In this paper, we provide a detailed critical review of current approaches to ecthesis in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, with a view to motivate a new approach, which builds upon previous work by Marion & Rückert (2016) on the dictum de omni. This approach sets Aristotle’s work within the context of dialectic and uses Lorenzen’s dialogical logic, hereby reframed with use of Martin-Löf's constructive type theory as ‘immanent reasoning’. We then provide rules of syllogistic for the latter, and provide proofs of (...) e-conversion, Darapti and Bocardo and e-subalternation, while showing how close to Aristotle’s text these proofs remain. (shrink)

Most discussions frame the Liar Paradox as a formal logical-linguistic puzzle. Attempts to resolve the paradox have focused very little so far on aspects of cognitive psychology and processing, because semantic and cognitive-psychological issues are generally assumed to be disjunct. I provide a motivation and carry out a cognitive-computational treatment of the liar paradox based on a cognitive-computational model of language and conceptual knowledge within the Predictive Processing framework. I suggest that the paradox arises as a failure of synchronization between (...) two ways of generating the liar situation in two different PP sub-models, one corresponding to language processing and the other to the processing of meaning and world-knowledge. In this way, I put forward the claim that the liar sentence is meaningless but has an air of meaningfulness. I address the possible objection that the proposal violates the Principle of Unrestricted Compositionality, which purportedly regulates the conceptual competence of thinkers. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that authors can make anything whatsoever true in their fictions by artistic fiat. Harry Deutsch originally called this position the Principle of Poetic License. If true, PPL sets an important constraint on accounts of fictional truth: they must be such as to allow that, for any x, one can write a story in which it is true that x. I argue that PPL is far too strong: it requires us to abandon the law of non-contradiction and (...) entails a radical revision of otherwise ordinary commitments about truth in fiction. (shrink)

This book’s basic argument is that the Freudian unconscious, far from constituting a radical break with the philosophy of consciousness, is merely the latest exemplar in a heritage of philosophical misunderstanding of the Cartesian cogito that interprets “I think, therefore I am” as “I represent myself, therefore I am” (in the classic interpretation of Heidegger, one of the targets of the book).

Etrange parcours que celui du Logos qui, de Heraclite a nos jours, tend a s'effacer, dans ce monde actuel, tout entier voue a la science, au tout numerique. Cette vision heracliteenne de la totalite s'est estompee, transformee qu'elle fut deja des les premiers siecles de notre ere dans sa postulation religieuse, puis dans la modernite, et s'est perdue dans un monde ou, science et technique prenant leur envol, l'homme avait comme horizon de " devenir comme maitre et possesseur de la (...) Nature ". Michel Blay analyse cet etat qui nous laisse de plus en plus en desherence ; et dans un monde ou " Dieu est mort, et c'est nous qui l'avons tue ", comment ne pas sombrer dans cette illusion d'un homme tout-puissant, dans lequel meme le psychique est traite a l'aune des neuro-sciences ou l'homme a perdu sa completude et ne pense meme plus a la chercher? Ne serait-ce pas la poesie, elle seule, " dans ces temps de detresse " qui offrirait une voie pour retrouver sa voix? Certes " Il n'y a pas de paradis " nous dit Andre Frenaud. " Etait-ce l'aube, ou le soir deja perce? Qu'avions-nous espere que nous allons cherchant? ". (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore the importance of biological and social networks in Whitehead's philosophy. This exploration will involve a consideration of pluridisciplinarity in Whitehead, including a consideration of the relationship between scientific understanding and philosophical thinking, the question of method in Whitehead's thought, and the crucial distinctions between mechanism and organicism and between nature lifeless and nature alive.

Violence confronts us increasingly, everywhere: how are we to make sense of it? Its ubiquity begs the question of analytical differentiation. This article seeks to open the field by suggesting a fivefold typology: violence as loss of meaning; violence as non-sense; violence as cruelty; fundamental violence; and founding violence. The idea of analytically differentiating between types of violence cannot avoid the fact that sometimes victims are also perpetrators in other ways, and that even violent activity is not conducted only by (...) essentially violent subjects. Violence needs to be connected to modernity and to problems of identity formation and not only to personal or collective risk. (shrink)

Scientists working on the wave theory of light in the 19 th century took it for granted that there had to be a medium for the propagation of light waves. This medium was called the luminiferous [= “light carrying”] ether. One of the central questions about this medium concerned its state of motion. There were two options: (1) The ether is completely undisturbed by matter moving through it (stationary or immobile ether); (2) Matter drags along the ether in its vicinity (...) and/or in its interior (dragged-along ether). Stellar aberration provided the main argument for the first option (even though a special dragging effect in the case of transparent matter had to be built into the theory to account for refraction). Polarization provided the main argument for the second option. These two options and the arguments pro and con will be explained in more detail below. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the constitutive problems and other several aspects of what a research entitled 'formal epistemology' should be. The interest in this subject has to do with the possibility of reaching a privileged point of view or axis of research - i.e., the 'formal' one - that would allow, a better grasp of the richness and variety of the facts and problems tackled by precise (local) epistemology of theories (for example, in physics). This approach is likely to (...) enable one to hold the main structural lines that organize those theories according to a more com prehensive, unifying and synthetic intelligibilit. By the same token, it would eventually allow a better handling of the changes required in the organization of knowledge, putting emphasis on its main directions, drawing up a rational inventory of this knowledge, and perhaps anticipating others. At first, we deal with the `thought of changes' that no approach of the 'form' can afford to leave aside, since the meaning of this concept is inseparable from the contents that come with constructions and modifications. We examine then the notion of 'epistemic operation' as an instrument to create new forms on the theoretical as well as on the meta-theoretical levels. ln the wake of it, we analyze the characteristics of the form and of the formal, as well as their relationship with the contents of knowledge. We also take the notion of object into account, since it depends upon the decision of a subject and upon conventional choices. We finally inquire about the link between `epistemic operations' as specified above and algorithmic functions for knowledge statements, and emphasize the risk of reductionism that might follow from a naturalistic conception of representation. (shrink)

Most states are multination states, and most peoples are stateless peoples. Just as collectives can behave as sovereign states only if they are recognized by the international community, liberal multination states must recognize stateless peoples in order to determine their political status within that state. There is, however, no agreement on the kind of principles that should be considered, especially under classical liberalism, which gives individuals preeminence over groups. Liberal theories that attempt to accommodate collective rights are often based on (...) a comprehensive version of liberalism that subscribes to moral individualism. Within such a framework, they develop a watered-down concept of collective rights. In A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights Michel Seymour explores the theoretical resources of John Rawls’s political liberalism and shows that this particular approach can accommodate genuine collective rights. By Rawls’s account, Seymour explains, peoples are moral agents and sources of valid moral claims and are therefore entitled to collective rights. These kinds of rights translate, in the constitution of the multination state, to a true political recognition for stateless peoples. Ultimately, A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights answers three important questions: Who is the subject of collective rights? What is the object of collective rights? And can they be institutionalized in real politics? (shrink)

According to the traditional view, meaning presents itself under the form of some kind of identity.

I relate the story of how matrix mechanics grew out of the treatment of optical dispersion in the old quantum theory, paying special attention to the contributions of the American theoretical physicists John H. Van Vleck and John C. Slater. Van Vleck shares the credit with Max Born for being the first to publish a full derivation of the crucial Kramers dispersion formula using Bohr’s correspondence principle. Slater was one of the architects of the short-lived but influential Bohr-Kramers-Slater (BKS) theory (...) that helped popularize the so-called Ersatz- or virtual oscillators central both to the treatment of dispersion in the old quantum theory and to the transition to matrix mechanics. (shrink)

En contrepoint à son œuvre mathématique et physique — et en relation avec elle — d'Alembert a développé une théorie de la connaissance influencée par Locke et le sensualisme de Condillac, mais centrée avant tout sur une épistémologie de la physique newtonienne. Réaliste, prônant le recours à l'expérience, il est en même temps profondément rationaliste, et même précisément, quoiqu'il s'en défende plutôt, dans la lignée de Descartes, Mais, bien que la Raison soit sa référence fondamentale, à tel point qu'il voudrait (...) fonder sur ses principes les plus évidents toute la science physico-mathématique — c'est-à-dire par excellence la Mécanique —, son programme ne peut être dit cartésien : non seulement il rejette les idées innées, mais il accepte la critique d'une rationalité apparente requise par la considération de faits irréductibles (l'attraction par exemple). Son épistémologie est un réalisme rationnel référé à l'être même de la Nature (la Raison et la Nature se rejoignent en profondeur). C'est en fonction de ces conceptions qu'il accepte ou rejette certaines notions physiques soit ambiguës, soit incertaines. Son rejet du concept de force comme celui de la considération d'une texture intime des corps semblent en faire, par le refus de ce qui ne serait pas directement mesurable, l'annonciateur du positivisme de Laplace et de Comte : une telle interprétation serait inexacte, et d'Alembert considère que la pensée peut parvenir à la connaissance du réel. Si ses conceptions s'élaborent en contrepoint de son activité scientifique, c'est en même temps en lutte et polémique contre la métaphysique, au sein de son engagement philosophique — il est tête de file, avec Voltaire, du « parti philosophique » — et notamment dans l'Encyclopédie. Bien qu'il se réfère, comme Newton, à une Intelligence suprême à l'œuvre dans l'Univers, il n'est pas déiste et affiche bientôt une position sceptique. Sa recherche et son affirmation de l'autonomie des lois de la Nature sont a-thées au sens privatif qui annonce Laplace. Il s'oppose au matérialisme de d'Holbach ou Helvétius, mais il se rapproche peu à peu — et notamment vers 1765, sans doute sous l'influence de Diderot qui rédigea vers cette époque Le rêve de d'Alembert et avec qui il venait de renouer — d'un matérialisme dynamique : mais, ce matérialisme, il ne le professe qu'en privé (essentiellement dans sa correspondance avec Frédéric de Prusse). L'âme est matérielle, et si « le plus simple raisonnement prouve qu'il y a un être éternel » , ce Dieu est matériel, il « n'est que la matière en tant qu'intelligente » , ce qui rejoint la définition du matérialisme donnée par Diderot dans l'Encyclopédie. Toutefois, refusant de se prononcer sur l'en-soi des choses, et sur la nature de la matière elle-même, comme de se définir métaphysiquement, son matérialisme tardif est encore marqué de scepticisme. (shrink)

In Kant, remarkably, and for the first time perhaps in the history of philosophy, the problem of the Ego receives an ontological signification. The critique of the paralogisms of rational psychology concerns, explicitly, this fundamental problem of the being of the ego. Kant’s examination of this problem constitutes an essential moment of the history of modern philosophy. This examination results finally in the complete failure to determine such a being, a failure that Kant attempts to pass off ultimately as a (...) metaphysical impossibility. This is affirmed constantly through the labyrinthine analysis of the Transcendental Dialectic: what emerges from its difficulties, and obscurities, is that the being of the Ego can be neither determined, nor posited, metaphysically. The conclusion is unquestionably the following: the ego cogito does not contain in itself any sum, at least if, by the latter, one intends, as does rational psychology, the metaphysical and, in some way, absolute being of the ‘I’. (shrink)

Le symbolisme naît à partir du langage quand l'homme prend conscience qu'il est un être irrémédiablement clivé entre nature et culture, conscient et inconscient, masculinité et féminité, idéal du moi et moi idéal ; une sorte d'animal dénaturé à la recherche d'une unité perdue, que lui prête, provisoirement et superficiellement, le symbolique, ce lieu où il tente de "recoller les morceaux", c'est-à-dire retrouver le monde du prénatal, de l'amniotique qui était le Un et pas encore le Deux. Le symbolisme serait-il (...) la marche vers un Principe unificateur, comme le pense l'Eglise catholique, ou la prise de conscience et l'acceptation d'une vacuité lucide comme le suggère la psychanalyse...? (shrink)

As I am not at all a specialist on Gottlob Frege’s work, my comments intended initially to be focused on an aspect that emerges in the last part of Peter Clark’s paper “Frege, neo-logicism and applied mathematics” 1, where he treats the question of “applied mathematics” — an aspect that appealed to me and that was triggered by Frege’s relationship between numbers and concepts, and reasoning. Starting with this concern, I have been led by my subject to propose some considerations (...) about foundations and rationality which will go — briefly — in two directions. The first direction is that of a distinction between logical and rational foundations, whilst the second direction is that of taking into account as a fact the historical development of mathematics among the sciences, which modifies the terms of any foundational program. In delineating these considerations, I found that what I had in mind could apply to mathematics itself as well as to “applied mathematics”, thus deviating somewhat from my first explicit intention. In conclusion I shall consider the possibility of a rational foundation programme for mathematical and physico-mathematical sciences which would take into account the changes in the scientific contents and the widenings of the forms of rationality that, in my view, make these changes possible. Such foundations for knowledge would not be any more static, but dynamical and would be possibly considered only retrospectively: they would be “forward foundations”, in a sense that will be discussed in detail elsewhere. (shrink)

This article tries to demonstrate that the promise made to Nathanael through Gen 38:12-19 in Jn 1:51, foretells the glorification of the Son of Man at the end of his terrestrial journey, described as a descent and an ascent. But this glorification will be carried out by means of the crucifixion ; hence the recourse to two other texts of the O.T. to prove, first in Jn 3:14-15, that the crucifixion of Jesus would be a salvific elevation prefigurated by the (...) serpent raised by Moses on a stake (Nm 21:4-9). But the crucifixion of Jesus is also the ultimate step of the descent of the Son of Man, its salvific value is then proven by the gift of manna, bread descended from heaven (Ex 16:4.15.35 ; Ps 78:24). Jesus, as the true bread of life, transmits the life he continuously receives from his Father to those who remain faithful to him unto the foot of the cross (6:48-58). (shrink)

In order to assess the future status and applicability of process modes of thought, three steps are suggested: first, a systematic account of Process and Reality's conception of philosophical speculation; second, its application to the targeted question; third a complementary specification with the help of Whitehead's insistence on duty and reverence.

English summary: This commentary of Plato's Euthydemus demonstrates its place as the clearest text for understanding the relationship between Platonism and Sophism. French description: De tous les dialogues de Platon, l'Euthydeme est peut-etre le plus exclusivement consacre a l'elucidation de la relation du platonisme avec la sophistique. Ce qu'on a pris pour indigence de son contenu, c'est l'acuite avec laquelle la forme y est consideree. Formalisme moral de Socrate, formalisme eristique des sophistes: dans la lecon d'eristique donnee a Socrate apparait, (...) plus clairement peut-etre que dans aucun texte antique, la logique propre au discours sophistique, celle-la meme a laquelle a affaire dans sa totalite le texte platonicien. La sophistique, et Platon avec elle, relevent d'un regime de discours pre-aristotelicien, et c'est dans la pratique de ce discours que demande a etre reinscrite la tant galvaudee ironie socratique. (shrink)

Dostoyevsky explained how human being could be the builder who has the power to destroy everything-that-is. Thomas Mann unveiled the deep influence of the unconscious as well as the subconscious: both components of human psyche must be taken into account, when exploring the mystery of human being. Robert Musil’s literary works focused on commonalities between animals and human beings, that is, their similar instincts. Musil was promoting a new morals, as it is grounded on instinctive life. Dostoyevsky, Mann and Musil (...) agreed that human being is prone to consider himself/herself as an infinite being. Firstly, human being destroys Nature and justifies himself/herself through technocratic, anthropometric, and anthropocentric worldviews. Secondly, human beings forget the situation of nonhuman beings and put the emphasis on their privileged position in the Cosmos. Thirdly, human being looks at language as the supreme quality of living beings and makes human language the ultimate parameter for any other form of language. The way those three aspects of human being and existence are idolized strengthens a mindset focusing on the infinite character of humankind, when compared with the situation of nonhuman beings. (shrink)

L’apparition de données quantitatives en archéologie, puis des outils de gestion dont on commence seulement à maîtriser le développement, imposent de façon concomitante aux professionnels une réflexion de fond sur l’évolution de leur discipline : il importe en effet, au moment où l’on met en œuvre des outils nouveaux, de s’interroger sur les conséquences des transformations en cours sur le processus scientifique. Au-delà d'une démarche épistémologique, cet article interroge le caractère novateur que peut représenter la gestion de données de plus (...) en plus nombreuses. Il propose surtout de voir, dans la mutualisation de ces données, une nouveauté liée à la conjugaison de diverses décisions (liées à la recherche tant publique que privée), et un changement de paradigme dans la constitution des savoirs. Si la documentation est partagée par tous, le caractère innovant de la réflexion se déplace, non pas vers la maîtrise de données nouvelles, mais bien vers la capacité des acteurs scientifiques à exploiter ces données de façon différente. (shrink)

This paper analyzes how conflicts of perspective are resolved in the field of the human sciences. Examples of such conflicts are the duality between the actor and spectator standpoints, or the duality of participancy between a form of social life and a socio-anthropological study of it. This type of duality look irreducible, because the conflicting positions express incompatible interests. Yet, the claim of incommensurability is excessive. There exists a level of mental activity at which dialogue and resolution are possible. Reaching (...) this level only implies that one comes back to a state of undetermination between situations and interests whose best model is a superposition of states in generalized quantum theory. Some applications of this strategy of going back below the point of state reduction , from the psychology of perception to the history of civilization, are presented. (shrink)