Trust and Governance asks several important questions: Is trust really essential to good governance, or are strong laws more important? What leads people either to trust or to distrust government, and what makes officials decide to be trustworthy? Can too much trust render the public vulnerable to government corruption, and if so what safeguards are necessary? In approaching these questions, the contributors draw upon an abundance of resources to offer different perspectives on the role of trust in government. Enriched by (...) perspectives from political science, sociology, psychology, economics, history, and philosophy, Trust and Governance opens a new dialogue on the role of trust in the vital relationship between citizenry and government. (shrink)

Preparing the Next Generation of Oral Historians is an invaluable resource to educators seeking to bring history alive for students at all levels. Filled with insightful reflections on teaching oral history, it offers practical suggestions for educators seeking to create curricula, engage students, gather community support, and meet educational standards. By the close of the book, readers will be able to successfully incorporate oral history projects in their own classrooms.

Based on talks provided under the title "The Christian religion & its philosophy".

Retributivism Has a Past: Has It a Future? is the first volume of a series to be published by Oxford University Press: Studies in Penal Theory and Philosophy. Clearly the series is off to a fine st...

Margaret Boden presents a series of essays in which she explores the nature of creativity in a wide range of art forms. Creativity is the generation of novel, surprising, and valuable ideas. Boden identifies three forms of creativity each eliciting a different form of surprise.

This paper explores Augustine’s use of the twin images of Christ the physician and sin as sickness, especially in his sermons and Confessions. It shows how distinctive features of this image enable Augustine to illuminate a scriptural moral theology that is egalitarian and developmental. It is founded upon repentance, humility and a powerful awareness of dependence upon God’s grace, and demands communal responsibility for morality. Augustine’s moral theory fully integrates his personal and pastoral experience; the relevant similarities between his own (...) society and ours suggest that his theory, in its broad outlines, has not lost its validity. (shrink)

If particularism is right, the broad moral claims we make are usually riddled with exceptions. But such generalizations can still be a useful, even necessary part of moral life. They help us show what we should do, and they are essential for understanding why we should do it.

Even in its limited state-based form, human law owes its existence to the natural physical world with its self-created value systems. What is understood as human law is grounded in human-nonhuman entanglements, themselves a subset of a multi-dimensional natural nomos consisting of the intricately connected normative worlds of animals, plants, earth, and cosmos. Complex and intersecting plural normative fields include those associated with the nonliving world, the multiple ontological worlds produced by life forms, and the many strata of human becoming (...) – cultural, cognitive, social, and representational. As plural the nomos contains many irreducible dimensions. Normative fields intersect, hybridise, and clash; they can mutually strengthen and also negate other normativities. In this article, I set out and explore some dimensions of the plural nomos with a focus on living beings, notably the connectedness of being, knowing and normativity. The living nomos co-emerges with being and with the embodied knowledge of even the simplest forms of life. Life is both cognitive and normative; living beings inherit ancestral norms but, in living and adapting, life creates new norms, biological, cultural, and behavioural. The living-knowing being is always normative – produced by the norming processes and constraints of life and matter at large. Normative elements are a critical part of the ontological and epistemological embeddedness of human beings in more than human worlds. Before law (or knowledge) can be about life, it is also of or from life. Expanding the analytical frame of law in this way is one method by which we might reshape western narratives of law, with the aims of promoting better openness to First Nations laws, discouraging western cultural superiority and human exceptionalism, and moving toward a more eco-sensitive view of the continuity between human law-culture-society and the natural world. (shrink)

McCradden and colleagues' argues that machine learning in health care poses new challenges to appropriate evaluation for safe use in clinical care. It also claims that “the longstanding syst...

These expanded versions of papers presented at the Fourth International Conference on Evil and Wickedness, Prague, March 2003, explore evil in a variety of forms and disciplinary approaches.

In this exploratory paper, we investigate the extension of Haidt’s :814–834, 2001, The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion, 2012) Moral foundations theory, operationalized as the MFQ30 questionnaire, from a sample of the general public across many countries to a sample of business students. MFT posits that people rely on five major concerns, or foundations, when making moral judgments. The five concerns are care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, respect/authority, and purity/degradation. In addition, Haidt suggests that intuition, rather (...) than reasoning, leads to moral judgment. We replicate Haidt’s measurement model and find that the measurement model based on our sample is consistent. This indicates support for MFT. Further, we find structural differences in the measurement model between the genders and between areas of study. Our findings suggest that all students in the sample focus substantially on the fairness foundation. Ethics education and research may seek to expand the number of moral foundations individuals consider when discerning whether something is right or wrong. (shrink)

Pet adoption from an animal rescue shelter would seem to be one of those indisputable things in life that only increases a person's positive karma. Kant spoke of morality residing in a good will and pure intention; saving a dog from being euthanized by providing it with a loving, secure home seems the living embodiment of that. Or so it would seem.

This chapter explains Descartes confusion on sensations, size, shape, position, and motion. Descartes in detail explains that we perceive particular figures or actual bodies affecting our senses much more distinctly than their colours. Descartes construe the perception of position, distance, size, and shape as involving strong intellectual elements and he holds that they differ in this fundamental respect from ordinary perceptions of color, sound, heat and cold, taste, and the like, which are said to consist just in having “sensations” that (...) “arise from the mind-body union.” This position leaves room for uncertainty about what he means when he speaks elsewhere of the near-uselessness of sense perceptions in informing us of particular qualities of bodies, in so far as it opens the possibility of a quite restricted understanding of “sense perception” in these contexts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mary Margaret Mackenzie THE TEARS OF CHRYSES: RETALIATION IN THE ILIAD1 ATHEORY of punishment is a systematic justification of the practice of punishment. Before the emergence of true penology in classical Greece—in Plato's Laws for example—penal transactions are associated only with pre-philosophic rationalizations. But such rationalizations must, nevertheless, be regarded as the antecedents of a formalized theory of punishment. In order to understand the classical approach to punishment, (...) therefore, we should look to the early literature for evidence, descriptive or evaluative, of the penological antecedents. To begin at the beginning, this article will consider the Iliad. Yet this procedure begs questions. First of all, a critic might deny the propriety of the use of literary evidence in a study of a philosophical problem. The objection is twofold—both against the treatment of literature as philosophy and against the assumption of continuity in the transition from non-philosophical to explicitly philosophical sources. To this the answer lies partly in the nature of Greek culture. Until the sophistic age there existed no moral philosophy as such—and yet the Greeks were capable of considering and solving moral problems, such as the questions surrounding the practice of punishment. Thus while we should distinguish between this unphilosophical approach and the systematic analyses of the philosopher, the problems with which they deal remain the same. Second, Homer depicts a fictional society: it is a common contention that we therefore have no grounds for attributing consistency or historical reality to any of the institutions described in the poems. Thus the proposition is that, not content with inventing a story to tell, Homer imagined all the trappings of the fiction as well—the conventions and the sentiments bear no relation to conventions or values of his own or any other time. The same argument might be applied to other literary works which make no claim to historicity. But its plausibility depends upon an inflated notion of fiction in which nothing of the 4 Philosophy and Literature story approaches the familiar experiences of its hearers. It is, of course, more reasonable to suppose that fiction generally derives its impact from familiarity, and that Homer's popularity was founded in his appeal to the audience's imagination in the context of their own lives. Thus while the story itself is fiction, it is associated with fact in its detail—the commonplaces of social life and human reaction among which the heroes move. Our task is to look to the commonplaces, for here will be found the social practices and the assumptions which Homer's audience would take for granted. Finally, we may generally suppose that the context of a particular source is determined chiefly by its antecedents. If, however, we are to treat the Homeric poems as the earliest Greek literary sources available to us, there is a major difficulty in this establishment of context: the absence of antecedent. The discussion of Homeric society has been severely hampered by the lack of contemporary referents and by the consequent temptation to import our own values as yardsticks for the measuring of the idiosyncracies of Homeric thought. To a large extent this is a useful enterprise; it is possible, for instance, to point out the differences between Homeric military structure and our own, or between the kingship system and the political structures of later Greek societies. On the other hand, as soon as the discussion turns to values, the issue becomes complicated; to compare two values, in our own society and in the Homeric poems, tends to presuppose some common ground where there need be none, to assume that the way we might translate a word reflects significantly upon its original use. This third difficulty gives rise to an eristic dilemma, common in the history of ideas: how do we know that a transaction is a punishment unless we already know that it is a punishment? Or if we are uncertain whether punishment occurs (and if we have no common language to help in the identification), where should we look for it? Further, having established the area in which punishment should occur, what criteria are to be employed to determine whether in fact it does? The first... (shrink)