Clahsen has added to the body of evidence that, on average, regular and irregular inflected words behave differently. However, the dual-mechanism account he supports predicts a crisp distinction; the empirical data instead suggest a fuzzy one, more in line with single-mechanism connectionist models.

Evolutionary psychology claims biological inclinations for certain behaviors (e.g., a desire for more frequent sex and more sexual partners by males as compared to females), and the origin of these inclinations in natural selection. Jerry Fodor’s recent book, The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way (2000), grants the nativist case for such biological grounding but disputes the presumed certainty of its origin in natural selection. Nevertheless, there is today a consensus that at least some of the claims of evolutionary psychology are (...) true, and their broad appeal suggests that many see them as easy insights into and possible license for some controversial behaviors. Evolutionary psychologists, on the other hand, caution that an origin in natural selection implies only an inclination for certain behaviors, and not that the behaviors will be true of all people, will lead to happiness or are morally correct. But such cautions can be as facile as the simplistic positions they are intended to counter. A biological basis implies tendencies to behaviors that will be pleasurable when engaged in, and that can be modified to an extent and at a psychic cost that is, at best, not fully understood. Also, while it is true that naturally selected behaviors are not necessarily moral, the implications of current evolutionary psychology cast doubt on any absolute foundation for morality at all, as well as suggesting limits on our ability to fully understand both ourselves and the universe around us. However, this does not mean that our (relative) values or apparent free will are any less real or important for us. (shrink)

The current transatlantic debate over multilateralism reveals that the traditional understanding of liberal internationalism is being transcended in favor of “globalism.” The latter is a doctrine that goes well beyond favoring international cooperation among states; in fact, the new globalism is intrinsically hostile to the sovereignty of the nation-state. Thus it runs counter to the basic liberal understanding of the nature of the political order, as reflected in the American Declaration of Independence and, on a more philosophical level, in the (...) political teaching of John Locke. The Declaration and the Lockean teaching proclaim universal principles, but hold that the implementation of these principles should be the business not of some international authority but of democratically elected and accountable national. (shrink)

Traditionally, species have been treated by biologists and philosophers as natural kinds. However, this conception of species has posed several problems for evolutionary theory. For example, biologists have been hard pressed to find traits had by all and only the members of a species. This has caused some philosophers to doubt that evolutionary theory is a scientific theory. ;In an effort to resolve such problems, Michael Ghiselin and David Hull have argued that species are not kinds but individuals. A number (...) of authors have adopted this conclusion. Some have even gone on to argue that besides showing that species are not kinds, the thesis that species are individuals has other ramifications for evolutionary theory. For example, the thesis is said to lend support to the Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium. ;In my dissertation, I argue that while species are not kinds, most species are not individuals either. Furthermore, even if all species were individuals, the alleged ramifications are not forthcoming. ;More specifically, in Chapter One I review the arguments against species being kinds and the recent replies to those arguments. I also examine the nature of kinds and contend that the original arguments against species being kinds still stand. ;In Chapter Two, I turn to the metaphysics of individuality. I argue that mere spatiotemporal continuity and a rough similarity among the constituents of an entity are insufficient for it to be an individual. The constituents of an individual must be appropriately causally connected as well. ;With this requirement, I return to species in Chapter Three. Most species consist of subpopulations which are not causally connected in any biological fashion. Because of this, and other reasons, I argue that most species are not individuals. ;In the final chapter, I point out that the result of the previous chapter goes against the claim that what distinguishes species from higher taxa is that species and not higher taxa are individuals. I also argue that even if all species were individuals, their individuality does not support the Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium. Finally, some authors maintain that a unit of selection must be an individual. I argue that there is no such requirement on units of selection. (shrink)

It has been suggested that certain problems may be unsolvable because of the mind's cognitive structure, but we may wonder what problems, and exactly why. The ultimate origin of the universe and the mind-body problem seem to be two such problems. As to why, Colin McGinn has argued that the mind-body problem is unsolvable because any theoretical concepts about the brain will be observation-based and unable to connect to unobservable subjective experience. McGinn's argument suggests a requirement of imagability -- an (...) observation basis -- for physical causal explanation that cannot be met for either of these problems. Acausal descriptions may be possible but not the causal analyses that provide the greatest explanatory satisfaction, a psychological phenomenon that seems tied to the strength of the underlying observation basis but is affected by other factors as well. (shrink)

Most words in natural languages are polysemous; that is, they have related but different meanings in different contexts. This one‐to‐many mapping of form to meaning presents a challenge to understanding how word meanings are learned, represented, and processed. Previous work has focused on solutions in which multiple static semantic representations are linked to a single word form, which fails to capture important generalizations about how polysemous words are used; in particular, the graded nature of polysemous senses, and the flexibility and (...) regularity of polysemy use. We provide a novel view of how polysemous words are represented and processed, focusing on how meaning is modulated by context. Our theory is implemented within a recurrent neural network that learns distributional information through exposure to a large and representative corpus of English. Clusters of meaning emerge from how the model processes individual word forms. In keeping with distributional theories of semantics, we suggest word meanings are generalized from contexts of different word tokens, with polysemy emerging as multiple clusters of contextually modulated meanings. We validate our results against a human‐annotated corpus of polysemy focusing on the gradedness, flexibility, and regularity of polysemous sense individuation, as well as behavioral findings of offline sense relatedness ratings and online sentence processing. The results provide novel insights into how polysemy emerges from contextual processing of word meaning from both a theoretical and computational point of view. (shrink)

It may be that Kant manifested a profound understanding of modern empirical science in his observation that we have now placed nature on the witness stand and are compelling her to answer the questions we think fit to propose. This, I am convinced, is not the approach best suited to bring out the deepest insights and systematic teachings of another philosopher. On the contrary, it would seem that one can make sense out of another man's thought only by coming to (...) know how that person sees the problem, and what he regards as an adequate solution to it. If this is correct, one of our first objectives should be to see how Weiss sees the problem of knowledge and what he regards as the requirements for an adequate account of human knowledge. (shrink)

This collection of essays, offered in honor of the distinguished career of prominent political philosophy professor Clifford Orwin, brings together internationally renowned scholars to provide a wide context and discuss various aspects of the virtue of “humanity” through the history of political philosophy.

Inflectional morphology has been taken as a paradigmatic example of rule-governed grammatical knowledge (Pinker, 1999). The plausibility of this claim may be related to the fact that it is mainly based on studies of English, which has a very simple inflectional system. We examined the representation of inflectional morphology in Serbian, which encodes number, gender, and case for nouns. Linguists standardly characterize this system as a complex set of rules, with disagreements about their exact form. We present analyses of a (...) large corpus of nouns which showed that, as in English, Serbian inflectional morphology is quasiregular: It exhibits numerous partial regularities creating neighborhoods that vary in size and consistency. We then asked whether a simple connectionist network could encode this statistical information in a manner that also supported generalization. A network trained on 3,244 Serbian nouns learned to produce correctly inflected phonological forms from a specification of a word's lemma, gender, number, and case, and generalized to untrained cases. The model's performance was sensitive to variables that also influence human performance, including surface and lemma frequency. It was also influenced by inflectional neighborhood size, a novel measure of the consistency of meaning to form mapping. A word-naming experiment with native Serbian speakers showed that this measure also affects human performance. The results suggest that, as in English, generating correctly inflected forms involves satisfying a small number of simultaneous probabilistic constraints relating form and meaning. Thus, common computational mechanisms may govern the representation and use of inflectional information across typologically diverse languages. (shrink)

Isaiah Berlin is heralded as one of the great thinkers of the 20th century and this editied work by a group of distinguished scholars is an examination of an Humean liberal intellectual. Isaiah Berlin's legacy still excites intense scholarly debate.

This collection of essays, offered in honor of the distinguished career of prominent political philosophy professor Clifford Orwin, brings together internationally renowned scholars to provide a wide context and discuss various aspects of the virtue of “humanity” through the history of political philosophy.

The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces three interlocking conceptual problems that together frame the problem of cognitive ontology. First, they must establish which tasks elicit which cognitive capacities, and specifically when different tasks elicit the same capacity. To address this operationalization problem, scientists often assess whether the tasks engage the same neural mechanisms. But to determine whether mechanisms are of the same or different kinds, we need to solve the abstraction problem by (...) determining which mechanistic differences are and are not relevant, and also the boundary problem by distinguishing the mechanism from its background conditions. Solving these problems, in turn, requires understanding how cognitive capacities are elicited in tasks. These three problems, which have been noted and discussed elsewhere in the literature, together form a ‘cycle of kinds’ that frames the central problem-space of cognitive ontology. We describe this cycle to clarify the intellectual challenges facing the cognitive ontologist and to reveal the kind of iterative process by which ontological revision in cognitive neuroscience is likely to unfold. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOther people’s emotional reactions to a third person’s behaviour are potentially informative about what is appropriate within a given situation. We investigated whether and how observers’ inferences of such injunctive norms are shaped by expressions of anger and disgust. Building on the moral emotions literature, we hypothesised that angry and disgusted expressions produce relative differences in the strength of autonomy-based versus purity-based norm inferences. We report three studies using different types of stimuli to investigate how emotional reactions shape norms about (...) potential norm violations, and contexts. Consistent with our theoretical argument, the results indicate that observers use others’ emotional reactions not only to infer whether a particular behaviour is inappropriate, but also why it is inappropriate: because it primarily violates auto... (shrink)

In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.

The Human Genome Project is an expensive, ambitious, and controversial attempt to locate and map every one of the approximately 100,000 genes in the human body. If it works, and we are able, for instance, to identify markers for genetic diseases long before they develop, who will have the right to obtain such information? What will be the consequences for health care, health insurance, employability, and research priorities? And, more broadly, how will attitudes toward human differences be affected, morally and (...) socially, by the setting of a genetic “standard”? The compatibility of individual rights and genetic fairness is challenged by the technological possibilities of the future, making it difficult to create an agenda for a “just genetics.” Beginning with an account of the utopian dreams and authoritarian tendencies of historical eugenics movements, this book’s nine essays probe the potential social uses and abuses of detailed genetic information. Lucid and wide-ranging, these contributions will interest bioethicists, legal scholars, and policy makers. Essays: “The Genome Project and the Meaning of Difference,” Timothy F. Murphy “Eugenics and the Human Genome Project: Is the Past Prologue?,” Daniel J. Kevles “Handle with Care: Race, Class, and Genetics,” Arthur L. Caplan “Public Choices and Private Choices: Legal Regulation of Genetic Testing,” Lori B. Andrews “Rules for Gene Banks: Protecting Privacy in the Genetics Age,” George J. Annas “Use of Genetic Information by Private Insurers,” Robert J. Pokorski “The Genome Project, Individual Differences, and Just Health Care,” Norman Daniels “Just Genetics: A Problem Agenda,” Leonard M. Fleck “Justice and the Limitations of Genetic Knowledge,” Marc A. Lappé. (shrink)

English summary: Schelling's Die Weltalter was frequently announced as ready for publication, but little of the book was ever written. Schelling planned Die Weltalter as a volume in three parts, describing the past, present, and future of the world; however, he began only the first part, rewriting it several times and at last keeping it unpublished. The other two parts were left only in planning. French text.French description: « Commencé seulement les Ages du monde ». Cette note que Schelling consigne (...) dans son Tagebuch à la date du 27 décembre 1810 donne le coup d'envoi d'un des projets les plus grandioses qu'un philosophe se soit proposé, retracer sur la base de concepts philosophiques les étapes de la vie divine et de la création. S'il est vrai, comme le disait Novalis, que « vouloir écrire une Bible est un penchant à la folie que tout homme doit avoir pour être complet », cette grande fresque cosmique et théologique représente la tentative la plus magistrale qu'ait menée l'idéalisme allemand pour rendre compte de la totalité de la manifestation divine et en proposer une présentation effective et complète. Or, dans la dernière version de l'ouvrage, celle-là même que Schelling fit introduire dans ses Sammtliche Werke et dont nous donnons ici une nouvelle traduction dans la continuité de celle des brouillons de 1811 et 1813, le récit et la construction spéculative cherchent encore à atteindre un point d'équilibre. Un double effort pour implanter la succession au coeur même de l'Absolu tout en équilibrant en Dieu les rapports de l'idéal et du réel prépare l'avènement d'une philosophie historique sans ue l'on débouche jamais tout à fait sur une hétérogénéité radicale de l'être et du penser. Ainsi, à travers cette description du passé le plus archaïque, Schelling met pour la première fois effectivement la philosophie en possession de ce qu'elle recherche depuis toujours : « la science, c'est-à-dire l'histoire ». (shrink)

Task unrelated thought (TUT) refers to thought directed away from the current situation, for example a daydream. Three experiments were conducted on healthy participants, with two broad aims. First, to contrast distributed and encapsulated views of cognition by comparing the encoding of categorical and random lists of words (Experiments One and Two). Second, to examine the consequences of experiencing TUT during study on the subsequent retrieval of information (Experiments One, Two, and Three). Experiments One and Two demonstrated lower levels of (...) TUT and higher levels of word-fragment completion whilst encoding categorical relative to random stimuli, supporting the role of a distributed resource in the maintenance of TUT. In addition the results of all three experiments suggested that experiencing TUT during study had a measurable effect on subsequent retrieval. TUT was associated with increased frequency of false alarms at retrieval (Experiment One). In the subsequent experiments TUT was associated with no advantage to retrieval based on recollection, by manipulating instructions at encoding (Experiment Two), and/or at retrieval (Experiment Three). The implications of the results of all three experiments are discussed in terms of recent accounts of memory retrieval and conscious awareness. (shrink)

Since current water governance patterns mandate cooperation and partnership within and between the actors in the hydrosystems, supplementary models are necessary to distinguish the roles and the rules of indoor actions which is why we extend a theory in the frameworks of philosophy of technology. This analysis is empirically grounded on the problematic hydrosystems of a river in central Iran, Zayandehrud. Following a modernist-holistic-based analysis, it illustrates how values in the water apportionment mechanisms are being reshaped. The article by using (...) the theory of normative practice has scrutinised the tasks and the rules of the old and new water-management systems, Mirab. Subsequently according to such philosophical theory, it has argued that the conflicts over the cases are due to interference of structural and directional norms within them. (shrink)

Plato's Euthyrphro, Apology, andCrito portray Socrates' words and deeds during his trial for disbelieving in the Gods of Athens and corrupting the Athenian youth, and constitute a defense of the man Socrates and of his way of life, the philosophic life. The twelve essays in the volume, written by leading classical philosophers, investigate various aspects of these works of Plato, including the significance of Plato's characters, Socrates's revolutionary religious ideas, and the relationship between historical events and Plato's texts.