This paper tackles the problem of defining what a cognitive expert is. Starting from a shared intuition that the definition of an expert depends upon the conceptual function of expertise, I shed light on two main approaches to the notion of an expert: according to novice-oriented accounts of expertise, experts need to provide laypeople with information they lack in some domain; whereas, according to research-oriented accounts, experts need to contribute to the epistemic progress of their discipline. In this paper, I (...) defend the thesis that cognitive experts should be identified by their ability to perform the latter function rather than the former, as novice-oriented accounts, unlike research-oriented ones, fail to comply with the rules of a functionalist approach to expertise. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In the 18th century, Kant evaluated that his historical period was not a time of enlightenment, but rather minority, because of man’s inability to use his own understanding. Adorno updated this problem, interpreting the minority in our presente in terms of loss of experience. Men are no longer apt to experience, because the technical and economic apparatus prevents the clarification and awareness of reality. From this diagnosis, The aim of this article is to investigate Adorno’s educational thought in its (...) possibilities of emancipation. In our point of view, the role of education, in the thoughts of the Frankfurtian, is to recover the critical autonomy of individuals, through dialectical thinking, to rebuild the damaged experience. (shrink)

Context: Varela’s neurophenomenology was conceived from the outset as a criticism and dissolution of the “hard problem” of the physical origin of consciousness. Indeed, the standard (….

This book provides an innovative way to revisit the depth and scope of our moral/post-moral worldviews, while undertaking an ontic reflection about organizational life. The ontic dimension of life refers to existing entities’ lived experiences. It has nothing to do with psychological and relational processes. The ontic level of analysis mirrors a philosophical outlook on organizational life. Unlike moral worldviews, post-moral worldviews oppose the existence of Truth-itself. Post-moral worldviews rather imply that dialogical relationships allow people to express their own truth-claims (...) and welcome others’ truth-claims. The purpose of this book is to explain the philosophical implications of moral and post-moral worldviews and the way to move from a moral to a post-moral worldview. Moreover, this book explores the possibility to transcend the moral/post-moral dualism, through moral deliberation processes and a reinterpretation of the Presence of the Infinite in all dimensions of human life. This book could eventually help to better grasp the basic philosophical challenges behind ethical reflection about organizational issues. (shrink)

On désigne ici comme « espace esthétique » la forme subjective et pure de l’intuition du sens externe, telle que la met à jour l’exposition métaphysique de l’espace. Kant l’appelle ainsi « espace métaphysique » en l’opposant rigoureusement à l’« espace géométrique », déjà conceptualisé et ne relevant plus comme tel de l’Esthétique transcendantale dans son moment originaire. L’espace esthétique doit pouvoir être atteint dans son essence pure avant et indépendamment de ce que la « mathématique de l’étendue » constitue (...) du second : il faut délier le moment propre de l’Esthétique de toute subordination à la géométrie. À l’inverse, on esquissera la genèse transcendantale des différents types d’objectivité géométrique désignés dans des « concepts d’espace » (le quantum, la figure, l’espace lui-même considéré objectivement). (shrink)

Concept contextualism is the view that the information associated with a concept is dependent on the context in which it is tokened. This view is gaining support in recent years. The received and c...

It is commonly thought that authors can make anything whatsoever true in their fictions by artistic fiat. Harry Deutsch originally called this position the Principle of Poetic License. If true, PPL sets an important constraint on accounts of fictional truth: they must be such as to allow that, for any x, one can write a story in which it is true that x. I argue that PPL is far too strong: it requires us to abandon the law of non-contradiction and (...) entails a radical revision of otherwise ordinary commitments about truth in fiction. (shrink)

Although many small businesses and a great number of large enterprises have environmental policies, the contents of such policies vary widely according to their emphases either on technical rationality and technocentrism/technocracy or on ecological rationality and ecocentrism/ecocracy. I present them in four categories: with regard to strong anthropocentrism, (1) the neo-technocratic enterprise and (2) the techno-environmentalist enterprise; and with regard to weak anthropocentrism, (3) the pseudo-environmentalist enterprise and (4) the quasi-environmentalist enterprise. Such a typology can be useful for business managers (...) to write and/or review their environmental policies. However, it only reflects the “ideal values” of the enterprise, not the corporate story with regard to environmental issues. (shrink)

Having a confirmation bias sometimes leads us to hold inaccurate beliefs. So, the puzzle goes: why do we have it? According to the influential argumentative theory of reasoning, confirmation bias emerges because the primary function of reason is not to form accurate beliefs, but to convince others that we’re right. A crucial prediction of the theory, then, is that confirmation bias should be found only in the reasoning domain. In this article, we argue that there is evidence that confirmation bias (...) does exist outside the reasoning domain. This undermines the main evidential basis for the argumentative theory of reasoning. In presenting the relevant evidence, we explore why having such confirmation bias may not be maladaptive. (shrink)

Etrange parcours que celui du Logos qui, de Heraclite a nos jours, tend a s'effacer, dans ce monde actuel, tout entier voue a la science, au tout numerique. Cette vision heracliteenne de la totalite s'est estompee, transformee qu'elle fut deja des les premiers siecles de notre ere dans sa postulation religieuse, puis dans la modernite, et s'est perdue dans un monde ou, science et technique prenant leur envol, l'homme avait comme horizon de " devenir comme maitre et possesseur de la (...) Nature ". Michel Blay analyse cet etat qui nous laisse de plus en plus en desherence ; et dans un monde ou " Dieu est mort, et c'est nous qui l'avons tue ", comment ne pas sombrer dans cette illusion d'un homme tout-puissant, dans lequel meme le psychique est traite a l'aune des neuro-sciences ou l'homme a perdu sa completude et ne pense meme plus a la chercher? Ne serait-ce pas la poesie, elle seule, " dans ces temps de detresse " qui offrirait une voie pour retrouver sa voix? Certes " Il n'y a pas de paradis " nous dit Andre Frenaud. " Etait-ce l'aube, ou le soir deja perce? Qu'avions-nous espere que nous allons cherchant? ". (shrink)

Having served for a long time under Ostrogothic kings, then removed from office, Cassiodorus (vith century) designed his writings for the members of the famous monastery that he founded at Vivarium. In his monumental Expositio Psalmorum, meant for the novices, he wanted to give his readers not only an exegesis of the biblical text, but rudiments of Liberal Arts too, especially of dialectics and logic. This paper intends to show Cassiodorus’ conception of an orthodox study of dialectics, and his pedagogical (...) devices. Then is considered the way in which Cassiodorus applies in his commentary categorical and hypothetical syllogistics. Finally, special attention is given to Cassiodorus’ rigorous demonstration about the famous Three Chapters controversy. In the dialectical passages of the Expositio appears the artificial cha­racter of this attempt to reconcile secular culture and biblical exegesis. The best in Cassiodo­rus’ enterprise is his enthusiasm. (shrink)

Most states are multination states, and most peoples are stateless peoples. Just as collectives can behave as sovereign states only if they are recognized by the international community, liberal multination states must recognize stateless peoples in order to determine their political status within that state. There is, however, no agreement on the kind of principles that should be considered, especially under classical liberalism, which gives individuals preeminence over groups. Liberal theories that attempt to accommodate collective rights are often based on (...) a comprehensive version of liberalism that subscribes to moral individualism. Within such a framework, they develop a watered-down concept of collective rights. In A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights Michel Seymour explores the theoretical resources of John Rawls’s political liberalism and shows that this particular approach can accommodate genuine collective rights. By Rawls’s account, Seymour explains, peoples are moral agents and sources of valid moral claims and are therefore entitled to collective rights. These kinds of rights translate, in the constitution of the multination state, to a true political recognition for stateless peoples. Ultimately, A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights answers three important questions: Who is the subject of collective rights? What is the object of collective rights? And can they be institutionalized in real politics? (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the constitutive problems and other several aspects of what a research entitled 'formal epistemology' should be. The interest in this subject has to do with the possibility of reaching a privileged point of view or axis of research - i.e., the 'formal' one - that would allow, a better grasp of the richness and variety of the facts and problems tackled by precise (local) epistemology of theories (for example, in physics). This approach is likely to (...) enable one to hold the main structural lines that organize those theories according to a more com prehensive, unifying and synthetic intelligibilit. By the same token, it would eventually allow a better handling of the changes required in the organization of knowledge, putting emphasis on its main directions, drawing up a rational inventory of this knowledge, and perhaps anticipating others. At first, we deal with the `thought of changes' that no approach of the 'form' can afford to leave aside, since the meaning of this concept is inseparable from the contents that come with constructions and modifications. We examine then the notion of 'epistemic operation' as an instrument to create new forms on the theoretical as well as on the meta-theoretical levels. ln the wake of it, we analyze the characteristics of the form and of the formal, as well as their relationship with the contents of knowledge. We also take the notion of object into account, since it depends upon the decision of a subject and upon conventional choices. We finally inquire about the link between `epistemic operations' as specified above and algorithmic functions for knowledge statements, and emphasize the risk of reductionism that might follow from a naturalistic conception of representation. (shrink)

There is a striking difference between the methodology of the young Einstein and that of the old. I argue that Einstein’s switch in the late 1910s from a moderate empiricism to an extreme rationalism should at least in part be understood against the background of his crushing personal and political experiences during the war years in Berlin. As a result of these experiences, Einstein started to put into practice what, drawing on Schopenhauer, he had preached for years, namely to use (...) science as his means of escaping from “the merely personal.” Whatever the exact sources of Einstein’s about-face, the older man has left us with a highly misleading picture of how the younger man achieved the successes that we still celebrate today. This has had a harmful influence on theoretical physics. If the young Einstein’s successes are any guide as to how successful theoretical physics is done, close adherence to general features of the empirical data is much more and mathematical elegance is much less important than the old Einstein wanted us to believe. (shrink)

Scientists working on the wave theory of light in the 19 th century took it for granted that there had to be a medium for the propagation of light waves. This medium was called the luminiferous [= “light carrying”] ether. One of the central questions about this medium concerned its state of motion. There were two options: (1) The ether is completely undisturbed by matter moving through it (stationary or immobile ether); (2) Matter drags along the ether in its vicinity (...) and/or in its interior (dragged-along ether). Stellar aberration provided the main argument for the first option (even though a special dragging effect in the case of transparent matter had to be built into the theory to account for refraction). Polarization provided the main argument for the second option. These two options and the arguments pro and con will be explained in more detail below. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of Bas van Fraassen’s views on representation. While I agree with most of his claims, I disagree on the following three issues. Firstly, I contend that some isomorphism between the representor and what is represented is a universal necessary condition for the success of any representation, even in the case of misrepresentation. Secondly, I argue that the so-called “semantic” or “model-theoretic” construal of theories does not give proper due to the (...) role played by true propositions in successful representing practices. Thirdly, I attempt to show that the force of van Fraassen’s pragmatic - and antirealist - “dissolution” of the “loss of reality objection” loses its bite when we realize that our cognitive contact with real phenomena is achieved not by representing but by expressing true propositions about them. (shrink)

I relate the story of how matrix mechanics grew out of the treatment of optical dispersion in the old quantum theory, paying special attention to the contributions of the American theoretical physicists John H. Van Vleck and John C. Slater. Van Vleck shares the credit with Max Born for being the first to publish a full derivation of the crucial Kramers dispersion formula using Bohr’s correspondence principle. Slater was one of the architects of the short-lived but influential Bohr-Kramers-Slater (BKS) theory (...) that helped popularize the so-called Ersatz- or virtual oscillators central both to the treatment of dispersion in the old quantum theory and to the transition to matrix mechanics. (shrink)

According to the traditional view, meaning presents itself under the form of some kind of identity.

Toute science, admet-on, commence par détacher un objet en le rendant indépendant des sujets et des situations. Mais cette conception étroite de la connaissance scientifique laisse subsister des zones d'ombre. La conscience n'est pas un objet. Elle est ce sans quoi rien ne pourrait être pris pour objet. La conscience n'est pas détachable des sujets, car elle s'identifie à ce qui est vécu par un sujet. De façon analogue, en physique quantique, un phénomène n'est pas dissociable de son contexte expérimental, (...) car il s'identifie à ce qui se manifeste à grande échelle au laboratoire. Que faire pour ne pas laisser ces cas extrêmes de côté? Généraliser la méthode scientifique. Ne plus la borner à définir et à caractériser des objets, mais l'étendre à la coordination directe des expériences. Telle est la révolution de pensée qu'il faut accomplir pour résoudre, ou plutôt dissoudre, deux questions-limites de la science : le problème de l'origine de la conscience et le paradoxe du "chat de Schrödinger" en physique quantique. (shrink)

As I am not at all a specialist on Gottlob Frege’s work, my comments intended initially to be focused on an aspect that emerges in the last part of Peter Clark’s paper “Frege, neo-logicism and applied mathematics” 1, where he treats the question of “applied mathematics” — an aspect that appealed to me and that was triggered by Frege’s relationship between numbers and concepts, and reasoning. Starting with this concern, I have been led by my subject to propose some considerations (...) about foundations and rationality which will go — briefly — in two directions. The first direction is that of a distinction between logical and rational foundations, whilst the second direction is that of taking into account as a fact the historical development of mathematics among the sciences, which modifies the terms of any foundational program. In delineating these considerations, I found that what I had in mind could apply to mathematics itself as well as to “applied mathematics”, thus deviating somewhat from my first explicit intention. In conclusion I shall consider the possibility of a rational foundation programme for mathematical and physico-mathematical sciences which would take into account the changes in the scientific contents and the widenings of the forms of rationality that, in my view, make these changes possible. Such foundations for knowledge would not be any more static, but dynamical and would be possibly considered only retrospectively: they would be “forward foundations”, in a sense that will be discussed in detail elsewhere. (shrink)

A questão da natureza e do sentido de um "idealismo leibniziano" encontra-se, já há vinte anos, no centro de um grande debate nos estudos leibnizianos, principalmente anglo-saxões. A conepção mais consequente e mais radical desse idealismo foi exposta por Robert Merrihew Adams : " o princípio mais fundamental da metafísica de Leibniz é que não há nada mais nas coisas que substâncias simples e, nelas, as percepções e as apetições".. Esse debate encontra um outro sobre o reconhecimento de períodos na (...) formação da metafísica leibniziana e sobre o ponto de vista que permite dar conta desses períodos da maneira mais adequada: expressão constante de um "Sistema de Leibniz" invariável em suas teses e sua estrutura, ou, antes, pesquisa aberta na qual a invenção concentual não se fecha nunca em uma fórmula sistemática única? Com efeito, mesmo aqueles que quiseram reconhecer um período de "anos intermediários", durante o qual Leibniz não teria aderido ao idealismo, geralmente concederam que a última metafísica, aquela que se desenvolve propriamente segundo a tese monadológica, está, finalmente, bem caracterizada por essa adesão. Proponho-me desenvolver os seguintes argumentos: 1. Do ponto de vista genético, a tese monadológica responde originariamente à exigência de um funamento da realidade dos corpos. 2. O desenvolvimento da metafísica leibniziana do último período não dispensam a caracterização de uma verdadeira "substância corporal". 3. É a especificação do que chama de "organismo" que impede Leibniz de deixar a última palavra a um idealismo tal como o que se atribui a ele. Se há idealismo, é preciso entendê-lo em outro sentido. (shrink)

This paper deals with the question whether Seneca’s dramas contain a concept of the tragic. Examining this question this contribution first discusses the studies that have supported the thesis that Seneca’s dramas are anti-tragic. Then it tries by means of the method of the interpretatio stoica to advance a hypothesis how a concept of tragic could be grasped at the background of Seneca’s philosophical thinking. Finally the paper examines this hypothesis at the example of the „Troades“.

Dostoyevsky explained how human being could be the builder who has the power to destroy everything-that-is. Thomas Mann unveiled the deep influence of the unconscious as well as the subconscious: both components of human psyche must be taken into account, when exploring the mystery of human being. Robert Musil’s literary works focused on commonalities between animals and human beings, that is, their similar instincts. Musil was promoting a new morals, as it is grounded on instinctive life. Dostoyevsky, Mann and Musil (...) agreed that human being is prone to consider himself/herself as an infinite being. Firstly, human being destroys Nature and justifies himself/herself through technocratic, anthropometric, and anthropocentric worldviews. Secondly, human beings forget the situation of nonhuman beings and put the emphasis on their privileged position in the Cosmos. Thirdly, human being looks at language as the supreme quality of living beings and makes human language the ultimate parameter for any other form of language. The way those three aspects of human being and existence are idolized strengthens a mindset focusing on the infinite character of humankind, when compared with the situation of nonhuman beings. (shrink)

L’apparition de données quantitatives en archéologie, puis des outils de gestion dont on commence seulement à maîtriser le développement, imposent de façon concomitante aux professionnels une réflexion de fond sur l’évolution de leur discipline : il importe en effet, au moment où l’on met en œuvre des outils nouveaux, de s’interroger sur les conséquences des transformations en cours sur le processus scientifique. Au-delà d'une démarche épistémologique, cet article interroge le caractère novateur que peut représenter la gestion de données de plus (...) en plus nombreuses. Il propose surtout de voir, dans la mutualisation de ces données, une nouveauté liée à la conjugaison de diverses décisions (liées à la recherche tant publique que privée), et un changement de paradigme dans la constitution des savoirs. Si la documentation est partagée par tous, le caractère innovant de la réflexion se déplace, non pas vers la maîtrise de données nouvelles, mais bien vers la capacité des acteurs scientifiques à exploiter ces données de façon différente. (shrink)