Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). During the (...) last 2300 years this basic idea has been expressed in many ways, resulting in a rather extended family of views, theories, and theory sketches. The members of the family employ various concepts for the relevant relation (correspondence, conformity, congruence, agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signification, representation, reference, satisfaction) and/or various concepts for the relevant portion of reality (facts, states of affairs, situations, events, objects, sequences of objects, sets, properties, tropes). The resulting multiplicity of versions and reformulations of the theory is due to a blend of substantive and terminological differences. (shrink)

They reject the correspondence theory, insist truth is anemic, and advance an "anti-theory" of truth that is essentially a collection of platitudes: "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white; "Grass is green" is true if and only if grass is green. According to disquotationalists, the only profound insight about truth is that it lacks profundity. David contrasts the correspondence theory with disquotationalism and then develops the latter position in rich detail - more than has been (...) available in previous literature - to show its faults. (shrink)

Truthmakers have come to play a central role in David Armstrong's metaphysics. They are the things that stand in the relation of truthmaking to truthbearers. This chapter focuses on the relation. More specifically, it discusses a thesis Armstrong holds about truthmaking that is of special importance to him; namely, the thesis that truthmaking is an internal relation. It explores what work this thesis is supposed to do for Armstrong, especially for this doctrine of the ontological free lunch, raising questions and (...) pointing out difficulties along the way. At the end of the chapter, it is shown that Armstrong's preferred truthbearers generate a serious difficulty for his thesis that the truthmaking relation is internal. (shrink)

The paper deals with the ethical-moral dimension of Popper’s critical rationalism, which is the less analyzed aspect of his philosophy. Critical rationalism is not without assumptions. As a life attitude, it is actualized on the basis of one’s moral preferences based rather on assumptions than on critical reasonableness. Critical rationalism does not exclude logical argumentation and reasoning, but the adoption of them is predominantly the result of an individual moral decision and choice, based, paradoxically enough, on an irrational belief in (...) reason. The author considers this attitude to be productive, as it emphasizes individual moral responsibility. Nobody is able to persuade us about the relevance of what we don’t want to adopt and apply. Thus we find ourselves in the sphere of personal morality. (shrink)

This article serves as an introduction to the special issue discussing the usefulness of philosophy in managerial practice. We present the papers included in this special issue and identify keynote directions for further research. The initial intention of the call for papers was to promote this topic on research agendas by offering a platform for discussing if, why, and how philosophy can complement and enhance management practice. Now that this special issue has been published, we see a broader significance: the (...) arguments explored here are a starting point for more in-depth studies of the connections that can occur between specific philosophical concepts, theories, methods on the one hand, and concrete managerial practices on the other. (shrink)

In this article I wish to show how care ethics puts forward a fundamental critique on the ideal of independency in human life without thereby discounting autonomy as a moral value altogether. In care ethics, a relational account of autonomy is developed instead. Because care ethics is sometimes criticized in the literature as hopelessly vague and ambiguous, I shall begin by elaborating on how care ethics and its place in ethical theory can be understood. I shall stipulate a definition of (...) care ethics as a moral perspective or orientation from which ethical theorizing can take place. This will mean that care ethics is more a stance from which we can theorize ethically, than ready-made theory in itself. In conceiving care ethics in this way, it becomes possible to make clear that, for instance, a moral concept of autonomy is not abandoned, but instead is given a particular place and interpretation. In the final part of this article I will show how ‘relational autonomy’ can be applied fruitfully in the practice of psychiatric care. (shrink)

The thesis of the inexpressibility of certain kinds of philosophical knowledge, as ascribed to plato, is subjected to an analysis and, in consequence, interpreted in such a way which does not charge plato's position with any kind of mysticism or irrationalism. The interpretation propounded assumes that it is only some vague philosophical ideas that are said to be not expressible in a definite way.

I this paper I give minimal axioms for the ontology of time, especially A-theories and B-theories and I derive philosophically interesting lemmas. The exercise is set-theoretical, defining all notions and indicating assumptions and philosophical points of disagreement, while being easy to translate to other formal expressions . The issue of a logic for A-theories of time is treated towards the end, where I sketch ‘copresent’ operators for capturing the idea of temporal passage. The main conclusion will be that, while circularity (...) threatens both families of theories, the growing block theory (belonging to the A-theory) is the least objectionable philosophically. (shrink)

To study animal welfare empirically we need an objective basis for deciding when an animal is suffering. Suffering includes a wide range ofunpleasant emotional states such as fear, boredom, pain, and hunger. Suffering has evolved as a mechanism for avoiding sources ofdanger and threats to fitness. Captive animals often suffer in situations in which they are prevented from doing something that they are highly motivated to do. The an animal is prepared to pay to attain or to escape a situation (...) is an index ofhow the animal about that situation. Withholding conditions or commodities for which an animal shows (i.e., for which it continues to work despite increasing costs) is very likely to cause suffering. In designing environments for animals in zoos, farms, and laboratories, priority should be given to features for which animals show inelastic demand. The care ofanimals can thereby be based on an objective, animal-centered assessment of their needs. (shrink)

The adoption of personalisation as the principle on which policy and practices for social care in England should be developed has been hailed as marking a fundamental transformation in the nature of social care and the experiences of service users. This article examines both the discourse of personalisation and the practices that are being adopted to implement this from an ethic of care perspective. It adopts an approach based on Sevenhuijsen's ‘Trace’ analysis to trace the normative frameworks in key policy (...) documents (in particular Putting People First), noting that critics of care have largely succeeded in relegating care to a marginal position within policy discourse and that a relational sensibility is largely absent within this. The article considers the practices associated with personalisation in relation to the moral principles of an ethic of care and conceptions of the ‘individual’ within these. It addresses the implications of this approach for broader political and policy issues: the universality of provision, collective responsibility for welfare and well-being, and broader issues of social justice in conditions of vulnerability. (shrink)

David Wallace has recently argued that the eigenstate–eigenvalue (E–E) link has no place in serious discussions of quantum mechanics on the grounds that, as he claims, the E–E link is an invention of philosophers rather than the community of practicing physicists. This raises an historical question regarding the origin of the link. This paper aims to answer this question by tracing the historical development of the link through six key textbooks of quantum mechanics. In light of the historical evidence from (...) these textbooks, it is argued that Wallace provides insufficient grounds for dismissing the E–E link from discussions of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to argue against well-known Fregean idea according to which the meaning of a proper name determines the referent of the name, and the consequence thereof that semantically interesting proper names can be characterized independently of the notion of referent. The claim that it is meaningful to formulate a theory of meaning only for those names that has referents is defended. Several important morals concerning proper names follow from the claim. 1. The role of a (...) theory of meaning is in fact radically different than it is supposed by Fregean approaches. 2. The meaning of a name cannot determine its referent, and therefore mediate the relation of reference between a name and an object. 3. A theory of reference of proper names, contrary to Fregean point of view, should be taken as primary to a theory of meaning. (shrink)

In Reason, Truth, and History Hilary Putnam has presented an anti-skeptical argument purporting to prove that we are not brains in a vat. How exactly the argument goes is somewhat controversial. A number of competing "recon¬structions" have been proposed. They suffer from a defect which they share with what seems to be Putnam's own version of the argument. In this paper, I examine a very simple and rather natural reconstruction of the argument, one that does not employ any premises in (...) which a sentence, viz. the sentence 'I am a brain in a vat', is mentioned rather than used. In this respect my version of the argument is importantly different from what appears to be Putnam's own version. (shrink)

This book disassembles the moral assessment of business practices into its constituent parts to identify and clarify the four key concepts that form the basis of important moral disagreements in business: ‘personhood,’ ‘ownership,’ ‘harm,’ and ‘consent.’ ‘Moral bottom lines’ are those fundamental concepts in business ethics that ultimately account for our most resilient moral claims and unsurpassable convictions, and exploring them provides essential insights into the grounds on which we disagree in business ethics. This analysis is useful for students in (...) business school looking to understand fundamental moral disagreements in business and for practitioners interested in connecting practice with their own moral intuitions. The book also challenges scholars of business ethics by arguing that we can reduce business ethics disagreements to these four issues. "This is the most refreshing book on business ethics to appear in a long time. By focusing on 'personhood,' 'ownership,' 'harm,' and 'consent,' Eabrasu brings a new level of clarity and insight into disagreements on business ethic issues. Rather than reaching for an artificial utopian resolution, he embraces the challenge of explaining why we disagree. This is a must-read for serious business ethic scholars."Nicolas CapaldiLoyola University New OrleansLegendre-Soulé Distinguished Chair in Business Ethics. (shrink)

What is animal welfare? Why has it proved so difficult to find a definition that everyone can agree on? This concise and accessible guide is for anyone who is interested in animals and who has wondered how we can assess their welfare scientifically. It defines animal welfare as 'health and animals having what they want', a definition that can be easily understood by scientists and non-scientists alike, expresses in simple words what underlies many existing definitions, and shows what evidence we (...) need to collect to improve animal welfare in practice. Above all, it puts the animal's own point of view at the heart of an assessment of its welfare. But, can we really understand what animals want? A consistent theme running through the book is that not only is it possible to establish what animals want, but that this information is vital in helping us to make sense of the long and often confusing list of welfare measures that are now in use such as 'stress' and 'feel good hormones', expressive sounds and gestures, natural behaviour, cognitive bias, and stereotypies. Defining welfare as 'health and what animals want' allows us to distinguish between measures that are simply what an animal does when it is alert, aroused, or active and those measures that genuinely allow us to distinguish between situations the animals themselves see as positive or negative. Sentience (conscious feelings of pleasure, pain, and suffering) is for many people the essence of what is meant by welfare, but studying consciousness is notoriously difficult, particularly in non-human species. These difficulties are discussed in the context of our current - and as yet incomplete - knowledge of human and animal consciousness. Finally, the book highlights some key ideas in the relationship between animal welfare science and animal ethics and shows how closely the well-being of humans is linked to that of other animals. The Science of Animal Welfare is an ideal companion for undergraduate and graduate students taking courses in animal behaviour and welfare, as well as for professional researchers, practitioners and animal welfare consultants. At the same time, it is easily understandable to non-scientists and anyone without prior knowledge but with an interest in animals and the rapidly evolving science of animal welfare. (shrink)

_Systematic public vaccination constitutes a tremendous health success, perhaps the greatest achievement of biomedicine so far. There is, however, room for improvement. Each year, 1.5 million deaths could be avoided with enhanced immunisation coverage. In recent years, many countries have introduced mandatory childhood vaccination programmes in an attempt to avoid deaths. In Norway, however, the vaccination programme has remained voluntary. Our childhood immunisation programme covers protection for twelve infectious diseases, and Norwegian children are systematically immunised from six weeks to sixteen (...) years of age. In this article, we address the question of whether our country, Norway, should make the childhood vaccination programme mandatory. This question has received considerable public attention in the media, yet surprisingly little academic discussion has followed. The aim of the article is to systematically discuss whether it is morally justified to introduce a mandatory childhood vaccination programme in Norway. Our discussion proceeds as follows: We begin by presenting relevant background information on the history of vaccines and the current Norwegian childhood vaccination programme. Next, we discuss what we consider to be the most central arguments against mandatory childhood vaccination: the argument from the standpoints of parental rights, bodily integrity, naturalness, mistrust, and immunisation coverage. After that, we examine the central arguments in favour of mandatory childhood vaccination from the standpoints of harm, herd immunity, and as a precautionary strategy. We conclude that there are convincing moral arguments in favour of adopting a policy of mandatory childhood vaccination in Norway._ _Keywords_: autonomy, harm principle, herd immunity, parental rights, precautionary approach. (shrink)

Although the managerial practice of cheating spans complex and heterogeneous situations, most business ethics scholars consider that the very idea of cheating is indefensible on moral grounds, and quickly dismiss it as wrongdoing. This paper proposes to fine-tune this conventional moral assessment by arguing that some forms of cheating can be justified—or at least excused. To do so, it starts with a value-free definition of cheating that covers a wide diversity of situations: “breaking the rules while deliberately leading or allowing (...) others to think they have been respected.” While using this definition at the metaethical level, the paper contends that the moral assessment of cheating depends on the obligation to comply with the rules. There are rules which do not entail moral obligations, and there are special circumstances where other more important obligations override the obligation to comply with the rules. Furthermore, the paper argues that respecting the penalty rules also influences the moral assessment of cheating on the rules. The key interest of this endeavor lies in contributing to building a more solid theoretical framework for the study of cheating in management, which may replace our common prejudices and basic intuitions on this matter. (shrink)

In clinical practice, modern medicine, especially intensive medicine, has made outstanding technological progress that has changed diagnostic and therapeutic paradigms. Nowadays, some patients for whom there were no treatments in the past not only survive but return to active life thanks to intensive medicine. However, in some cases intensive care will not help patients in a critical condition and merely prolong death. In such situations, the treatment is terminated or not extended, and the patient is allowed to die in dignity. (...) In this specific situation all intensive procedures are terminated. Palliative care is the next stage. This is a sensitive issue that should be discussed with healthcare professionals and experts from other areas of life to ensure it is communicated appropriately to patients and their relatives. (shrink)

In 1944, American Polonia consisted of two separate social groups. The first one was the so-called “old Polonia”. This group was significantly assimilated into America’s culture and way of life, and had strong self-help organizations. The second group, “new Polonia”, was formed of wartime émigrés, mainly with intellectual backgrounds. They experienced at first hand the anti-human policies of the Nazi and Soviet systems.In the Polish American Congress, founded in 1944 by representatives of both groups, there was great concern about the (...) policies of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The fear was that these policies would allow Stalin, by a method of fait accompli, to introduce the Soviet system in all countries “liberated” by the Red Army. Old Polonia was under the influence of the US Administration and, despite reservations, supported the approach of Polish Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk who was committed to finding a Polish-Soviet compromise. Such a compromise turned out to be impossible because of Stalin’s demands. Firstly, nearly 50% of the pre-war territory of Poland was to be ceded to the Soviet Union. Secondly, fundamental changes were to be made in the government leadership of the Polish satellite state.New Polonia, which in 1942 formed the National Committee of Americans of Polish Descent, had a strong intellectual group. They warned the Polish American Congress and the US Administration against conceding to Stalin’s demands. From the perspective of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, their evaluation of Stalin’s policy has turned out to be correct.There was also a small group of Polish American activists centered around Professor Oskar Lange and the eminent poet Julian Tuwim, who belonged to the so-called Kościuszko League. During the Warsaw Uprising they were willing to accept Stalin’s demands and in connection with this supported the policies of the Polish Committee for National Liberation (a pro-communist coalition).The overwhelming majority of American Polonia was involved in unmasking false information about the Warsaw Uprising in the American press. They signed petitions to the President and Secretary of State. They collected money. They organized religious and patriotic meetings at which true information about the Warsaw Uprising was presented. (shrink)

Jak wiadomo, teksty biblijne czyta się wielorako. Jednym z uprawnionych, aczkolwiek niewykorzystanych sposobów ich lektury jest odczytanie w klu­czu antropologicznym. Wtedy całe partie Biblii można traktować jako wynik rzeczywistej refleksji nad człowiekiem, jego naturą, kondycją, losem, którą przeprowadzili archaiczni myśliciele i wyrazili przemyślnym, symbolicznym językiem. W perspektywie takiego interpretacyjnego założenia Pismo Święte staje się tyle wyjątkowym, ile niedocenionym źródłem wiedzy o człowieku. Nigdzie indziej nie zgromadzono tak konsekwentnie i w takiej liczbie opi­sów ludzkich losów uwzględniających żywe i bogate doświadczenie religijne. (...) Uznając swoistość tego doświadczenia, zyskuje się ogrom materiału do badań w ramach filozoficznej antropologii. Metodami tej dyscypliny, za pomocą jej systemu pojęciowego można czytać i interpretować mit adamiczny, historię patriarchów, sędziów. Można medytować nad losami bohaterów biblijnych: królów, proroków, uczniów Jezusa w planie antropologicznym, a wynik tej refleksji wyrazić za pomocą siatki pojęciowej filozofii człowieka. (shrink)