This article develops and defends a triadic account of structural domination, according to which structural domination (e.g. patriarchy, white supremacy, capitalism) is a triadic relation between dominator(s), dominated, and regulator(s)—the constitutive domination dyad plus those roles and norms expressively upholding it. The article elaborates on the relationship between structure and agency from the perspective of both oppressor and oppressed and discusses the deduction of the concept of the capitalist state from the concept of capitalism. On the basis of these definitions, (...) it shows that structural domination under capitalism presupposes collective power but no joint agency or shared intentions on the part of the dominators. (shrink)

Can a person privileged in some respect understand what it is like to be disprivileged in that respect? Some say yes; some say no. I argue that both positions are correct, because ‘understand what it is like to be disprivileged’ is ambiguous. Sometimes, it means grasp of the character of particular experiences of disprivileged people. Privileged people can achieve this. Sometimes, it means grasp of the general character shared by experiences of disprivileged people. Privileged people cannot achieve this. However, there (...) is a general kind of understanding that they can achieve: understanding of why individual experiences have their character, in relation to privilege and disprivilege. This understanding is a skill, not knowledge. It is difficult and discomforting for the privileged to acquire and is easily conflated with knowledge of general experiential character. Distinguishing and characterizing these kinds of understanding clarifies whether, and how, the privileged might understand what it is like to be disprivileged. (shrink)

The privation theory of evil (PTE) states that evil is the absence of some good that is supposed to be present. For example, if vision is an intrinsic good, and if human beings are supposed to have vision, then PTE implies that a human being’s lacking vision is an evil, or a bad state of affairs. The mere-difference view of disability (MDD) states that disabilities like blindness are not inherently bad. Therefore, it would seem that lacking sight is not a (...) bad state of affairs. Thus PTE and MDD seem to be in tension. This essay discusses that apparent tension and explains how it might be resolved without doing violence to either view. Given the prominence of PTE in the history of Christian theology, and the wide support for MDD among disability theorists, it is worth finding a way to harmonize these two views. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to build towards an explanation of just what the matter is.

Introduction: the question of reason -- The Frankfurt School critique of reason -- Habermas's communicative rationality -- Macintyre's tradition-constituted reason -- A substantive reason -- Beyond relativism: reasonable progress and learning from -- Conclusion: toward a Thomistic-Aristotelian critical theory of society.

In this paper we explore how compositional semantics, discourse structure, and the cognitive states of participants all contribute to pragmatic constraints on answers to questions in dialogue. We synthesise formal semantic theories on questions and answers with techniques for discourse interpretation familiar from computational linguistics, and show how this provides richer constraints on responses in dialogue than either component can achieve alone.

Now that the winds have died down, flood waters have receded, and rebuilding has begun, the brand of public-oriented journalism found in the midst of the storms must not be forgotten. --.

P. F. Strawson famously gives pride of place to the reactive attitudes in his account of moral responsibility, though he says little about guilt or any other self-reactive attitudes. This inattention is curious, given that on his view lacking capacity for self-reactive attitudes is grounds for exemption from the moral community. Perhaps because of Strawson’s limited remarks regarding them, the self-reactive attitudes have not received much attention in commentaries on his view. In this paper, I will attempt to fill this (...) lacuna by examining the role of the self-reactive attitudes within his approach to moral responsibility. I will focus in particular on reactive guilt to show that it plays a number of roles in our interpersonal lives, from reinforcing our important personal relationships to holding ourselves accountable with respect to our own personal ideals. A better understanding of these roles, I will argue, helps to clarify Strawson’s notion of reactive attitude and to strengthen his overall argument, in addition to revealing some interesting aspects of the way various self-reactive attitudes operate within our lives. (shrink)

The open borders view is frequently dismissed for making infeasible demands. This is a potent strategy. Unlike normative arguments regarding open borders, which tend to be relatively intractable, the charge of infeasibility is supposed to operate as what we call a "normative argument-stopper." Nonetheless, we argue that the strategy fails. Bringing about open borders is perfectly feasible on the most plausible account of feasibility. We consider and reject what we take to be the only three credible ways to save the (...) charge of infeasibility: by proposing an alternative account of feasibility; by proposing an alternative, more circumscribed interpretation of the subject-matter of feasibility claims; and by proposing a more expansive account of the addressees of the demand for open borders. The first fails to vindicate the claim that infeasibility is a normative argument-stopper. The second does not provide an argument against open borders at all. The third underestimates the power of at least some non-state actors. We conclude by drawing some lessons for the open borders view and the use of feasibility in politics more generally. (shrink)

Can findings from psychology and cognitive neuroscience about the neural mechanisms involved in decision-making can tell us anything useful about the commonly-understood mental phenomenon of making voluntary choices? Two philosophical objections are considered. First, that the neural data is subpersonal, and so cannot enter into illuminating explanations of personal level phenomena like voluntary action. Secondly, that mental properties are multiply realized in the brain in such a way as to make them insusceptible to neuroscientific study. The paper argues that both (...) objections would be weakened by the discovery of empirical generalisations connecting subpersonal properties with the personal level. It gives three case studies that furnish evidence to that effect. It argues that the existence of such interrelations are consistent with a plausible construal of the personal-subpersonal distinction. Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that the notion subpersonal representation relied on in cognitive neuroscience illicitly imports personal-level phenomena like consciousness or normativity, or is otherwise explanatorily problematic. (shrink)

Sedlár and Vigiani [18] have developed an approach to propositional epistemic logics wherein (i) an agent’s beliefs are closed under relevant implication and (ii) the agent is located in a classical possible world (i.e., the non-modal fragment is classical). Here I construct first-order extensions of these logics using the non-Tarskian interpretation of the quantifiers introduced by Mares and Goldblatt [12], and later extended to quantified modal relevant logics by Ferenz [6]. Modular soundness and completeness are proved for constant domain semantics, (...) using non-general frames with Mares–Goldblatt truth conditions. I further detail the relation between the demand that classical possible worlds have Tarskian truth conditions and incompleteness results in quantified relevant logics. (shrink)

A probability function is non-conglomerable just in case there is some proposition E and partition \ of the space of possible outcomes such that the probability of E conditional on any member of \ is bounded by two values yet the unconditional probability of E is not bounded by those values. The paradox of non-conglomerability is the counterintuitive—and controversial—claim that a rational agent’s subjective probability function can be non-conglomerable. In this paper, I present a qualitative analogue of the paradox. I (...) show that, under antecedently plausible assumptions, an analogue of the paradox arises for rational comparative confidence. As I show, the qualitative paradox raises its own distinctive set of philosophical issues. (shrink)

This introductory article is structured around the following themes: it begins with a brief overview of some important works that have paved the way for the present discussion. This is followed by a critique of the concept of “experience” and the philosophies based on it, that was first presented by feminist thinkers Joan Scott and Judith Butler in the 1980’s. The question this debate poses to the discussions in this book is whether focusing on experience is still a philosophically viable (...) option. After that, the views of Edmund Husserl – often described as “the father of phenomenology” – are presented on the particular themes of motherhood and pregnancy, as it is often overlooked that he had anything to say on the topic. Then follows a short outline of the structure of the experience of pregnancy, and also the modest suggestion that pregnancy should be seen not only as “split subjectivity” but also as a specific mode of phenomenological “in-between.” Thereafter the question is taken up whether pregnancy as a philosophical topic might also affect the methodological core of phenomenology. The article ends with a speculative outlook towards certain themes that have developed as a consequence of thinking pregnancy philosophically. (shrink)

This article discusses the current epistemological status of the political blogosphere, in light both of the concerns raised by Alvin Goldman in his 2008 paper ?The Social Epistemology of Blogging? and the recent drastic changes in the structure of the blogosphere. I argue that the political blogosphere replicates epistemically beneficial functions of the mainstream media for the functioning of democracy, and defend this claim from objections to the blogosphere that have been levelled by Goldman and Richard Posner. I then provide (...) an expanded defence of the political blogosphere in response to these particular objections. (shrink)

Eclipse of Grace offers original insights into the roots of modern theology by introducing systematic theologians and Christian ethicists to Hegel through a focus on three of his seminal texts: Phenomenology of Spirit, Science of Logic, and Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Presents brilliant and original insights into Hegel’s significance for modern theology Argues that, theologically, Hegel has been misconstrued and that much more can be gained by focusing on the logic that he develops out of an engagement with (...) Christian doctrines Features an original structure organized as a set of commentaries on individual Hegel texts, and not just presenting overviews of his entire corpus Offers detailed engagement with Hegel’s texts rather than relying on generalizations about Hegelian philosophy Provides an illuminating, accessible and lucid account of the thinking of the major figures in modern German philosophy and theology. (shrink)

The term ‘rumor’ is often used interchangeably with ‘gossip’ and ‘urban legend’ by both laypersons and scholars. In this article we attempt to clarify the construct of rumor by proposing a definition that delineates the situational and motivational contexts from which rumors arise (ambiguous, threatening or potentially threatening situations), the functions that rumors perform (sense-making and threat management), and the contents of rumor statements (unverified and instrumentally relevant information statements in circulation). To further clarify the rumor construct we also investigate (...) the contexts, functions and contents of gossip and urban legends, juxtapose these with rumor, and analyze their similarities and differences. (shrink)

The still dominant virtue-ethical account of right action claims that an action is right just in case a virtuous agent would perform it. Because this account arguably fails to capture what makes actions right, virtue ethicists are well-advised to consider alternatives. I argue that a target-centered account, if suitably developed, succeeds in capturing what makes actions right. First, I explain why a target-centered account shows initial promise in capturing what makes actions right and present an interpretation of the account as (...) developed by its creator, Christine Swanton. Second, I argue that Swanton's and other prominent virtue ethicists’ views of virtuous action are defective, partly in virtue of accepting reasons of the wrong kind for an action’s being virtuous or vicious in respect to a virtue. My arguments, if successful, motivate an alternative version of the target-centered account. Finally, I contribute to the development of such an alternative by sketching a view of virtuous action that avoids the aforementioned defects and thereby promises full success in capturing what makes actions right. (shrink)

Motor training to improve walking and balance function is a common aspect of rehabilitation following motor-incomplete spinal cord injury. Evidence suggests that moderate- to high-intensity exercise facilitates neuroplastic mechanisms that support motor skill acquisition and learning. Furthermore, enhancing corticospinal drive via transcranial direct current stimulation may augment the effects of motor training. In this pilot study, we investigated whether a brief moderate-intensity locomotor-related motor skill training circuit, with and without tDCS, improved walking and balance outcomes in persons with MISCI. In (...) addition, we examined potential differences between within-day and between-day effects of MST. Twenty-six adults with chronic MISCI, who had some walking ability, were enrolled in a 5-day double-blind, randomized study with a 3-day intervention period. Participants were assigned to an intensive locomotor MST circuit and concurrent application of either sham tDCS or active tDCS. The primary outcome was overground walking speed measured during the 10-meter walk test. Secondary outcomes included spatiotemporal gait characteristics, peak trailing limb angle, intralimb coordination, the Berg Balance Scale, and the Falls Efficacy Scale-International questionnaire. Analyses revealed a significant effect of the MST circuit, with improvements in walking speed, cadence, bilateral stride length, stronger limb TLA, weaker limb ACC, BBS, and FES-I observed in both the MST+tDCSsham and MST+tDCS groups. No differences in outcomes were observed between groups. Between-day change accounted for a greater percentage of the overall change in walking outcomes. In persons with MISCI, brief intensive MST involving a circuit of ballistic, cyclic locomotor-related skill activities improved walking outcomes, and selected strength and balance outcomes; however, concurrent application of tDCS did not further enhance the effects of MST.Clinical Trial Registration[ClinicalTrials.gov], identifier [NCT03237234]. (shrink)

Much attention has been given to Arabic thought in the history of philosophy, however, Arabic contributions to logic have been greatly overlooked. In the ten essays of this book, Nicholas Rescher presents substantial material on the history, progression and major trends of Arabic logic from the eighth through the sixteenth century. Rescher finds that, like much of Western thought, Arabic logic had its basis in Greek philosophy, and specifically in Hellenistic Aristotelian logic.

In an earlier paper I argued that time travellers cannot change the past: alleged models of changing the past either fall into contradiction or else involve avoiding, not changing, the past. Goddu has responded to my argument, maintaining that his hypertime model involves time travellers changing (not avoiding) the past. In the present paper I first discuss what would be required to substantiate the claim that a given model involves changing rather than avoiding the past. I then consider Goddu's hypertime (...) model and an earlier model due to Meiland. I argue that neither author does what would be required to substantiate the claim that the model involves changing (not avoiding) the past. I go on to give reasons for the stronger claim that no-one can present a coherent model and also substantiate the claim that it involves changing (not avoiding) the past. (shrink)

Somewhere in the depths of the Hegelian system there is an answer to any question you care to ask, even if you ask: what lies beyond the State? Because the State is for Hegel a `concrete whole', because it is the context in which all our moral and political self-understanding is grounded, the question of what lies beyond it might be thought particularly difficult for him to answer. Not a bit of it. Towards the end of the Philosophy of Right, (...) beyond the two sections on the State in its internal and external relations, lies the conclusion to the whole work. Beyond the spirits of individual peoples, given substance in their individual states, we find the World Spirit, and, for a philosopher who has been accused of worshipping the State, Hegel locates a great deal in the realm that transcends it, for to the realm of the universal or World Spirit belong art, religion, philosophy — and world history.For world history is about the passing away of states in the interests of a fuller conception of human totality — or freedom, as Hegel puts it — than they had succeeded in embodying, and though that fuller conception may then be successfully embodied in some other state, it is the lesson of world history that no state is immortal. Beyond the state, any state, lies a yet more concrete and yet more universal expression of the freedom of the spirit. Judged by that criterion, tried in the crucible of world-historical change, which usually means war, every state is eventually found wanting. (shrink)

By applying the normative basis of Confucian ritual activity to the repeatable designs of internet memes, this essay explores the ways in which socially recognized forms can allow individuals to engage in thoughtful activity with what is represented by but cannot be reduced to form: the particulars of human experience. The goal of this insight is to suggest that the value of art and ideas cannot be isolated from how individuals interact with them, and thus critique should examine how well (...) an idea or piece promotes an active, creative, and critical relationship to a person’s own experiences. (shrink)

In modern societies entrepreneurship and innovation are widely seen as key sources of economic growth and welfare increases. Yet entrepreneurial innovation has also meant losses and hardships for some members of society: it is destructive of some stakeholders’ wellbeing even as it creates new wellbeing among other stakeholders. Both the positive benefits and negative externalities of innovation are problematic because entrepreneurs initiate new ventures before their private profitability and/or social costs can be fully recognized. In this paper we consider three (...) analytical frameworks within which these issues might be examined: pre-commitments, contractarianism, and an entrepreneurial framework. We conclude that the intersection of stakeholder theory and entrepreneurial innovation is a potentially rich arena for research. (shrink)

This paper responds to Nick Bostrom’s suggestion that the threat of a human-unfriendly superintelligenceshould lead us to delay or rethink progress in AI. I allow that progress in AI presents problems that we are currently unable to solve. However; we should distinguish between currently unsolved problems for which there are rational expectations of solutions and currently unsolved problems for which no such expectation is appropriate. The problem of a human-unfriendly superintelligence belongs to the first category. It is rational to proceed (...) on that assumption that we will solve it. These observations do not reduce to zero the existential threat from superintelligence. But we should not permit fear of very improbable negative outcomes to delay the arrival of the expected benefits from AI. (shrink)

And Jesus said, How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God! For it is easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. And they that heard it said, Who then can be saved? And he said, The things which are impossible with men are possible with God... There is no man that hath left house, or parents, or brethren, or wife, or (...) children, for the kingdom of God's sake, Who shall not receive manifold more in this present time, and in the world to come life everlasting. (shrink)

The suggestion that philosophers are responsible for global warming seems, on the face of it, absurd. However, that we might cause global warming has been known for over a century. If we had had in existence a more rigorous kind of academic inquiry devoted to promoting human welfare, giving priority to problems of living, humanity might have become aware of the dangers of global warming long ago, and might have taken steps to meet these dangers decades ago. That we do (...) not have academic inquiry of this type, giving priority to problems of living and able to warn humanity of the impending disaster of global warming, is the result of a philosophical mistake – a mistake about what constitutes rigorous intellectual inquiry. This is a mistake of philosophers. Thus philosophers, in failing to grasp the profound intellectual and humanitarian failings of academia as it is at present organized (the outcome of implementing a seriously defective philosophy of inquiry) can perhaps be said to be responsible for global warming. (shrink)

At Providence St. Joseph Health in Oregon, many factors contribute to the integration and success of the ethics services. There are three principal lenses through which one can understand the distinct way in which the ethics services are operationalized and integrated: the theological foundations of ethics as a service, the institutional ecology, and the professionalization of the field of health care ethics. The authors review key realities that have shaped their work through these three lenses and then describe the activities (...) of the Providence Center for Health Care Ethics regarding its strategic objectives and clinical and administrative integration. (shrink)

The article urges a negative answer to the question if values merely lie ‘‘in the eyes of the beholder’’. It argues the objectivity of values via their status as tertiary properties that are neither on dispositionally inherent in their objects nor yet affective (dispositionally evoked in the interaction between objects and sense–observers), but rather reflective in being dispositionally evoked in suitably competent minds considering the matters involved.