Rivault’s book offers a comprehensive overview of the religious landscape of Caria as it relates to cults of Zeus, and is a reworked version of her doctoral thesis, examined at the University of Bordeaux in 2016. The book is structured around three chapters that each seek to speak to different elements of Zeus’ domain, with a short introduction and conclusion. The bulk of the text consists of what is effectively a catalogue of the different cult epicleses of Zeus that are (...) found in Caria acros... (shrink)

A persistent tradition existed in antiquity linking Caria with the island of Crete. This central theme of regional history is mirrored in the civic mythologies, cults and toponyms of southwestern Anatolia. This book explains why by approaching this diverse body of material with a broad chronological view, taking into account both the origins of this regional narrative and its endurance. It considers the mythologies in the light of archaeologically attested contacts during the Bronze Age, exploring whether such interaction could have (...) left a residuum in later traditions. The continued relevance of this aspect of Carian history is then considered in the light of contacts during the Classical and Hellenistic periods, with analysis of how, and in which contexts, traditions survived. The Carians were an Anatolian people; however, their integration into the mythological framework of the Greek world reveals that interaction with the Aegean was a fundamental aspect of their history. (shrink)

Processions in the Greek East were organised according to a clear visual schema, which helped to impose order and provide meaning. This demarcation was primarily enacted materially, with ritual roles frequently defined by the carrying of objects or accoutrements. This article focuses on the diversity and local particularities of roles terminating in -phoros during the Hellenistic and imperial periods, as evidenced by the epigraphic record. It explores how intrinsic these material dimensions were to the processional experience in the Greek world, (...) probing what they contributed to the aesthetics of procession and how they were ‘read’, both by participants and observers. (shrink)

The strong sensorimotor account of perception gives self-induced movements two constitutive roles in explaining visual consciousness. The first says that self-induced movements are vehicles of visual awareness, and for this reason consciousness ‘does not happen in the brain only’. The second says that the phenomenal nature of visual experiences is consists in the action-directing content of vision. In response I suggest, first, that the sense in which visual awareness is active should be explained by appeal to the role of attention (...) in visual consciousness, rather than self-induced movements; and second, that the sense in which perceptual consciousness does not happen in the brain only should be explained by appeal to the relational nature of perceptual consciousness, appeal to which also shows why links with action cannot exhaust phenomenal content. (shrink)

Verification and validation of numerical models of natural systems is impossible. This is because natural systems are never closed and because model results are always nonunique. Models can be confirmed by the demonstration of agreement between observation and prediction, but confirmation is inherently partial. Complete confirmation is logically precluded by the fallacy of affirming the consequent and by incomplete access to natural phenomena. Models can only be evaluated in relative terms, and their predictive value is always open to question. The (...) primary value of models is heuristic. (shrink)

Author note: Naomi Zack is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Albany. She herself is of mixed race: Jewish, African American, and Native American.

The U.S. scientific community has long led the world in research on such areas as public health, environmental science, and issues affecting quality of life. These scientists have produced landmark studies on the dangers of DDT, tobacco smoke, acid rain, and global warming. But at the same time, a small yet potent subset of this community leads the world in vehement denial of these dangers. -/- Merchants of Doubt tells the story of how a loose-knit group of high-level scientists and (...) scientific advisers, with deep connections in politics and industry, ran effective campaigns to mislead the public and deny well-established scientific knowledge over four decades. Remarkably, the same individuals surface repeatedly-some of the same figures who have claimed that the science of global warming is "not settled" denied the truth of studies linking smoking to lung cancer, coal smoke to acid rain, and CFCs to the ozone hole. "Doubt is our product," wrote one tobacco executive. These "experts" supplied it. -/- Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, historians of science, roll back the rug on this dark corner of the American scientific community, showing how ideology and corporate interests, aided by a too-compliant media, have skewed public understanding of some of the most pressing issues of our era. (shrink)

In this paper, I take seriously calls for public engagement in human genome editing decision-making by endorsing the convening of a “Citizens Jury” in conjunction with the International Commission on the Clinical Use of Human Germline Genome Editing’s next summit scheduled for March 6–8, 2023. This institutional modification promises a more inclusive, deliberative, and impactful form of engagement than standard bioethics engagement opportunities, such as comment periods, by serving both normative and political purposes in the quest to offer moral guidance (...) on gene editing. In examining evidence from the Australian Citizens’ Jury on Genome Editing convened in 2021, I argue that Citizens’ Juries should work in tandem with governing institutions to preserve the role of expertise while ensuring that the diverse views of the public are incorporated into their final reports as well. First, early inclusivity allows “the people” to hold agenda setting power through helping to set resource priorities. This also makes a downstream deliberative event, such as the called for Global Citizens’ Assembly, both more likely to occur and more influential on policy. Second, Jury’s diverse composition promises substantive contributions to the Commission’s work. Third, Citizens’ Juries could help to cultivate the Commission’s trustworthiness. (shrink)

We are morally obligated to plan for disaster because it affects human life and well-being. Because contemporary disasters affect the public, such planning should be public in democracies and it should not violate the basic ethical principles of normal times. Current Avian Flu pandemic planning is restricted to a response model based on scarce resources, or inadequate preparation, which gives priority to some lives over others. Rather than this model of ‘Save the Greatest Number,’ the public would be more ethically (...) served by a model of ‘Save All Who Can Be Saved,’ which is based on adequate preparation. And where events exceed adequate preparation, scarce resources should be allocated fairly. (shrink)

Peopling the donor world -- The meaning of family in a changing world -- Creating families -- Creating communities across families -- The laws of the donor world: parents and children -- Law, adoption, and family secrets: disclosure and incest -- Reasons to regulate -- Regulating for connection -- Regulating for health and safety: setting limits in the gamete world -- Why not to regulate -- Conclusion: challenging and creating kinship.

Examining racial profiling in American policing, Naomi Zack argues against white privilege discourse while introducing a new theory of applicative justice. Deepening understanding without abandoning hope, Zack shows why it is more important to consider black rights than white privilege as we move forward through today's culture of inequality.

A central intuition regarding self-knowledge is that if I say (or think) that I believe that it is raining – to use a familiar example – I do not merely state a fact about my mental life but also express my view of the world: I take it to be the case that it is raining. The notion of avowal is supposed to capture this duality of perspectives: whilst occupying one’s first-person perspective, one self-attributes a mental attitude, which is a (...) fact that is supposed to be true independent of one’s own perspective. Another way of putting this is that avowal is a self-attribution of an intentional mental attitude that is first-personal and commissive. Many grant that avowal and its commissive form are essential to the first-person character of self-knowledge – which I call the commitment view. However, only a few argue that avowal remains essential in achieving self-knowledge of one’s substantial mental attitudes, i.e., attitudes that are significant to a person’s life and self-conception, such as one’s values, deeper desires, and cares. In fact, current orthodoxy is skeptical that avowal has any role to play in acquiring substantial self-knowledge. According to this skeptical view of avowal, such attitudes are often distorted in the first-person perspective and are better reflected in someone’s behavior, i.e., in the relevant patterns of action and reaction. Rather than avowing an attitude, interpreting these patterns is supposed to provide substantial self-knowledge. The paper proceeds by first clarifying the commitment view (section 2) and the skeptical view (section 3). I will then offer two arguments against the skeptical view. First, I will show that substantial mental attitudes cannot, as the skeptical view needs to assume, be discovered in patterns of action and reaction (section 4). Secondly, I will inquire the complex relation between avowal and patterns of action and reaction and argue that a gap between the two cannot be determined nor understood without the agent’s perspective, including their avowal (section 5). Both arguments establish that the skeptic cannot deny a necessary role for avowal. This reflects the agential nature of substantial mental attitudes and challenges the dominant skeptical view of substantial self-knowledge. (shrink)

The question of whether it is permissible to quantify into a modal context is re-examined from an empiricist perspective. Following Wiggins, it is argued that an ontology of continuants implies essentialism, but it is also argued, against Wiggins, that the only conception of necessity that we need to start out with is that of analyticity. Essentialism, of a limited kind, can then be actually generated from this. An exceptionally fine-grained identity criterion for continuants is defended in this context. The debate (...) between Wiggins and Ayer over the legitimacy of de re modality is then examined in the light of these results, and it is argued that my position is consistent with Ayer’s minimalist assumptions. It is also argued that non-continuants will not sustain the essential/accidental distinction, thus giving some concessions to the sceptics. It is also shown that there are close connections between these issues and the more modern two-dimensionalist way of disentangling the necessary from the a posteriori, and that the latter needs to learn from the former. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that grounding relations are asymmetric. Here I develop and argue for a theory of metaphysical structure that takes grounding to be nonsymmetric rather than asymmetric. Even without infinite descending chains of dependence, it might be that every entity is grounded in some other entity. Having first addressed an immediate objection to the position under discussion, I introduce two examples of symmetric grounding. I give three arguments for the view that grounding is nonsymmetric (I call this view (...) ‘metaphysical interdependence’). These arguments are: (i) that metaphysical interdependence is the only theory able to reconcile competing intuitions about grounding; (ii) that it is the only theory consistent with both ‘gunk’ and ‘junk’; and (iii) that offers a satisfactory solution to the problem concerning whether or not grounding is itself grounded. (shrink)

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In “The Promise and Reality of Public Engagement in the Governance of Human Genome Editing Research,” Conley et al. raise (2023) important critiques of several public engagement practices in the re...

This chapter argues that a central division among accounts of joint attention, both in philosophy and developmental psychology, turns on how they address two questions: What, if any, is the connection between the capacity to engage in joint attention triangles and the capacity to grasp the idea of objective truth? How do we explain the kind of openness or sharing of minds that occurs in joint attention? The chapter explores the connections between answers to both questions, and argues that theories (...) can be divided into two distinct types according to how these connections are developed. (shrink)

Attempts to elucidate grounding are often made by connecting grounding to metaphysical explanation, but the notion of metaphysical explanation is itself opaque, and has received little attention in the literature. We can appeal to theories of explanation in the philosophy of science to give us a characterization of metaphysical explanation, but this reveals a tension between three theses: that grounding relations are objective and mind-independent; that there are pragmatic elements to metaphysical explanation; and that grounding and metaphysical explanation share a (...) close connection. Holding fixed the mind-independence of grounding, I show that neither horn of the resultant dilemma can be blunted. Consequently, we should reject the assumption that grounding relations are mind-independent. (shrink)

Kant’s Critical philosophy seems to leave very little room to account for the mental lives of animals, since the understanding, which animals lack, is required for experience and cognition. While Kant does not regard animals as Cartesian machines, he leaves them few resources for getting around in the world in a coherent and responsive way. In this paper I present Kant’s account of animal minds. According to this picture, animals have representations of which they are not conscious, and these representations (...) can give rise to inclinations through a form of reflection. While this account faces difficulties in accounting for the variety and complexity of animal behavior, it is impressive in its ingenuity, and it clarifies the role of various faculties and terms in the Critical philosophy. -/- . (shrink)

Socrates was not a moral philosopher. Instead he was a theorist who showed how human desire and human knowledge complement one another in the pursuit of human happiness. His theory allowed him to demonstrate that actions and objects have no value other than that which they derive from their employment by individuals who, inevitably, desire their own happiness and have the knowledge to use actions and objects as a means for its attainment. The result is a naturalised, practical, and demystified (...) account of good and bad, and right and wrong. Professor Reshotko presents a freshly envisioned Socratic theory residing at the intersection of the philosophy of mind and ethics. It makes an important contribution to the study of the Platonic dialogues and will also interest all scholars of ethics and moral psychology. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Naomi Scheman argues that the concerns of philosophy emerge not from the universal human condition but from conditions of privilege. Her books represents a powerful challenge to the notion that gender makes no difference in the construction of philosophical reasoning. At the same time, it criticizes the narrow focus of most feminist theorizing and calls for a more inclusive form of inquiry.

Plato's texts have been subject to re‐reading in recent years, reflecting new ways in which philosophy has sought to understand the relationship between the author, the reader, and the text. This chapter begins by restating the allegory of the Stanley Cavell in The Republic, before turning to Cavell's reading of this in relation to the opening of the text. It further illustrates the idea of education as a finding of voice, which Cavell articulates through Emersonian moral perfectionism with reference to (...) his work on philosophy as autobiography. The educative relationship to the self and to the other, and the responsibility one takes for one's voice, is then illustrated further by way of Michel Foucault's account of Socratic parrhesia, a practice evident in The Republic and in other texts of Plato to which Foucault refers. Cavell ventures the term sublimation in relation to his questioning of the allegory of the Cave. (shrink)

‘Like the shadow of one’s own head, [the referent of one’s ‘I’ thoughts] will not wait to be jumped on. And yet it is never very far ahead; indeed, sometimes it does not seem to be ahead of the pursuer at all. It evades capture by lodging itself in the very inside of the muscles of the pursuer. It is too near even to be within arm’s reach.’(C of M 177-89).

This chapter begins by providing some historical background to European integration. It draws attention to the way that history has been used to promote a European identity since the European Union and, with it, European citizenship were created in 1992. The framing of the relationship between globalisation and its socioeconomic challenges has made the need to attend to questions of citizenship, particularly through education, self‐evident. The shift in the mode of governance has not only entailed using education as a means (...) of educating citizens about Europe: in the current context, education, or specifically, learning, has become a central aspect of how citizenship is understood. Examples of recent educational and cultural policy highlight terms that are central to producing a particular mode of governance. These examples illustrate the practices of accountability that have emerged in recent years that require governments, institutions, organisations, and individuals to speak about themselves in particular ways. (shrink)

It is argued that it is very hard to analyse causation in such a way that prevents everything from causing everything else. This is particularly true if we assume that the causal relation is transitive, for it all too often happens that causal chains that we wish to keep separate pass through common intermediate events. It is also argued that treating causes as aspects of events, rather than the events themselves, will not solve this problem. This is because aspects have (...) to be highly disjunctive, and disjunctive conditions tend to undermine causal connections, a fact that is most clearly seen when causation is analysed in terms of INUS conditions. It is concluded that reductive analyses of causation do not work, and that transitivity can only be guaranteed in cases where the elements of the causal chain constitute an independently understood causal process. (shrink)

The role of motherhood was attenuated over the second half of the twentieth century, by literal and metaphorical factors: Privileged women gained control over their reproduction and developed non-mothering life priorities; government and society became less nurturing in public ideals; projects of spontaneous speciation began in biology; the environment became unsustaining. In addition, feminist criticism resulted in greater individuation between the persons of mothers and their children. With these changes, the role of motherhood lacks a positive identity, culturally and psychically. (...) Extending a literary character, I suggest that mothers consider an attenuated internal identity, based on their unique biological relationships to their children. This would afford a more positive self-identity, as well as a pragmatic solution to demands made by present “middleman” roles for mothers to procure expert child enculturation care, in addition to their “second shifts.”. (shrink)