– The conjunction of three plausible theses about the nature of causal powers—that they are intrinsic, that their effects are produced mutually, and that the manifestations they are for are essential to them—leads to a problem concerning the ability of causal powers to work together to produce manifestations. I call this problem the problem of fit. Fortunately for proponents of a power-based metaphysic, the problem of fit is not insurmountable. Fit can be engineered if powers are properties whose natures are (...) determined holistically. However, this power holism does not come without a cost, as a power-based metaphysic must be supplemented by a certain amount of additional machinery in order to avoid the problem. (shrink)

Many philosophres have attempted to argue from the "Humean Theory of Motivation" (HTM) and the "Internalism Requirement" (IR) to the "Humean Theory of Practical Reason" (HTPR). This argument is familiar, but it has rarely been stated with sufficient precision. In this paper, I shall give a precise statement of this argument. I shall then rely on this statement to show two things. First, the HTPR is false: it is incompatible with some extremely plausible assumptions about weakness of will or akrasia. (...) Second, this argument for the HTPR is invalid: even if the HTM and the IR are true, they do not provide any support whatsoever to the HTPR. (shrink)

Every kind of ‘ought’ implies some kind of ‘can’ – but there are many kinds of ‘ought’ and even more kinds of ‘can’. In this essay, I shall focus on a particular kind of ‘ought’ – specifically, on what I shall call the “rational ‘ought’”. On every occasion of use, this kind of ‘ought’ is focused on the situation of a particular agent at a particular time; but this kind of ‘ought’ is concerned, not with how that agent acts at (...) that time, but with what beliefs or intentions the agent has at the time, or with the sort of reasoning by means of which the agent at that time forms or revises those beliefs or intentions. (shrink)

Inferentialism is explained as an attempt to provide an account of meaning that is more sensitive (than the tradition of truth-conditional theorizing deriving from Tarski and Davidson) to what is learned when one masters meanings.

This paper provides a new argument for a position of Crispin Wright's: given that ethical statements can be embedded within all sorts of sentential operators and are subject to definite standards of warrantedness, they must have truth conditions. Allan Gibbard's normative logic' is the only noncognitivist logic that stands a chance of avoiding Geach's Fregean objection. But what, according to Gibbard, is the point of avoiding inconsistency in one's ethical statements? He must say that it is to ensure that one's (...) ethical statements have a property that has certain features. But the only property that has those features is truth. (shrink)

These essays bring Weber's sociology to bear on the current transformation of the political landscape. After the collapse of communism, many states are faced with the challenges of democratization: they need to establish their legitimacy in an uncertain economic climate and within a new geopolitical order. The essays in this volume develop Weberian concepts and apply his comparative-historical method to deepen our understanding of these problems. They cover a wide range of examples, from the United Stated to Western and Eastern (...) Europe, and from Russia and Japan to the Islamic States. (shrink)

In this article i defend the claim that an individual is no more and no less than a bundle of instances of properties against the following objections: (1) the concept of an instance of a property presupposes the concept of an individual. i argue that it presupposes only that no instance of a property exists independently of other instances. (2) if a thing were only a bundle of instances of properties, then properties would qualify properties. this objection commits the fallacy (...) of composition. (3) a bundle constituting an individual needs a component which is not a property to individuate it. i argue that such a bundle individuates itself. (4) the bundle theory makes change impossible. i argue against this claim by distinguishing a thing's numerical identity from its "complete" identity. (5) the bundle theory makes all true statements about individuals analytically true. i show that, at least for one interpretation of 'analytically true', this is not so. (shrink)

This paper suggests that Jean‐Jacques Rousseau, John Dewey, and Paulo Freire each engage in philosophical projects that seek to employ the practice of philosophy as a means to the development of the person and as a political and educational method of philosophy that aims to discover and answer the problems of cooperative associations. The paper argues that the philosophical projects of Rousseau, Dewey, and Freire are intimately related in approach, scope, and intent. Furthermore, it argues that by reading Rousseau, Dewey, (...) and Freire in conversation with one another, their philosophical projects can be effectively employed in an inquiry into citizenship and citizenship education and accordingly as the foundation for a fruitful philosophical methodology that is both political and educational. (shrink)

A theory in natural science is a comprehensive formula or doctrine which describes and correlates in a unified abstract form of statement the general determining factors of some special group of natural facts. It is at once inclusive, realistic and understandable. If a theoretical statement holds good, the existence and characteristics of many individual events can be inferred deductively from it. It thus gives a logical basis for empirical fact. But it is based on experience of nature, and must conform (...) to the facts of nature; these are primary, and a valid theory, no matter how broad it may be, is to be considered as itself a statement of fact, i.e., a true description of some condition which has a real and stable existence in the natural world. In its scientific usage, the term “fact” refers primarily to some datum of experience having the special character of permanence or regular recurrence; this is why scientific facts are verifiable; in this respect they differ from the passing individual events of history. Any scientific theory presupposes the stability and unequivocality of the natural facts. Hence if a theory is sound, it furnishes a reliable basis for prediction, discovery and invention. Scientific or technological creation then becomes possible; modern engineering and medicine could never have become what they are without a background of theoretical physics and biology. Obviously any natural science must always have at its disposal an ample body of observational and experimental data, but in most cases the work of collecting and verifying these is carried out under the guidance of theory. (shrink)

The _Symbolic Forms_ has long been considered the greatest of Cassirer’s works. Into it he poured all the resources of his vast learning about language and myth, religion, art, and science—the various creative symbolizing activities and constructions through which man has expressed himself and given intelligible objective form to this experience. “These three volumes alone make an outstanding contribution to epistemology and to the human power of abstraction. It is rather as if ‘The Golden Bough’ had been written in philosophical (...) rather than in historical terms.”—F.I.G. Rawlins, _Nature_. (shrink)

Philosophers have long distinguished between practical and theoretical rationality. The first section of this chapter begins by discussing the ways in which this distinction was drawn by Aristotle and Kant; then it sketches what seems to be the general consensus today about how, at least roughly, the distinction should be drawn. The rest of this chapter explores what practical and theoretical rationality have in common: in the second section, several parallels between practical and theoretical rationality are outlined, and it is (...) argued that these parallels make it plausible that a unifying account of rationality can be given. Finally, in the third section, a number of such unifying accounts of practical and theoretical rationality are surveyed. These include accounts that are inspired in various ways by Hume and by the results of formal decision theory, as well as views that appeal to reasons and to the distinctive value of correct or appropriate attitudes. (shrink)

Although Freud's merits may be readily acknowledged in the year of his 150th birthday, recent findings on repression-related phenomena cannot be accommodated by his classic conception, on which Erdelyi's theory is built. This point is illustrated by discussing the role of inhibitory processes. The unified theory of repression should be elaborated to generate falsifiable predictions on the reported phenomena.

Despite the ontogenetic allometric size effects that explain much of phyletic variation in brain components, the residuals of some structures indicates that mosaic brain evolution was an important factor in hominid evolution, and that reorganization of the hominid brain may have occurred as early as 3+ MY. Finlay et al.'s allometric technique masks residual variation around allometric trends, and the patterns of residuals relevant to species-specific departures from strict allometric trends.

If we may rely for our evidence on simple observation, it would appear that the tendency of random or unguided activity in external nature is opposed to the development of complex organization and favorable to structural simplicity—in the sense of uniformity in the distribution of elements. This anti-organizing trend of purely physical processes is illustrated in ordinary large-scale mixing and stirring operations, as well as in the automatic increase of entropy with time in systems subject to the laws of thermodynamics. (...) It is common experience that complex systems which are the seat of physical activity tend to become simpler when left to themselves, i.e., they lose organization. Recently Eddington has given the whole matter an admirably clear expression: “Entropy may most conveniently be described as the measure of disorganization of a system.... We can see chance creeping in where formerly it was excluded.” Unless counteracted by directive action the casual or random element in nature tends to increase. If things are left to chance, not only does organization of any high degree of complexity fail to develop, but what organization there is tends to lapse or disappear. Hence in those cases, such as living organisms, where the existence and activity of the system depend on a special and complex organization, it appears necessary to assume the continued operation of a stable directive influence or factor which pervades the whole system and excludes or compensates casual factors as far as possible. The presence of this factor is what makes possible the development and maintenance of the organization required for vital activity. (shrink)

Robert Koch discovered the causal agents for tuberculosis, cholera, and anthrax. The 1905 Nobel Prize acknowledged Koch 's criteria for identifying the causal agent of an infectious disease. These criteria remain useful and the data reviewed below show that the cholinergic contributions to REM sleep control are confirmed by Koch 's postulates. [Hobson et al.].

The salvation present in and through the person of Jesus is an organic motif of Luke's Gospel. It encompasses the offer of new life and the demand for disciplined living.

Thomas & Karmiloff- Smith provide evidence from computational modeling against modular assumptions of “Residual Normality” in developmental disorders. Even though I agree with their criticism, I find their choice of empirical evidence disappointing. Cognitive neuroscience cannot as yet provide a complete understanding of most developmental disorders, but what is known is more than enough to debunk the idea of RN.

Most words are like small vessels with constantly changing contents. Life does not wait for adjustments in language, but seeks to give an immediate solution to its most imperative needs and interests. It builds up and sometimes destroys. It is a panorama in flux.

The phrase "identity in difference" has been regarded by some thinkers as a matter of mere mystery-mongering. How can differences nevertheless be identical? The phrase is transparently absurd.

Only a negative fundamental option, that is, the engagement of man's core awareness and freedom, can bring about the reality known as mortal sin.

In this paper, we consider the way that web documents seeking to persuade readers of certain science claims provide information about the sources of the arguments. Our quantitative analysis reveals that web documents in our sample include hundreds of examples in which the reader is provided information regarding the trustworthiness of sources. The web documents also contain a large number of examples in which the reader is provided with information about how many individuals hold a particular belief. We discuss ad (...) hominem, ad verecundiam, and ad populum arguments, and the way that the examples found in our sample of documents are related to these argumentation schemes. (shrink)