This article critically considers calls for the precautionary principle to inform judicial decision making in a private law context in light of the Hoffman litigation, where it is alleged that the potential for genetic contamination from genetically modified (GM) crops causes an unreasonable interference with the rights of organic farmers to use and enjoy their lands, giving rise to an actionable nuisance. Applying the precautionary principle in this context would likely privilege non-GM land uses over GM uses, given the latter's (...) uncertain environmental impacts. Through a comparison of the institutional characteristics and respective roles of public and private regulation, the authors argue that the private law context, which lacks democratic accountability and has a limited ability to address complex scientific issues, is poorly suited to apply the diffuse, policy-based risk allocation considerations raised by the precautionary principle. (shrink)

We can infer moral conclusions from nonmoral evidence using a three-step procedure. First, we distinguish the processes generating belief so that their reliability in generating true belief is statistically predictable. Second, we assess the processes’ reliability, perhaps by observing how frequently they generate true nonmoral belief or logically inconsistent beliefs. Third, we adjust our credence in moral propositions in light of the truth ratios of the processes generating beliefs in them. This inferential route involves empirically discovering truths of the form (...) “Process P, which generates belief in moral proposition M, has truth ratio T", and using them to discover probabilities for moral propositions. The inferential route is noncircular, and progress along it is driven fundamentally by induction. (shrink)

I argue that if David Lewis’ modal realism is true, modal realists from different possible worlds can fall in love with each other. I offer a method for uniquely picking out possible people who are in love with us and not with our counterparts. Impossible lovers and trans-world love letters are considered. Anticipating objections, I argue that we can stand in the right kinds of relations to merely possible people to be in love with them and that ending a trans-world (...) relationship to start a relationship with an actual person isn't cruel to one's otherworldly lover. (shrink)

A new pragmatic approach, based on the latest developments in argumentation theory, analyzing appeal to expert opinion as a form of argument. Reliance on authority has always been a common recourse in argumentation, perhaps never more so than today in our highly technological society when knowledge has become so specialized—as manifested, for instance, in the frequent appearance of "expert witnesses" in courtrooms. When is an appeal to the opinion of an expert a reasonable type of argument to make, and when (...) does it become a fallacy? This book provides a method for the evaluation of these appeals in everyday argumentation. Specialized domains of knowledge such as science, medicine, law, and government policy have gradually taken over as the basis on which many of our rational decisions are made daily. Consequently, appeal to expert opinion in these areas has become a powerful type of argument. Challenging an argument based on expert scientific opinion, for example, has become as difficult as it once was to question religious authority. Walton stresses that even in cases where expert opinion is divided, the effect of it can still be so powerful that it overwhelms an individual's ability to make a decision based on personal deliberation of what is right or wrong in a given situation. The book identifies the requirements that make an appeal to expert opinion a reasonable or unreasonable argument. Walton's new pragmatic approach analyzes that appeal as a distinctive form of argument, with an accompanying set of appropriate critical questions matching the form. Throughout the book, a historical survey of the key developments in the evolution of the argument from authority, dating from the time of the ancients, is given, and new light is shed on current problems of "junk science" and battles between experts in legal argumentation. (shrink)

The question of the psychopath's responsibility for his or her wrongdoing has received considerable attention. Much of this attention has been directed toward whether psychopaths are a counterexample to motivational internalism (MI): Do they possess normal moral beliefs, which fail to motivate them? In this paper, I argue that this is a question that remains conceptually and empirically intractable, and that we ought to settle the psychopath's responsibility in some other way. I argue that recent empirical work on the moral (...) judgments of psychopaths provides us with good reason to think that they are not fully responsible agents, because their actions cannot express the kinds of ill-will toward others that grounds attributions of distinctively moral responsibility. I defend this view against objections, especially those due to an influential account of moral responsibility that holds that moral knowledge is not necessary for responsibility. (shrink)

One of the hardest parts of being a leader is handling disagreements about values. The skills required to do this are increasingly important in polarized societies where there is pressure for businesses and organizations to have a sense of purpose and "do the right thing." Our book helps readers address these challenges. To do this, we don''t give a simplistic cookie-cutter recipe for what is right and wrong. Rather, we guide readers on a journey to rigorously explore their values and (...) better understand the values of others. We discuss the human psychology that drives conflicts over values as well as the philosophical frameworks that have guided people for millennia. We provide strategies, based in research from psychology and the behavioral sciences, whichthat readers can use to implement their values in their lives and their organizations. Topics covered include moral intuitions, self-serving biases, situational pressures, social norms, the role of business in society, consequentialism/utilitarianism, motives, perspective-taking, justice, fairness, and liberty. (shrink)

A number of writers have tackled the task of characterizing the differences between analytic and Continental philosophy.I suggest that these attempts have indeed captured the most important divergences between the two styles but have left the explanation of the differences mysterious.I argue that analytic philosophy is usefully seen as philosophy conducted within a paradigm, in Kuhn’s sense of the word, whereas Continental philosophy assumes much less in the way of shared presuppositions, problems, methods and approaches.This important opposition accounts for all (...) those features that have rightly been held to constitute the difference between the two traditions.I finish with some reflections on the relative superiority of each tradition and by highlighting the characteristic deficiencies of each. (shrink)

Discussions of virtue signaling to date have focused exclusively on the signaling of the moral virtues. This article focuses on intellectual virtue signaling: the status-seeking advertising of supposed intellectual virtues. Intellectual virtue signaling takes distinctive forms. It is also far more likely to be harmful than moral virtue signaling, because it distracts attention from genuine expertise and gives contrarian opinions an undue prominence in public debate. The article provides a heuristic by which to identify possible instances of intellectual virtue signaling. (...) When people with no relevant expertise rapidly move to offer their opinions on a wide range of topics as soon as these topics become fashionable or newsworthy, and especially when these opinions are contrarian, we should suspect them of intellectual virtue signaling. (shrink)

The moral belief problem is that of reconciling expressivism in ethics with both minimalism in the philosophy of language and the syntactic discipline of moral sentences. It is argued that the problem can be solved by distinguishing minimal and robust senses of belief, where a minimal belief is any state of mind expressed by sincere assertoric use of a syntactically disciplined sentence and a robust belief is a minimal belief with some additional property R. Two attempts to specify R are (...) discussed, both based on the thought that beliefs are states that aim at truth. According to the first, robust beliefs are criticisable to the extent that their content fails to match the state of the world. This sense fails to distinguish robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. According to the second, robust beliefs function to have their content match the state of the world. This sense succeeds in distinguishing robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. The conclusion is that the debate concerning the cognitive status of moral convictions needs to address the issue of the function of moral convictions. Evolutionary theorising may be relevant, but will not be decisive, in answering this question. (shrink)

A general method is provided whereby bizarre revisions of consistent theories with respect to contingent sentences that they refute can be delivered by revision-functions satisfying both the basic and the supplementary postulates of the AGM-theory of theory-revision.

The conflict between agency and stakeholder theories of the firm has long been entrenched in organizational and management literature. At the core of this debate are two competing views of the firm in which assumptions and process contrast each other so sharply that agency and stakeholder views of the firm are often described as polar opposites. The purpose of this paper is to show how agency theory can be subsumed within a general stakeholder model of the firm. By analytically deconstructing (...) the assumptions of agency theory, it is argued that agency theory: (1) must include a recognition of stakeholders; (2) requires a moral minimum to be upheld, which places four moral principles above the interests of any stakeholders, including shareholders; (3) consists of contradictory assumptions about human nature and which give rise to the equally valid assumptions of trust, honesty and loyalty to be infused into the agency relationship. In this way, stakeholder theory is argued to be the logical conclusion of agency theory. Empirical hypotheses are presented as a means to substantiate this claim. (shrink)

We examine the arguments on both sides of the recent debate (Hale and Wright v. Field) on the existence, and modal status, of the natural numbers. We formulate precisely, with proper attention to denotational commitments, the analytic conditionals that link talk of numbers with talk of numerosity and with counting. These provide conceptual controls on the concept of number. We argue, against Field, that there is a serious disanalogy between the existence of God and the existence of numbers. We give (...) stronger reasons than those advanced by Wright for resisting Field's analogy. We argue that the rules governing the basic numerical notions commit us to the natural numbers as necessary existents. We also show that the latest twist in the debate involving 'surdons' leaves both sides in a stalemate. (shrink)

When it is suggested that the fine‐tuning of the universe for life provides evidence for a cosmic designer, the multiple‐universe hypothesis is often presented as an alternative. Some philosophers object that the multiple‐universe hypothesis fails to explain why this universe is fine‐tuned for life. We suggest the “This Universe” objection is no better than the “This Planet” objection. We also fault proponents of the “This Universe” objection for presupposing that we could not have existed in any other universe and that (...) the values of the free parameters of the Universe could have been different. Lastly, we reflect on why fine‐tuning for life needs explaining. (shrink)

This study continues the anti-realist’s quest for a principled way to avoid Fitch’s paradox. It is proposed that the Cartesian restriction on the anti-realist’s knowability principle ‘ϕ, therefore 3Kϕ’ should be formulated as a consistency requirement not on the premise ϕ of an application of the rule, but rather on the set of assumptions on which the relevant occurrence of ϕ depends. It is stressed, by reference to illustrative proofs, how important it is to have proofs in normal form before (...) applying the proposed restriction. A similar restriction is proposed for the converse inference, the so-called Rule of Factiveness ‘3Kϕ therefore ϕ’. The proposed restriction appears to block another Fitch-style derivation that uses the KK -thesis in order to get around.. (shrink)

In 2015, in preparation for implementation of the California End of Life Option Act, the UCLA Workgroup dedicated scores of hours to exploring the ethical underpinnings of aid-in-dying and the guid...

Abstractabstract:In his Pragmatism lectures, William James argued that philosophers' temperaments partially determine the theories that they find satisfying, and that their influence explains persistent disagreement within the history of philosophy. Crucially, James was not only making a descriptive claim, but also a normative one: temperaments, he thought, could play a legitimate epistemic role in our philosophical inquiries. This paper aims to evaluate and defend this normative claim.There are three problems for James's view: (1) that allowing temperaments to play a role (...) within inquiry replaces philosophical disagreement with psychological difference; (2) that including temperaments would allow arbitrary elements to influence the outcome of inquiry; and (3) that such a view assumes an implausible metaphysical picture. Through clarifying the nature of temperaments, and what counts as a satisfactory philosophical theory on a pragmatist account, this paper presents an interpretation of James's metaphilosophical claims that can provide satisfactory responses to these problems. (shrink)

This is a reply to the considerations advanced by Schroeder-Heister and Tranchini as prima facie problematic for the proof-theoretic criterion of paradoxicality, as originally presented in Tennant and subsequently amended in Tennant. Countering these considerations lends new importance to the parallelized forms of elimination rules in natural deduction.

In medieval writers we find a distinction between body as a substance – corpus-substantia – and body as a quantity – corpus-quantitas (or quantum). One of the earliest uses of this distinction is in works written by Robert Grosseteste in the 1220s. In this paper I explore his use and understanding of this distinction. I argue that he understands corpus-substantia as such as a dimensionless composite of a first corporeal form, corporeity, and prime matter. Corporeity itself is an active power (...) for three dimensions. Through its infinite and necessary self-multiplication corporeity extends the prime matter it informs into three dimensions, thereby resulting in corpus-quantum. I explore how Grosseteste’s conception of corporeity, though probably based on ideas found in Avicenna, diverges from different understandings of Avicenna’s conception of corporeity proposed by medieval and modern commentators. (shrink)

The rules for Core Logic are stated, and various important results about the system are summarized. We describe its relationship to other systems, such as Classical Logic, Intuitionistic Logic, Minimal Logic, and the Anderson–Belnap relevance logicR. A precise, positive explication is offered of what it is for the premises of a proof to connect relevantly with its conclusion. This characterization exploits the notion of positive and negative occurrences of atoms in sentences. It is shown that all Core proofs are relevant (...) in this precisely defined sense. We survey extant results about variable-sharing in rival systems of relevance logic, and find that the variable-sharing conditions established for them are weaker than the one established here for Core Logic (and for its classical extension). Proponents of other systems of relevance logic (such asRand its subsystems) are challenged to formulate a stronger variable-sharing condition, and to prove thatRor any of its subsystems satisfies it, but that Core Logic does not. We give reasons for pessimism about the prospects for meeting this challenge. (shrink)

If the concept of proof (including arithmetic proof) is syntactically restricted to closed sentences (or their Gödel numbers), then the standard accounts of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems (and Löb’s Theorem) are blocked. In these standard accounts (Gödel’s own paper and the exposition in Boolos’ Computability and Logic are treated as exemplars), it is assumed that certain formulas (notably so called “Gödel sentences”) containing the Gödel number of an open sentence and an arithmetic proof predicate are closed sentences. Ordinary usage of the (...) term “provable” (and indeed “unprovable”) favors their restriction to closed sentences which unlike so-called open sentences can be true or false. In this paper the restricted form of provability is called strong provability or unprovability. If this concept of proof is adopted, then there is no obvious alternative path to establishing those theorems. (shrink)

Advancing a creolizing reading of the eighteenth-century philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, this volume explores Rousseau’s strong resonances in Caribbean thought and politics.

I present a general theory of abstraction operators which treats them as variable-binding term- forming operators, and provides a reasonably uniform treatment for definite descriptions, set abstracts, natural number abstraction, and real number abstraction. This minimizing, extensional and relational theory reveals a striking similarity between definite descriptions and set abstracts, and provides a clear rationale for the claim that there is a logic of sets (which is ontologically non- committal). The theory also treats both natural and real numbers as answering (...) to a two-fold process of abstraction. The first step, of conceptual abstraction, yields the object occupying a particular position within an ordering of a certain kind. The second step, of objectual abstraction, yields the number sui generis, as the position itself within any ordering of the kind in question. (shrink)

Norms explained as grounds of practical judgment, using example of queue. Some norms informal, inexact, depend on common understanding ; some articulated in context of two-tier normative order: `rules', explicit or implicit. Logical structure of rules displayed. Informal and formal normative order explained, `institutional facts ' depend on acts and events interpreted in the light of normative order. Practical force of rules differentiated; either `absolute application' or `strict application' or `discretionary application', depending on second-tier empowerment. Discretion can be guided by (...) values, principles standards. Pervasiveness of institutions and institutional facts, especially but not only in relation to institutions of state-law, including constitution and state-institutions. Searle's and Ruiter's theories of institution, institutional fact, considered: `constitutive rule' rejected in favour of `underlying principle', structure of `institutive, consequential and terminative' rules explained and defended. Ruiter's conception of `institutional `régime' considered and adopted, validity of norms and normative `régimes' considered and differentiated from truth of statements of institutional fact. (shrink)

This chapter explains an approach to relevantization of logical reasoning that seeks to maximize epistemic gain. It does so by retaining Disjunctive Syllogism and making admissible only a restricted rule of Cut. The virtue of this approach is that one can show that the resulting relevant logic is adequate for mathematics and science. In the course of explaining this kind of relevant logic, we compare and contrast our approach with the Anderson-Belnap tradition.

Gareth Evans has argued influentially against vague identities. David Lewis and Theodore Sider have argued against vague parthood. Much of the distaste among philosophers for metaphysical vagueness is sourced in these arguments. I argue that even if the considerations adduced by Evans, Lewis and Sider are conclusive, metaphysical boundary vagueness remains possible.

This paper offers an original solution to the problem of the many, built on a foundation of powers-based causation. At its most basic, the solution should be understood as a type of maximality response, and on those grounds its originality might be questioned. However, it is argued that novelty of the solution owes as much to the meta-metaphysical context in which the solution is framed as it does the model of causal powers. A discussion of paradigms in metaphysics is included.

Ned Block has influentially distinguished two kinds of consciousness, access and phenomenal consciousness. He argues that these two kinds of consciousness can dissociate, and therefore we cannot rely upon subjective report in constructing a science of consciousness. I argue that none of Block's evidence better supports his claim than the rival view, that access and phenomenal consciousness are perfectly correlated. Since Block's view is counterintuitive, and has wildly implausible implications, the fact that there is no evidence that better supports it (...) than the rival view should lead us to reject it. (shrink)

If you have taken a college biology class, or just watched Animal Planet, you may have been struck by the startling complexity of living organisms. From the grandest mammal to the lowliest cell, life displays intricacy and structure that would put a high-paid team of engineers to shame. How could such fantastically organized, complex structures arise blindly out of unintelligent matter? Speaking of matter, why is it the way it is? Though unimaginably vast, our universe has precise features, as does (...) the matter in it. A glance at the inside back cover of a college physics textbook shows that there are extremely precise numbers describing the fundamental properties of matter. These include numbers for the speed of light in a vacuum, for the masses of fundamental particles like the electron, proton, and neutron, and for the strengths of forces like gravity and electromagnetism that act on those particles. These numbers seem utterly arbitrary. For all we know, they could have been completely different. Yet they turn out to be exactly what a universe needs in order for complex life to emerge in it. Likewise, the cosmology section of an astronomy course will teach you that there are very precise values for the temperature of the universe, for how much matter there is per cubic centimeter in the universe, for the rate at which the universe is expanding, and so on. How did those numbers get to be what they are? Were they just magically pulled out of a cosmic hat at the Big Bang? (shrink)

This article addresses two areas of continuing controversy about consent in clinical research: the question of when consent to low risk research is necessary, and the question of when consent to research is valid. The article identifies a number of considerations relevant to determining whether consent is necessary, chief of which is whether the study would involve subjects in ways that would (otherwise) infringe their rights. When consent is necessary, there is a further question of under what conditions consent is (...) valid or successful in waiving a right. The most influential account of validity conditions is non-moralized, in the sense that the conditions make no essential reference to whether the researcher soliciting consent has obtained it in a way that wrongs the subject. The article examines the implications of this account, and compares it with recent accounts that moralize some of the validity conditions. -/- . (shrink)

It is by now well established that the fact that an action or aconsequence was inevitable does not excuse the agent from responsibilityfor it, so long as the counterfactual intervention which ensures thatthe act will take place is not actualized. However, in this paper I demonstrate that there is one exception to this principle: when theagent is aware of the counterfactual intervener and the role she wouldplay in some alternative scenario, she might be excused, despite the fact that in the (...) actual scenario she acts, as we say, of her own freewill. I illustrate this contention by way of a critique of Fischer andRavizza''s well-known account of responsibility for consequences. (shrink)

Is there a ‘constitutional moment’in contemporary Europe? What if anything is the constitution of the European Union; what kind of polity is the Union? The suggestion offered is that there is a legally constituted order, and that a suitable term to apply to it is a ‘commonwealth’, comprising a commonwealth of ‘post-sovereign’ states. Is it a democratic commonwealth, and can it be? Is there sufficiently a demos or ‘people’ for democracy to be possible? If not democratic, what is it? Monarchy, (...) oligarchy, or democracy, or a ‘mixed constitution’? Argued: there is a mixed constitution containing a reasonable element of democratic rule. The value of democracy is then explored in terms of individualistic versus holistic evaluation and instrumental versus intrinsic value. Subsidiarity can be considered in a similar light, suggestively in terms of forms of democracy appropriate to different levels of self-government. The conclusion is that there is no absolute democratic deficit in the European commonwealth. (shrink)

According to the Epistemic Theory of Mind, knowledge is part of the best overall framework for explaining behavior at the psychological level. This theory, which has become increasingly popular in recent decades, has almost always been conjoined with an invariantist theory of “knows.” In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: the Epistemic Theory of Mind is far more explanatorily powerful when conjoined with contextualism. I conclude that if the Epistemic Theory of Mind is true, then there is (...) a powerful new reason to accept contextualism. (shrink)

We explore the consequences, for logical system-building, of taking seriously the aim of having irredundant rules of inference, and a preference for proofs of stronger results over proofs of weaker ones. This leads one to reconsider the structural rules of REFLEXIVITY, THINNING, and CUT. REFLEXIVITY survives in the minimally necessary form $\varphi:\varphi$. Proofs have to get started. CUT is subject to a CUT-elimination theorem, to the effect that one can always make do without applications of CUT. So CUT is redundant, (...) and should not be a rule of the system. CUT-elimination, however, in the context of the usual forms of logical rules, requires the presence, in the system, of THINNING. But THINNING, it turns out, is not really necessary. Provided only that one liberalizes the statement of certain logical rules in an appropriate way, one can make do without CUT or THINNING. From the methodological point of view of this study, the logical rules ought to be framed in this newly liberalized form. These liberalized logical rules determine the system of core logic. Given any intuitionistic Gentzen proof of $\Delta:\varphi$, one can determine from it a Core proof of some subsequent of $\Delta:\varphi$. Given any classical Gentzen proof of $\Delta:\varphi$, one can determine from it a classical Core proof of some subsequent of $\Delta:\varphi$. In both cases the Core proof is of a result at least as strong as that of the Gentzen proof; and the only structural rule used is $\varphi:\varphi$. (shrink)

Police officers around the world must often select between equally unappealing, uncertain courses of action in an attempt to achieve the best outcome. Despite the immense importance of such decisions, there remains a lack of understanding in the study of individual differences in police decision-making. Here, using a sample of senior police officers recruited from decision-making training events across the United Kingdom (n = 96), we used the Least-worst Uncertain Choice Inventory For Emergency Responses (LUCIFER) to measure the effect of (...) maximization on both domain-specific (police) and domain-general (military) decisions. In line with a wealth of research on traditional “consumer” decisions, we found that police officers who were “maximizers” found decisions more difficult. Gender and previous military experience also influenced the process of decision-making. Specifically, police officers with military experience took more time to assess the situation but were faster to choose a course of action and commit to it. Female police officers also were slower to assess the situation. As recent events show, the outcomes of police decisions have significant consequences for the public, the officers involved, the police force as a whole, and the wider population, yet psychological research has yet to fully explore the role of individual differences in how such decisions are made. While this study does not seek to identify factors associated with “good” or “better” decision-makers, it provides strong support for the need to factor in perspectives of the individual when creating theory, or applied tools, in support of police decision-making. (shrink)

I WOULD LIKE TO respond to the four commentaries in turn. In each case I have started by setting out what I think the commentaries are claiming; in doing so, I may reveal that I have misunderstood or misconstrued, and I apologize where this is the case. My responses in many cases are provisional: the commentaries have given me much to think about. Also, my responses are selective—there are many points not touched upon here that deserve consideration. Finally, the order (...) of my responses is arbitrary. (shrink)