In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 187 standing. He picks his way philosophicelly ~darough the many preludes, interludes and epilogues of the long, autobiographical poem, The Prelude. He succeeds in interpreting philosophically.Wordsworth's absorption in "the life of things" and the "immanence of the world soul." These ideas remain, it seems to me, in Wordsworth's mind as well as in.his art primarily "lyrical ballads." But Melvin Rader has given us a thoroughly intelligible (...) account, both historical and philosophical, of both Coleridge and Wordsworth as reflectiveminds, without detracting item them as artists. HERBERTW. SCHNEIDER Claremont Graduate School and Unlver~i~y Center gchelting et la R~alit~ Finis: Essai sur la Philosophic de la Nature et de l'[dentit~. By Judith E. Schlanger. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966. Pp. 162. = Biblioth~que de Philosophie Contemporaine: Histoire de ta Philosophie et Philosophie Gfin6rale. Paper, F. 12.--) L'dtude de Judith E. Schlanger pr~se~te un bref expos6 des th~mes princ~paux de la pens~e philosophlque de Schelling en retra~ant de fa~on plus ou moius syst6matique l'itindraire spirituel de ce grand penseur qui a crd6 les fondsments spdculatifs du romantisme aIlemand. La philosophie de Schelling refl~te une ardeur,constants de recherche toujours progressive miroitant lea rythmes intimes de son articulation/~ la fois subtile et intensive. Nous allons donner en raccourci la principale ligne d'6volution de cette pens~e. L'essai de Schlanger a pour objet propre le probl~me philosophique qui rdsulte de la connexion 6troite de deux th~mes constituant les fondoments de la philosophie schellingienne, notamment le bh6me d'une philosophie concrAte qui rdcupAre intdgralement l'intuition et celui de la simultan6it6 de l'absolu et du finidans une rdalitdqui n'est constitu6e que par des totas diserAtes. Pour Schelling l'absolu n'est autre chose que la rdalitd concrete constitude par l'ensemble des totalitds individuelles et particuli6res qui sent con~ues comme dtant organiques et qui sent intelligibles, c'est-~.dire leur prdsence et leur raison d'etre coincident et ne peuvent ~tre saisiesque par l'immddiatetd de l'intuition intellectuelle et non par une rationslitd ddductive. L'absolu eat organicitd intelligibleau moyen d'un mode de connaissance intdgralement intuitif, done de rationalitd/t dvidence pleine et non de rationalitd ~t mddiation conceptuelle. L'absolu est done un total, une totalitd complexe ~ cause do ses articulations ind6finiment multiples ~tl'intdrieur. La philosophie enest la transposition aussi bien dans son d6veloppement actuel que dans l'embrassement des multiples ddterminations en un totalitarisme du savoir. L'instrument opdrationnel et cognitif capable d'61aborer cette transposition est l'intuition,la "Anschauung". En effet l'intuition joue un r61e capital dans la philosophie de Schelling. Issue directement de l'exp6rience sensible, c'est-~-dire, concrbte et individuelle, ellepermet d'englober dans l'immddiatetd d'une seule dvidence ~ la fois coner ~te et totale la coprdsence et la contemporandit6 de l'absolu et du finien une unit6 positive, non-dialectique, mais organique. Il est vrai que le scheme de l'organisme et de l'organicitd detains la pensde de ScheUing. L'absolu et le finisent en correlation organique. L'actualit6 dvidents de leur opposition manifeste leur copr~ence simultande, ce qui traduit leur unit~ absolue, sous-jacente qui a rendu possible cette opposition. La liaison effective, rdelle,empiriquement constatde des deux termes opposds leur suppose un fondement commun absolu. La dichotomie n'estpas primordiale, l'antith~sea pour support affirmatifun absolu. L'absolu est le lieu de l'identitd des opposds. C'est la coincidence immddiate entre des termes antinomiques qui d6finitl'unitd absolue. Et de cet absolu, la philosophic poss~de un savoir imm6diat, c'est-~dire absolu. II en rdsulte que l'intuitionest le principe m~me de l'intelligibilitd.Le probIAme phUosophique capital qui se pose et que Schlanger dtudie dana l'ceuvre de Schelling depuis les ddbuts de sa pensde en 1794jusqu'au moment o~1la philosophie de l'Identitd eat constitude, en 1804environ s'dnonce comme suit: La vision de l'identit6 immddiate des opposds comme forme de la rdalitd absolue pourra-t-elle s'articuler dans un savoir systdmatique et objective- 188 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ment communicable de la totalit6... (shrink)

“The primary purpose of this book has been to provide a single source of containing the basic information about systematic and theoretical psychology which any student of psychology should have. It is mainly directed at the senior undergraduate major and the beginning of the graduate student.”-Publisher.

This book contains new essays in honor of Melvin J. Lerner, a pioneer in the psychological study of justice. The contributors to this volume are internationally renowned scholars from psychology, business, and law. They examine the role of justice motivation in a wide variety of contexts, including workplace violence, affirmative action programs, helping or harming innocent victims and how people react to their own fate. Contributors explore fundamental issues such as whether people's interest in justice is motivated by self-interest (...) or a genuine concern for the welfare of others, when and why people feel a need to punish transgressors, how a concern for justice emerges during the development of societies and individuals, and the relation of justice motivation to moral motivation. How an understanding of justice motivation can contribute to the amelioration of major social problems is also examined. (shrink)

In a forthcoming paper, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues propose a Basic Logic of Evidence whose natural deduction rules are thought of as preserving evidence instead of truth. BLE turns out to be equivalent to Nelson’s paraconsistent logic N4, resulting from adding strong negation to Intuitionistic logic without Intuitionistic negation. The Carnielli/Rodrigues understanding of evidence is informal. Here we provide a formal alternative, using justification logic. First we introduce a modal logic, KX4, in which \ can be read as asserting (...) there is implicit evidence for X, where we understand evidence to permit contradictions. We show BLE embeds into KX4 in the same way that Intuitionistic logic embeds into S4. Then we formulate a new justification logic, JX4, in which the implicit evidence motivating KX4 is made explicit. KX4 embeds into JX4 via a realization theorem. Thus BLE has both implicit and explicit possibly contradictory evidence interpretations in a formal sense. (shrink)

The variety of semantical approaches that have been invented for logic programs is quite broad, drawing on classical and many-valued logic, lattice theory, game theory, and topology. One source of this richness is the inherent non-monotonicity of its negation, something that does not have close parallels with the machinery of other programming paradigms. Nonetheless, much of the work on logic programming semantics seems to exist side by side with similar work done for imperative and functional programming, with relatively minimal contact (...) between communities. In this paper we summarize one variety of approaches to the semantics of logic programs: that based on fixpoint theory. We do not attempt to cover much beyond this single area, which is already remarkably fruitful. We hope readers will see parallels with, and the divergences from the better known fixpoint treatments developed for other programming methodologies. (shrink)

LP can be seen as a logic of knowledge with justifications. See [S. Artemov, The logic of justification, The Review of Symbolic Logic 1 477–513] for a recent comprehensive survey of justification logics generally. Artemov’s Realization Theorem says justifications can be extracted from validities in the more conventional Hintikka-style logic of knowledge S4, in which they are not explicitly present. Justifications, however, are far from unique. There are many ways of realizing each theorem of S4 in the logic LP. If (...) the machinery of justifications is to be applied to artificial intelligence, or better yet, to everyday reasoning, we will need to work with whatever justifications we may have at hand—one version may not be interchangeable with another, even though they realize the same S4 formula. In this paper we begin the process of providing tools for reasoning about justifications directly. The tools are somewhat complex, but in retrospect this should not be surprising. Among other things, we provide machinery for combining two realizations of the same formula, and for replacing subformulas by equivalent subformulas. The results are algorithmic in nature—semantics for LP plays no role. We apply our results to provide a new algorithmic proof of Artemov’s Realization Theorem itself. This paper is a much extended version of [M.C. Fitting, Realizations and LP, in: S. Artemov, A. Nerode , Logical Foundations of Computer Science—New York ’07, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4514, Springer-Verlag, 2007, pp. 212–223]. (shrink)

This paper attempts to make more explicit the relationship between narrativity and feminist care ethics. The central concern is the way in which narrativity carries the semantic load that some accounts of feminist care ethics imply but leave hanging. In so doing, some feminist theorists of care-based ethics then undervalue the major contribution that narrativity provides to care ethics: it carries the semantic load that is essential to the best care. In this article, I defend the narrative as the central (...) medium though which we make sense of and communicate our lives and their attendant hopes and cares. More than just working with the narrative of the cared-for, caring is about investing in the narrative of the cared-for in order to meet the needs of this cared-for and how this narrative might turn out. I will further demonstrate how the attitude of caring or investing in a narrative would amount to what Gabriel Marcel has described as the attitude of disponibilité. (shrink)

In creative cognition research, the Romantic view about creative cognition is traditionally rejected in favor of the modern view. The modern view about creative cognition maintains that creativity is neither mysterious nor unintelligible and that it is indeed susceptible to analysis. The paradigmatic objects of analysis in creative cognition research have been creative output and the creative process. The degree of creativity of an output is assessed in accordance with certain criterial definitions. The degree of creativity of a cognitive process (...) is assessed in accordance with certain models of creative cognition, psychometric test measures, and neuroimaging studies that are grounded in certain criteria for assessment. The reliance on criterial definitions and criteria for assessment in analyzing either the creative output or the creative process suggests that creative cognition researchers remain under the sway of the classical, bundles-of-criteria theory of meaning. In this paper, I will critically evaluate the criterial problems that confront both criterial definitions and criteria for assessment before proposing an alternative theory of meaning. (shrink)

A sequent calculus of a new sort is extracted from the Prolog program leanTAP. This calculus is sound and complete, even though it lacks almost all structural rules. Thinking of leanTAP as a sequent calculus provides a new perspective on it and, in some ways, makes it easier to understand. It is also easier to verify correctness and completeness of the Prolog implementation. In addition, it suggests extensions to other logics, some of which are considered here.

We continue a series of papers on a family of many-valued modal logics, a family whose Kripke semantics involves many-valued accessibility relations. Earlier papers in the series presented a motivation in terms of a multiple-expert semantics. They also proved completeness of sequent calculus formulations for the logics, formulations using a cut rule in an essential way. In this paper a novel cut-free tableau formulation is presented, and its completeness is proved.

_The Undiscovered Dewey_ explores the profound influence of evolution and its corresponding ideas of contingency and uncertainty on John Dewey's philosophy of action, particularly its argument that inquiry proceeds from the uncertainty of human activity. Dewey separated the meaningfulness of inquiry from a larger metaphysical story concerning the certainty of human progress. He then connected this thread to the way in which our reflective capacities aid us in improving our lives. Dewey therefore launched a new understanding of the modern self (...) that encouraged intervention in social and natural environments but which nonetheless demanded courage and humility because of the intimate relationship between action and uncertainty. Melvin L. Rogers explicitly connects Dewey's theory of inquiry to his religious, moral, and political philosophy. He argues that, contrary to common belief, Dewey sought a place for religious commitment within a democratic society sensitive to modern pluralism. Against those who regard Dewey as indifferent to moral conflict, Rogers points to Dewey's appreciation for the incommensurability of our ethical commitments. His deep respect for modern pluralism, argues Rogers, led Dewey to articulate a negotiation between experts and the public so that power did not lapse into domination. Exhibiting an abiding faith in the reflective and contestable character of inquiry, Dewey strongly engaged with the complexity of our religious, moral, and political lives. (shrink)

Tinbergen’s classic “On Aims and Methods of Ethology” (_Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie, 20_, 1963) proposed four levels of explanation of behavior, which he thought would soon apply to humans. This paper discusses the need for multilevel explanation; Huxley and Mayr’s prior models, and others that followed; Tinbergen’s differences with Lorenz on “the innate”; and Mayr’s ultimate/proximate distinction. It synthesizes these approaches with nine levels of explanation in three categories: phylogeny, natural selection, and genomics (ultimate causes); maturation, sensitive period effects, and routine (...) environmental effects (intermediate causes); and hormonal/metabolic processes, neural circuitry, and eliciting stimuli (proximate causes), as a respectful extension of Tinbergen’s levels. The proposed classification supports and builds on Tinbergen’s multilevel model and Mayr’s ultimate/proximate continuum, adding intermediate causes in accord with Tinbergen’s emphasis on ontogeny. It requires no modification of Standard Evolutionary Theory or The Modern Synthesis, but shows that much that critics claim was missing was in fact part of Neo-Darwinian theory (so named by J. Mark Baldwin in _The American Naturalist_ in 1896) all along, notably reciprocal causation in ontogeny, niche construction, cultural evolution, and multilevel selection. Updates of classical examples in ethology are offered at each of the nine levels, including the neuroethological and genomic findings Tinbergen foresaw. Finally, human examples are supplied at each level, fulfilling his hope of human applications as part of the biology of behavior. This broad ethological framework empowers us to explain human behavior—eventually completely—and vindicates the idea of human nature, and of humans as a part of nature. (shrink)

Could translation be fully automated? We must first acknowledge the complexity, ambiguity, and diversity of natural languages. These aspects of natural languages, when combined with a particular dilemma known as the computational dilemma, appear to imply that the machine translator faces certain obstacles that a human translator has already managed to overcome. At the same time, science has not yet solved the problem of how human brains process natural languages and how human beings come to acquire natural language understanding. We (...) will then distinguish between the task of translation and the responsibility of the translator. Thereafter, we will conduct a survey of the methods of machine translation (viz. RBMT, SMT, NMT, foundation models or large language models). These methods will then be critically evaluated both in general and relative to Bar-Hillel’s hypothesis about the impossibility of fully automatic, high-quality machine translation (Fahqmt). Some concluding remarks will be made about the scope, prospects, and limits of machine translation. (shrink)

Modal logic is an enormous subject, and so any discussion of it must limit itself according to some set of principles. Modal logic is of interest to mathematicians, philosophers, linguists and computer scientists, for somewhat different reasons. Typically a philosopher may be interested in capturing some aspect of necessary truth, while a mathematician may be interested in characterizing a class of models having special structural features. For a computer scientist there is another criterion that is not as relevant for the (...) other disciplines: a logic should be ‘well-behaved.’ This is, admittedly, a vague notion, but some things are clear enough. A logic that can be axiomatized is better than one that can’t be; a logic with a simple axiomatization is better yet; and a logic with a reasonably implementable proof procedure is best of all. My current interests are largely centered in computer science, and so I will only discuss well-behaved modal logics. My talk is organized into three sections, depending on the expressiveness of the modal logics considered: propositional; first-order with rigid designators; first-order with non-rigid designators. Even limited as I have said, the subject is a big one, and this talk can be no more than an outline. For a general discussion of propositional modal logic see [2]; for this and first-order modal logic see [9], [10] and [8]; for tableau systems in modal logic see [6]. (shrink)

Addressing himself to basic ethical questions -- What is the essential value of life? What is right action? What is the nature of a good social order? -- the author seeks to find his answers in the humanist spirit of philosophy. The author takes his quest beyond the limits of personal ethics. Viewing man both as an individual and as a member of society, he examines, among various themes, the meaning and implications of the community as an ethical concept. In (...) so doing, he refers to such related fields as religion, law, sociology and political theory, but the primary focus of the book is on basic sources and central issues. Far more than most writers on ethics, he deals with the concept of justice, and with human rights and liberties; the values of democracy he treats at length and relates to the individual. The result is a text of depth and distinction that deals with the total human personality in the dynamic context of a functioning society. (shrink)

First-order modal logics, as traditionally formulated, are not expressive enough. It is this that is behind the difficulties in formulating a good analog of Herbrand’s Theorem, as well as the well-known problems with equality, non-rigid designators, definite descriptions, and nondesignating terms. We show how all these problems disappear when modal language is made more expressive in a simple, natural way. We present a semantic tableaux system for the enhanced logic, and (very) briefly discuss implementation issues.

In this paper, two central questions will be addressed: ought we to implement medical AI technology in the medical domain? If yes, how ought we to implement this technology? I will critically engage with three options that exist with respect to these central questions: the Neo-Luddite option, the Assistive option, and the Substitutive option. I will first address key objections on behalf of the Neo-Luddite option: the Objection from Bias, the Objection from Artificial Autonomy, the Objection from Status Quo, and (...) the Objection from Inscrutability. I will thereafter present the Demographic Trends Argument and the Human Enhancement Argument in support of alternatives to the Neo-Luddite option. In the second half of the paper, I will argue against the Substitutive option and in favour of the Assistive option, given the existence of two chief formal deficits in medical AI technology: the causality deficit and the care deficit. (shrink)

This is a thorough treatment of first-order modal logic. The book covers such issues as quantification, equality (including a treatment of Frege's morning star/evening star puzzle), the notion of existence, non-rigid constants and function symbols, predicate abstraction, the distinction between nonexistence and nondesignation, and definite descriptions, borrowing from both Fregean and Russellian paradigms.

Few thinkers exerted a greater influence upon British thought and public policy between 1880 and 1914 than T. H. Green. In his appraisal Richter applies to Green, usually studied as a philosopher, the techniques of analysis taken from sociology and the history of ideas. The result is important both as a study of a man who considerably affected the thought of his time and also as a contribution to the social and intellectual history of Victorian England. The chapter headings include: (...) Idealism and the Crisis of the Evangelical Conscience; Metaphysical Foundations; the Principles of Political Obligation; From the Old Liberalism to the New: Private Property, Capitalism and State Intervention; and the Life of Citizenship. (shrink)

Suppose there are several experts, with some dominating others (expert A dominates expert B if B says something is true whenever A says it is). Suppose, further, that each of the experts has his or her own view of what is possible — in other words each of the experts has their own Kripke model in mind (subject, of course, to the dominance relation that may hold between experts). How will they assign truth values to sentences in a common modal (...) language, and on what sentences will they agree? This problem can be reformulated as one about many-valued Kripke models, allowing many-valued accessibility relations. This is a natural generalization of conventional Kripke models that has only recently been looked at. The equivalence between the many-valued version and the multiple expert one will be formally established. Finally we will axiomatize many-valued modal logics, and sketch a proof of completeness. (shrink)

Propositional modal logic is a standard tool in many disciplines, but first-order modal logic is not. There are several reasons for this, including multiplicity of versions and inadequate syntax. In this paper we sketch a syntax and semantics for a natural, well-behaved version of first-order modal logic, and show it copes easily with several familiar difficulties. And we provide tableau proof rules to go with the semantics, rules that are, at least in principle, automatable.

The revival of interest in pragmatism and its practical relevance for democracy has prompted a reconsideration of John Dewey’s political philosophy. Dewey’s _The Public and Its Problems _ constitutes his richest and most systematic meditation on the future of democracy in an age of mass communication, governmental bureaucracy, social complexity, and pluralism. Drawing on his previous writings and prefiguring his later thinking, Dewey argues for the importance of civic participation and clarifies the meaning and role of the state, the proper (...) relationship between the public and experts, and the source of democracy’s legitimacy. These themes remain as important today as they were when Dewey first engaged them, and this is the work to which scholars consistently turn when assessing Dewey’s conception of democracy and what might be imagined for democracy in our own time. In this carefully annotated edition, Melvin L. Rogers provides an introductory essay that elucidates the philosophical and historical background of _The Public and Its Problems_ while explaining the key ideas of the book. He also provides a biographical outline of Dewey’s life and bibliographical notes to assist student and scholar alike. (shrink)

How might we philosophize about the metaverse? It is traditionally held that the four main branches of philosophy are metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and logic. In this article, I shall demonstrate how virtual walt-fictionalism, a particular version of virtual irrealism, is able to offer a straightforward, internally consistent, and powerful response about the metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology (ethics) of the metaverse. I will first characterize the metaverse in terms of a reality-virtuality (RV) continuum and distinguish between virtual realism and virtual irrealism, (...) before elaborating on the explanatory power and potential of virtual walt-fictionalism relative to the metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology (ethics) of the metaverse. (shrink)

Causal reasoning is an aspect of learning, reasoning, and decision-making that involves the cognitive ability to discover relationships between causal relata, learn and understand these causal relationships, and make use of this causal knowledge in prediction, explanation, decision-making, and reasoning in terms of counterfactuals. Can we fully automate causal reasoning? One might feel inclined, on the basis of certain groundbreaking advances in causal epistemology, to reply in the affirmative. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that one still has (...) good skeptical grounds for resisting any conclusions in favour of the automation of causal reasoning. If by causal reasoning is meant the entirety of the process through which we discover causal relationships and make use of this knowledge in prediction, explanation, decision-making, and reasoning in terms of counterfactuals, then one relies besides on tacit knowledge, as might be constituted by or derived from the epistemic faculty virtues and abilities of the causal reasoner, the value systems and character traits of the causal reasoner, the implicit knowledge base available to the causal reasoner, and the habits that sustain our causal reasoning practices. While certain aspects of causal reasoning may be axiomatized and formalized and algorithms may be implemented to approximate causal reasoning, one has to remain skeptical about whether causal reasoning may be fully automated. This demonstration will involve an engagement with Meno’s Paradox. (shrink)

A well-known problem with Hintikka-style logics of knowledge is that of logical omniscience. One knows too much. This breaks down into two subproblems: one knows all tautologies, and one’s knowledge is closed under consequence. A way of addressing the second of these is to move from knowledge simpliciter, to knowledge for a reason. Then, as consequences become ‘further away’ from one’s basic knowledge, reasons for them become more complex, thus providing a kind of resource measurement. One kind of reason is (...) a formal proof. Sergei Artemov has introduced a logic of explicit proofs, LP. I present a semantics for this, based on the idea that it is a logic of knowledge with explicit reasons. A number of fundamental facts about LP can be established using this semantics. But it is equally important to realize that it provides a natural logic of more general applicability than its original provenance, arithmetic provability. (shrink)