European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Contemporary moral philosophy is split between an inherently a-historical moral philosophy/theory on the one hand and a growing interest in moral history and the historicity of morality on the other. In between these, the very moments of moral change are often left insufficiently attended to and under-theorized. Yet moral change is, arguably, one of the defining features of present day moral frameworks, and thus one of the main things we need to make sense of in moral philosophy. In this paper, (...) I present an account of moral change through the use of three metaphors: the tipping point, the bargaining table and the strong rope. I suggest these as coordinates for the development of a full-blown, historically sensitive conception of morality. (shrink)

In her book Iris Murdoch, Gender and Philosophy, Sabina Lovibond argues that Iris Murdoch's philosophical and literary work is covertly dedicated to an ideology of female subordination. The most central and interesting aspect of her multifaceted argument concerns Murdoch's focus on the individual person's moral self-scrutiny and transformation of consciousness. Lovibond suggests that this focus is antithetical to the kind of communal and structural criticism of society that has been essential for the advance of feminism. She further reads Murdoch's dismissal (...) of “structuralism” as proof of Murdoch's alleged conservatism and neglect of feminist concerns. In this article I will argue that this line of argument—though not completely off-base concerning the awkwardness of Murdoch's relation to feminism— gives a misleading picture of Murdoch's philosophical and ideological position, and establishes a problematic antagonism between moral self-scrutiny and social criticism, which a closer look at Murdoch's work can help us overcome. (shrink)

This book is an investigation into the descriptive task of moral philosophy. Nora Hämäläinen explores the challenge of providing rich and accurate pictures of the moral conditions, values, virtues, and norms under which people live and have lived, along with relevant knowledge about the human animal and human nature. While modern moral philosophy has focused its energies on normative and metaethical theory, the task of describing, uncovering, and inquiring into moral frameworks and moral practices has mainly been left (...) to social scientists and historians. Nora Hämäläinen argues that this division of labour has detrimental consequences for moral philosophy and that a reorientation toward descriptive work is needed in moral philosophy. She traces resources for a descriptive philosophical ethics in the work of four prominent philosophers of the twentieth century: John Dewey, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault, and Charles Taylor, while also calling on thinkers inspired by them. (shrink)

Beginning with Barry Hoffmaster’s charge that we reclaim bioethics from the moral philosopher’s top-down theorizing, I discuss two moral philosophy contexts that offer resources for the kind of complex attention Hoffmaster demands: Iris Murdoch and Cora Diamond in moral philosophy and Margaret Urban Walker, Hilde Lindeman, and Marian Verkerk’s joint take on bioethics. My aim is: 1) to dispel a simplified notion of philosophy in bioethics; 2) to unite two strands of philosophy, which converge on important issues relevant to contemporary (...) bioethics; and 3) to explore these strands in terms of enabling, maieutic work on our ethical points of departure. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals was Iris Murdoch’s major philosophical testament and a highly original and ambitious attempt to talk about our time. Yet in the scholarship on her philosophical work thus far it has often been left in the shade of her earlier work. This volume brings together 16 scholars who offer accessible readings of chapters and themes in the book, connecting them to Murdoch’s larger oeuvre, as well as to central themes in 20th century and contemporary thought. (...) The essays bring forth the strength, originality, and continuing relevance of Murdoch’s late thought, addressing, among other matters, her thinking about the Good, the role and nature of metaphysics in the contemporary world, the roles of art in human understanding, questions of unity and plurality in thinking, the possibilities of spiritual life without God, and questions of style and sensibility in intellectual work. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a perspective on Iris Murdoch conception of metaphysics, starting from her puzzling contention that she could describe herself as a ?Wittgensteinian Neo-Platonist?. I argue that this statement is a central clue to the nature both of her philosophical method which is strongly reminiscent of Wittgenstein's, and of her Platonism, which in its emphasis on the everyday and metaphorical aspects of his work differs starkly from received modern interpretations. Placing Murdoch between Plato and (...) Wittgenstein can help us to understand the nature of her metaphysics as a complex, continuous, pictorial activity, which shows a deep awareness of and is compatible with the late twentieth century and contemporary distrust of large metaphysical systems or explanations. (shrink)

In the past few years, we have seen emerging new work that brings into focus the role of historical change and its moral implications in Iris Murdoch's philosophy. This paper strengthens this reading of her work and investigates the implications of this aspect of Murdoch's thinking for education in general and for moral education in particular. It resituates the Platonic imagery of the individual's ascent towards the true and the good in a framework where our conceptions of the true and (...) the good are in a process of historical reconfiguration. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the viability of the claim that at least some forms of moral theory are harmful for sound moral thought and practice. This claim was put forward by e.g. Elisabeth Anscombe ( 1981 ( 1958 )) and by Annette Baier, Peter Winch, D.Z Phillips and Bernard Williams in the 1970’s–1980’s. To this day aspects of it have found resonance in both post-Wittgensteinian and virtue ethical quarters. The criticism has on one hand contributed to a substantial change (...) and broadening of the scope of analytic moral philosophy. On the other hand it is, at least in its most strongly anti-theoretical formulations, now broadly considered outdated and—to the extent that it is still defended—insensitive to the changes that have occurred within the field in the last 20–30 years. The task of this paper is to relocate the anti-theoretical critique into the field of analytic ethics today. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

In this paper I argue that the lack of interest, among analytic moral philosophers, in the contingencies of our moral present, produces an impoverished moral philosophy, unable to address the moral problems and quandaries of ordinary people. What is needed to remedy this is a broadening of the scope of the moral philosopher’s thought to include a rich attention to moral phenomena of the present. One such phenomenon, attended to by sociologists and critical journalists over the past few decades, is (...) the contemporary proliferating genre of psychologically oriented self-help literature. I display a range of sociological responses to self-help in order to point out aspects of morality that are made visible in these discussions, whereas they often remain invisible in standard moral philosophy. The aim is not to suggest a specific methodology for including such material into philosophical discussions, but rather to urge philosophers to reconsider the range of materials they attend to in their work, in order to produce a more lively engagement with and understanding of contemporary morality. (shrink)

In Chapter 18 of Murdoch’s Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals the concept of ‘void’ is offered as a label for a fourth dimension of moral thought, after ‘axioms, duties and Eros’ in the preceding chapter. Void, unlike the others, does not provide a mode of structuring a normative conception of some area or aspect of the moral life. It is rather described as a ‘tract of experience’—of evil, darkness, desolation, hopelessness, pain—offered as an antidote to overly optimistic readings of (...) her ethics of Eros. Murdoch draws heavily on Simone Weil’s work here, but a closer look at the chapter discloses a dissonance in her use of ‘void’, which in turn reveals a difference between these two thinkers. (shrink)

Consistency is usually seen as one of the hallmarks and a cardinal virtue of moral theory, as well as of any defensible real-life moral perspective. In everyday life a consistent set of moral beliefs is conductive to moral clarity, communicability, responsibility and responsiveness. But this is just one side of the story. In this paper I argue that inconsistency, properly understood, is a productive and constructive aspect of both moral philosophy and our moral lives. After an introductory glance at Ralf (...) Waldo Emerson and Hannah Arendt, the argument proceeds in three main steps. First, I discuss the philosophical importance of paying heed to inconsistencies in our moral lives, which often are prematurely pruned from moral philosophy. Second, I discuss the positive moral roles of inconsistency in terms of responsiveness to different situations, values, needs and concerns that call upon our attention in everyday life. Third, I argue that moral inconsistencies contribute to the necessary adaptability of our moral understandings to changing conditions. Fourth, in the place of a conclusion, I revisit the issue of consistency, clarity and accountability. (shrink)

Iris Murdoch’s late major work Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals is rich in unusual philosophical insight, but frequently found difficult, not least because its form and perspectives defy the expectations of her readers. In this introduction we review some central aspects of the book: the nature of Murdoch’s philosophical ambitions, her attempts at rethinking faith and spirituality in a secular world, her work on the metaphysical underpinnings of our thinking, the roles of art in all of this, and her (...) historical sensibility, which up to recently has largely been overlooked by commentators. We also look at the textual features of the book which make it particularly challenging but also gratifying for the reader who has discovered its distinctive charms. (shrink)

This book provides a philosophical assessment of the idea of personhood advanced in popular self-help literature. It also traces, within academic philosophy and philosophical scholarship, a self-help culture where the self is brought forth as an object of improvement and a key to meaning, progress and profundity. Unlike other academic treatments of the topic of self-help, this book is not primarily concerned with providing a critique of popular self-help and self-transformative practices. Rather, it is concerned with how they work to (...) shape contemporary forms and ideals of moral personhood and are conductive to moral renegotiation and change. The book consists of two parts with somewhat different argumentative strategies. Part 1 consists of an overview and reassessment of popular self-help literature and its sociological and journalistic critics, written from a moral philosophical perspective. Part 2 opens with discussion of the current attraction, among a range of philosophers, to self-transformative themes. The chapters assess the strand of self-transformative philosophy found in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault, Pierre Hadot, Stanley Cavell and Iris Murdoch. Finally, the book concludes with a discussion of the theme of social change and moral renegotiation in contemporary societies, which is a central but underestimated undercurrent in discussions on contemporary self-transformative practices. The book's dual perspective-on both popular self-help and self-transformative currents in philosophy-enables a cultural and moral philosophical analysis of contemporary ethical ideals of personhood, as well as reflection on the literatures available for its development. The Making of the Good Person will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in moral philosophy, history of philosophy, psychology, sociology and literary studies. (shrink)

Moral change in a historical perspective is a prominent theme in narrative literature, but this dimension of our moral lives has been left in the shade of what I call a context sensitive universalism that guides the mainstream of moral philosophical readings of literature after Nussbaum, Murdoch, Diamond and Cavell among others. Focalizing Robert Pippin’s reading of Henry James’s The Wings of the Dove, this paper addresses literature as a place for philosophical exploration of the historicity of morality, and argues (...) for making more space for the facticity of change in ethics and ethical readings of literature, not least as a necessary prerequisite for both individual and collective moral self-understanding. (shrink)

Hanna Meretojan kirja The Ethics of Storytelling ammentaa hermeneuttisesta perinteestä aineksia kirjallisuutieteelliseen näkökulmaan, joka valottaa kerronnan rooleja meidän jokapäiväisessä elämässämme ja pyrkii myös tarjoamaan kriittisen välineistön, jonka avulla voimme ymmärtää ja kritisoida aikamme kerronnallisia käytäntöjä ja kertomusmalleja. Tämä teksti tarkastelee Meretojan argumentin pääpiirteitä ja sijoittaa hänen työnsä laajempaan nykyaikaisen eettisen ajattelun kontekstiin.

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

through examining the case of Doris Lessing’s varying accounts of her mother, I discuss here the fundamental fact/value entanglement involved in describing people, human situations, and human relations. A serious consideration of the ethical and epistemic challenges involved in biographical narration will provide strong reasons for jettisoning the fact/value dichotomy when thinking about human life.1 Yet, I do not propose such considerations as providing an overall model for rejecting the fact/value dichotomy, but rather suggest that there may be no formal (...) unity to the various considerations that speak against upholding a fact/value dichotomy in different philosophical discussions. Furthermore, seeking such unity .. (shrink)

Can a good man do evil things? This paper offers a moral philosophical reading of Hilary Mantel’s novels Wolf Hall and Bring up the bodies, focusing on Mantel’s fictional portrayal of Thomas Cromwell as a good person, in spite of his growing involvement in the dirty work of Henry VIII. The narrative resists interpretations of Cromwell as someone corrupted by power. It also thwarts attempts to read his deeds as results of a deficient capacity for sympathetic imagination, which has been (...) a focalized moral flaw in contemporary moral philosophical discussions of literature. By thus resisting moralized readings of his character, the novels invite intensified attention to the complex dynamics of character and circumstance. (shrink)

This volume showcases contemporary, ground-up ethical essays in the tradition of Wittgenstein’s broader philosophy and Wittgenstein-inspired ethical reflection. It takes the ethical relevance of Wittgenstein as a substantial and solid starting point for a broad range of ongoing thinking about contemporary ethical issues. The texts are organised in two sections. The first consists of chapters exploring questions around what could be called the “grammar” of our moral forms of life, and thus represents a more traditional approach in ethics after Wittgenstein. (...) The second part represents a recent turn in the tradition towards investigating moral conceptions, perspectives and concepts that are undergoing change, either because the world itself is changing (for instance with new technologies) or because human agency, such as social movements, has brought us to reconsider previously unquestioned ideas and structures. Within the book, the authors’ contributions are inspired, in their ways of working with ethical questions, by Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language, understanding and the nature of philosophical inquiry. This book is of interest to philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein, as well as to all ethicists seeking ideas for how to do philosophy in a manner close to lived experience and practice. (shrink)

Review of Salla Aldrin Salskov, Ondřej Beran and Nora Hämäläinen (eds.), Ethical Inquiries after Wittgenstein.

To integrate social robots in real-life contexts, it is crucial that they are accepted by the users. Acceptance is not only related to the functionality of the robot but also strongly depends on how the user experiences the interaction. Established design principles from usability and user experience research can be applied to the realm of human–robot interaction, to design robot behavior for the comfort and well-being of the user. Focusing the design on these aspects alone, however, comes with certain ethical (...) challenges, especially regarding the user’s privacy and autonomy. Based on an example scenario of human–robot interaction in elder care, this paper discusses how established design principles can be used in social robotic design. It then juxtaposes these with ethical considerations such as privacy and user autonomy. Combining user experience and ethical perspectives, we propose adjustments to the original design principles and canvass our own design recommendations for a positive and ethically acceptable social human–robot interaction design. In doing so, we show that positive user experience and ethical design may be sometimes at odds, but can be reconciled in many cases, if designers are willing to adjust and amend time-tested design principles. (shrink)

While the pursuitworthiness of philosophical ideas has changed over time, philosophical practice and methodology have not kept pace. The worthiness of a philosophical pursuit includes not only the ideas and objectives one pursues but also the methods with which one pursues them. In this paper, we articulate how empirical approaches benefit philosophy of science, particularly advocating for the use of qualitative methods for understanding the social and normative aspects of scientific inquiry. After situating qualitative methods within empirical philosophy of science, (...) we discuss how to adapt these traditionally sociological methods to empirically inform philosophical questions. Our aim is to normalize and legitimize qualitative methods for philosophical purposes and discuss how they can elucidate descriptive and normative components of scientific practice in a more generalizable non-idealized manner. We contend that qualitative methods are particularly well suited to philosophical interest in the social norms of science, their achievability, and their mutability. Furthermore, unlike more historical case studies in philosophy, qualitative methods enable more confidence in generalizability, albeit limited, from a concrete sample to a larger class. We conclude by addressing anxieties about the distinctness of empirical philosophy of science from social epistemology and from sociology of science. (shrink)

Four detailed cases of delusions of misidentification (DM) are presented: two cases of misidentification of the reflected self, one of reverse intermetamorphosis, and one of reduplicative paramnesia. The cases are discussed in the context of three levels of interpretation: neurological, cognitive and phenomenological. The findings are compared to previous work with DM patients, particularly the work of Ellis and Young (1990; Young, 1998) who found that loss of the normal affective response to familiar faces was a contributing factor in the (...) Capgras delusion. The four cases presented suggest that this particular deficit is not a critical factor in the development of other forms of DM. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of advantage in sport. Advantage is often referred to in discussions of the philosophy of sport, but only a few analyses of the term exist. Sigmund Loland has discussed advantage most comprehensibly. Nevertheless, his view does not address all of the relevant kinds of advantage. I begin with a summary of Loland's view and then show its limitations. I continue by developing his ideas further to present what I call performance (...) advantage, a comparative relationship between numbers attributed to performances. For instance, the performance of a football team that beat its opponent 3?2 is given a numerical value. However, another kind of advantage exists, one that I label property advantage. This term refers to advantage as a comparative relationship between different properties that affect performances. For example, a runner may have more haemoglobin than his or her competitor. I then outline the relationship between the two meanings of advantage. Finally, I summarise by stating that advantage in sport is a relationship of superiority that can be divided into performance advantage and property advantage. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the inherent purpose of sports competitions. In ‘On Winning and Athletic Superiority’, Nicholas Dixon states that the central comparative purpose of an athletic contest is to determine which team or player is superior, or, synonymously, to provide an accurate measure of athletic superiority. Dixon identifies athletic skill as the standard of athletic superiority in competitive sport. However, I argue there are three separate standards of athletic superiority: the demonstration of (...) athletic skill, the achievement of prelusory goal using lusory means, and achievement of superior formal result. This stance responds to Dixon’s argument that failed athletic contests are contests that have not fulfilled the central purpose of competitive sport, because they have been undermined by refereeing errors, cheating, gamesmanship or bad luck. I argue that a failed athletic contest occurs when any of the three standards of athletic superiority conflict. (shrink)

Background: Nurses need moral courage to ensure ethically good care. Moral courage is an individual characteristic and therefore it is relevant to examine its association with nurses’ socio-demographic factors. Objective: To describe nurses’ self-assessed level of moral courage and its association with their socio-demographic factors. Research design: Quantitative descriptive cross-sectional study. The data were collected with Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale and analyzed statistically. Participants and research context: A total of 482 registered nurses from a major university hospital in Southern Finland (...) completed the Finnish language version of Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale in autumn 2017. Ethical considerations: Ethical approval was obtained from the university ethics committee and permission for the data collection from the participating hospital. Ethical principles and scientific guidelines were followed throughout the research process. Findings: Nurses’ self-assessed level of moral courage was rather high. On Visual Analogy Scale (0–10), the mean value was 8.20 and the mean score of the four dimensional, 21-item Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale was 4.09 on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents’ gender, present work role, ethical knowledge base, additional ethics education, self-study as a means to acquire ethical knowledge, and frequency of work situations needing moral courage were statistically significantly associated with nurses’ moral courage. Discussion: Strongest association was found between nurses’ higher moral courage level and formal and informal ethics education. Honesty and patient’s humane and dignified encounter received the highest scores indicating respondents’ internalization of the core values of nursing. Conclusion: Although nurses were fairly morally courageous, moral courage should be a part of nurses’ basic and continuing education thus covering its theoretical and practical learning. Since moral courage is a virtue that can be taught, learnt, and practiced, education is a relevant way to maintain and further strengthen nurses’ moral courage. (shrink)

The so-called “conciliatory” norm in epistemology and meta-ethics requires that an agent, upon encountering peer disagreement with her judgment, lower her confidence about that judgment. But whether agents actually abide by this norm is unclear. Although confidence is excessively researched in the empirical sciences, possible effects of disagreement on confidence have been understudied. Here, we target this lacuna, reporting a study that measured confidence about moral beliefs before and after exposure to moral discourse about a controversial issue. Our findings indicate (...) that participants do not abide by the conciliatory norm. Neither do they conform to a rival “steadfast” norm that demands their confidence to remain the same. Instead, moral discourse seems to boost confidence. Interestingly, we also find a confidence boost for factual beliefs, and a correlation between the extremity of moral views and confidence. One possible explanation of our findings is that when engaging in moral discourse participants become more extreme in their opinions, which leads them to become more confident about them, or vice versa: they become more confident and in turn more extreme. Although our work provides initial evidence for the former mechanism, further research is needed for a better understanding of confidence and moral discourse. (shrink)

There is good reason to believe that scientific realism requires a commitment to the objective modal structure of the physical world. Causality, equilibrium, laws of nature, and probability all feature prominently in scientific theory and explanation, and each one is a modal notion. If we are committed to the content of our best scientific theories, we must accept the modal nature of the physical world. But what does the scientific realist’s commitment to physical modality require? We consider whether scientific realism (...) is compatible with Humeanism about the laws of nature, and we conclude that it is not. We specifically identify three major problems for the best-systems account of lawhood: its central concept of strength cannot be formulated non-circularly, it cannot offer a satisfactory account of the laws of the special sciences, and it can offer no explanation of the success of inductive inference. In addition, Humeanism fails to be naturalistically motivated. For these reasons, we conclude that the scientific realist must embrace natural necessity. (shrink)

Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalized persons to educate them about the nature of their oppression. I argue that epistemic exploitation is marked by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic labor. The coercive and exploitative aspects of the phenomenon are exemplified by the unpaid nature of the educational labor and its associated opportunity costs, the double bind that marginalized persons must navigate when faced with the demand to educate, and the need for additional labor created by the default (...) skepticism of the privileged. I explore the connections between epistemic exploitation and the two varieties of epistemic injustice that Fricker (2007) identifies, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. I situate epistemic exploitation within Dotson’s (2012; 2014) framework of epistemic oppression, and I address the role that epistemic exploitation plays in maintaining active ignorance and upholding dominant epistemic frameworks. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay argues that there was a sense in which Shelley actively approved of “jingling verse.” His poetic energy was sustained by a substratum of popular and tuneful versifying, such as impromptus, bouts-rimés, anagrams, enigmas, ballads, Mother Goose rhymes, proverbs, hymns, and drinking songs. He hybridizes the registers and meters of these humble forms with elevated, sublime, and erudite ones. This hybridization is, arguably, connected to the characteristic coexistence of the direct and clear with the knotty and puzzling in his (...) poetry. After a brief account of Shelley’s submerged youthful reading, noting in passing that Shelley’s lyrics proved amenable during the early twentieth century to recycling as Shelleyesque jingles, the essay illustrates its thesis from unfamiliar fragments in Shelley’s notebooks, such as the late lyric fragment “Time is flying,” and from more familiar matter such as “Dirge for the Year,” “Mont Blanc,” “The Cloud,” “On the Medusa of Leonardo da Vinci,” “The Sensitive... (shrink)

W niniejszym artykule analizuję koncepcję Arystotelesa dotyczącą wymagań epistemicznych koniecznych do identyfikacji czynów moralnie dobrych. W Etyce Nikomachejskiej, Arystoteles zdaje się twierdzić, że jesteśmy w stanie rozpoznawać takie czyny, nie mając wiedzy o tym, dlaczego są one dobre. Inne twierdzenia zawarte w tych dziele, nie pozwalają jednak na bezkrytyczne przyjęcie tej tezy. Zdaniem Johna McDowella, Arystoteles uważał, iż dobro etyczne czynu jest zależne od kontekstu. Gdyby tak było, by rozpoznać dany czyn jako dobry, musielibyśmy wiedzieć jakie cechy danej sytuacji czynią (...) go dobrym. Bronię tezy, że nawet jeśli dobro czynu byłoby zależne od kontekstu, Arystoteles nie uważałby znajomości tego kontekstu za jedyny sposób rozpoznania czynu jako dobry. By tego dowieść, sięgam do dorobku współczesnej filozofii. Realizm wewnętrzny Hilarego Putnama pozwala wyjaśnić w jaki sposób podmiot rozpoznaje egzemplarze należące do danego rodzaju naturalnego, bez znajomości definicji tego rodzaju naturalnego. David Charles pokazuje, że Arystoteles podziela podobny pogląd, choć nie uważa, że podmiot musi zakładać, iż istnieje definicja danego rodzaju. Twierdzę, że ten aspekt teorii Arystotelesa może być zastosowany także do identyfikacji czynów moralnie dobrych. Jednostka może rozpoznawać dobre czyny jako czyny konieczne do prowadzenia cnotliwego życia. Nie musi wiedzieć dlaczego określone czyny są dobre. Wystarczy, że ma wizję dobrego życia, którą – jak twierdzi Arystoteles – może rozwinąć poprzez naśladowanie tych, którzy mają „oko doświadczenia”. (shrink)

This essay revisits the main themes and arguments put forward in The Comanche Empire: indigenous agency; spatial reorientation in the writing of colonial histories; the composition of the Comanche empire and its impact on the history of North America. It also responds to a number of specific issues raised by the roundtable participants: differences and similarities between indigenous and Euro-colonial power regimes; balancing of culture-specific frameworks with broad-gauge political economic analysis; linkages between indigenous agency and indigenous sovereignty in colonial encounters; (...) the question of periodization in writing Native American and colonial histories. Finally, the essay points to new ways of understanding, conceptualizing, and comparing nonterritorial nomadic empires by introducing the concept of “kinetic empire,” which refers to a flexible imperial organization that revolves around a set of mobile activities and relies on selective nodal control of key resources. (shrink)