There has long been a debate on the possible similarity between some forms of Indian and Greek idealistic monism ( Advaita and Neoplatonism ). After a basic historical introduction to the debate, the text proposes that Paramādvaita , also known as Kashmiri Shaivism , is a more suitable comparandum for Neoplatonism than any other form of Advaita , suggested in the debate. Paramādvaita ’s dynamic view of reality summarized in the terms prakāśa-vimarśa or unmeṣa-nimeṣa , corresponds quite precisely to the (...) viewpoint of Neoplatonism , summarized in the similar bipolar terms such as prohodos-epistrophe . The context of the dynamic nature of reality doctrine is also quite similar ( svataḥsiddhatva, authypostasis ). My arguments are based on the texts of Plotinus and Proclus ( Neoplatonism ) and the texts of Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva and Kṣemarāja ( Paramādvaita ) . Several parallel doctrines of both systems are further discussed: the doctrine of creative multilevel subjectivity , the doctrine of mutual omnipresence of all in all , the doctrine of creative multilevel speech , and some corresponding doctrines on aesthetic beauty and its important role in the Soul’s return towards its ultimate source. Some implications of the high degree of correspondence between both systems are considered at the end of the paper, for instance whether some similarities of compared systems might be explained on a structural basis, since both schools ware facing similar sceptical critique ( Mādhyamika, Hellenistic scepticism ). (shrink)

The issue of infinity appeared in cosmology in the form of a question on spatial and time finiteness or infinity of the universe. Recently, more and more talking is going on about “other universes” (different ones from “our”), the number of which may be infinite. Speculations on this topic emerged in effect of the discussions on the issue of the anthropic principle, and the so-called inflation scenario. In truth, this kind of speculations are hardly recognized as scientific theories, however, they (...) may be included in a sort of “scientific fringe” fulfilling a beneficial heuristic function.All of the speculations regarding numerous universes boil down to the juggling of probabilities, i.e. to the applying of the theory of probability to the universes’ set. However, without probabilistic measure being introduced onto this “set” (as it is not known whether it is a set in a technical sense of this term)—and there is no knowledge at all as to how to do this—such considerations may not go beyond a vague intuition.The producing of other universes usually results from an assumption that the disturbing of original circumstances, of values of physical constants, or of other parameters characterizing the universe is possible. On the other hand, the idea of the final theory seems to assume that the mathematical structure of this theory should be rigid, i.e. that the disturbing of its parameters leads on to the very same structure. This would have eliminated the possibility of the existence of other universes.The idea of infinite number of universes sometimes has an anti-theological undertone: there is no need for assuming purposeful acting of the Creator, since all possibilities are fulfilled. The reaction of a theologian may be as follows: Just the same, God may create just a single universe, as much as an infinite number of universes. What’s more, one may risk saying that God is not interested in nothing that may be short of infinity. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine the usage of the term “just-so story.” I attempt to show that just-so storytelling can be seen as an epistemic concept that, in various ways, tackles the epistemological and methodological problems relating to evolutionary explanations qua historical/narrative explanations. I identify two main, yet mutually exclusive, strategies of employing the concept of a just-so story: a negative strategy and a positive strategy. Subsequently, I argue that these strategies do not satisfactorily capture the core (...) of the “original” meaning advanced by Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin at the end of the 1970s. I revisit the foundation(s) of their anti-adaptationist critique in order to reframe it as a critique of distinctive methodological manners and epistemic maxims related to historical inquiry. Last but not least, I suggest that contemporary evolutionary thinkers have two conceptually different options: they can either adhere to the “original” meaning of the term “just-so story” or accept that “just-so story” is a term equivalent to “implausible narrative explanation.”. (shrink)

Many people believe that it is better to extend the length of a happy life than to create a new happy life, even if the total welfare is the same in both cases. Despite the popularity of this view, one would be hard-pressed to find a fully compelling justification for it in the literature. This paper develops a novel account of why and when extension is better than replacement that applies not just to persons but also to non-human animals (...) and humanity as a whole. (shrink)

The overreliance on verbal models and theories in psychology has been criticized for hindering the development of reliable research programs (Harris, 1976; Yarkoni, 2020). We demonstrate how the conceptual space framework can be used to formalize verbal theories and improve their precision and testability. In the framework, scientific concepts are represented by means of geometric objects. As a case study, we present a formalization of an existing three-dimensional theory of emotion which was developed with a spatial metaphor in mind. Wundt (...) posits that the range of human emotion can be represented along three axes of basic emotions (pleasure/displeasure, excitement/inhibition, tension/relaxation), just as color vision can be represented using three basic colors. We use dimensions to represent basic emotions, points to represent emotional states, and regions to represent broader emotional concepts. We then compare our formalization to an existing structuralist formalization of Wundt’s theory. Further, we discuss the empirical predictions that our formalization generates, such as comparisons of similarity and intensity. We conclude by demonstrating how the tools developed in the conceptual space framework can be used to formulate a theory of emotion based on empirical observation. (shrink)

There have been repeated calls to ensure that clinical artificial intelligence (AI) is not discriminatory, that is, it provides its intended benefit to all members of society irrespective of the status of any protected characteristics of individuals in whose healthcare the AI might participate. There have also been repeated calls to ensure that any clinical AI is tailored to the local population in which it is being used to ensure that it is fit-for-purpose. Yet, there might be a clash between (...) these two calls since tailoring an AI to a local population might reduce its effectiveness when the AI is used in the care of individuals who have characteristics which are not represented in the local population. Here, I explore the bioethical concept of local fairness as applied to clinical AI. I first introduce the discussion concerning fairness and inequalities in healthcare and how this problem has continued in attempts to develop AI-enhanced healthcare. I then discuss various technical aspects which might affect the implementation of local fairness. Next, I introduce some rule of law considerations into the discussion to contextualise the issue better by drawing key parallels. I then discuss some potential technical solutions which have been proposed to address the issue of local fairness. Finally, I outline which solutions I consider most likely to contribute to a fit-for-purpose and fair AI. (shrink)

The aim of the present investigation is to sketch a new approach to analysing normativity. First I locate the problem of normativity in the landscape of contemporary philosophy and focus on the dispute between naturalism and antinaturalism. Then I discuss the so-called top-down approach to studying normativity, to which I oppose the bottom-up approach inspired by contemporary philosophy of science. I see the integration of these approaches as enabling investigations of normative phenomena that do not reduce them to just (...) one type of normativity. (shrink)

To commemorate 40 years since the founding of the Journal of Business Ethics, the editors in chief of the journal have invited the editors to provide commentaries on the future of business ethics. This essay comprises a selection of commentaries aimed at creating dialogue around the theme Ethics at the centre of global and local challenges. For much of the history of the Journal of Business Ethics, ethics was seen within the academy as a peripheral aspect of business. However, in (...) recent years, the stakes have risen dramatically, with global and local worlds destabilized by financial crisis, climate change, internet technologies and artificial intelligence, and global health crises. The authors of these commentaries address these grand challenges by placing business ethics at their centre. What if all grand challenges were framed as grand ethical challenges? Tanusree Jain, Arno Kourula and Suhaib Riaz posit that an ethical lens allows for a humble response, in which those with greater capacity take greater responsibility but remain inclusive and cognizant of different voices and experiences. Focussing on business ethics in connection to the grand challenge of environmental emergencies, Steffen Böhm introduces the deceptively simple yet radical position that business is nature, and nature is business. His quick but profound side-step from arguments against human–nature dualism to an ontological undoing of the business–nature dichotomy should have all business ethics scholars rethinking their “business and society” assumptions. Also, singularly concerned with the climate emergency, Boudewijn de Bruin posits a scenario where, 40 years from now, our field will be evaluated by its ability to have helped humanity emerge from this emergency. He contends that Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell illustrates how human rights take centre stage in climate change litigation, and how business ethics enters the courtroom. From a consumer ethics perspective, Deirdre Shaw, Michal Carrington and Louise Hassan argue that ecologically sustainable and socially just marketplace systems demand cultural change, a reconsideration of future interpretations of “consumer society”, a challenge to the dominant “growth logic” and stimulation of alternative ways to address our consumption needs. Still concerned with global issues, but turning attention to social inequalities, Nelarine Cornelius links the capability approach to global and corporate governance, arguing that CA will continue to lie at the foundation of human development policy, and, increasingly, CSR and corporate governance. Continuing debate on the grand challenges associated with justice and equality, Laurence Romani identifies a significant shift in the centrality of business ethics in debates on managing differences, positing that dialogue between diversity management and international management can ground future debate in business ethics. Finally, the essay concludes with a commentary by Charlotte Karam and Michelle Greenwood on the possibilities of feminist-inspired theories, methods, and positionality for many spheres of business ethics, not least stakeholder theory, to broaden and deepen its capacity for nuance, responsiveness, and transformation. In the words of our commentators, grand challenges must be addressed urgently, and the Journal of Business Ethics should be at the forefront of tackling them. (shrink)

Intertemporal choice requires one to decide between smaller sooner and larger later payoffs and is captured by discount rates. Across two preregistered experiments testing three language pairs (Polish vs. English, Spanish, and German; Experiment 1) and with incentivized participants (Experiment 2), we found no evidence that using a foreign language decreased the strength or increased the consistency of intertemporal choices. On the contrary, there was some evidence of stronger discounting when a foreign language was used. We confirmed prior findings that (...) more reflective individuals discount less strongly but observed that they were just as (un)affected by using foreign language as less reflective individuals. Thus, we provide preliminary evidence that the foreign language effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive reflection. (shrink)

The main purpose of the article is to compare the originally Greek, Plato\'s concept of dialogue and its function in the procedure of philosophying to the one developed by the 20-century \"philosophy of dialogue\" (F. Rosenzweig, M. Buber, F. Ebner, E. Levinas). It seems quite astounding that philosophy of dialogue, a trend which consistently and persistently defends the privileged position of dialogue in the structure of reality and uses it as an essential factor in the understanding of the relation between (...) God and Man, has not developed any solid methodological perspective. What is even worse, it failed to observe its presence in the very core of philosophical thinking, i.e. in Plato\'s thought. We are capable of reconstructing Plato\'s modus philosophandi with its essential conditions: the philosopher must not only \'see\' the truth (the noetical function), but must also tell it to the others, choose the partners of the dialogue and defend his logos if necessary (the apophantical function). The article consists of two complementary analyses: the first one is devoted to the presentation of the dialogical factor in Plato\'s noetics and apophantics, and the second one focuses on Rosenzweig\'s criticism of the whole European philosophy. The author tries to indicate its doubtful moments by -putting forward the question whether Plato\'s philosophy may be justly ascribed to the tradition under Rosenzweig\'s criticism, and if so, to what extent. (shrink)

Apart from the Treaty of human nature, political philosophy of David Hume's not systematic. This fact is probably associated with Hume's skepticism, disbelief in the philosophical, abstract synthesis, which necessarily reduces the complexity of the world to just one aspect. Most distinct evidence of this belief are philosophical essays, often recognized for popularizing some of the ideas contained in the Treaty. Popularization of the former no doubt, but there were also more than that. Hume They analyzed human reason and (...) morality in a very broad historical context. Essays are full of details taken from the history of culture, politics and the economy in both England and the ancient peoples. Greeks and Romans had for special esteem for Hume, and ancient historians considered it his pattern, moreover, does not mean that he was against them uncritically. (shrink)

Space, time and probabilities not only form the arena of many physical theories, but also the arena of our everyday life. Therefore, the problem of their ontological status becomes even more interesting. It seems that this problem cannot be solved before we have the final physical theory ("theory of everything"). However, various methods of looking for such a theory lead to converging results, and are able to elucidate the problem in question. We analyze noncommutative algebraic methods, and show that, when (...) applied to model the fundamental level, they suggest a nonlocal regime in which there is no space and no time, in their usual sense, and which is essentially probabilistic (in a generalized sense). In the noncommutative approach there are many probabilistic measures (not just one "probability" as in macroscopic physics), and none of them seems to be distinguished in any way. The tentative conclusion is that space, time and probability are not "absolute categories", but rather aspects of the world structure emergent from the fundamental level. One should expect that the ultimate theory will be well off our traditional philosophical categories. This shows that our mind has a peculiar property allowing it to reach far beyond its usual limitations. (shrink)

Our present knowledge in the field of dynamical systems, information theory, probability theory and other similar domains indicates that the human brain is a complex dynamical system working in a strong chaotic regime in which random processes play important roles. In this environment our mental life develops. To choose a logically ordered sequence from a random or almost random stream of thoughts is a difficult and energy consuming task. The only domain in which we are able to do this with (...) a full success is mathematics. Leibniz’s life ambition was to extend this success, with the help of what he called _characteristica universalis_, to other areas of human activity. The belief that this is possible lies at the basis of Leibniz’s rationalist system. Reasoning within his system, Leibniz claimed that also fundamental laws of physics can be deduced from the “first principles”. Just as linguistic or conceptual units are at the basis of the _charactersistica universalis_, his monads are responsible for physical activity of material bodies. When this rationalistic strategy is applied to the philosophy of space and time, it leads to their radically relational conception. Leibniz’s rationalistic approach to philosophy and science arouses out sympathy but it was Newton’s mathematical-empirical method that turned out to be effective in human endeavour to understand the functioning of the physical world. Successes of the Newtonian method compel us to revise our concept of rationality. (shrink)

Our present knowledge in the field of dynamical systems, information theory, probability theory and other similar domains indicates that the human brain is a complex dynamical system working in a strong chaotic regime in which random processes play important roles. In this environment our mental life develops. To choose a logically ordered sequence from a random or almost random stream of thoughts is a difficult and energy consuming task. The only domain in which we are able to do this with (...) a full success is mathematics. Leibniz’s life ambition was to extend this success, with the help of what he called _characteristica universalis_, to other areas of human activity. The belief that this is possible lies at the basis of Leibniz’s rationalist system. Reasoning within his system, Leibniz claimed that also fundamental laws of physics can be deduced from the “first principles”. Just as linguistic or conceptual units are at the basis of the _charactersistica universalis_, his monads are responsible for physical activity of material bodies. When this rationalistic strategy is applied to the philosophy of space and time, it leads to their radically relational conception. Leibniz’s rationalistic approach to philosophy and science arouses out sympathy but it was Newton’s mathematical-empirical method that turned out to be effective in human endeavour to understand the functioning of the physical world. Successes of the Newtonian method compel us to revise our concept of rationality. (shrink)

The pandemic situation showed us, that the separation from other people is an important part of our lives and makes even more impact than we thought. Yet, the dominant picture of this separation is hugely negative and was so for a long time. Solitude, being nor positive nor negative on its own, just as being with others, is not something that people as a whole acknowledge in their lives – it is perceived as a state to endure, something that (...) can be useful, but not something we should just live with, at least partially. This paper shows how important it is to create a new picture of solitude – as something normal, not exceptional. It indicates the task to create a new vocabulary around the phenomena of solitude, free of its negative connotations, which will enable us to incorporate the solitude back to our lives. I argue, that such change in vocabulary may enable us normalization of solitude and that such normalization should be our goal. (shrink)

Crisis, sometimes associated with historically distant times or centrally planned economies, has turned out to be one of the main contemporary issues. Hence different systems like socialism and capitalism become similar in their inability to reply to expectations for a safe, peaceful and abundant life. It means that economic problems are more complex in their nature. Thorough analysis of the roots of different crises should therefore reach deeper than just economic explanations. This is the point where ethical and cultural (...) explanations may be useful because they strive to explore the socio-cultural fabric at its foundations in the hierarchy of values and vision of human beings and society. When it comes to contemporary crisis the problem is twofold: firstly, there is the threat that the crisis will be treated inadequately and not realistically in consequence. Secondly, the roots ofthe crisis may not be diagnosed properly, which may lead to false ‘treatment’. This article is an attempt to highlight the above issues and analyse them in the context ofthe common good approach, which seems to offer valuable potential to understand the difficulties properly and offer a reasonable plan for recovery. (shrink)

Dear Editor, -/- It is the responsibility of healthcare professionals to present patients with the available options for managing their conditions, including the potential benefits and anticipated negative consequences of each option. Patients then weigh the potential benefits and drawbacks of each option, and juxtapose them with their wider life goals and preferences. We generally accept that patients might not choose the option that is most health or life preserving because they might value other things more. We accept that forms (...) of cancer treatment that might only minimally extend life are not always a reasonable choice or that a patient might chose not to wish to have CPR performed if they suffer a cardiac arrest. While all people tend to value health to some extent some might value friendship and family life over their health. Of course, having good health helps with having fulfilling relationships with others, but often it is having these relationships is the primary goal of tending to one's health. If you are elderly and might die soon anyway, you might wish to take the risk of meeting others and dying sooner over living longer and potentially not meeting anyone. Not everyone values the same basic goods of life (e.g. as presented by New Natural Law theorists) to the same extent. -/- Governments need to balance how they prioritise these goods, which is very difficult, especially in a liberal and pluralistic society which largely tries to refrain from making judgments on how to prioritise such goods. The authors of the original article have rightly highlighted the potential consequences of the Christmas relaxation of the lockdown measures (which relaxation has now been cancelled). Yet, we should simultaneously not expect governments and citizens to make decisions based on their consequences on the NHS and people's health. Health is a good, but not the only, or even supreme, good. Liberty, friendship and family are other goods. People also need to have hope to live their lives well, and governments need to be trusted if people are to obey them. It is not clear that the general mood in society following the cancellation of the Christmas relaxations will not have graver consequences than the original relaxation would have - this is anyone's guess. But it would not be irrational for the government to allow these relaxations - it would simply not have aimed at maximising the benefit to the NHS and people's health. We would not expect patients to always act to maximise their health, why would we necessarily expect the government to do it - it did not get voted in solely on the basis of their health policies. -/- Why we might wish people and governments to promote health in general, we should not be surprised if they make decisions where they balance different goods and not just maximise health. This might not be generally helpful to us as healthcare professionals, but it is neither irrational nor is it different how we often make decisions in our personal lives. (shrink)

This article is about the problem of non-disclosure of an assumed method and approach to international law. That makes some real and current issues of international more difficult to grasp – and how to debate about something if there is a misunderstanding of the basics? The problem is depicted with two examples: the attitude of international law toward the statehood of Taiwan along with the on-going development of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Both reveal the clash between so-called black-letterism and (...) a policy-approach to international law. Meanwhile the doctrinal method is fully functional and mostly accepted in domestic law, though often contested in international law. But after all, international law being sui generis law is not just an instance of the domestic-type law which is the effect of particular features of the international community. (shrink)

This chapter examines the possibility of using AI technologies to improve human moral reasoning and decision-making, especially in the context of purchasing and consumer decisions. We characterize such AI technologies as artificial ethics assistants (AEAs). We focus on just one part of the AI-aided moral improvement question: the case of the individual who wants to improve their morality, where what constitutes an improvement is evaluated by the individual’s own values. We distinguish three broad areas in which an individual might (...) think their own moral reasoning and decision-making could be improved: one’s actions, character, or other evaluable attributes fall short of one’s values and moral beliefs; one sometimes misjudges or is uncertain about what the right thing to do is in particular situations, given one’s values; one is uncertain about some fundamental moral questions or recognizes a possibility that some of one’s core moral beliefs and values are mistaken. We sketch why one might think that AI tools could be used to support moral improvement in those areas, and describe two types of assistance: preparatory assistance, including advice and training supplied in advance of moral deliberation; and on-the-spot assistance, including on-the-spot advice and facilitation of moral functioning over the course of moral deliberation. Then, we turn to some of the ethical issues that AEAs might raise, looking in particular at three under-appreciated problems posed by the use of AI for moral self-improvement: namely, reliance on sensitive moral data; the inescapability of outside influences on AEAs; and AEA usage prompting the user to adopt beliefs and make decisions without adequate reasons. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that one-way quantum computation can be seen as a form of phase transition with the available information about the solution of the computation being the order parameter. We draw a number of striking analogies between standard thermodynamical quantities such as energy, temperature, work, and corresponding computational quantities such as the amount of entanglement, time, potential capacity for computation, respectively. Aside from being intuitively pleasing, this picture allows us to make novel conjectures, such as an estimate (...) of the necessary critical time to finish a computation and a proposal of suitable architectures for universal one-way computation in 1D. (shrink)

This paper investigates the phenomenon of judicial law-making in the practice of the highest courts dealing with criminal matters in Germany and Poland on the basis of 200 of their decisions. While German jurisprudence principally acknowledges the right of the judiciary to create new law, the Polish legal theory generally rejects this notion. Still, research indicates that, in practice, the differences in the frequency and intensity with which these courts pass creative rulings are not as substantial as the discrepancy in (...) the theoretical stance would suggest. Owing to circumstances, both the German Federal Court of Justice and the Polish Supreme Court are willing to create new legal norms, but the dimensions of judicial law-making presented by these bodies deviate from each other. In the research sample, the German Federal Court of Justice was more inclined to introduce legal institutions that were foreign to the statutes and rule against the will of the lawmaker explicitly stated in the preparatory works. On the other hand, the Polish Supreme Court used logical conclusions more often, but did not also refrain from passing rulings against the clear wording of the statutory law, and was just as willing to go beyond the wording of the law as was the German Federal Court of Justice. Notably, only the German apex court is willing to openly admit that it creates new legal norms, whereas the Polish Supreme Court does not concede in the reasons that its decisions are of a law-making nature, especially when it applies so-called “interpretation in the wider sense”—which is, in essence, a “concealed” way of creating new legal norms. (shrink)

Vision is inseparably connected to perceptual awareness which can be seen as the culmination of sensory processing. Studies on conscious vision reveal that object recognition is just one of the means through which our representation of the world is built. We propose an operationalization of subjective experience in the context of deep neural networks (DNNs) that could encourage a more thorough comparison of human and artificial vision.

This paper critically assesses the possibility of moral enhancement with ambient intelligence technologies and artificial intelligence presented in Savulescu and Maslen (2015). The main problem with their proposal is that it is not robust enough to play a normative role in users’ behavior. A more promising approach, and the one presented in the paper, relies on an artifi-cial moral reasoning engine, which is designed to present its users with moral arguments grounded in first-order normative theories, such as Kantianism or utilitarianism, (...) that reason-responsive people can be persuaded by. This proposal can play a normative role and it is also a more promising avenue towards moral enhancement. It is more promising because such a system can be designed to take advantage of the sometimes undue trust that people put in automated technologies. We could therefore expect a well-designed moral reasoner system to be able to persuade people that may not be persuaded by similar arguments from other people. So, all things considered, there is hope in artificial intelli-gence for moral enhancement, but not in artificial intelligence that relies solely on ambient intelligence technologies. (shrink)

One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of (...) consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled. (shrink)

Objective:This study explored the psychological and academic effects of studying online from the home vis-à-vis host country during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in the experience of international students at the University of Warsaw, Poland.Methods:A total of 357 international students from 62 countries (236 in the host country and 121 in the home country) completed an online questionnaire survey 2 months after transition to online learning. We studied students' levels of loneliness, life and academic satisfaction, acculturative stress, academic adjustment, (...) performance, loyalty, and perceptions of the online learning experience.Results:The country-of-residence variable had no statistically significant effects on most psychological and academic variables. Significant effects were observed only for two academic variables. Specifically, students who returned to the home country found online communication with other students more contributing to their online learning experience and exhibited higher academic adjustment than students who remained in the host country. This suggests the positive influence of (peer and familial) support on online learning experience from the home country. Furthermore, a significant difference in experiencing acculturative stress occurred for students in quarantine/self-isolation in the host country, which expands prior literature on the disruptive effects of social distancing on students' mental health. Finally, this study confirmed the expected increased levels of loneliness among self-isolating students in both countries, hence extending prior results to the home- and host-country contexts. No relationship between self-isolation and students' life or academic satisfaction was found, which is explained by the specific nature of the learning-from-home experience. (shrink)

It is not clear to what the projects of creating an artificial intelligence (AI) that does ethics, is moral, or makes moral judgments amounts. In this paper we discuss some of the extant metaethical theories and debates in moral philosophy by which such projects should be informed, specifically focusing on the project of creating an AI that makes moral judgments. We argue that the scope and aims of that project depend a great deal on antecedent metaethical commitments. Metaethics, therefore, plays (...) the role of an Archimedean fulcrum in this context, very much like the Archimedean role that it is often taken to take in context of normative ethics (Dworkin 1996; Dreier 2002; Fantl 2006; Ehrenberg 2008). (shrink)

This article presents an argument for the view that we can perceive temporal features without awareness. Evidence for this claim comes from recent empirical work on selective visual attention. An interpretation of selective attention as a mechanism that processes high-level perceptual features is offered and defended against one particular objection. In conclusion, time perception likely has an unconscious dimension and temporal mental qualities can be instantiated without ever being conscious.

Quality Space Theory is a holistic model of qualitative states. On this view, individual mental qualities are defined by their locations in a space of relations, which reflects a similar space of relations among perceptible properties. This paper offers an extension of Quality Space Theory to temporal perception. Unconscious segmentation of events, the involvement of early sensory areas, and asymmetries of dominance in multi-modal perception of time are presented as evidence for the view.

The concept of depth is central to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and informed not only his philosophy of perception but also his thinking about psychology, art and politics. This article traces the ways the notion of depth appears in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking in these fields, contrasting it with Husserl’s own phenomenological investigations. The article starts with a comparison of the function of perception in Husserl’s phenomenology and then proceeds with an analysis of how the issue of depth reappears in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, (...) phenomenology of art and political philosophy. I argue that while Husserl’s approach to phenomenology led him to analyses of aesthetics stemming from works of art as random examples, and to non-participation in politics, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology leads to the opposite approach, inviting concrete criticism in art and active participation in politics. It is argued that Merleau-Ponty’s approach is more philosophically consistent. The choice of particular works of art, and the particular political engagements, can retrospectively clarify the transcendental phenomenological investigations themselves. (shrink)

The article deals with Hurka?s critique of Kymlicka and Arneson?s critique of Dworkin on endorsement constraint thesis, according to which a person cannot have a valuable life if values are imposed on her - primarily by state action - overriding her preferences and convictions on the good life. This thesis has often been identified with neutral liberalism and counterposed to perfectionism. The text argues against Hurka?s and Arneson?s argument that mild coercion and paternalistic reduction of trivial, bad or worthless options (...) can indeed bring about a more valuable life. Their argument does not acknowledge adequately the difference between coercion from a person?s immediate social environment and state coercion, which are not equally legitimate. My critique, however, does not exclude the legitimacy of perfectionistic measures, as a person could accept as justified state intervention concerning the support of particular values or goods, while at the same time not endorsing those values and goods. Not all endorsed goods or activities should be treated equally, as more relevant and valuable ones can be legitimately supported by particular policy. (shrink)

We introduce a nonstandard arithmetic $NQA^-$ based on the theory developed by R. Chuaqui and P. Suppes in [2] (we will denote it by $NQA^+$ ), with a weakened external open minimization schema. A finitary consistency proof for $NQA^-$ formalizable in PRA is presented. We also show interesting facts about the strength of the theories $NQA^-$ and $NQA^+$ ; $NQA^-$ is mutually interpretable with $I\Delta_0 + EXP$ , and on the other hand, $NQA^+$ interprets the theories IΣ1 and $WKL_0$.

In my dissertation I critically survey existing theories of time consciousness, and draw on recent work in neuroscience and philosophy to develop an original theory. My view depends on a novel account of temporal perception based on the notion of temporal qualities, which are mental properties that are instantiated whenever we detect change in the environment. When we become aware of these temporal qualities in an appropriate way, our conscious experience will feature the distinct temporal phenomenology that is associated with (...) the passing of time. The temporal qualities model of perception makes two predictions about the mechanisms of time perception; one that time perception is modality specific and the other that it can occur without awareness. My argument for this view partially depends on a number of psychophysical experiments that I designed and implemented myself and which investigate subjective time distortions caused by looming visual stimuli. These results show that the mechanisms of conscious experience of time are distinct from the mechanisms of time perception, as my theory of temporal qualities predicts. (shrink)

Although the literature on the issue of pluralism within the philosophy of science is very extensive, this paper focuses on the metaphysical causal pluralism that emerges from the new mechanistic discussion on causality. The main aim is to situate the new mechanistic views on causation within the account of varieties of causal pluralism framed by Psillos ( 2009 ). Paying attention to his taxonomy of metaphysical views on causation (i.e., the straightjacket view, the functional view, the two-concept view, the agnostic (...) view and the atheist view) will help clarify differences in opinion and, at the same time, make it possible to elucidate the main metaphysical theses present within the new mechanistic debate. Special attention is given to S. Glennan’s theory of causation, since it is unique in offering an overall metaphysical view of the issue. It is also argued that mechanists are not “atheists” on causation: while all of them are causal realists, most mechanists are “agnostic” on causation, with a few exceptions such as S. Glennan, P. Machamer and J. Bogen. (shrink)

Language not only reflects and cocreates social universes but can also be and is performative regarding the planetary common good, e.g., through international treaties and agreements. This paper investigates the rationale and feasibility of altering the language used by Glasgow Climate Pact to a posthuman mode that addresses the issue of more-than-human inequality by becoming inclusive toward nonhuman actors, and presents a selection of edited excerpts. The main findings state that (1) the language of the Glasgow Climate Pact is inadequate (...) concerning its expected agency, (2) the reasons for this include its anthropocentrism, capitalocentrism and technocentrism, and (3) it is possible to rephrase the Glasgow Climate Pact and similar documents to address the diagnosed problems in a radically inclusive way. This paper represents a starting point for a discussion on the interrelations between climate and language and on the importance of language used by policy documents in the optics of climate action. (shrink)

Ajtai’s completeness theorem roughly states that a countable structure A coded in a model of arithmetic can be end-extended and expanded to a model of a given theory G if and only if a contradiction cannot be derived by a proof from G plus the diagram of A, provided that the proof is definable in A and contains only formulas of a standard length. The existence of such model extensions is closely related to questions in complexity theory. In this paper (...) we give a new proof of Ajtai’s theorem using basic techniques of model theory. (shrink)

Alexis de Tocqueville’s political thought is often seen as inconsistent for offering two apparently dissimilar theories of revolution. The first is universal democratisation, understood as a social phenomenon and a grand revolutionary change; the second sees revolution as the logical continuation and radicalisation of the preceding regime. The following question arises: was Tocqueville inconsistent in his principal works? I argue that this was not the case and that the two processes are complementary elements in Tocqueville’s model, which combines the ancient (...) cyclical science of regime change with modern theories of revolutionary progress. What Tocqueville offers is a powerful political theory with considerable predictive power. Tocqueville, I consequently claim, should be viewed as a theorist of revolution rather than as a theorist of democracy per se. (shrink)

Under the continuum hypothesis we prove that for any tall P-ideal Ionω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{I} \,{\rm on}\,\, \omega}$$\end{document} and for any ordinal γ≤ω1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\gamma \leq \omega_1}$$\end{document} there is an I\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{I}}$$\end{document}-ultrafilter in the sense of Baumgartner, which belongs to the class Pγ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{P}_{\gamma}}$$\end{document} of the P-hierarchy of ultrafilters. Since the class (...) of P2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{P}_2}$$\end{document} ultrafilters coincides with the class of P-points, our result generalizes the theorem of Flašková, which states that there are I\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{I}}$$\end{document}-ultrafilters which are not P-points. (shrink)

Dear Editor, -/- We are pleased to report that we have recently published an article in a well-established bioethics journal where we briefly review the evidence surrounding abortion pill reversal (APR) and argue that those who identify with the pro-choice standpoint should support APR provision (indeed, the ex-CEO of BPAS, Ann Furedi, has agreed in principle with this conclusion of ours in one of her tweets). We also hope that our article will serve as a record in the peer-reviewed and (...) indexed literature of the struggles our fellow CMA UK members have gone through to support women who eventually decided to keep their pregnancies, and the tribulations they had to endure from their colleagues in the medical establishment. It is perhaps somewhat symbolic that our paper has been published in a special issue dedicated to the ‘feminist ethics of care’ as APR and the sacrifice of our colleagues shows what care for women should really look like.(1) -/- We have made sure to spread the word about this as well. One of us has given an interview to Irish pro-life group Protect Life (still to be published) and we have submitted a post to a pro-life collaborative that also awaits publication. Finally, we have also published a post about this paper and current developments in the USA in a well-established bioethics news site, which has been republished in various online outlets.(2) -/- We believe that this promotion of APR is vital, as recent statements from both the UK and the USA indicate that the pressure against APR might grow. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have published a post entitled ‘Facts Are Important: Medication Abortion "Reversal" Is Not Supported by Science’.(3) Similarly, the UK Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, together with other bodies (including the British Society of Abortion Care Providers) have posted a position statement stating that there is no reputable evidence for using progesterone in APR.(4) One truly wonders why these organisations are pushing this narrative despite the weight of the evidence available being in favour of APR and their organisations’ professed support for women’s choice. (shrink)

Dear Editor, -/- One of the recent changes in the UK cabinet, after Liz Truss became the Prime Minister, was that Dr Therese Coffey become the new Health Secretary. Some news outlets were quick to point out her anti-abortion stance (see e.g. (1–3)) and that this, according to them, might be a problem. While pro-lifers might not completely rejoice over this situation as Coffey stated that ‘she wouldn’t “seek to undo” abortion laws’(3), I do not wish to focus here on (...) speculating on the future status of UK abortion legislation. Rather, I wish to focus on some statements quoted by the media as made by Clare Murphy, chief executive of the British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS), who stated that: (2,4) -/- ‘Earlier this year, our new Health Secretary voted to revoke access to at-home abortion care, and recriminalise women who end their own pregnancies without the approval of two doctors.’ ‘In doing so, Therese Coffey voted against the advice of leading medical bodies.’ ‘To have a health secretary who would place their personal beliefs above expert clinical guidance is deeply concerning.’ -/- Coffey is a Catholic, and this brings back to mind some of the aspects of the debate surrounding conflicts of interest in bioethics. There have been, for example, discussions and proposals that having a religious belief should be declared as a conflict of interest.(5,6) But something seems to be missing in these portrayals of conflict of interest and the disagreement between Coffey and these ‘leading medical bodies’. If we regard financial conflicts of interests as the classical case of such conflicts that is used as a reference to other types of conflicts of interest,(5,6) then why do we not see the media complaining that ‘leading medical bodies’ support procedures that will give them more work oppor-tunities and improve their financial stability? To paraphrase Murphy who (according to the BBC 'said while politicians were entitled to their own views on abortion, what mattered was whether their "personal convictions stand in the way of women's ability to act on their own”. (4) perhaps ‘BPAS and the leading medical bodies are entitled to considerations of their financial interests, but what matters is whether the advice they give is clinically sound and founded in the principles of ethical clinical practice. In Matthew 6:24 Our Lord said that one cannot serve two masters, so perhaps we should not be so concerned with Coffey consulting her conscience, but rather scrutinise clinical institutions. (shrink)

The submitted contribution is devoted to the controversy in Martin Buber’s conception of responsibility and especially to the question whether its nature is reciprocal or asymmetrical. This controversy arises from a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of his concept of mutuality as a constituent of I-Thou relation. Several refuting arguments are offered against the claim that the mutuality of the I-Thou relationship means equality of responsibility which enables ethical calculus.

This paper is a report of the conference 'John Duns Scotus 1308–2008. Investigations into his Philosophy' 5-9 November 2008.

The problem of the intuition of the individual as such, i. e. of its individuality (the „principle of individuation“) gave rise to many controversies. The problem becomes especially urgent in the light of the Christian revelation, since Christianity in the first place relates to the singular and individual (and therefore contingent), whereas the universal assumes only a secondary rôle. John Duns Scotus deals with this theologico-philosophical problem and sets out to defend intellective intuition of the individual as a whole. He (...) distinguishes three kinds within this type of cognition: perfect intuitive intellective cognition which is possible only in patria, direct but imperfect (i. e. not penetrating the principle of individuation) intuitive intellective cognition which relates to contingent truths and spiritual acts, and, finally, imperfect and indirect intuitive intellective cognition, i. e. acts of recalling the past intuitive cognitions. In these three examples the fundamental Scotus’s arguments are exhibited and the extent to which Scotus transgresses the limits of Aristotelian epistemology is made clear. (shrink)