I propose an argument for the thesis that laws of nature are necessary in the sense of holding in all worlds sharing the properties of the actual world, on the basis of a principle I propose to call the Causal Criterion of Reality . The CCR says: for an entity to be real it is necessary and sufficient that it is capable to make a difference to causal interactions. The crucial idea here is that the capacity to interact causally - (...) or to contribute to determining causal interactions - is not only the ultimate metaphysical ground for the existence of an entity, but it also provides a criterion for determining the nature of that entity, i.e. its properties. The alternative is to conceive of laws of nature as contingent: they could be different from what they are like in the actual world, where that possibility is understood to be metaphysical, not only epistemic. For the sake of this paper, I shall accept Armstrong's thesis that laws of nature are relations between universals. I also follow Armstrong in the view that both the existence and the properties of particulars are metaphysically independent of the existence and identity of other particular. However, what is controversial and what I shall challenge is his thesis that universals are like particulars in the following respect: according to Armstrong, each universal is a logically distinct entity whose existence and identity is independent of the existence and identity of other universals. My aim in this paper is to show that the identity of a universal is entirely determined by its lawful relations to other universals. The crucial premise I use is the thesis that the CCR is a universal criterion, which applies both to particulars and universals. From the thesis that the identity of a universal is exclusively determined by laws, it follows that laws are necessary in the sense that they cannot differ without the universals they link also being different. This creates a difficulty for those authors who, as Armstrong, accept the CCR but nevertheless defend the view that laws are contingent. (shrink)

This paper raises a challenge to Jonathan Schaffer's priority monism. I contend that monism may be true at the actual world but fail to hold as a matter of metaphysical necessity, contrary to Schaffer's view that monism, if true, is necessarily true. My argument challenges Schaffer for his reliance on contingent physical truths in an argument for a metaphysically necessary conclusion. A counterexample in which the actual laws of physics hold but the physical history of the universe is different shows (...) that priority monism is contingently true at best. I suggest some general lessons for discussion of metaphysical dependence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 293 graphies, which put the individual thinkers and their works into their proper doctrinal context, are very welcome. Noack tries to be, and is, fair. We saw that he even tries to find a common ground between phenomenological and analytical philosophy. He does not reject the latter at the outset. He is objective within the limits of his philosophical upbringing and his historical background. MAx RIESZR New (...) YorIc City Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics. An Introduction to His Thought. By George Joseph Seidel, O. S. B. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964. Pp. x + 169.) Seidel's book, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Soeratics, is a carefully documented explication of Heidegger's interpretations of Parnmnides and Heraclitus. Beyond this it attempts and in large measure succeeds in giving an account of tteidegger's understanding of the western philosophical tradition as originated and at the same time fatefully misled by the Greeks. Seidel intends his study to be an introduction to Heidegger's thought. For purposes of evaluation I will divide my remarks into three major categories: (1) Seidel's work as an introduction to Heidegger's philosophy, (2) Seidel's work as an account of Heidegger's philosophy, and (3) the value of the work to the historian of philosophy and to the philosopher. Seidel's rejections of various al~rnative approaches to Heidegger's thought are somewhat contrived and not terribly convincing, which brings into question the author's claim tt~at Heidegger is approached least prejudicially through his interpretations of the presocratics. There are I think even more compelling reasons for rejecting Seidel's claim. In fact, there are strong reasons for rejecting his approach. I shall deal with them shortly. The author rejects an approach to Heidegger through Heidegger's Kantbuch (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysilc) because of the difficulty involved in disentangling Kant's views, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's views, and Heidegger's own views as revealed in these interpretations. The same difficulty, however, pertains with respect to YIeidegger's interpretations of Parmenides and Heraclitus, though I suspect classical scholars will react with no small degree of indignation to the suggestion that Heidegger's interpretations of these thinkers are not easily distinguishable from what they actually said. To give but one more example, Seidel rejects an approach to tIeidegger through Hegel on the grounds that the similarities holding between the two thinkers tends to blind one to their essential differences. Now if this were truly the case, and I seriously doubt that it is, it is a very sad commentary on the capacities of historians and scholars of German philosophy. Leaving aside the fact that the reasons offered for the purpose of eliminating various alternative approaches to tteidegger are dubious, let us consider Seidel's own approach. There are at least two strong reasons for rejecting it. To begin with, it is indispensable to an understanding of Heidegger's "conversations" with past thinkers that his views on the nature of the history of philosophy be grasped. This in turn involves a commentator in that nest. of problems which center in and around I]eidegger's understanding of the nature of history. This leads one back ultimately to a discussion of Heidegger's conception of time and of temporality, for it is temporality that grounds and makes intelligible historicity and with it those sets of happenings which come to be understood as historical. Heidegger makes clear in Sein und Zeit that a proper understanding of time is necessary not only for the articulation of Being, but that it is the indespensable horizon in terms of which a phenomenological destruction--and, one might add, understanding--of the history of ontology is possible. Now Seidel is by no means unaware of this, but nonetheless he fails to give us any more than a sketchy account of Heidegger's understanding of time and temporality, and he gives us little more information with respect to history and historicity. The information he does give--at least in the case of history--is accurate enough, but it lacks that amplification and care for detail that would permit us a comprehension of the nature and significance of Heidegger... (shrink)

Vorlesungen Kants über Metaphysik aus drei Semestern ist ein unveränderter, hochwertiger Nachdruck der Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1894. Hansebooks ist Herausgeber von Literatur zu unterschiedlichen Themengebieten wie Forschung und Wissenschaft, Reisen und Expeditionen, Kochen und Ernährung, Medizin und weiteren Genres. Der Schwerpunkt des Verlages liegt auf dem Erhalt historischer Literatur. Viele Werke historischer Schriftsteller und Wissenschaftler sind heute nur noch als Antiquitäten erhältlich. Hansebooks verlegt diese Bücher neu und trägt damit zum Erhalt selten gewordener Literatur und historischem Wissen auch für (...) die Zukunft bei. (shrink)

Theodor Adorno's concept of 'natural history' [Naturgeschichte] was central for a number of Adorno's theoretical projects, but remains elusive. In this essay, I analyse different dimensions of the concept of natural history, distinguishing amongst (a) a reflection on the normative and methodological bases of philosophical anthropology and critical social science; (b) a conception of critical memory oriented toward the preservation of the memory of historical suffering; and (c) the notion of 'mindfulness of nature in the subject' provocatively asserted in Max (...) Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment. These strands are united by the notion of transience and goal of developing a critical theory sensitive to the transient in history. The essay concludes by suggesting some implications of an expanded concept of natural history for issues in the discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas. (shrink)

Brod und Weltsch charakterisieren ihr Werk als eine Art „Monographie über verschwommene Vorstellungen". Sie zeigen, dass die von der philosophischen Phänomenologie Franz Brentanos und Husserls aufgestellten Postulate der Evidenz und genauen Beschreibung nur im Bereich der Wissenschaft statthaft sind, ansonsten aber unsere Wahrnehmungswelt von einer Vielzahl von vagen, unbestimmten, verschwommenen Sinnes- und Gedächtniseindrücken bestimmt wird, die eine empirisch arbeitende Psychologie ebenso wie die philosophische Erkenntnistheorie mit einzufangen und ihren Funktionen zu explizieren habe. Diese Schrift ist daher ein idealer Ausgangspunkt, um (...) ein differenzierteres Bild der epistemischen Konfiguration der Prager Moderne zu zeichnen und grundsätzlich die Möglichkeiten einer psychologischen Ästhetik auszuloten. Die Neu-Edition dieser Schrift öffnet aber auch wieder einen lange verschütteten Zugang zur Literatur der Prager Moderne, insbesondere für das Erzählwerk Kafkas. Die Edition des lange vergriffenen Werkes enthält eine Einleitung sowie ausgewählte Literatur zur Rezeption des Werks. (shrink)

Gesture and elaborate forms of nonverbal behaviour have been posited as necessary antecedents to language and shared conceptual understanding. Here we argue that subtle and largely unintentional nonverbal behaviours play a key role in building consensual beliefs within culture. We propose a model that focuses on the subtle and automatic nonverbal transmission of attitudes, beliefs and cultural ideals. Specifically, people extract attitudes and beliefs from nonverbal behaviour-- such extraction is both ubiquitous and efficient. The extracted attitudes and beliefs become individual (...) beliefs if encountered frequently enough. Consequently, people may come to adopt the same attitudes, beliefs and behaviours in the absence of verbal communication. Finally, one's own nonverbal behaviour reflects the extracted attitudes, beliefs and ideals of those of one's group, serving as a means for transmitting culture. The implication is that subtle nonverbal behaviour is important for the creation and maintenance of culture. (shrink)

Dieses Buch ist bis heute eine der populärsten Darstellungen der Relativitätstheorie geblieben. In der vorliegenden Version haben J. Ehlers und M. Pössel vom Max-Planck-Institut für Gravitationsphysik (Albert-Einstein-Institut) in Golm/Potsdam den Bornschen Text kommentiert und einen den anschaulichen, aber präzisen Stil Borns wahrendes, umfangreiches Ergänzungskapitel hinzugefügt, das die stürmische Entwicklung der Relativiatätstheorie bis hin zu unseren Tagen nachzeichnet. Eingegangen wird auf Gravitationswellen und Schwarze Löcher, auf neuere Entwicklungen der Kosmologie, auf Ansätze zu einer Theorie der Quantengravitation und auf die zahlreichen raffinierten (...) Experimente, welche die Gültigkeit der Einsteinschen Theorie mit immer größerer Genauigkeit bestätigt haben. Damit bleibt dieses Buch nach wie vor einer der unmittelbarsten Zugänge zur Relativitätstheorie für alle die sich für eine über das rein populärwissenschaftliche hinausgehende Einführung interessieren. (shrink)

L’article étudie la naissance et le développement du calendrier ecclésiastique chrétien, i. e. le comput, depuis les premiers témoignages de la célébration annuelle de la résurrection de Jésus jusqu’aux traductions des tables astronomiques arabes au xiie siècle. Il privilégie les procédures qui aboutissent à la détermination des dates pascales et à leur mise en forme tabulaire. Les analyses sont conduites à partir d’un double point de vue. L’un est scientifique. Il s’appuie sur les données astronomiques retenues par Ptolémée et sur (...) l’apport de la tradition mathématique grecque au calcul par approximations. Les cycles soli-lunaires sont posés à partir des fractions continues et le cycle soli-hebdomadaire à partir du plus petit commun multiple. Le second point de vue est social : l’unification du comput participe à celle de la chrétienté comprise comme une configuration politico-religieuse. Deux conclusions s’imposent. Quelle que soit l’importance que la civilisation médiévale a attribuée au comput, il reste que : 1 / les Pâques sont porteuses de significations irréductibles aux techniques chronométriques qui inscrivent cette fête dans le déroulement de l’année ; 2 / ces techniques ont toutefois marqué profondément les curiosités intellectuelles des Latins et les ont préparé à accueillir avec ferveur les zīj et la numération de position. (shrink)

... and the right preparation to see the bearing of the American experience on them. The result was not only the greatest book ever written on America, ...

I propose a realist theory of laws formulated in terms of tropes that avoids both the problems of the "best-systems-analysis" and the "inference problem" of realism of universals. I analyze the concept of an exceptional situation, characterized as a situation in which a particular object satisfies the antecedent but not the consequent of the regularity associated with a law, without thereby falsifying that law. To take this possibility into account, the properties linked by a law must be conceived as dispositional (...) and not necessarily manifest. (shrink)

The commentary is presented in three sections. Section 1 presents a brief summary of the main theses in Cummins' paper. In section 2, I argue that this analysis is not peculiar to cognition, and that in fact, a similar, more general analysis has been given [3] in fundamental areas of inquiry, hitherto independent of cognitive science. Finally, in section 3, it is argued that, if this general form of Cummins' analysis is correct, it calls for a profound re‐evaluation of our (...) conception of science. (shrink)