A layered approach to the evaluation of action alternatives with continuous time for decision making under the moral doctrine of Negative Utilitarianism is presented and briefly discussed from a philosophical perspective.

For many philosophers working in the area of Population Ethics, it seems that either they have to confront the Repugnant Conclusion , or they have to confront the Non-Identity Problem . To them it seems there is no escape, they either have to face one problem or the other. However, there is a way around this, allowing us to escape the Repugnant Conclusion, by using what I will call Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism – which though similar to anti-frustrationism, (...) has some important differences in practice. Current “positive” forms of utilitarianism have struggled to deal with the Repugnant Conclusion, as their theory actually entails this conclusion; however, it seems that a form of Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism easily escapes this dilemma. (shrink)

Ever since the publication of Harry Frankfurt’s “Equality as a Moral Ideal” :21–43, 1987), the doctrine of sufficiency has attracted great attention among both ethical theorists and political philosophers. The doctrine of sufficiency consists of two main theses: the positive thesis states that it is morally important for people to have enough; and the negative thesis states that once everybody has enough, relative inequality has absolutely no moral importance. Many political philosophers have presented different versions of sufficientarianism that retain (...) the general spirit of what Frankfurt had proposed in his seminal work. However, all of these different versions of sufficientarianism suffer from two critical problems: they fail to give right answers to lifeboat situations, and they fail to provide continuous ethical judgments. In this paper, I show a version of utilitarianism that solves these problems while retaining the major attractions of sufficientarianism. I call it “prospect utilitarianism.” In addition, I show that prospect utilitarianism can avoid standard objections to utilitarianism and has aspects that can appeal to both prioritarians and egalitarians as well. (shrink)

The most common argument against negative utilitarianism is the world destruction argument, according to which negative utilitarianism implies that if someone could kill everyone or destroy the world, it would be her duty to do so. Those making the argument often endorse some other form of consequentialism, usually traditional utilitarianism. It has been assumed that negative utilitarianism is less plausible than such other theories partly because of the world destruction argument. So, it is (...) thought, someone who finds theories in the spirit of utilitarianism attractive should not go for negative utilitarianism, but should instead pick traditional utilitarianism or some other similar theory such as prioritarianism. I argue that this is a mistake. The world destruction argument is not a reason to reject negative utilitarianism in favour of these other forms of consequentialism, because there are similar arguments against such theories that are at least as persuasive as the world destruction argument is against negative utilitarianism. (shrink)

In this article I defend a rule utilitarian approach to paternalistic policies in research with human participants. Some rules that restrict individual autonomy can be justified on the grounds that they help to maximize the overall balance of benefits over risks in research. The consequences that should be considered when formulating policy include not only likely impacts on research participants, but also impacts on investigators, institutions, sponsors, and the scientific community. The public reaction to adverse events in research (such as (...) significant injury to participants or death) is a crucial concern that must be taken into account when assessing the consequences of different policy options, because public backlash can lead to outcomes that have a negative impact on science, such as cuts in funding, overly restrictive regulation and oversight, and reduced willingness of individuals to participate in research. I argue that concern about the public reaction to adverse events justifies some restrictions on the risks that competent, adult volunteers can face in research that offers them no significant benefits. The paternalism defended here is not pure, because it involves restrictions on the rights of investigators in order to protect participants. It also has a mixed rationale, because individual autonomy may be restricted not only to protect participants from harm but also to protect other stakeholders. Utility is not the sole justification for paternalistic research policies, since other considerations, such as justice and respect for individual rights/autonomy, must also be taken into account. (shrink)

By the turn of the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham was a well‐ known moral and legal reformer. Bentham's moral philosophy is often introduced as an object lesson in the failures of simplistic utilitarianism. This chapter outlines the basic elements of Bentham's political philosophy. It looks at three important and distinctive features of his utilitarian thought: his introduction of four subordinate ends to guide public morality and law, his account of “official aptitude,” and his “assumption of infallibility” argument. The chapter (...) then considers James Mill's own published comments, positive and negative, on Bentham's work. It argues that, despite some rhetorical flourishes, Mill's critical comments are carefully qualified and quite specific, and do not touch large parts of Bentham's utilitarian reform project. The chapter then articulates what Mill in fact carries over from Bentham, revealing the continuing significance of both these great utilitarian thinkers. (shrink)

The article develops an internalist justification of welfare ethics based on empathy. It takes up Hume’s and Schopenhauer’s internalistic (but not consistently developed) justification approach via empathy, but tries to solve three of their problems: 1. the varying strength of empathy depending on the proximity to the object of empathy, 2. the unclear metaethical foundation, 3. the absence of a quantitative model of empathy strength. 1. As a solution to the first problem, the article proposes to limit the foundation of (...) welfare ethics to certain types of empathy. 2. In response to the second problem, an internalistic metaethical conception of the justification of moral principles is outlined, the result of which is: The moral value of the well-being of persons is identical to the expected extent of (positive and negative) empathy arising from this well-being. 3. The contribution to the solution of the third problem and focus of the article is an empirical model of the (subject’s) expected extent of empathy depending on (an object’s) well-being. According to this model, the extent of empathy is not proportional to the expected empathy, but follows a concave function and is therefore prioritarian. Accordingly, the article provides a sketch of an internalist justification of prioritarianism. (shrink)

InMoral Thinking R. M. Hare offers a very influential defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections. Hare's argument is roughly that utilitarianism conflicts with defensible moral intuitions only in unusual cases and that, in such cases, even defensible moral intuitions are unreliable. This paper reconstructs Hare's arguments and argues that they presuppose the success of his problematic proof of utilitarianism. Contrary to what many have thought, Hare's negative defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections is not separable (...) from his proof. In the second part of the paper I argue that Hare does not succeed in defending utilitarianism against the objection that it is too demanding. The final section of the paper sketches a substantially revised version of Hare's reply to intuitive objections. So revised, the argument is independent of Hare's proof and affords a plausible answer to the objection that utilitarianism is too demanding. (shrink)

The paper is one of the first empirical attempts that builds on the moral dilemmas and group rationality literature to explore the way in which group composition with respect to group members’ individual choices in moral dilemmas and social influence processes impact on group moral choices. First individually and then, in small groups, 221 participants were asked to decide on 10 moral dilemmas. Our results show that emergent group level utilitarianism is higher than the average individual utilitarianism, yet, (...) lower than the highest individual utilitarianism within groups. We also show that average individual utilitarianism positively predicts group utilitarianism while group fragmentation in individual utilitarianism has a negative effect on group utilitarianism. Next to group composition, minority influence processes explain additional variance in group utilitarianism, cognitive dissent having a positive influence, while normative deviance a negative influence on group utilitarianism. Majority influence has no significant influence on group utilitarianism. Finally, our results show that the relationship between group fragmentation in individual utilitarianism and emergent group utilitarianism is mediated by the two forms of minority influence. (shrink)

Antinatalism assigns reproduction a negative value. There should be fewer or no births. Those who say that there should be fewer births have been called conditional antinatalists. A better name for their view would be selective pronatalism. Those who say that there should be no births face two challenges. They must define the scope of their no-birth policy. Does it apply only to human or sentient beings or can it also be extended to all organic life, perhaps even to (...) machine consciousness? And whatever the scope, they have to justify the eventual extinction of humankind or other life forms, an inevitable consequence of unconditional antinatalism. Different axiologies and moral theories produce different responses to these challenges. It is argued that a two-value conflict-sensitive negative utilitarianism would produce a kind and reasonable justification for ending at least human and factory-animal reproduction. The conclusion is purely moral and supports only voluntary extinction for humankind. (shrink)

One of the most important aspects of human life is the role of ethics and value judgments, which are unavoidable in everyday life. On the other hand, belief in the afterlife significantly influences various human affairs. This article explores the impact of belief in resurrection on moral values and judgments using a descriptive and analytical method. In this context, it critiques and analyzes the school of ethical utilitarianism, one of the most prominent ethical schools of the contemporary era. Several (...) issues arise when attempting to calculate the outcomes of actions both quantitatively and qualitatively. These include the conflict between profiteering and moral conscience in specific responsibilities, the conflict with justice in many instances, and the contrast between quantitative and qualitative criteria in the pursuit of pleasure. There is also a conflict between human intention and will, and a conflict between supporting the interests of the minority and those of the majority. Furthermore, utilitarianism fails to account for eternal life and how to live in the next world, and it neglects the spiritual dimensions and growth of humanity. Even without considering the afterlife, utilitarianism relies solely on quantitative and material calculations as criteria. Therefore, the moral system and profit-oriented logic, along with its various forms, are neither reliable nor practical. If we do not believe in the Return, we lack a complete rational justification for moral rules and value systems. From the perspective of the afterlife, the ideal and intrinsic good is happiness in its most comprehensive sense, encompassing both worldly happiness and happiness in the hereafter. When voluntary actions and attributes are connected to this intrinsically good and desirable end, their positive or negative moral judgments are determined. A system of political ethics that focuses on the hereafter possesses all the advantages and virtues of other systems, but it does not suffer from their shortcomings and faults. (shrink)

One of the most important aspects of human life is the role of ethics and value judgments, which are unavoidable in everyday life. On the other hand, belief in the afterlife significantly influences various human affairs. This article explores the impact of belief in resurrection on moral values and judgments using a descriptive and analytical method. In this context, it critiques and analyzes the school of ethical utilitarianism, one of the most prominent ethical schools of the contemporary era. Several (...) issues arise when attempting to calculate the outcomes of actions both quantitatively and qualitatively. These include the conflict between profiteering and moral conscience in specific responsibilities, the conflict with justice in many instances, and the contrast between quantitative and qualitative criteria in the pursuit of pleasure. There is also a conflict between human intention and will, and a conflict between supporting the interests of the minority and those of the majority. Furthermore, utilitarianism fails to account for eternal life and how to live in the next world, and it neglects the spiritual dimensions and growth of humanity. Even without considering the afterlife, utilitarianism relies solely on quantitative and material calculations as criteria. Therefore, the moral system and profit-oriented logic, along with its various forms, are neither reliable nor practical. If we do not believe in the Return, we lack a complete rational justification for moral rules and value systems. From the perspective of the afterlife, the ideal and intrinsic good is happiness in its most comprehensive sense, encompassing both worldly happiness and happiness in the hereafter. When voluntary actions and attributes are connected to this intrinsically good and desirable end, their positive or negative moral judgments are determined. A system of political ethics that focuses on the hereafter possesses all the advantages and virtues of other systems, but it does not suffer from their shortcomings and faults. (shrink)

In this essay I defend a variety of political perfectionism that I call negative perfectionism. Negative perfectionism is the position that if some design of the basic structure of society promotes objectively bad human living, then this should count as a reason against it. To give this hypothetical some bite, I draw on Rousseau’s diagnosis of the maladies of his society to defend two further claims: first, that some human lives are objectively bad, and, second, that some designs (...) of the basic structure promote objectively bad human living. It follows that we have should avoid such designs of the basic structure, which means that negative political perfectionism presents true requirements of justice. (shrink)

Many consider Nozick’s “utility monster”—a being more efficient than ordinary people at converting resources into wellbeing, with no upper limit—to constitute a damning counterexample to utilitarianism. But our intuitions may be reversed by considering a variation in which the utility monster starts from a baseline status of massive suffering. This suggests a rethinking of the force of the original objection.

Despite the prevalence of the terms utilitarianism and utilitarian in the health care and health policy literature, anecdotal evidence suggests that authors are often not fully aware of the diversity of utilitarian theories, their principles, and implications. Further, it seems that authors often categorically reject utilitarianism under the assumption that it violates individual rights. The tendency of act utilitarianism to neglect individual rights is attenuated, however, by the diminishing marginal utility of wealth and the disutility of a (...) protest by those who are disadvantaged. In practice, act utilitarians tend to introduce moral rules and preserve traditional rules. At the same time, the tenability of rule utilitarianism is limited because it ultimately collapses into act utilitarianism or a deontological theory. Negative utilitarianism is a viable utilitarian variant only if we accept complete aversion to suffering, ie, if we disregard any forgone opportunities to increase pleasure. Finally, the adoption of preference utilitarianism requires us to accept the subjectivity of individual claims which may be perceived as unfair. (shrink)

The view that the obligation to promote happiness is, as Popper puts it, "in any case much less urgent" than the obligation to eliminate unhappiness we might call the "Negative Doctrine". I know of no plausible form of the Negative Doctrine.

This article presents a revised version of negative utilitarianism. Previous versions have relied on a hedonistic theory of value and stated that suffering should be minimized. The traditional rebuttal is that the doctrine in this form morally requires us to end all sentient life. To avoid this, a need-based theory of value is introduced. The frustration of the needs not to suffer and not to have one’s autonomy dwarfed should,prima facie, be decreased. When decreasing the need frustration of (...) some would increase the need frustration of others, the case is deferred and a fuller ethical analysis is conducted. The author’s perceptions on murder, extinction, the right to die, antinatalism, veganism, and abortion are used to reach a reflective equilibrium. The new theory is then applied to consumerism, material growth, and power relations. The main finding is that the burden of proof should be on those who promote thestatus quo. (shrink)

Karl Popper suggested that the utilitarian formula "Maximise happiness" should be replaced by the formula "Minimize suffering" - a view which has been called "negative utilitarianism". Can such a view be spelled out in a plausible way? Examining several ways of understanding the alleged ethical priority of pain over pleasure, I come to the conclusion that none of them is satisfactory as a basis for a theory of benevolence. However, once we move from hedonistic to preference utilitarianism (...) two possible views emerge which, although not fundamentally different from classical utilitarianism, diverge from it in interesting ways and seem to warrant further study. (shrink)

Matti Häyry presents a new ethical theory that he calls “conflict-responsive need-based negative utilitarianism.”1 In this commentary, I present my critical observations on his main points against the more general background of utilitarianism and theories of value.

To evaluate non-acting involves more theoretical problems than to estimate actions. There is a full range of possible solutions of this question. The extreme ones are presented, on the one hand, by consequentialism that denies the difference between action and non-acting if their results are the same; and, on the other, by negative utilitarianism, that is based on the literal interpretation of the rule “Do not do the evil” that says nothing about non-acting. There is, of course, intermediary (...) proposition held by moderated versions of absolutistic ethics and utilitarianism which, both, assert the responsibility for non-acting but differentiate it from the responsibility for actions. (shrink)

Our growing understanding of human mind and cognition and the development of neurotechnology has triggered debate around cognitive enhancement in neuroethics. The dissertation examines the normative issues of memory enhancement, and focuses on two issues: the distinction between memory treatment and enhancement; and how the issue of authenticity concerns memory interventions, including memory treatments and enhancements. rnThe first part consists of a conceptual analysis of the concepts required for normative considerations. First, the representational nature and the function of memory are (...) discussed. Memory is regarded as a special form of self-representation resulting from a constructive processes. Next, the concepts of selfhood, personhood, and identity are examined and a conceptual tool—the autobiographical self-model —is introduced. An ASM is a collection of mental representations of the system’s relations with its past and potential future states. Third, the debate between objectivist and constructivist views of health are considered. I argue for a phenomenological account of health, which is based on the primacy of illness and negative utilitarianism.rnThe second part presents a synthesis of the relevant normative issues based on the conceptual tools developed. I argue that memory enhancement can be distinguished from memory treatment using a demarcation regarding the existence of memory-related suffering. That is, memory enhancements are, under standard circumstances and without any unwilling suffering or potential suffering resulting from the alteration of memory functions, interventions that aim to manipulate memory function based on the self-interests of the individual. I then consider the issue of authenticity, namely whether memory intervention or enhancement endangers “one’s true self”. By analyzing two conceptions of authenticity—authenticity as self-discovery and authenticity as self-creation, I propose that authenticity should be understood in terms of the satisfaction of the functional constraints of an ASM—synchronic coherence, diachronic coherence, and global veridicality. This framework provides clearer criteria for considering the relevant concerns and allows us to examine the moral values of authenticity. rn. (shrink)

The author submits that Popper's social philosophy rests on seven pillars: rationality (both conceptual and practical), individualism (ontological and methodological), libertarianism, the nonexistence of historical laws, negative utilitarianism ("Do no harm"), piecemeal social engineering, and a view on social order. The first six pillars are judged to be weak, and the seventh broken. In short, it is argued that Popper did not build a comprehensive, profound, or even consistent system of social philosophy on a par with his work (...) in epistemology. Still, he did make some important contributions to the field, such as unveiling the philosophical roots of totalitarianism and defending social engineering against both revolutionists and conservatives. (shrink)

In his essay “The Human Prejudice” Bernard Williams presented a sophisticated defense of the moral relevance of the concept “human being”. Here I offer both an analysis of his essay and a defense of his conclusions against criticisms made by Julian Savulescu and Peter Singer. After a discussion of the structure of Williams’s argument, I focus on several complaints from Savulescu: that Williams underestimates the similarities between speciesism and racism or sexism, that Williams relies on a disputable internalism about reasons (...) to make his case, that Williams ignores the arbitrariness of species membership, and (a complaint also made by Singer) that Williams attacks a straw man in considering only negative utilitarianism when criticizing the idea of an Impartial Observer. I defend Williams against these charges and end with a brief discussion of how his alien invasion example illustrates the fundamentally different philosophical sensibility of Bernard Williams in comparison to critics like Savulescu and Singer. (shrink)

Principles are investigated that allow one to establish a preference ordering between possible actions based on the question of whether the acting agent himself or other agents will benefit or be harmed by the consequences of an action. It is shown that a combination of utility maximization, an altruist principle, and weak negative utilitarianism yields an ordering that seems to be intuitively appealing, although it does not necessarily reflect common everyday evaluations of actions.

Meta-ethical attempts to define concepts such as 'goodness', ‘right and wrong’, ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’, have proved largely futile, even over-ambitious. Morality, it is argued, should therefore be directed primarily at the reduction of suffering, principally because the latter is more easily recognisable and accords with an objective view and requirements of the human condition. All traditional and contemporary perspectives are without suitable criteria for evaluating moral dilemmas and without such guidance we face the potent threat of sliding to a (...) destructive moral nihilism. This book presents a possible set of defining characteristics for the foundation of future moral evaluations and engagements, taking into consideration that the historically maligned female gender may be better disposed to ethical leadership. (shrink)

In the third edition of ‘Practical Ethics’ (2011), Peter Singer reexamines the so-called “replaceability argument,” according to which merely sentient beings, as opposed to persons (self-conscious and with a robust sense of time), are replaceable—it is in principle permissible to kill them provided that they live pleasant lives that they would not have had otherwise and that they be replaced by equally happy beings. On this view, existence is a benefit and death is not a harm. Singer’s challenge is to (...) avoid (i) the replaceability of persons while preserving the replaceability of merely sentient beings, (ii) the implication that parents are morally required to procreate if they can have happy children, and (iii) to do avoid these implications without having the proposed solution (the “debit view” of preferences) imply negative utilitarianism, or the conclusion that a nonsentient universe is better than any sentient universe. I review Singer’s changing views since 1975 and I argue that his attempt to avoid the replaceability of persons fails: either both non-persons and persons are replaceable or neither are. Singer can only avoid this conclusion by appealing to controversial metaethical claims (attitude-independent moral objectivism) and/or giving up on essential features of utilitarianism. (shrink)

Recent research has relied on trolley-type sacrificial moral dilemmas to study utilitarian versus nonutili- tarian modes of moral decision-making. This research has generated important insights into people’s attitudes toward instrumental harm—that is, the sacrifice of an individual to save a greater number. But this approach also has serious limitations. Most notably, it ignores the positive, altruistic core of utilitarianism, which is characterized by impartial concern for the well-being of everyone, whether near or far. Here, we develop, refine, and validate (...) a new scale—the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale—to dissociate individual differences in the ‘negative’ (permissive attitude toward instrumental harm) and ‘positive’ (impartial concern for the greater good) dimensions of utilitarian thinking as manifested in the general population. We show that these are two independent dimensions of proto-utilitarian tendencies in the lay population, each exhibiting a distinct psychological profile. Empathic concern, identification with the whole of humanity, and concern for future generations were positively associated with impartial beneficence but negatively associated with instrumental harm; and although instrumental harm was associated with subclinical psychopathy, impartial beneficence was associated with higher religiosity. Importantly, although these two dimensions were independent in the lay population, they were closely associated in a sample of moral philosophers. Acknowledging this dissociation between the instrumental harm and impartial beneficence components of utilitarian thinking in ordinary people can clarify existing debates about the nature of moral psychology and its relation to moral philosophy as well as generate fruitful avenues for further research. (shrink)

According to Pettit and Skinner the rising of utilitarianism would have decisively contributed to the eclipse of the modern republican tradition. The Utilitarians would have been responsible for a radical critique of the concept of republican liberty, which would have resulted in the predominance of the Hobbesian conception of freedom. The sharpness and strength of the utilitarian attack to the conception of republican liberty would have be summarized in a set of objections formulated, in the late eighteenth century, by (...) the English theological utilitarian William Paley. An examination of Paley's thought shows that his conception of liberty, contrary to what suggest Skinner and Pettit, is quite distinct from the Hobbesian concept. (shrink)

In four experiments, we asked subjects for judgements about scenarios that pit utilitarian outcomes against deontological moral rules, for example, saving more lives vs. a rule against active killing. We measured trait emotions of anger, disgust, sympathy and empathy, asked about the same emotions after each scenario. We found that utilitarian responding to the scenarios, and higher scores on a utilitarianism scale, were correlated negatively with disgust, positively with anger, positively with specific sympathy and state sympathy, and less so (...) with general sympathy or empathy. In a fifth experiment, we asked about anger and sympathy for specific outcomes, and we found that these are consistently predictive of utilitarian responding. (shrink)

As members of the most evolutionarily developed species on earth, most of us share the common-sensical belief that our treatment of animals should be based more or less on moral grounds. However, it is also an undeniable fact that for more than two millennia, from the appearance of the first moral theories in Ancient Greece until almost the last quarter of the 20th century, this traditional moral concern for animals has gone hand in hand with their systematic exclusion from the (...) moral community of human beings, which deprives them of basic protective rights against moral abuse and mistreatment. A radical paradigm shift in ethics emerges, especially in the last quarter of the 20th century, when some philosophers begin to question this anthropocentric conception of ethics and the “otherness” of animals in terms of their traditional location outside the ethical discourse. Peter Singer, who is a utilitarian, and Tom Regan, who defends the “rights view” against Singer’s utilitarianism, are two prominent representatives of this new ethical approach. After showing how Singer and Regan reject speciesism, this paper focuses on Regan’s critique of Singer’s account and adds new objections that show that utilitarianism has serious general defects even if it is restricted to human beings. Moreover, these defects give rise to more complicated problems when utilitarianism is applied to animals. After pointing to some weak aspects in Regan’s theory, the paper spells out the sketch of an alternative account that points to the possibility of a synthesis of utility principle and right principle. Accordingly, Regan’s worse-off principle deduced from the rights view is interpreted as a formal principle, while the utility principle as the material content of it is accepted: as long as there is no violation of the worse-off principle, one ought to deduce particular commands to maximize utility for specific cases out of the application of the utility principle. In this context, the worse-off principle has only a negative and formal function that prevents the utility principle from overriding individual rights by giving it its obligatory form. (shrink)

The ethical concerns regarding the successful development of an Artificial Intelligence have received a lot of attention lately. The idea is that even if we have good reason to believe that it is very unlikely, the mere possibility of an AI causing extreme human suffering is important enough to warrant serious consideration. Others look at this problem from the opposite perspective, namely that of the AI itself. Here the idea is that even if we have good reason to believe that (...) it is very unlikely, the mere possibility of humanity causing extreme suffering to an AI is important enough to warrant serious consideration. This paper starts from the observation that both concerns rely on problematic philosophical assumptions. Rather than tackling these assumptions directly, it proceeds to present an argument that if one takes these assumptions seriously, then one has a moral obligation to advocate for a ban on the development of a conscious AI. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill's version of utilitarianism is that there is something that is a value as an end of action and that all actions, rules for action, laws, policies, and so on, are to evaluated by their promotion of that value or reduction of the negative of that value. The value judgment, that promotion of happiness and reduction of unhappiness are the normative ends of action is the “principle of utility,” and the “proof” is designed to argue for (...) that principle. The proof is an argument from introspective psychology, on what people desire, and are averse to, as ends. The claim is that when properly analyzed each person desires his or her own happiness, and this is evidence that happiness is the kind of thing that is valuable as an end, whether it exists in the agent's or another's consciousness. It is a “comprehensive formula, including all things which are in themselves good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an end, but as a means…”. (shrink)

This paper aims to check some Nussbaum’s reviews, in Hiding from Humanity, about Mill’s conception of liberty. The analysis frame is given by constant tension between the utilitarian justification and the justification based on per se value of liberty. This article wants to support the following hypothesis: Millean liberty cannot be criticized for reducing its value to instrumental terms. On the contrary, in order to be loyal with Mill, liberty has a double justification: one based on its utilitarianism and (...) another based on its intrinsic value. We use Bernard Williams’s suggestion about the intrinsic value of human goods for supporting the latter. He proposed an important criterion to demonstrate the intrinsic value: coherent relation with other values and other human necessities. Finally, the article briefly exposes the problem of coherence in Millean utilitarianism. (shrink)

The article is a reductio ad absurdum of assumptions which are shared by a large number of followers of the animal welfare movement and utilitarianism. I argue that even if we accept the main ethical arguments for a negative moral assessment of eating meat we should not promote vegetarianism but rather beefism (eating only meat from beef cattle). I also argue that some forms of vegetarianism, i.e. ichtivegetarianism, can be much more morally worse than normal meat diet. In (...) order to justify these thesis I show that there are significant moral differences in the consumption of animal products from different species. (shrink)

In light of the many corporate scandals, social and ethical commitment of society has increased considerably, which puts pressure on companies to communicate information related to corporate social responsibility (CSR). The reasons underlying the decision by management teams to engage in ethical communication are scarcely focussed on. Thus, grounded on legitimacy and stakeholder theory, this study analyses the views management teams in large listed companies have on communication of CSR. The focus is on aspects on interest, motives/reasons, users and problems (...) related to corporate communication of CSR information. A questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews confirm that there is a distinct trend shift: towards more focus on CSR in corporate communication. Whilst this trend shift started as a reactive approach initiated by the many corporate scandals, the trend shift is now argued to be of a proactive nature focussed at preventing legitimacy concerns to arise. These findings are significant and interesting, implying that we are witnessing a transit period between two legitimacy strategies. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the way respondents argue when it comes to CSR activities coincides with consequentialism or utilitarianism, i. e. companies engage in CSR activities to avoid negative impacts instead of being driven by a will to make a social betterment or acting in accordance with what is fundamentally believed to be right to do. This provides new input to the ongoing debate about business ethics. The findings should alert national and international policy makers to the need both to increase the vigilance and capacity of the regulatory and judicial systems in the CSR context and to increase institutional pressure to enhance CSR adoption and CSR communication. Furthermore, stakeholders need to be careful in assuming that CSR communication is an evidence of a CSR commitment influencing corporate behaviour and increasing business ethics. (shrink)

Autonomous vehicles —and accidents they are involved in—attest to the urgent need to consider the ethics of artificial intelligence. The question dominating the discussion so far has been whether we want AVs to behave in a ‘selfish’ or utilitarian manner. Rather than considering modeling self-driving cars on a single moral system like utilitarianism, one possible way to approach programming for AI would be to reflect recent work in neuroethics. The agent–deed–consequence model :3–20, 2014a, Behav Brain Sci 37:487–488, 2014b) provides (...) a promising descriptive and normative account while also lending itself well to implementation in AI. The ADC model explains moral judgments by breaking them down into positive or negative intuitive evaluations of the agent, deed, and consequence in any given situation. These intuitive evaluations combine to produce a positive or negative judgment of moral acceptability. For example, the overall judgment of moral acceptability in a situation in which someone committed a deed that is judged as negative would be mitigated if the agent had good intentions and the action had a good consequence. This explains the considerable flexibility and stability of human moral judgment that has yet to be replicated in AI. This paper examines the advantages and disadvantages of implementing the ADC model and how the model could inform future work on ethics of AI in general. (shrink)

Moral and political theorists who espouse Egalitarianism and Marxism tend to assume that it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to put forward an original and plausible moral justification of classical liberalism. Professor Spector is concerned to build just such a justification. He reconstructs and then criticizes a familiar approach to the moral foundations of classical liberalism which rests on the maximization of negative freedom, and then frames an alternative theory centered in the obligation to protect positive freedom. In (...) doing so he parts company not only with utilitarianism and contractarianism, but also with the theory of natural rights. Among the topics he discusses are the concepts of negative and positive freedom, the notion of a moral right, the connection between positive freedom and personal autonomy, the axiological uniqueness of each human being, and the agent-relativity of moral reasons. (shrink)

Sidgwick famously claimed that an argument in favour of utilitarianism might be provided by demonstrating that a set of defensible philosophical intuitions undergird it. This paper focuses on those philosophical intuitions. It aims to show which specific intuitions Sidgwick endorsed, and to shed light on their mutual connections. It argues against many rival interpretations that Sidgwick maintained that six philosophical intuitions constitute the self-evident grounds for utilitarianism, and that those intuitions appear to be specifications of a negative (...) principle of universalization (according to which differential treatments must be based on reasonable grounds alone). In addition, this paper attempts to show how the intuitions function in the overall argument for utilitarianism. The suggestion is that the intuitions are the main positive part of the argument for the view, which includes Sidgwick's rejection of common-sense morality and its philosophical counterpart, dogmatic intuitionism. The paper concludes by arguing that some of Sidgwick's intuitions fail to meet the conditions for self-evidence which Sidgwick himself established and applied to the rules of common-sense morality. (shrink)

The thesis of the present volume is critical and dual. (1) Present day philosophy of man and sciences of man suffer from the Greek mis taken polarization of everything human into nature and convention which is (allegedly) good and evil, which is (allegedly) truth and fal sity, which is (allegedly) rationality and irrationality, to wit, the polar ization of all fields of inquiry, the natural and social sciences, as well as ethics and all technology, whether natural or social, into the (...) totally positive and the totally negative. (2) Almost all philosophy and sci ences of man share the erroneous work ethic which is the myth of man's evil nature - the myth of the beast in man, the doctrine of original sin. To mediate or to compromise between the first view of human nature as good with the second view of it as evil, sociologists have devised a modified utilitarianism with deferred gratification so called, and the theory of the evil of artificial competition (capitalist and socialist alike) and of keeping up with the Joneses. Now, the mediation is not necessary. For, the polarization makes for abstract errors which are simplistic views of rationality, such as reductionism and positivism of all sorts, as well as for concrete errors, such as the disposition to condemn repeatedly those human weaknesses which are inevitable, namely man's inability to be perfectly rational, avoid all error, etc. , thus setting man against himself as all too wicked. (shrink)

Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of the Establishment Clause have failed to provide a clear framework for determining what government actions are prohibited. Part of the problem concerns what kinds of actions constitute an establishment of religion. What criteria should determine the boundaries of an establishment challenge? Are governmental actions that may only indirectly affect religion (either positively or negatively) prohibited? This article aims to provide a coherent and normatively justified understanding of the Establishment Clause to help (...) answer these questions by considering not just the history of the Clause or the cases the Court has decided under it, but also considering overlaps from various philosophical justifications for the Clause—including justifications from rights theory, political liberalism, utilitarianism, and communitarianism. In the process, the article eliminates from consideration the Supreme Court’s so-called “accommodationist” approach and presents a new understanding of the neutrality test that anchors itself between strict separation and the current neutrality approaches. This it does by also taking into account what in moral theory is known as the doctrine of double effect and by showing how the doctrine further limits the various judicial views to just neutrality in the new sense I suggest, while also providing both clearer and firmer conditions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Teaching General Music in Grades 4–8: A Musicianship ApproachKatherine StrandThomas Regelski, Teaching General Music in Grades 4–8: A Musicianship Approach ( Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004)In this recent addition to the world of texts for secondary methods classes, Teaching General Music in Grades 4–8: A Musicianship Approach, Thomas Regelski takes a new look at the challenging task of teaching the pre-adolescent and adolescent age group. This text brings (...) together many of Regelski's earlier writing on topics such as the professionalism of music teaching practice, music education as praxial education, and the operationalization of critical theory in music education. His thoughtful work offers insights and challenges to pre-service and in-service teachers.In the Introduction, Regelski provides a brief history of critical theory in education and describes how he applies critical theory to the profession of music teaching and the experience of musical learning. In this "new view" of education, teachers should seek to be transformative rather than simply transmitting a cultural status quo through status quo methods of teaching. Critical theory in teaching criticizes both the methods and the content in the light of context, student learning needs, praxis, and the situatedness of learning. He argues, as in earlier articles, against what he calls methodolotry: the tendency to adopt a method and follow that method unquestioningly. Rather, he proposes that teachers [End Page 121] should adopt a stance of reflective practitioner, becoming informal action researchers by questioning the value and effectiveness of instructional strategy and curricular content. (Sadly, once introduced, there is no more information about how to engage in action research, nor any encouragement to learn more about the subject.)Educational content should be based on critical theory which, as Regelski argues:... seeks to study the past, but in terms of its implications–positive or negative–for the present and, especially, as a basis for improving society and the individuals who constitute society.... [T]he past is evoked "critically" and selectively and new practices that will become traditions of the future will be initiated.1The job of the teacher is to help students make critical judgments regarding music and the "good time" the musical experience contributes to the students' lives.2 Music classrooms should be considered music laboratories in which children learn through thoughtful, investigatory experiences. Music education should promote life-skills relevant to the student's world, teach functional musical skills, incite interest in unfamiliar musical experiences, and address the pre-adolescent and adolescent student's "need to achieve."3In the first chapter, Regelski argues for "action learning," or learning in which the student is the principal actor. To support his argument, he cites findings in cognitive psychology, philosophical trends of pragmatism, utilitarianism, and humanism, transfer of learning theory, authentic learning and assessment, and constructivist learning theories. This myriad of ideas combine to form the essence of his argument: children in this age group need to develop intentionality in music-making to have a "good time" and instruction should always connect in-school musical learning with a student's real-world musical experiences. The value of action learning lies in the transfer of learning from the classroom to life after school:It advances the skills predictably useful to typical adults throughout life: for example, recreational singing, music reading sufficient to church and community choirs, "making sense" of music and enjoyment through listening, and the like. It is not a survey of disconnected musical generalities, a superficial sampling of music "in general"; boiled down theory, history, appreciation: or the introduction to the "discipline" of music as a "subject" of study for its own sake. Instead, it promotes the broad musicianship skills and positive attitudes for "breaking 100" [as in bowling, the level at which one calls oneself a "musician"] that enable students to be musically independent and active outside of class and after graduation, and to want to be musically active as part of the life well lived [italics added].4 [End Page 122]In the second chapter, Regelski provides an excellent summary of the physical, cognitive, and social development of children from age 9 to 14. Age categories are broken into upper elementary grades 4–6... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Sanity and Irresponsibility”Lloyd Fields (bio)AbstractI make two criticisms of Wilson’s proposal to dispense with a loaded axiological criterion of sanity. First, Edwards’s axiological criterion of sanity, which Wilson accepts, involves the requirement of impartiality, which at least excludes some standards of right and wrong. Second, value pluralism applies only to morally acceptable forms of life and thus presupposes a standard of right and wrong. I conclude by (...) noting that mental illnesses are not sufficiently characterised by extreme and persistent deviance from practical rationality, as conceived by Edwards and Wilson.KeywordsSanity, responsibility, mental illness, value pluralismWilson’s paper is set in an important tradition of which Susan Wolf is a notable exemplar. He tackles the crucially important issue of how practical rationality is related to mental health and of how certain forms of irrationality are connected with mental illness. This issue must be taken into account in order to avoid infecting the criteria of sanity with “idiosyncratic or culturally biased norms.” Like Wolf (1989, 137–151), Wilson holds that sanity is a necessary condition of responsibility. But Wilson rejects the second of Wolf’s two criteria of sanity on the grounds that it invokes a definite normative theory of right and wrong. He proposes instead that whether an agent is sane should be decided on the basis of whether s/he displays practical rationality, as defined by Edwards’s list of seven items. Following Edwards, Wilson implicitly equates “sanity” with “mental health” and “insanity” with “mental illness.” By rejecting an axiological criterion of sanity that depends on a normative theory of right and wrong, Wilson is able to ensure that individuals like JoJo are not judged to be insane and hence not morally responsible for their actions. Wilson is right to stress the importance of our not applying notions such as “mental illness” or “insanity” too widely, especially in such a way as to allow blameworthy persons to escape blame and punishment.But are Wilson’s own criteria of sanity free from dependence on a normative theory, or a normative standard, of right and wrong? First, let us note that Wilson states Edwards’s seventh condition of practical rationality as follows: “holding values that are or would be adopted under the conditions of (negative) freedom.” Edwards’s own formulation of this condition is the following: “having values which have been (or would be) adopted under conditions of freedom, enlightenment and impartiality” (1982, 315). Wilson explains “freedom” as the absence of coercion. It is uncertain what “enlightenment” means in this context. Impartiality would seem to include being impartial between oneself and others and between one’s own tribe, nation or race and that of others. Although this requirement is perhaps too general to be regarded as a sufficient standard [End Page 303] of right and wrong, it is at least part of such normative theories as utilitarianism and Kant’s moral theory, while it is inconsistent with ethical egoism, i.e., the view that an action is right or wrong depending on whether it serves or frustrates the agent’s overall best interests. One could dispute Wilson’s claim, therefore, that Edwards’s seventh item is not a “loaded” axiological criterion.Second, Wilson maintains that we can avoid assuming a loaded axiological criterion for sanity by adopting the position of value pluralism. Wolf’s axiological criterion for sanity is that the agent should be capable of knowing the difference between right and wrong. Wilson holds that this criterion, as presented, invokes a normative theory of right and wrong. The criterion would not do so if it were applied in accordance with value pluralism, which, Wilson says, “rejects the notion that there is one monolithic theory of right and wrong without denying that an actor may behave virtuously or viciously.” Wilson appears to assume that an “unloaded” version of Wolf’s axiological criterion would be more or less equivalent to Edwards’s seventh condition of practical rationality.Value pluralism maintains that there are incompatible forms of life that display distinct virtues. “Whichever form of life one is pursuing there are virtues which elude one because they are available only to people pursuing alternative and... (shrink)

Since the financial crisis first erupted in the summer of 2007, the US Federal Reserve has sought to contain negative spillovers into the real economy by dramatically loosening monetary policy. Initially, this was done by lowering its key lending rates, but as the crisis has worsened, and rates have approached closer to zero, it has resorted to expanding its balance sheet in a historically unprecedented fashion. The Fed’s total assets have more than doubled to nearly $2 trillion since the (...) summer of 2007.Much of the debate surrounding the wisdom of this extraordinary increase in the production of money has revolved around its expediency–in other words, will it actually work to rescue the economy? Very little has been said, at least explicitly, about whether it is the morally right thing to do.This paper seeks to fill this gap by providing a moral analysis of the Fed’s response to the financial crisis. For this purpose, we apply Aristotelian virtue theory, Lockean natural rights philosophy, Kantian deontology, and Benthamite utilitarianism. The idea is that if a consensus, or a strong majority, can be reached from differing philosophic assumptions and starting points, then the resulting judgment ought to be compelling for all neutral observers. On the basis that the Fed’s efforts are likely to result in a marked rise in inflation, we argue that every one of these four moral theories ultimately renders a negative judgment. As such, we conclude that the Fed is pursuing an immoral course. (shrink)

Backdating of stock options is an example of an agency problem. It has emerged despite all the measures (i.e., new regulations and additional corporate governance mechanisms) aimed at addressing such problems? Beyond such negative controlling measures, a more positive empowering approach based on ethics may also be necessary. What ethical measures need to be taken to address the agency problem? What values and norms should guide the board of directors in protecting the shareholders' interests? To examine these issues, we (...) first discuss the role values and norms can play with respect to underlying corporate governance and the proper role of directors, such as transparency, accountability, integrity (which is reflected in proper mechanisms of checks and balances), and public responsibility. Second, we discuss various stakeholder approaches (e.g., government, directors, managers, and shareholders) by which conflicts of interest (i.e., the agency problem) can be addressed. Third, we assess the practice of backdating stock options, as an illustration of the agency problem, in terms of whether the practice is legally acceptable or ethically justifiable. Fourth, we proceed to an analysis of good corporate governance practice involving backdating options based on a series of ethical standards including: (1) trustworthiness; (2) utilitarianism; (3) justice; and (4) Kantianism. We conclude that while executive compensation schemes (e. g., stock options) were originally intended to help remedy the agency problem by tying together the interests of the executives and shareholders, these schemes may have actually become "part of the problem," and that the solution ultimately depends upon whether directors and executives accept that all of their actions must be based on a set of core ethical values. (shrink)