Le présent tome traite de la mécanique quantique non relativiste. Il comprend, outre ses fondements, de multiples applications de la mécanique quantique dans une plus large mesure que dans les cours généraux. Dans leur exposé des questions générales, les auteurs dégagent au maximum l'essence physique de la théorie, à partir de laquelle ils développent l'appareil mathématique. Contrairement au schéma habituel allant des théorèmes mathématiques relatifs aux opérateurs linéaires, les auteurs déduisent les exigences mathématiques auxquelles doivent répondre les opérateurs et les (...) fonctions propres à partir de la position physique du problème. Des compléments mathématiques sont donnés en appendice. (shrink)

According to Husserl, the epochè (or suspension of judgment) must be left incomplete. It is to be performed step by step, thus defining various layers of “reduction.” In phenomenology at least two such layers can be distinguished: the life-world reduction, and the transcendental reduction. Quantum physics was born from a particular variety of the life-world reduction: reduction to observables according to Heisenberg, and reduction to classical-like properties of experimental devices according to Bohr. But QBism has challenged this limited version of (...) the phenomenological reduction advocated by the Copenhagen interpretation. QBists claim that quantum states are “expectations about experiences of pointer readings,” rather than expectations about pointer positions. Their focus on lived experience, not just on macroscopic variables, is tantamount to performing the transcendental reduction instead of stopping at the relatively superficial layer of the life-world reduction. I will show that quantum physics indeed gives us several reasons to go the whole way down to the deepest variety of phenomenological reduction, may be even farther than the standard QBist view: not only reduction to experience, or to “pure consciousness,” but also reduction to the “living present.”. (shrink)

This article takes issue with two prominent views in the current debate around epistemic partiality in friendship. Strong views of epistemic partiality hold that friendship may require biased beliefs in direct conflict with epistemic norms. Weak views hold that friendship may place normative expectations on belief formation but in a manner that does not violate these norms. It is argued that neither view succeeds in explaining the relationship between epistemic norms and friendship norms. Weak views inadvertently endorse a form of (...) motivated reasoning, failing to resolve the normative clash they seek to avoid. Strong views turn out to be incoherent once we consider the question of whether the requirement to form an epistemically partial belief is independent of whether the belief in question would be true. It is then argued that an epistemology of friendship should recognise the special role that understanding plays in friendship. On this view, friendship normatively requires understanding the truth about our friends. This entails that epistemic partiality, far from being a requirement, is in fact at odds with good friendship. (shrink)

Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-1974. Ed. Jacques Lagrange, trans. Graham Burchell, intro. Arnold I. Davidson,. Extract from Chapter One, 7 November 1973.

This paper investigates a series of normative principles that are used to justify different aspects of executive compensation within business firms, as well as the remuneration of lower-ranking employees. We look at how businesses perform pay benchmarking; employees’ engagement, fidelity and loyalty ; and the acceptability of what we call both-ends-dipping, that is, receiving both ex ante and ex post benefits for the same work. We make two observations. First, either different or incoherent principles are used to justify the pay (...) of executives compared to employees, or the same principles are applied differently. Second, these differences or inconsistencies tend to be to the benefit of executives and/or to the detriment of employees. We conclude by asking whether there is any reason for thinking differently about executive pay than we do about employee pay. Our analysis leads us to question the principles justifying current executive compensation and to wonder if these principles are potentially being instrumentalized to serve other ends. (shrink)

After a presentation of some relevant aspects of Chakravartty's semi-realism (A Metaphysics for scientific realism. Knowing the unobservable. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), this paper addresses two difficulties that appear to be inherent to important components of his proposed metaphysics for scientific realism. First, if particulars and laws are concrete structures, namely actual groupings of causal properties as the semirealist contends, the relation between particulars and laws becomes also a relation between particulars with some annoying consequences. This worry—and some others—are (...) resolved if laws are taken to be statements and particulars are construed not only as groupings of properties, but things that contain a non-conceptual ingredient which can be given in perceptual awareness. Second, on the semirealist's view of particulars it becomes difficult to defend an epistemological version of scientific realism according to which we have good reasons to believe that the same things are referred to despite the fact that successive theories may attribute different properties to them. (shrink)

L'un des traits par lesquels on distingue habituellement la théorie générale du droit de la philosophie du droit est le formalisme, souvent considéré comme excessif. Il s'explique par la volonté de se limiter à la description du droit positif tel qu'il est et non tel qu'il devrait être, et par le souci de donner à cette description un objet général, c'est-à-dire de rendre compte de plusieurs systèmes juridiques. Or, ce qui est commun à plusieurs systèmes, c'est la forme, tandis que (...) le fond du droit change selon les pays ou les époques. Cette attention à la forme a cependant un inconvénient sérieux la théorie du droit peut bien décrire avec rigueur la structure du système juridique, elle ne rend pas compte de ce qui constitue une partie essentielle du travail réel des juristes. Ceux-ci traitent en effet du fond du droit. Ils parlent d'Etat, de souveraineté, de représentation, du pouvoir des juges. Sans doute ces discours sont-ils idéologiques et normatifs. Mais ils ont une existence et une fonction réelle dans le monde du droit, de sorte que la théorie générale du droit se trouve face à un dilemme. Ou bien elle traite elle aussi des questions matérielles ; elle se place sur le terrain normatif, au risque de perdre son caractère général, comme sa rigueur scientifique. Ou bien elle entend préserver sa pureté ; elle ignore ces discours et se limite à une analyse formelle, mais elle manque une partie de son objet. Les études rassemblées ici montrent qu'on peut échapper à ce dilemme et concevoir une théorie qui soit à la fois matérielle, générale et descriptive. La théorie matérielle du droit apparaît alors étroitement liée à la fois à la forme de l'argumentation et de la justification juridiques, comme à la structure du système, c'est-à-dire à la hiérarchie des normes. (shrink)

This paper draws on the emerging field of innovation ethics to complement the more established field of responsible innovation by focusing on key ethical issues raised by technological innovations. One key limitation of influential frameworks of RI is that they tend to neglect some key ethical issues raised by innovation, as well as major normative dimensions of the notion of responsibility. We explain how IE could enrich RI by stressing the more important role that ethical analysis should play in RI. (...) We focus on two transversal issues of IE: the issue of redrawing conceptual boundaries, especially the topic of the artificialization of the world, and the issue of responsibility, especially the notion of total responsibility. We address these two issues from the thematic perspective of IE, thereby generating lessons learnt for RI. These two examples are taken as illustrations and blueprint of the dialogue that should take place between the two fields. (shrink)

La philosophie de l’histoire des mathématiques entretient chez Cavaillès un rapport étroit et contrasté, avec celle que Brunschvicg expose dans La Modalité du jugement (1897). L’activité du jugement scientifique y est dite mixte, entre jugements (idéaux) d’intériorité et jugements (réalistes) d’extériorité. La forme mixte de l’activité historique de la connaissance est la modalité du possible. D’où une épistémologie historique qui revendique la filiation idéaliste kantienne et rejette l’idéalisme spéculatif. Cavaillès, penseur de la nécessité créatrice du devenir mathématique, réduisant le rôle (...) de la possibilité et de l’aventure intellectuelle dans son histoire, se détache par là d’un maître dont un Canguilhem serait demeuré plus proche. L’histoire mathématique récente, en préparant à un Kronecker sa revanche sur les conceptions ensemblistes abstraites qui inspiraient le nécessitarisme de Cavaillès, conduit à reconsidérer le radicalisme qui l’opposait à la philosophie brunschvicgienne de la modalité du jugement. (shrink)

In this book, a world-leading Ricoeur scholar examines Ricoeur's philosophy in relation to other major figures in contemporary French philosophy including Bourdieu, Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, and Castoriadis.

In this paper I argue in favour of a moderate and selective version of scientific realism with respect to the existence of some physical theoretical objects and the truth of some statements about them. The analysis of common sense or ordinary experience reveals that existence and truth assertions concerning familiar objects are warranted if they satisfy what we call the criteria of presence and invariance. Ordinary objects exemplify a form or a structure determined by constant and changing features with respect (...) to the variation of the conditions of observation and a content given in sensory presence. It is claimed that some theoretical physical objects that possess a structure or a form determined by invariant and variable characteristics relatively to a specified group of transformations and a content provided by observations on which the measurement of those characteristics is grounded can also be justifiably asserted to exist. We further show that this defence of scientific realism in physics doesn't fall prey to the objections that have been raised against the usual vindication of scientific realism based on the no-miracle argument. Some standard objections to scientific realism, such as the underdetermination of theories by observations and the pessimistic meta-induction, are examined and shown to be unconvincing. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: From “Truth and Power”.

Contemporary psychiatry maintains the myth that it is value neutral by appeal to modern medical science for both its diagnostic categories and its therapeutic interventions, leaving the impression that it relies on reason—that is to say, reason divorced from tradition—to master human nature. Such a practice has a certain way of characterizing and defining humanity's lapses from acceptable human behavior—a lapse from human being. The modern practice of psychiatry applies a particular notion (largely influenced by Enlightenment ideals) of scientific instrumentation (...) to the human person in order to diagnose the ailment and manufacture a corresponding treatment in keeping with a hidden conception of human biological flourishing. This covert vision is an impoverished (and possibly dangerous) one. As much as the practice of psychiatry is constrained by the goals of the dominant moral tradition of our day, it becomes a tool (or technique) for achieving the transient and partial ends of modern individualism. Given this truncated view of human nature and human end, modern psychiatry fails to attend comprehensively to the unity of a life, missing altogether the essential relevance of character formation, and thereby forfeiting excellence in human flourishing. (shrink)

L’article apporte le bilan de ce que l’on sait aujourd’hui, en fonction des sources publiées, des relations philosophiques entre John Toland et Leibniz. Il esquisse une revue thématique des arguments, en se plaçant au point de vue de Leibniz.

If through rotation of a hollow sphere one produces a Coriolis field inside of it, then a centrifugal field is produced [...] that is not the same as the one that would occur in a rotating rigid system with the same Coriolis field. One can therefore not think of rotational forces as produced by the rotation of the fixed stars ….

The aim of this article is to explore the importance of biological and social networks in Whitehead's philosophy. This exploration will involve a consideration of pluridisciplinarity in Whitehead, including a consideration of the relationship between scientific understanding and philosophical thinking, the question of method in Whitehead's thought, and the crucial distinctions between mechanism and organicism and between nature lifeless and nature alive.

Gentle handling of mammals , and lizards , but not of frogs and fish elevated the set-point for body temperature, i.e., produced an emotional fever, achieved only behaviourally in lizards. Heart rate, another detector of emotion in mammals, was also accelerated by gentle handling, from ca. 70 b/min to ca. 110 b/min in lizards. This tachycardia faded in about 10 min. The same handling did not significantly modify the frogs’ heart rates. The absence of emotional tachycardia in frogs and its (...) presence in lizards , together with the emotional fever exhibited by mammals and reptiles, but not by frogs or fish, would suggest that emotion emerged in the evolutionary lineage between amphibians and reptiles. Such a conclusion would imply that reptiles possess consciousness with its characteristic hedonic dimension, pleasure. The role of sensory pleasure in decision making was therefore verified in iguanas placed in a motivational conflict. To be able to reach a bait , the iguanas had to leave a warm refuge, provided with standard food, and had to venture into a cold environment. The results showed that lettuce was not necessary to the iguanas and that they traded off the palatability of the bait against the disadvantage of the cold. Thus, the behaviour of the iguanas was possibly produced, as it is in humans, through the maximization of sensory pleasure. Altogether, these results may indicate that the first elements of mental experience emerged between amphibians and reptiles. (shrink)