On fait ici l’hypothèse que les atmosphères nous enjoignent de penser l’unité originaire, c’est-à-dire non synthétique, d’une spatialité et d’une tonalité affective. Ce problème est philosophiquement ouvert dans Être et temps par la détermination heideggerienne de la spatialité et de la Befindlichkeit, ce qui ne débouche toutefois pas sur une étude des atmosphères. L’article présente ensuite deux voies pour penser la coappartenance de l’espace et de l’intonation, c’est-à-dire pour penser l’espace intoné (gestimmter Raum) : celle qui part de la vie (...) charnelle (Hermann Schmitz) et celle qui part de l’expressivité (Elisabeth Ströker). (shrink)

L’article examine le sens de la systématisation de la philosophie transcendantale que Schelling présente en 1800 comme accomplie par l’art, « organon et document » de la philosophie. A partir d’une reconstitution du problème et de la dynamique propres au Système de l’idéalisme transcendantal, puis de la fonction systématique de la philosophie de l’art, on soutient que l’achèvement que l’art est censé accomplir prend en fait plutôt – en lien direct avec l’ambiguïté du principe du Système – la figure d’une (...) mise en suspens, d’une indécision fondamentale entre deux voies, ultérieurement empruntées l’une par la philosophie de l’identité, l’autre par la dernière philosophie.This article examines the significance of the systematization of transcendental philosophy which Schelling claims in 1800 to be fulfilled by art, « the organon and document » of philosophy. After reconstructing the problem and the process peculiar to the System of transcendental Idealism, as well as the systematic function of the philosophy of art, we maintain that the supposed completion of philosophy by art is in fact fundamentally unresolved, suspended between two distinct approaches which will later be taken up in the philosophy of identity and in the late philosophy. (shrink)

Connaissant bien le rôle essentiel pris par le symbolisme, comme présence objective de l’Idée, dans les métaphysiques de l’art postkantiennes (Schelling, Hegel), V. Basch en fait cependant la clef de sa propre esthétique sentimentaliste, subjectiviste et anti-métaphysique. Le déplacement de sens du symbolisme, qui s’effectue chez Basch principalement à partir de son étude de Kant, de Fr. Th. Vischer et de la psychologie physiologique allemande (G. Th. Fechner, W. Wundt), est analysé dans l’article comme le passage d’une incarnation qui est (...) présentation de l’Idée dans le phénomène, à une prise de chair de mes propres sentiments et émotions à même l’objet de l’expérience esthétique. (shrink)

Schelling’s philosophy of art between 1801 and 1807 can be defined as metaphysics of art. The object of that metaphysics is to deploy the absolute as the being of art and of the arts. Schelling has been criticized on the basis that this metaphysics of art represses the infinite diversity of existing works of art, while overlooking concrete aesthetic experience. Based on Schelling’s definition of the “philosophical construction” of art as an inseparably speculative and historical construction, the aim of this (...) paper is to challenge such assertions. It will show that “historical construction” has to be understood in a twofold manner: first, as a transcendental history of the absolute’s artistic individuation and second, as a cultural history of both the ancient and modern worlds of art. Working within this twofold setting the paper argues that Schelling’s systematic approach, while exhibiting a unifying force, still remains open to the otherness of the real. (shrink)

L’article analyse le sens que prend l’architecture dans la philosophie de Schelling vers 1802/05. On montre comment ce dernier subvertit la thèse de l’architecture-art comme imitation de la simple construction, pour finalement définir l’art architectural par sa capacité à présenter, dans l’inorganique, des allégories de l’organique. On illustre pour finir concrètement différents niveaux de compréhension de cette caractérisation, d’une part avec des exemples tirés de Schelling, d’autre part avec des édifices architecturaux récents relevant à divers titres de la bioinspiration.

Big data and artificial intelligence (“AI”) promise to transform virtually all aspects of biomedical research and health care (Matheny et al. 2019), through facilitation of drug development, diagno...

The use of racial categories in biomedicine has had a long history in the United States. However, social hierarchy and discrimination, justified by purported scientific differences, has also plagued the history of racial categories. Because “race” has some correlation with biological and genetic characteristics, there has been a call not to “throw the baby out with the bathwater” by eliminating race as a research or clinical category. I argue that race is too undefined and fluid to be useful as a (...) proxy for biology or genetics. (shrink)

A familiar criticism of bioethics charges it with being more conceptual than practical—having little application to the “real world.” In order to answer its critics and keep its feet on the ground, bioethics must utilize the social sciences more effectively. Empirical research can provide the bridge between conceiving a moral vision of a better world, and actually enacting it.

In his book Objectivity, William Earle has attempted to give the phenomenologically intentional aspect of awareness its philosophical due. To sharpen the issues, it may be well to review some of the main points of his treatment. Earle combines a realist view of the object of awareness with a partially Hegelian conception of awareness. Awareness, according to Earle, involves three stages, recognizable as thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The thesis is made up of the subject and object intertwined, and not yet (...) distinguished from each other. The antithesis is constituted by a recoil of the subject from the object back upon itself. Earle terms this recoil a primary reflexivity of the subject, which, though ingredient in awareness, is not yet sufficient to constitute awareness. Whereas for Hegel the reflexive recoil of the subject back upon itself constitutes the object for the subject, for Earle this recoil of the subject in no way creates its object. The reflexive withdrawal of the subject from the object simply separates two metaphysically distinct entities. Hegel's separation of subject and object alienates the subject from himself; Earle's separation of subject and object alienates the subject from the world. But for both Earle and Hegel, knowledge of the object does not take place until a redemptive synthesis of subject and object occurs. In the Hegelian scheme the redemptive synthesis unifies the subject with himself. According to Earle, however, the redemptive synthesis achieves only knowledge of the object as other than the subject; that is, it is the object as distant from, therefore intended by, the subject that is known. The final stage in knowledge is thus constituted by a positive approach of the subject to a metaphysically distinct object. Earle must therefore insist, as he does, that immediate self-awareness is, in principle, impossible. He characterizes his own method as retrospectively reflexive, very different from the primary reflexivity involved in the constitution of awareness. To justify the validity and possibility of this retrospective reflexivity, he argues for the metaphysical identity of a subject forever outside of and beyond its own acts, and, of course, inaccessible to knowledge in a way that the world independent of the subject is not. (shrink)

As part of the celebrations of The Hastings Center’s fiftieth anniversary, we are launching an annual prize, The David Roscoe Award for an Early‐Career Scholar’s Essay on Science, Ethics, and Society. The award is named in honor of David Roscoe, an accomplished essayist and recent past chair of the Hastings board. The award is intended to highlight the good scholarship that will take the field of bioethics forward into the next fifty years. It will recognize an early‐career scholar—someone who either (...) is currently pursuing a relevant academic degree or has earned one within the last six years—for a published essay on the social and ethical implications of advances in science and technology. More information about the award, along with online submission forms, is available on The Hastings Center’s website. (shrink)

Here at the Center, we had the privilege of seeing how Dan Callahan lived out his last days and weeks. True to his nature, Dan never stopped thinking or writing. Indeed, his wife Sidney told me that he finished his last essay one day before his death, on July 16th, insisting that she help him get to the computer so he could discuss it with a colleague. “It's my last one,” he told her with his characteristic self‐awareness. Dan also chose (...) the last topic he would focus on: climate change. At a December 2018 board meeting, Dan presented his desire to develop a workshop to explore the ways in which bioethics in general, and The Hastings Center in particular, might be able to make a valuable contribution to addressing the problem of global warming. (shrink)

Institutional ethics consultation services for biomedical scientists have begun to proliferate, especially for clinical researchers. We discuss several models of ethics consultation and describe a team-based approach used at Stanford University in the context of these models. As research ethics consultation services expand, there are many unresolved questions that need to be addressed, including what the scope, composition, and purpose of such services should be, whether core competencies for consultants can and should be defined, and how conflicts of interest should (...) be mitigated. We make preliminary recommendations for the structure and process of research ethics consultation, based on our initial experiences in a pilot program. (shrink)

Institutional ethics consultation services for biomedical scientists have begun to proliferate, especially for clinical researchers. We discuss several models of ethics consultation and describe a team-based approach used at Stanford University in the context of these models. As research ethics consultation services expand, there are many unresolved questions that need to be addressed, including what the scope, composition, and purpose of such services should be, whether core competencies for consultants can and should be defined, and how conflicts of interest should (...) be mitigated. We make preliminary recommendations for the structure and process of research ethics consultation, based on our initial experiences in a pilot program. (shrink)

This paper advances a new paradigm in clinical ethics education that not only emphasizes development of individual cli but also focuses on the institutional context within which health care professionals work. This approach has been applied to the goal of improving the care provided to critically and terminally ill adults. The model has been adopted by about thirty hospitals and nursing homes; additional institutions will soon join the program, entitled Decisions Near the End of Life. Here, we describe the history (...) and rationale for this approach, its goals, pedagogical assumptions, and design. (shrink)

Across the world, an authoritarian and exclusionary form of populism is gaining political traction. Historically, some populist movements have been democratic and based on a sense of inclusive justice and the common good. But the populism on the rise at present speaks and acts otherwise. It is challenging constitutional democracies. The polarization seen in authoritarian populism goes beyond the familiar left-right political spectrum and generates disturbing forms of extremism, including the so-called alternative right in the United States and similar ethnic (...) and nationalistic political movements in other countries. The field of bioethics will be profoundly affected if authoritarian populism displaces constitutional democracy. But the field has a significant contribution to make to rebuilding the communal and civic foundations upon which constitutional democracy rests. (shrink)

As we write, U.S. cities and states with extensive community transmission of Covid‐19 are in harm's way—not only because of the disease itself but also because of prior and current failures to act. During the 2009 influenza pandemic, public health agencies and hospitals developed but never adequately implemented preparedness plans. Focused on efficiency in a competitive market, health systems had few incentives to maintain stockpiles of essential medical equipment. Just‐in‐time economic models resulted in storage of only those supplies needed then. (...) At the same time, global purchasing in search of lower prices reduced the number of U.S. suppliers, with hospitals dependent on foreign companies. There is still a possibility that the pandemic will be manageably bad rather than unmanageably catastrophic in this country. Immediate, powerful, and sustained federal action could make the difference. (shrink)

The Institute of Medicine has called on health care leaders to transform their health systems into “learning health care systems,” capable of studying and continuously improving their practices. Learning health care systems commit to carrying out numerous kinds of investigations, ranging from clinical effectiveness studies to quality improvement research and implementation science. There has been progress in realizing the IOM's vision, but also many challenges. One of these challenges has been lingering uncertainty about whether the data collection and monitoring central (...) to learning health care systems is actually research and if so, what kind of ethical oversight it should have. This is not a new question. Yet so far, there has been no foundational analysis of the fit between the existing human subjects protection framework in use in the United States and the new kinds of data collection activities that are being, and increasingly will be, undertaken by learning health care systems. Two companion feature articles in this volume, by a team at Johns Hopkins, fill this void. (shrink)

“There's glory for you!”“I don't know what you mean by ‘glory,’ ” Alice said.Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course, you dont—till I tell you. I meant ‘there's a nice knock-down argument.’”“But ‘glory’ doesn't mean a ‘nice knock-down argument,” Alice objected.“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”“The question is,” said (...) Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master, that's all.”When applied bioethics confronts the topic of futility, the question of who is to be master turns out to be central. Indeed, much of the literature on futility has focused on exactly this question: who gets to define the terms of the debate? Who gets to decide that treatment is “futile” and therefore allowably withheld or withdrawn? (shrink)

This essay summarizes key insights across the essays in the Hastings Center Report's special report “Time to Rebuild: Essays on Trust in Health Care and Science.” These insights concern trust and trustworthiness as distinct concepts, competence as a necessary but not sufficient input to trust, trust as a reciprocal good, trust as an interpersonal as well as structural phenomena, the ethical impermissibility of seeking to win trust without being trustworthy, building and borrowing trust as distinct strategies, and challenges to trustworthiness (...) posed by the contingent nature of science. Together, these insights stand to advance an area of research that we believe has been historically stymied by conceptual confusion and a long‐standing insistence on treating trust as a purely instrumental good. (shrink)

Human genetic and genomic research can yield information that may be of clinical relevance to the individuals who participate as subjects of the research. However, no consensus exists as yet on the responsibilities of researchers to disclose individual research results to participants in human subjects research. “Genetic and genomic research” on humans varies widely, including association studies, examination of allele frequencies, and studies of natural selection, human migration, and genetic variation. For the purposes of this article, it is defined broadly (...) to include analysis of DNA collected from humans that has implications for human health. This paper addresses both research results of individual research participants that may be an intended product of the research, as well as unanticipated, “incidental” findings. (shrink)