In the slipstream of several large-scale corporate scandals, the board of directors has gained a pivotal position in the corporate governance debate. However, due to an overreliance on particular methodological (i.e. input–output studies) and theoretical (i.e. agency theory) research fortresses in past board research, academic knowledge concerning how this important governance mechanism actually operates and functions remains relatively limited. This theoretical paper aims to contribute to the promising stream of research which focuses on behavioural perspectives and processes within the corporate (...) board, by delving into one of the research areas perhaps plagued most by these predominant approaches: board leadership. In adopting a team perspective on the board of directors our study goes beyond traditional board leadership research, which has turned a blind eye on actual leadership dynamics, by examining leadership processes and behaviours inside the board team. Specifically, we develop a conceptual framework addressing a novel and ethical approach to team leadership within the board, i.e. shared leadership, which has previously been demonstrated to result in performance benefits in various other team settings. (shrink)

What, if anything, is wrong with conspiracy theories? A conspiracy refers to a group of people acting in secret to achieve some nefarious goal. Given that the pages of history are full of such plots, however, why are CTs often regarded with suspicion and even disdain? According to “particularism,” the currently dominant view among philosophers, each CT should be evaluated on its own merits and the negative reputation of CTs as a class is wholly undeserved. In this paper, I defend (...) a moderate version of “generalism,” the view that there is indeed something prima facie suspicious about CTs, properly defined, and that they suffer from common epistemic defects. To demarcate legitimate theorizing about real-life conspiracies from “mere conspiracy theories”, I draw on a deep asymmetry between causes and effects in the natural world. Because of their extreme resilience to counterevidence, CTs can be seen as the epistemological equivalent of black holes, in which unwary truth-seekers are drawn, never to escape. Finally, by presenting a generic “recipe” for generating novel CTs around any given event, regardless of the circumstances and the available evidence, I rescue the intuitions beneath colloquial phrases like “That's just a conspiracy theory.”. (shrink)

Moving images of animals have been popular from the beginning of the medium of film and fascinate us from childhood, and they show the cultural image that exists in a (human) society of (other) animals. This essay outlines how Disney rose to prominence in the first half of the 20th century by strongly humanizing (or anthropomorphizing) animals in his animated films and not taking them very seriously as animals. In the second half of that century, the BBC had great success (...) with nature series in which, on the contrary, scientific distance and the differences between humans and animals (‘anthropo-denial’) were central, and animals were seen primarily as objects. In recent decades, new insights into biology on the one hand and technological innovations in the media on the other have led to more diverse and ambivalent animal images. These reflect a growing awareness of the similarities between humans and other animals, with films and TV series using new images and stories to enable viewers to empathize with non-human living beings. (shrink)

In many logics dealing with information one needs to make statements not only about cognitive states, but also about transitions between them. In this paper we analyze a dynamic modal logic that has been designed with this purpose in mind. On top of an abstract information ordering on states it has instructions to move forward or backward along this ordering, to states where a certain assertion holds or fails, while it also allows combinations of such instructions by means of operations (...) from relation algebra. In addition, the logic has devices for expressing whether in a given state a certain instruction can be carried out, and whether that state can be arrived at by carrying out a certain instruction. (shrink)

One way to address such questions about artifact kinds is to look for clues in the available literature on parallel questions that have been posed with respect to kinds in the natural domain. Philosophers have long been concerned with the ...

A complete reconstruction of Lehmer’s ENIAC set-up for computing the exponents of p modulo two is given. This program served as an early test program for the ENIAC (1946). The reconstruction illustrates the difficulties of early programmers to find a way between a man operated and a machine operated computation. These difficulties concern both the content level (the algorithm) and the formal level (the logic of sequencing operations).

This article takes up a text that Rancière published shortly after The Ignorant School Master appeared in French, 'École, production, égalité'[School, Production, Equality] (1988), in which he sketched the school as being preeminently the place of equality. In this vein, and opposed to the story of the school as the place where inequality is reproduced and therefore in need of reform, the article wants to recount the story of the school as the invention of a site of equality and as (...) primordially a public space. Inspired by Rancière, we indicate first how the actual (international and national) policy story about the school and the organizational technologies that accompany it install and legitimate profound inequalities, which consequently can no longer be questioned (and become 'invisible'). Second, the article recasts and rethinks different manifestations of equality and of 'public-ness' in school education and, finally, indicates various ways in which these manifestations are neutralized or immunized in actual discourses and educational technologies. (shrink)

Over the last twenty years, in all of these neighbouring fields, modal systems have been developed that we call multi-dimensional. (Our definition of multi ...

In this challenging essay, Maarten Doorman argues that in art, belief in progress is still relevant, if not essential. The radical freedoms of postmodernism, he claims, have had a crippling effect on art, leaving it in danger of becoming meaningless. Art can only acquire meaning through context the concept of progress, then, is ideal as the primary criterion for establishing that context. The history of art, in fact, can be seen as a process of constant accumulation, works of art (...) commenting on one another and enriching one another's meanings. It is these complex interrelationships and the progress they create in both art and its observers that Doorman, in a display of great philosophical erudition, defends. (shrink)

Part of the distinction between artefacts, objects made by humans for particular purposes, and natural objects is that artefacts are subject to normative judgements. A drill, say, can be a good drill or a poor drill, it can function well or correctly or it can malfunction. In this paper I investigate how such judgements fit into the domain of the normative in general and what the grounds for their normativity are. Taking as a starting point a general characterization of normativity (...) proposed by Dancy, I argue how statements such as ‘this is a good drill’ or ‘this drill is malfunctioning’ can be seen to express normative facts, or the content of normative statements. What they say is that a user who has a desire to achieve a particular relevant outcome has a reason to use, or not to use, the artefact in question. Next this analysis is extended to show that not just statements that say that an artefact performs its function well or poorly, but all statements that ascribe a function to an artefact can be seen as expressing a normative fact. On this approach the normativity of artefacts is analyzed in terms of reasons on grounds of practical, and to a lesser extent theoretical, rationality. I close by investigating briefly to what extent reasons on moral grounds are, in the analysis adopted here, involved in the normativity of artefacts.Keywords: Artefact; Normativity; Instrumental reason; Practical rationality; Function; Use. (shrink)

We expand first order models with a tolerance relation on thedomain. Intuitively, two elements stand in this relation if they arecognitively close for the agent who holds the model. This simplenotion turns out to be very powerful. It leads to a semanticcharacterization of the guarded fragment of Andréka, van Benthemand Németi, and highlights the strong analogies between modallogic and this fragment. Viewing the resulting logic – tolerance logic– dynamically it is a resource-conscious information processingalternative to classical first order logic. The (...) differences areindicated by several examples. (shrink)

The present study examined whether individuals with full-blown memories of highly implausible events are prone to commit source monitoring errors. Participants reporting previous-life memories and those without such memories completed a false fame task. This task provides an index of source monitoring errors . Participants with previous-life memories had a greater tendency to judge the names of previously presented non-famous people as famous than control participants. The two groups did not differ in terms of correct recognition of new non-famous names (...) and famous names. Although dissociation, cognitive failures, sleep-related experiences, depressive symptoms, and signs of psychological distress were all significantly higher in participants with previous-life memories than in controls, these variables did not predict the false fame illusion. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to offer a new model for the study of ocularization in film grounded in the semiotic pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce. We first present a literature overview addressing the state of research regarding the theorization of ocularization in film studies. Second, we discuss Peirce’s three universal categories (Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness) on which our model will be based. Third, we argue how the theme of ocularization in film, as outlined in the first part, can (...) be theorized anew through these categories. This will result in the introduction of a nine-field matrix that will allow us to systemize all kinds of instances of subjectivity in cinema. Lastly, we will demonstrate the empirical usefulness of this model by illustrating each of the matrix’ nine categories through a discussion of Steven Soderbergh’s film Kimi (2022). (shrink)

We respond to Van Leeuwen's critique of our paper. We clarify why our account is not committed to a unitary view of "belief", and we argue that Van Leeuwen's dichotomy between "fakers" and "fanatics" is a false dilemma, based on an equivocation in the use of the term "fanaticism". Once we pay attention to crucial content differences in religious belief, to which Van Leeuwen is largely oblivious, we can explain all the phenomena that he alludes to. Finally, we discuss some (...) peculiar features of religion, such as the unfalsifiablity of many doctrines and the importance of mystery, but we insist that such features do not rest on a difference in cognitive attitude. By and large, religious folks factually believe what they profess to believe. (shrink)

Starting with a discussion of what I call `Koyré's paradox of conceptual novelty', I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileo's work. I then argue that although their view on the nature of Galileo's conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileo's use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea (...) that Galileo's pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way, Galileo's experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics. (shrink)

Traditionally, ‘education through research’ is understood to be a main characteristic of education at the university. In this article we will explore how ‘education through research’ is argued to be of major importance for the European knowledge society, how there is still a reference to the idea of Bildung or liberal education, and what research is presumed to be like if it is to have this edifying potential. It will be argued that the edifying potential of research is related to (...) a normative component in the research activity and that this normative orientation and its presuppositions are problematic today. This lays the way for the exploration of alternative approaches to the edifying potential of research (with reference especially to Jürgen Mittelstrass and Jacques Derrida) and for the discussion of what could be at stake for ‘education through research’. (shrink)

The ‘European Space of Higher Education’ could be mapped as an infrastructure for entrepreneurship and a place where the distinction between the social and the economic becomes obsolete. Using Foucault's understanding of biopolitics and discussing the analyses of Agamben and Negri/Hardt it is argued that the actual governmental configuration, i.e. the economisation of the social, also has a biopolitical dimension. Focusing on the intersection between a politicisation and economisation of human life allows us to discuss a kind of ‘bio‐economisation’ , (...) a regime of economic terror and learning as investment. Finally it is argued how fostering learning, i.e. fostering life could turn into ‘let die’ and even into ‘make die’. (shrink)

Focal points seem to be important in helping players coordinate their strategies in coordination problems. Game theory lacks, however, a formal theory of focal points. This paper proposes a theory of focal points that is based on individual rationality considerations. The two principles upon which the theory rest are the Principle of Insufficient Reason (IR) and a Principle of Individual Team Member Rationality. The way IR is modelled combines the classic notion of description symmetry and a new notion of pay-off (...) symmetry, which yields different predictions in a variety of games. The theory can explain why people do better than pure randomization in matching games. (shrink)

The administration of psychological tests is highly regulated. Test manuals prescribe the instructions to the test subject, the time the test should take, where it should take place, whether and how the test administrator should answer questions from the test subject, and other aspects of the testing situation. Through the manual, the behaviour of test administrator and test subject is disciplined so that the subject may become measurable. The manuals of four tests are analysed, and the disciplinary mechanisms that operate (...) in the administration of these tests are described. Attention is then given to the question whether the discipline of the test is repressive or productive. It is concluded that test manuals, while being central to the production of a psychological subject, also articulate an excess subjectivity in the measures they prescribe to exclude it from the testing situation. (shrink)

Although universities are asked to play a role in the European knowledge society, the precise scope and meaning of this role is still under discussion. A major issue in this debate is the trend to adapt universities to economic needs and demands of society. In view of taking a critical stance against a one-sided economic interpretation of activities and functions of universities, their so-called “public” role is increasingly stressed in the debate as a crucial responsibility of universities that should not (...) be marginalized and therefore deserves our attention. In this paper, which is the introduction to a special issue on the public role of the university, we want to stress the importance of addressing the question of “the role of universities in the Europe of knowledge” in an open way and thus, without prejudices against or in favour of possible answers. It is our contention that a critical view of what is happening in universities today cannot simply rely on authoritative ideas or principles that are vaguely reminiscent of our university traditions. Consequently, this introductory paper pleas for a firmer argumentative and a richer empirical basis that takes account of the fact that our background has thoroughly changed in comparison to traditions that still implicitly inform our judgement of what universities can do, should do or should not do. Finally, we will discuss the way in which the articles collected in this issue are intended stimulating and supporting the debate on the public role of the university in Europe. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Object and Aims of Earth Science The Autonomy of Earth Science Explanation in Earth Science Conclusion Acknowledgment References.

Cultuurfilosofische studie over de romantische benadering van de werkelijkheid, in de 19e en 20e eeuw.

What makes beliefs thrive? In this paper, we model the dissemination of bona fide science versus pseudoscience, making use of Dan Sperber's epidemiological model of representations. Drawing on cognitive research on the roots of irrational beliefs and the institutional arrangement of science, we explain the dissemination of beliefs in terms of their salience to human cognition and their ability to adapt to specific cultural ecologies. By contrasting the cultural development of science and pseudoscience along a number of dimensions, we gain (...) a better understanding of their underlying epistemic differences. Pseudoscience can achieve widespread acceptance by tapping into evolved cognitive mechanisms, thus sacrificing intellectual integrity for intuitive appeal. Science, by contrast, defies those deeply held intuitions precisely because it is institutionally arranged to track objective patterns in the world, and the world does not care much about our intuitions. In light of these differences, we discuss the degree of openness or resilience to conceptual change (evidence and reason), and the divergent ways in which science and pseudoscience can achieve cultural “success”. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

Why did R.G. Collingwood come to reject the adversarial style of philosophical discussion so popular among his Oxford peers? The main aim of this paper is to explain that Collingwood came to reject his colleagues’ specific style of philosophical dialogue on methodological grounds, and to show how the argument against adversarial philosophical discussion is integrated with Collingwood’s overall criticism of realist philosophy. His argument exploits a connection between method and practice that should be taken seriously even today.

The concept of the future is re-emerging as an urgent topic on the academic agenda. In this article, we focus on the ‘politics of the future’: the social processes and practices that allow particular imagined futures to become socially performative. Acknowledging that the performativity of such imagined futures is well-understood, we argue that how particular visions come about and why they become performative is underexplained. Drawing on constructivist sociological theory, this article aims to fill this gap by exploring the question (...) ‘how do imagined futures become socially performative’? In doing so, the article has three aims to identify the leading social–theoretical work on the future; conceptualize the relationship of the imagination of the future with social practices and the performance of reality; provide a theoretical framework explaining how images of the future become performative, using the concepts ‘techniques of futuring’ and ‘dramaturgical regime’. (shrink)

We consider the problem of the product finite model property for binary products of modal logics. First we give a new proof for the product finite model property of the logic of products of Kripke frames, a result due to Shehtman. Then we modify the proof to obtain the same result for logics of products of Kripke frames satisfying any combination of seriality, reflexivity and symmetry. We do not consider the transitivity condition in isolation because it leads to infinity axioms (...) when taking products. (shrink)

A central claim of Jones & Love's (J&L's) article is that Bayesian Fundamentalism is empirically unconstrained. Unless constraints are placed on prior beliefs, likelihood, and utility functions, all behaviour is consistent with Bayesian rationality. Although such claims are commonplace, their basis is rarely justified. We fill this gap by sketching a proof, and we discuss possible solutions that would make Bayesian approaches empirically interesting.

What, if any, are the limits of human understanding? Epistemic pessimists, sobered by our humble evolutionary origins, have argued that some parts of the universe will forever remain beyond our ken. But what exactly does it mean to say that humans are ‘cognitively closed’ to some parts of the world, or that some problems will forever remain ‘mysteries’? In this paper we develop a richer conceptual toolbox for thinking about different forms and varieties of cognitive limitation, which are often conflated (...) by the so-called ‘new mysterians’. We distinguish between representational access and imaginative understanding, as well as between different modalities of cognitive limitation. Next, we look at tried-and-tested strategies for overcoming our innate cognitive limitations, drawing from the literature on distributed cognition and cognitive scaffolding’. This allows us to distinguish between the limits of bare brains vs. scaffolded brains. Most importantly, we argue that this panoply of mind-extension devices is combinatorial and open-ended. In the end, this allows us to turn the table on the mysterians: for every alleged ‘mystery’, they should demonstrate that no possible combination of mind extension devices will bring us any closer to a solution. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have given up on the quest for a silver bullet to put an end to all pseudoscience, as such a neat formal criterion to separate good science from its contenders has proven elusive. In the literature on critical thinking and in some philosophical quarters, however, this search for silver bullets lives on in the taxonomies of fallacies. The attractive idea is to have a handy list of abstract definitions or argumentation schemes, on the basis of which one (...) can identify bad or invalid types of reasoning, abstracting away from the specific content and dialectical context. Such shortcuts for debunking arguments are tempting, but alas, the promise is hardly if ever fulfilled. Different strands of research on the pragmatics of argumentation, probabilistic reasoning and ecological rationality have shown that almost every known type of fallacy is a close neighbor to sound inferences or acceptable moves in a debate. Nonetheless, the kernel idea of a fallacy as an erroneous type of argument is still retained by most authors. We outline a destructive dilemma we refer to as the Fallacy Fork: on the one hand, if fallacies are construed as demonstrably invalid form of reasoning, then they have very limited applicability in real life. On the other hand, if our definitions of fallacies are sophisticated enough to capture real-life complexities, they can no longer be held up as an effective tool for discriminating good and bad forms of reasoning. As we bring our schematic “fallacies” in touch with reality, we seem to lose grip on normative questions. Even approaches that do not rely on argumentation schemes to identify fallacies fail to escape the Fallacy Fork, and run up against their own version of it. (shrink)

Around the turn of the century the American engineer Frederick Taylor introduced scientific methods in manufacturing to improve the efficiency. The objective was to control labour by means of rational methods, technological means, and management techniques. Taylor has been at the centre of bitter controversies. On the one hand, his principles were warmly welcomed by industries and universities. On the other hand, they were strongly opposed by unions and politics. Despite the strong opposition, the ideas of Taylor spread quickly.

Schools and classrooms, as well as the work place and the Internet, are considered today as learning environments . People are regarded as learners and the main target of school education has become 'learning' pupils and students how to learn. The roles of teachers and lecturers are redefined as instructors, designers of (powerful) learning environments and facilitators or coaches of learning processes. The aim of this paper is to argue that the current self-understanding in terms of learning environments is not (...) merely about a renewal of our vocabulary, but an indication of a far more general transformation of the world of education. It is argued that the current self-understanding in terms of 'learning environments' and 'learners' indicates a shift in our experience of time and place; a shift from (modern) historical self-understanding towards (post-modern) environmental self-understanding. The essay draws upon Foucauldian concepts in order to map the modern organisation of time and space in 'schools'. This past organisation is confronted with the current organisation of time and space in 'learning environments'. By contrasting both maps the paper focuses on the main characteristics of the current experience of time and space, that is, 'environmental self-understanding', and explores in the final section the dark side of this self-understanding. (shrink)