perspective on current theories on the subject, we conduct a 500-year narrative history of scientific investigations into the human nervous system and theories that describe the neuronal pathway between sensory stimulus and emotional behavior. We then review inconsistencies between several currently accepted theories and recent data. In the second part, we lay out a new theory of emotions that describes how sensory stimuli between mother and baby unconsciously control the behavior and physiology of both. We present a theory of mother/infant emotion based on a set of assumptions fundamentally different from current theories. Briefly, we propose that mother/infant sensory stimuli trigger conditional autonomic socioemotional reflexes, which drive cardiac function and behavior without the benefit of the thalamus, amygdala or cortex. We hold that the ASR is shaped by an evolutionarily conserved autonomic learning mechanism that forms between mother and fetus during gestation and continues following birth. We highlight our own and others research findings over the past 15 years that support our contention that mother/infant socioemotional behavior is driven by mutual autonomic state plasticity, as opposed to cortical trait plasticity. We review a novel assessment tool designed to measure the behaviors associated with the ASR phenomenon. Finally, we discuss the significance of our theory for the treatment of mothers and infants with socioemotional disorders. (shrink)

The relation between virtue and nature, including human nature, depends on the different meanings and uses of the concept of “nature” as well as its change in the history of thought. Under the influence of modern sciences, nature as an object of “value-free” causal explanations increasingly loses its normative significance for ethics and virtues. In contemporary philosophy, there are basically three principal conceptions of their relation: ethical naturalism based on natural science, anti-natural ethics of reason, and virtue-ethics based on evaluative (...) concepts of nature. Only in some versions of the third option have virtues more than just an instrumental value. As such, they provide criteria for the direction of technological transformation of human and non-human nature. (shrink)

The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality is the first of its kind, synthesizing research from several disciplines for all students and professionals interested in better understanding the nature and structure of social reality. The contents of the volume are divided into eight sections, each of which begins with a short introduction: Collective Action and Intention Shared and Joint Attitudes Epistemology and Rationality in the Social Context Social Ontology Collectives and Responsibility Collective Intentionality and Social Institutions The Extent, Origins, and Development (...) of Collective Intentionality Semantics of Collectivity The eight sections contain a total of 40 accessible chapters, all written exclusively for this volume by a team of internationally recognized experts. Each chapter ends with a References and a Further Reading section as well as cross-references to other germane chapters in the volume. A longer General Introduction provides an initial overview of the history as well as the current issues and problems in collective intentionality, the range of topics and their interconnections, and the organization of the _Handbook_. Systematic in its approach and thorough and detailed in its coverage_, The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality_ provides readers with a valuable reference to this rapidly growing, cross-disciplinary research area and a trailhead to its most promising future directions. (shrink)

Perhaps even more radically than under the criticism of the ‘Maîtres du soupçon’, a whole world goes down in Greek comedy. Not only traditional religion, but also ethical life and finally even reason itself seem to be affected by the all-destroying power of laughter.The title of Aristophanes’ famous play ‘The Clouds’ has a symbolic meaning: in the comedy, Greek ethical life dissolves into a vanishing mist. Behind the player’s mask hides the principle of this total decomposition: the autonomous, selfconfident individual. (...) This event does not only have a theatrical meaning. It does not only exist in the artist’s imagination. It concerns a whole nation, a whole culture. The comedy is an expression of the way society understands itself. It represents in an aesthetic way the fact that the individual human being sees himself as ‘principium essendi et cognoscendi’ of everything. The comedy voices a new truth, namely that all truth begins and ends with man. The gods — symbols of truth and actuality- have dissolved in the shamelessness of a laughter, which does not halt for anything anymore. Formulated in modern terms: the comedy voices the philosophical principle that from now on the subject will be the reference point of all reality. Long before Descartes’s Cogito, a metaphysics of subjectivity here finds one of its remarkable expressions.At least, that is how Hegel interprets the comedy in his Phenomenology of Spirit. According to him, the destruction of the Greek world announces itself in the comedy. It signals the experience that a certain culture has grown old, that something new is coming. This new actuality will get its first, symbolic expression in the Christian religion. However, this transition is only possible if consciousness undergoes new experiences, by which the self-sufficient and frivolous cheerfulness of the comedy gets lost. In these new experiences the implications of the principle of the autonomous subjectivity, which is decisive for the comedy, come to light. Hegel defines this principle as following: “das Selbst ist das absolute Wesen; das Wesen, das Substanz und an dem das Selbst die Akzidentalität war, ist zum Prädikate herunter gesunken ...”.These new experiences are indicated by a term which is already familiar to the readers of the Phenomenology, namely ‘the unhappy consciousness’. Hegel writes: “We see that this Unhappy Consciousness constitutes the counterpart and the completion of the comic consciousness that is perfectly happy within itself”. The text is clear: the unhappy consciousness is not only that into which the comic consciousness turns. It is at the same time a change in which this consciousness accomplishes itself.The “Self which is for itself the absolute being” could not durably maintain itself in its position. Its “Leichtsinn” makes it “light”, too light to be the substance of everything. Very quickly, it loses its uncomplicated enjoyment of itself and becomes unhappy, even more: it has to become unhappy. I will return to the reason for this “having to” later on. But first, how does Hegel typify this historical experience, which is connected with the origin of Christianity? What does the bitter fruit of Greek comedy consist of? (shrink)

This book develops an integrated perspective on the practices and politics of making knowledge work in inclusive development and innovation. While debates about development and innovation commonly appeal to the authority of academic researchers, many current approaches emphasize the plurality of actors with relevant expertise for addressing livelihood challenges. Adopting an action-oriented and reflexive approach, this volume explores the variety of ways in which knowledge works, paying particular attention to dilemmas and controversies. The six parts of the book address the (...) complex interplay of knowledge and politics, starting with the need for knowledge integration in the first part and decolonial perspectives on the politics of knowledge integration in the second part. The following three parts focus on the practices of inclusive development and innovation through three major themes of transformative learning, evidence, and digitization. The final part of the book addresses the governance of knowledge and innovation in the light of political struggles about inclusivity. Exploring conceptual and practical themes through case studies from the Global North and South, this book will be of great interest to students, scholars and practitioners researching and working in development studies, epistemology, innovation studies, science and technology studies and sustainability studies more broadly. (shrink)

Excerpt from Vorlesungen Über das Wesen der Religion: Nebst Zusätzen und Anmerkungen Sch reihe fie meinen fammtliehen qberfen 016 ben achten sbanb an, weil ber 6chlu6 mit bem i'befen be6 @heiftenthume ein finniofer, bem b[an' bee 3bee, biz meiner (R)efammtaugahe 511 @mnbe liegt, burchauo miberfpmhenbee Ware. S>iefer gnfolge habe ich ba qbefen be6 (shtiftenthumo an meiner erften, b. H. Fruhften thrift gemacht, unb bahn abfiehttich bte @efammtauagabe mit ben (erlauterungen unb @rgangungen gum qbefen be6 @hriftenthumo begonnen. Sda nun aber bafl'elbe (...) buch auch in hie (c)efammtauogabe mit aufgenommen merben mute, fo eefcheint e6 feet bem (R)ruef nach 16 mein Iehte6 bert, mein Ieter qbifle unb (c)ebanfe. S)tefer trugerifche 6chein mu bahn auf; gehoben, ba6 (shetflenthum auf ben *blah guruefgebrangt werben, ber ihm in %ahrhcit gebuhrt. $dte6 gefehieht aber bureh btefeoflefungen. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

This text is a dynamic new translation of Wittgenstein' s most famous work -- one of the most influential philosophy works of the Twentieth Century. Kolak' s translation is the first to read like an original work written in English and is the first to restore the poetical and lyrical qualities of the original Tractatus as intended by the author.

[1] En tête de cet examen, qui doit servir en premier lieu à expliquer le problème et doit se contenter de quelques indications rapides permettant de le résoudre, plaçons un propos de Heidegger sur l’anthropologie : « Ce qui, dans l’anthropologie, relève de la considération somatique, biologique, psychologique de l’homme, ce qui, venant de la caractérologie, de la psychanalyse, de l’ethnologie, de la psychologie pédagogique, de la morphologie de la culture et la typologie des Weltanschauungen...

Even his peers called Locke's political philosophy “The ABC of Politics“: not only does he clarify why one should exit the state of nature (government guarantees protection of life, freedom, and wealth) but also what a good government has to provide. A government should protect individuals from assaults of fellow citizens, other countries, and itself. Locke also shows how to put limits to the power of political institutions: by division of powers, by law, by neutral judges, and by making people (...) trust their government -- and having the right to revolt when their trust is betrayed. This book provides a cooperative commentary to all important topics of Locke's "Two Treatises". With entries by Wolfgang von Leyden, Bernd Ludwig, Peter Niesen, Francis Oakley, Birger P. Priddat, Michaela Rehm, Michael Schefczyk, Ludwig Siep, A. John Simmons, und Simone Zurbuchen. (shrink)

The central concept in Kant's _Doctrine of Law_ is the concept of a _person_. This very concept is intimately connected with Kant's theory of transcendental freedom and thus with his Transcendental Idealism. Hence the conceptual framework of the _Doctrine of Law_ and with it the 'Universal Principle of Right' are inseparably connected to Kant's _critical_ moral philosophy and require especially the moral law as their foundation. But nevertheless this does not entail that legal coercion requires the personality of those who (...) are subject to it: A Kantian state would be possible even for a people of devils. (shrink)

Hans-Ludwig Schreiber hat über 300 Schriften zur Rechtstheorie und Rechtsphilosophie, zum Straf- und Strafprozessrecht sowie zum Medizin- und Biorecht verfasst. Da viele der grundlegenden Arbeiten an heute schwer zugänglichen Orten veröffentlicht wurden, bleiben seine Schriften in einer Auswahl mit diesem Band der Fachwelt dauerhaft zugänglich.

Zu Hegels verschiedenen Vorlesungen über die «Philosophie des Rechts» gab es bisher jeweils nur eine Mit- oder Nachschrift seiner Schüler. Deshalb ließ sich schwer einschätzen, inwieweit diese die sich ändernden Vorstellungen Hegels über Recht und Staatsverfassung authentisch wiedergaben. Die neu aufgetauchte und erstmals kritisch edierte Nachschrift K. W. L. Heyses stammt aus dem Wintersemester 1822/23, aus dem es bisher die Mitschrift H. G. Hothos gab. Beide ergänzen sich gegenseitig und zeigen, daß Hotho und Heyse Hegels Darlegungen genau verfolgt und in (...) verkürzter Form notiert haben. Damit ist für Hegels Haltung wenige Jahre nach den Karlsbader Beschlüssen eine sicherere Textgrundlage als bisher gegeben. (shrink)