This article reconstructs the normative strategy of interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time in modern analytical philosophy, and also proposes a theoretical framework for understanding this strategy as a historical phenomenon. The article describes the development of the normative direction in the interpretation of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Its first branch—the socio-normative, or the neopragmatist one—is associated with such philosophers as John Haugeland and Robert Brandom. The second one—the ethico-normative, or postneopragmatist one—branch is represented by (...) Steven Crowell and Sacha Golob. It is shown that the first group of normativists focused mainly on implicit social norms and structures of conformity, while the second—focuses primarily on Kantian ethics and Christina Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant, as well as on the inferentialist philosophy of language of Robert Brandom. The conceptual schemes used by each of the representatives of these approaches are reconstructed. The connections of different approaches within the framework of the normative direction with each other are shown. The concept of a relay race is proposed, which can describe normative Heideggerianism as a historical phenomenon. It is shown that the development of normative Heideggerianism can be characterized as theoretical progress in relation to the accuracy of the interpretation of Heidegger’s texts. The grounds for the comparative “progressiveness” of different normative approaches in the updates of the basic normative conceptual scheme that they involve are clarified. It is also shown that the progress of the normative conceptual scheme in the direction of flexibility and adaptation to Heidegger’s text is fraught with a loss of meaningfulness of the very concept of norm. It is argued that the concept of norm, despite the loss of its empirical content, can be used to translate Heidegger’s concepts for pragmatic reasons. (shrink)

To most interpreters, the case seems to be clear: Plotinus identifies matter and evil, as he bluntly states in Enn. 1.8[51] that 'last matter' is 'evil', and even 'evil itself'. In this paper, I challenge this view: how and why should Plotinus have thought of matter, the sense-making ἔσχατον of his derivational ontology from the One and Good, evil? A rational reconstruction of Plotinus's tenets should neither accept the paradox that evil comes from Good, nor shirk the arduous task (...) of interpreting Plotinus's texts on evil as a fitting part of his philosophy on the whole. Therefore, I suggest a reading of evil in Plotinus as the outcome of an incongruent interaction of matter and soul, maintaining simultaneously that neither soul nor matter are to be considered as bad or evil. When Plotinus calls matter evil, he does so metonymically denoting matter's totally passive potentiality as perceived by the toiling soul trying to act upon it as a form-bringer. As so often, Plotinus is speaking quoad nos here rather than referring to 'matter per se' (for Plotinus, somewhat of an oxymoron) which, as mere potentiality (and nothing else) is not nor can be evil. In short: matter is no more evil than the melancholy evening sky is melancholy -- not in itself (for it isn't), but as to its impression on us who contemplate it. As I buttress this view, it will also become clear that matter cannot tritely be considered to be the αὐτὸ κακόν as a prima facie-reading of Enn. 1.8[51] might powerfully suggest, but that the αὐτὸ κακόν, far from being a principle of its own, has to be interpreted within the dynamics of Plotinus's philosophical thinking as a unique, though numerously applicable flaw-pattern for all the single κακά (hence the Platonic αὐτό). To conclude, I shall offer a short outlook on the consistency of this interpretation with Plotinus's teaching on the soul and with the further Neoplatonic development of the doctrine of evil. (shrink)

This volume contains the proceedings of the Social Ontology, Normativity, and Philosophy of Law conference, which took place on May 30–31, 2019 at the University of Glasgow. At the invitation of the Social Ontology Research Group, a panel of prominent scholars shed light on a range of key topics within social ontology, normativity, and philosophy of law from an interdisciplinary perspective.

In his article on pre-conventions, Celano presents, what the author calls, the Ontological Commitment Thesis and the Normative Bite Thesis. In this short comment, the author argues that the two theses are together both incompatible with the idea that pre-conventions are facts which have causal powers in human behaviour; also, if the ontological thesis is abandoned, normative determination could not be obtained. In other terms, the author argues that either pre-conventions are part of our causal explanation of human (...) behaviour or pre-conventions are abstract entities able to determine human behaviour normatively. In the first case, pre-conventions lack normative meaning, while in the second pre-conventions cannot integrate our causal explanation of human actions. Tertium non datur. (shrink)

Applied ontology is the attempt to put to use the rigorous tools of philosophical ontology in the development of category systems which can be of use in the formalization and systematization of knowledge of a given domain. In what follows we shall sketch some elements of the ontology of legal and socio-political institutions, paying attention especially to the normativity involved in such institutions. We shall see that there is more than one type of normativity, but that this (...) fact that has often been ignored in standard attempts by philosophers to build ontologies of legal and other socio-political entities. In order to provide a sound system of categories for legal and socio-political institutions and entities, however, the manifold of normativity needs to be addressed. The classical examples of normative statements have been moral propositions; they do not merely describe states of affairs; they tell us how states of affairs ought to be. The distinction between how things are and how they ought to be is the basis of the distinction between fact and value. Analytic philosophers for a long time shunned discussions of normativity and ethics. They considered ethical statements as pseudo-propositions, or as expressions of pro- or con-attitudes of no theoretical significance.1 Nowadays, in contrast, prominent analytic philosophers discuss normative problems and there are important books written by such philosophers on topics such as law and justice. Here we pay attention to three seminal thinkers in this development: H. L. A. Hart, John Rawls, and John R. Searle in concerning ourselves especially with the way in which they deal with the issue of normativity. Hart is, within the context of recent analytic philosophy, the most important philosopher of law, Rawls the most.. (shrink)

In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.

This volume contains the proceedings of the Social Ontology, Normativity, and Philosophy of Law conference, which took place on May 30-31, 2019 at the University of Glasgow. At the invitation of the Social Ontology Research Group, a panel of prominent scholars shed light on a range of key topics within social ontology, normativity, and philosophy of law from an interdiciplinary perspective.

This article describes an ontological model of norms. The basic assumption is that a substantial part of a legal system is grounded on the concept of agency. Since a legal system aims at regulating a society, then its goal can be achieved only by affecting the behaviour of the members of the society. We assume that a society is made up of agents (which can be individuals, institutions, software programs, etc.), that agents have beliefs, goals and preferences, and that they (...) commit to intentions in order to choose a line of behaviour. The role of norms, within a legal system, is to specify how and when the chosen behaviour agrees with the basic principles of the legal system. In this article, we show how a model based on plans can be the basis for the ontological representation of norms, which are expressed as constraints on the possible plans an agent may choose to guide its behaviour. Moreover, the paper describes how the proposed model can be linked to the upper level of a philosophically well-founded ontology (DOLCE); in this way, the model is set in a wider perspective, which opens the way to further developments. (shrink)

This paper lays out two recent accounts of Hegel’s practical philosophy in order to present a challenge. According to Robert Stern and Mark Alznauer, Hegel attempts to ground our ethical practices in ontological norms. I argue that we cannot ground our ethical practices in this way. However, I also contend that Stern’s and Alznauer’s conception of reality as both conceptual and normative can still play a useful role in practical philosophy, namely, to help defuse a sceptical worry about a (...) threat to ethics. (shrink)

This paper considers in detail the ontological and normative presuppositions of the state-contingent approach to pricing commodities first introduced by Arrow in his model of general equilibrium under uncertainty, which became a milestone in the theory of finance. By contextualizing Arrow’s fundamental contribution and subsequent developments in finance, it demonstrates how this new conceptual framework implied certain technologies—both intellectual and financial. In showing how theoretical thinking about finance was underlying institutional developments in finance, this paper complements the familiar narrative (...) of the performativity of economics. (shrink)

The paper spells out an argument to the effect that rejecting what Sellars denounces as the “myth of the given” has a bearing not only on epistemology, but also on ontology: we get to recognizing persons as ontologically primitive. We spell that argument out by drawing on what is known as left-wing Sellarsianism, although our aim is not the exegesis of Sellars’s texts. Our aim is to show how one can get from this argument to a social ontology (...) in the guise of a synoptic view that recognizes both persons and matter in motion as ontologically primitive and that employs the conceptual tools of ontic structural realism. (shrink)

In this article I advocate a worldly account of normative reasons according to which there is an ontological gap between these and the premises of practical thought, i.e. motivating considerations. While motivating considerations are individuated fine-grainedly, normative reasons should be classified as coarse-grained entities, e.g. as states of affairs, in order to explain certain necessary truths about them and to make sense of how we count and weigh them. As I briefly sketch, acting for normative reasons is (...) nonetheless possible if the connection between normative reasons and motivating considerations is a competence-based correspondence. (shrink)

Purpose: Development of conceptual approaches to the understanding of ethical aspects of digital technologies, based on the ontological turn in the understanding of technological normativity.Design / Method / Approach: The research is based on an interdisciplinary approach combining philosophy of technology, ethics, social philosophy, science and technology research, computer science and cognitive psychology. Methods of conceptual analysis, phenomenological description, critical discourse analysis and comparative analysis are used.Findings: The ontological status of digital objects and their role in the formation of ethical (...) experience is analyzed. The forms of normativity of digital technologies are revealed: interface, algorithmic and infrastructural.Theoretical implications: The research contributes to the development of conceptual approaches to the ethical aspects of digital technologies, creating a basis for the integration of various philosophical traditions and expanding the possibilities of ethical analysis in the digital era.Practical implications: The proposed approach can be used to develop strategies for ethical design and management of digital technologies, including creating ethical guidelines, conducting ethical audits, designing interfaces, and developing educational programs on digital ethics.Originality / Value: A comprehensive approach to the consideration of the ethics of digital technologies is proposed, taking into account the ontological turn in the understanding of technological normativity. The novelty lies in the integration of the ideas of postphenomenology, object-oriented ontology and philosophy of information for the analysis of the ontology of digital objects and their normative force.Research limitations / Future research: Prospects include empirical studies of various forms of technological normativity, in-depth study of the ontological status of specific types of digital objects, and analysis of the relationship between the ontology of digital objects and their normative force in various contexts. The limitations are related to the theoretical nature of the study, which requires further empirical verification.Paper type: Theoretical. (shrink)

Terence Cuneo has recently argued that we have to be committed to the existence of epistemic facts insofar as they are indispensable to theorizing. Furthermore, he argues that the epistemic properties of these facts are inextricably ‘ontologically entangled’ with certain moral properties, such that there exist ‘moral-epistemic’ facts. Cuneo, therefore, concludes that moral realism is true. I argue that Cuneo’s appeal to the existence of moral-epistemic facts is problematic, even granting his argument for the existence of indispensable epistemic facts. I (...) conclude, therefore, that Cuneo’s argument fails to justify moral realism. (shrink)

The present special issue of Disputatio brings together some of the best work recently done in Brazil and Portugal in the tradition of analytic philosophy (broadly conceived). Over the past ten years or so we have witnessed an impressive growth of analytic philosophy in both countries, either in terms of quantity or in terms of quality of the produced philosophy. We hope that this volume capture, at least partly, the dynamics and strength of such development. The range of philosophical problems (...) and topics covered by the contributed essays is vast, cutting across several philosophical disciplines. Indeed, one can find therein issues in philosophical logic, meta-philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics and metaphysics. Such variety of subject-matter is also a trait of recent Luso-Brazilian analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The inherent normativity of HTA can be conceptualized as a result of normative commitments, a concept that we further specify to encompass moral, epistemological and ontological commitments at play in the practice of HTA. Based on examples from literature, and an analysis of the example of assessing Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT), we will show that inevitable normative decisions in conducting an assessment commits the HTA practitioner to moral (regarding what makes a health technology desirable), ontological (regarding which effects (...) of health technology are conceivable), and epistemological (regarding how to obtain reliable information about health technology) norms. This highlights and supports the need for integrating normative analysis and stakeholder participation, providing guidance to HTA practitioners when making normative choices. This will foster a shared understanding between those who conduct, use, or are impacted by assessments regarding what are conceivable and desirable outcomes of using health technology, and how to collect reliable information to assess whether these outcomes are (going to be) realized. It also provides more insight into the implications of different normative choices. (shrink)

A certain type of metaphysical manicheism has become quite prevalent among Levinas readers who insist in declaring his ethics to be a morally and, ultimately, politically necessary departure from Heidegger’s ontology. This approach inadequately moralizes Levinas’ articulation of the ethical which, I argue here, ought to be understood as an account of the pre-reflective normative conditions of ontology as meaning. In this paper, I seek to show that Levinas account of Ethics is squarely rooted in the epistemology (...) of Heidegger’s Being and Time and that, his phenomenological articulation of pre-deliberative normativity may be read as the Deduction and Schematism of Being and Time, that is, as its central mechanism. (shrink)

For much of the first fifty years of its existence, analytic philosophy shunned discussions of normativity and ethics. Ethical statements were considered as pseudo-propositions, or as expressions of pro- or con-attitudes of minor theoretical significance. Nowadays, in contrast, prominent analytic philosophers pay close attention to normative problems. Here we focus our attention on the work of Searle, at the same time drawing out an important connection between Searle’s work and that of two other seminal figures in this development: H.L.A. (...) Hart and John Rawls. We show that all three thinkers tend to assume that there is but one type of normativity within the realm of social institutions – roughly, the sort of normativity that is involved in following the results of chess – and that they thereby neglect features that are of crucial significance for an adequate understanding of social reality. (shrink)

Some of the most important contributions over the past two decades to understanding Heidegger's thought have been made by philosophers writing in English and sharing the broad perspective of analytic – or, perhaps better, “post-analytic” – philosophy. With Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, William Blattner has moved this approach several important steps forward. Like others in this recent movement, he interprets Heidegger not so much in the terms of existentialism or post-structuralism, as in those of the later Wittgenstein, classical American pragmatism, and (...) neo-pragmatism. Also like other Anglo-American interpretations of Heidegger, Blattner's (1.) focuses primarily on the Sein und Zeit era; (2.) tends to steer away from Heidegger's analysis of authenticity and toward his analysis of Dasein's everydayness; (3.) accords an especially large role to Being-with (Mitsein) and the They (das Man) in the constitution of everyday meaning; and (4.) is particularly concerned with developing a view of the foundation of “mind” and scientific knowledge in the practical abilities of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Given the obvious centrality of time in SZ, it is surprising that there have been relatively few concerted attempts to critically explicate Heidegger's view of it. Blattner's book fills this gap by focusing on Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein's “originary temporality”, as explicated in Division Two of SZ. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the problem of social exist- ence normativity. In the comparative analysis of the philosophy of law, humanities and social studies, the foundations of the ontological rootedness of the norm in human existence have been evidently found. The hypothesis of the study is that the norm is not a special way of regulating behavior, but is the main form of human existence. The ontological nature of the norm outside the semantic aspect of its individual manifestations is (...) revealed. For this purpose, the basis of the analysis is determined by the Decalogue, where for the first time an attempt was made to consolidate the “pure” norm. It is shown that the norm is born in the dialectic of pro- hibition and obligation in the reflexive processes of actions of a social subject. An attempt is made to comprehensively analyze the normativity of social existence. (shrink)

Is normative theory grounded in ontology and if so, how? Taking a debate between Kwame Gyekye and Thaddeus Metz as my point of departure, my aim in this article is to show that something normative does indeed follow from ontological views: The social ontological, I maintain, circumscribes the normative without, however, fully determining its content. My argument proceeds in two steps: First, I argue that our social ontological position constrains what kind of normative theory we (...) may plausibly defend. A relational ontology as defended by Gyekye entails a relational normative theory, whereas an atomist ontology calls for an individualist normative approach and a collectivist ontology for a strong communitarian one. Second, this link between the ontological and the normative has substantive implications for how to interpret the normative content of a theory; it entails interpreting normative values in light of the appropriate kind of normative thought. I illustrate the importance of this implication by showing that it suggests a decidedly relational reading of the core value of well-being in Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism, that resolves the alleged tension between communal and individual values in his account. (shrink)

We are all immersed in a sea of social norms, but they are sometimes tricky to observe with any clarity. They are often invisible to us and emerge only when they are not observed. Social norms are important to understand because they are both limiting of our freedom, such as gendered and racialized norms, and at the same time the very conditions of our agency. Social Goodness presents an original, externalist answer to the question of the source or origin of (...) social role normativity. Rather than grounding social normativity in the attitudes of persons, the book argues for an externalism that roots social role normativity in the social world itself: in its positions, institutions, and larger architecture. The core insight of externalism is that the function or structural feature of an enterprise or activity can bring with it normative demands quite independently of the attitudes of those who engage with it. According to the artisanal model, just as a carpenter, ceramicist, or chef is responsive to and evaluable under a set of artisanal norms or techniques, so too is a mother and or an academic or a President. The source of normativity is this technique or expertise, independent of the preferences, endorsements, or recognitive attitudes of individuals. The artisanal model for social role normativity has resources to explain both the "stickiness" or persistence of social norms and our ability to criticize existing norms and to engage in normative self-creation--to create new normative selves. The artisanal model also has resources to capture and express the social situatedness, locality, and materiality of social roles. The relational ontology of social roles, implicit in the artisanal model, provides a useful frame to consider both hierarchical and oppressive social relations. (shrink)

Several non-naturalist philosophers look for ways to maintain the objectivity of morals without making any ontological commitments. Recently Derek Parfit proposed an account of non-ontologically existing irreducible moral properties. My first aim in this paper is to outline that such an account is doomed to fail. My second aim in this paper is to argue that irreducible moral properties can be integrated with adaptions into an ontological framework such as E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology. If it can be shown that (...) irreducible moral properties have a proper place in such an ontology, then there is no need to distinguish between an ontological and non-ontological mode of existence, which, in turn helps to eschew the obscurities that this distinction brings in its wake. (shrink)

The essay addresses the debates about the ontology of norms considering the case of accounting for customary norms. It undertakes and defends a stance in favor of a semantic ontology by developing a framework for the explanation of norms as abstract objects and their linking with social facts to be identified in categories like “customary”, “enacted”, “legal”, “grammatical”, and so on. Furthermore, the work addresses the rival conceptions (pragmatic and eclectic) by showing the specific impossibility that these face (...) for giving a satisfactory account on customary norms. The inquiry concludes by exploring some possible insights from the philosophy of mind to explain the conceptual nature of norms as mental representations. (shrink)

Nearly all of the scant comparative work on Søren Kierkegaard and Confucius places the two starkly at odds with each other. Kierkegaard is pictured as the paradigmatic exemplar of the Western self: a discrete rights-bearing and volitional atom who is quite alone in the world, while Confucius, by contrast, is the paradigmatic exemplar of the Eastern self: a complex and irreducibly embedded communitarian bundle of relations and rich social roles. In this article, I challenge this oppositional approach, since it is (...) both erroneous and obscures fruitful dialogue between the two on conceptually commensurate problems. I argue (1) that Kierkegaard offers a relational ontology of the self which moves in a Confucian direction, (2) that subjectivity and relational reciprocity are not fundamentally at odds in the two thinkers, (3) that both thinkers value a life of harmonious integration that entails right relation to others, and finally (4) that Confucius’ appeal to Heaven as a source of normativity allows for salutary social critique of prevailing ethical norms and practices, in a way that provides important comparative insights with Kierkegaardian theism. (shrink)

In ethical discourse, it is common practice to distinguish between normative commitments and descriptive commitments. Normative commitments reflect what a person ought to be committed to, whereas descriptive commitments reflect what a person actually is committed to. While the normative/descriptive distinction is widely accepted as a way of talking about ethical commitments, philosophers have missed this distinction in discussing ontological commitments. In this paper, I distinguish between descriptive ontological commitments and normative ontological commitments and discuss several (...) significant benefits of recognizing this distinction. I argue that just as the normative/descriptive distinction is important for fruitful ethical discourse, so too is it important for fruitful discourse concerning our ontological commitments. And, it constitutes a significant step towards resolving some prominent debates concerning our ontological commitments. (shrink)

동양철학을 관계론 서양 철학을 존재론이란 말로 비교도하지만, 동서를 막론하고 우주(天)의 근원된 실체인 '존재의 물음'(Seinsfrage)은 철학의 제일 과제로 삼아왔다. 여기서 우주의 존재론 이해란 존재의 근본적보편적인 모든 규정을 연구하는 학문분야에 해당하며, 오늘날 본체론실체론존재철학존재학 등으로 명명되고 있다. 본 연구가 의도하는 바는 우주의 근원된 존재에 대한 해석과정에서 오늘날 진리 및 공리로 받아들이는 기하학원론이나 수리철학이 발달된 것 같이, 동서의 사유가 공히 그것과 규범의식을 함의하고 있는지 여부와, 우리의 경우는 어떠한지를 그 유사성과 통일성을 비교 탐색하는데 목적을 두고 있다. 이 목적을 수행하기위한 주요내용은 첫째 동서의 존재론에 대한 인식의 (...) 변화과정과 수리적 이해, 둘째 동서의 존재론 해석에 대한 수리적 탐색, 셋째 동서의 수리문화에 나타난 특성으로 구성되었다. 본 연구에서 비록 시론에 불과하지만 동양철학과 한국철학의 수리철학적 본체론 인식속에 서양철학보다 앞서 규범원리가 내재되어 있음을 분석한 것과 후속연구의 가능성을 열게 된 것은 의의가 있다고 본다. 나아가 근본적인 수리적 존재론에 있어 동서가 차이가 없음은 물론, 동양의 본체론 인식속에 오히려 수리적 규범원리가 동시에 강하게 내재하고 있어 동양철학과 동양문화의 높은 실천윤리성이 재인식 된다. (shrink)

This paper argues that the normative character of our unreflective situated behaviour is not factual. We highlight a problematic assumption shared by the two most influential trends in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science, reductionism and enactivism. Our intentional, normative explanations are referential, descriptive or factual. Underneath this assumption lies the idea that only facts can make true or false our attributions of cognitive, mental and agential abilities. We will argue against this view by describing the main features and (...) problems of reductionism and enactivism and then we will offer two arguments against this shared factualist assumption: (1) normative vocabulary is ineliminable if we want a complete explanation of our situated practices; and (2) the factualist assumption is a species of the is-ought fallacy. Finally, we will claim that a folk psychological explanation of our normative practices is fully compatible with ontological naturalism when such descriptivist or factualist assumption is rejected. (shrink)

This paper deals with custom in action, namely, with the relationship between custom and action against the background of Amedeo Giovanni Conte’s nomotropism. Starting with Frerichs’ provocation of the peculiarity of saying ‘handeln nach der Sitte’ (acting according to custom) in favor of ‘sich handelnd nach was üblich ist’ (acting after what is usual), this paper will begin an exploratory research regarding the semantics and the ontology of custom to investigate the possibility of a nomotropic behavior in the field (...) of custom. Therefore, this paper will quote, at first, Rudolf von Jhering’s theory, and, at second, Ferdinand Tönnies’ theory. In conclusion, this paper suggests that an inquiry into custom in action (and in particular Tönnies’ ontology of the normative) could benefit from the nomotropic categories of analysis – such as adeontic and deontic regularities. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, I analyse Rahel Jaeggi’s socio-ontological account of forms of life. I show that her framework is a two-sided one, since it involves an understanding of forms of life both as inert bundles of practices and as having a normative structure. Here I argue that this approach is based on an a priori argument which assumes normativity as the condition of intelligibility of social criticism. I show that the intimate tension between these two sides is reflected (...) in the socio-ontological model of the constitution of social phenomena, which on the one side is understood in terms of habituation and materialization, and on the other side in terms of constitution through norms. The second side in the end prevails and leads to some sort of normative essentialism which involves a prescriptive meta-theoretical understanding of normativity combined with a socio-ontological model of constitutive rules. I then analyse two arguments that Jaeggi offers in support of her assumption that normative constitution is the deep structure of social practices. I name these the functional-teleological argument, and the crisis developmental argument, and argue that neither succeeds in proving that practices are not normatively underdetermined. (shrink)

Institutions are norm-governed social practices, or so I propose. But what does it mean for a norm to govern a social practice? Theories that analyze institutions as equilibria equate norms with sanctions and model them as costs. The idea is that the sanctions change preferences and thereby behavior. This view fails to capture the fact that people are often motivated by social norms as such, when they regard them as legitimate. I argue that, in order for a social norm to (...) be perceived as legitimate, agents have to acknowledge reasons for conforming to it other than the sanctions they might incur for violating it. In light of this, I defend a theory of institutions that does not only invoke equilibria, but also normative rules that are supported by normative expectations and, in some cases, normative beliefs. (shrink)

Ontology cannot be left to the natural sciences, if only because it deals also with hypothetical and fictional objects. It pivots about proto-categorical issues relating to the features of objects of any and all kinds. This brings into its range issues that test the limits of knowledge by asking questions that are inherently unanswerable (for example: “What is an instance of an occurrence that no one ever mentions?”). And it raises issues of norms and values that science (in its (...) usual configuration) does not address. (shrink)

In 2006, this journal addressed the problem of technological artefacts, and through a series of articles aimed at tackling the ‘dual nature of technical artefacts’, posited an understanding of these as constituted by both a structural and a functional component. This attempt to conceptualise artefacts established a series of important questions, concerning such aspects of material technologies as mechanisms, functions, human intentionality, and normativity. However, I believe that in establishing the ‘dual nature’ thesis, the authors within this issue focused too (...) strongly on technological function. By positing function as the analytic axis of the ‘dual nature’ framework, the theorists did not sufficiently problematise what is ultimately a social phenomenon. Here I posit a complementary analytic approach to this problem; namely, I argue that by using the Strong Programme’s performative theory of social institutions, we can better understand the nature of material technologies. Drawing particularly from Martin Kusch’s work, I here argue that by conceptualising artefacts as artificial kinds, we can better examine technological ontology, functions, and normativity. Ultimately, a Strong Programme approach, constructivist and collectivist in nature, offers a useful elaboration upon the important question raised by the ‘dual nature’ theorists.Keywords: Technological artefacts; Dual nature; Technological functions; Normativity of artefacts; Performative theory of social institutions. (shrink)

This short contribution is written on the occasion of the book discussion of Sophie Loidolt’s Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory. It presents an attempt to read the two key notions Loidolt elaborates in her book – spaces of meaning and spaces of the public and private – from a critical perspective offered by Judith Butler’s taking up of Arendt’s work. Offering Butler’s conception of social ontology through several major (...) points of contestation with Arendt, I argue against an all too simple reduction of her understanding of the political and normativity to poststructuralist ones. (shrink)

In this paper, we engage in a philosophical investigation of how blockchain technologies such as cryptocurrencies can mediate our social world. Emerging blockchain-based decentralised applications have the potential to transform our financial system, our bureaucracies and models of governance. We construct an ontological framework of “narrative technologies” that allows us to show how these technologies, like texts, can configure our social reality. Drawing from the work of Ricoeur and responding to the works of Searle, in postphenomenology and STS, we show (...) how blockchain technologies bring about a process of emplotment: an organisation of characters and events. First, we show how blockchain technologies actively configure plots such as financial transactions by rendering them increasingly rigid. Secondly, we show how they configure abstractions from the world of action, by replacing human interactions with automated code. Third, we investigate the role of people’s interpretative distances towards blockchain technologies: discussing the importance of greater public involvement with their application in different realms of social life. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss the nature of disagreement in scientific ontologies in the light of case studies from biology and cognitive science. I argue that disagreements in scientific ontologies are usually not about purely factual issues but involve both verbal and normative aspects. Furthermore, I try to show that this partly non-factual character of disagreement in scientific ontologies does not lead to a radical deflationism but is compatible with a “normative ontological realism.” Finally, I (...) argue that the case studies from the empirical sciences challenge contemporary metaontological accounts that insist on exactly one true way of “carving nature at its joints.”. (shrink)

This paper considers normative naturalism, understood as the view that (i) normative sentences are descriptive of the way things are, and (ii) their truth/falsity does not require ontology beyond the ontology of the natural world. Assuming (i) for the sake of argument, I here show that (ii) is false not only as applied to ethics, but more generally as applied to practical and epistemic normativity across the board. The argument is a descendant of Moore's Open Question (...) Argument and Hume's Is-Ought Gap. It goes roughly as follows: to ensure that natural ontology suffices for normative truth, there must be semantically grounded entailments from the natural truths to the normative truths. There are none. So natural ontology does not suffice for normative truth. (shrink)

I will argue that social ontology is constituted as hierarchical and interlocking conventions of multifarious kinds. Convention, in turn, is modeled in a manner derived from that of David K. Lewis. Convention is usually held to be inadequate for models of social ontologies, with one primary reason being that there seems to be no place for normativity. I argue that two related changes are required in the basic modeling framework in order to address this (and other) issue(s): (1) a (...) shift to an intentional model—among other reasons, in order to account for normativity—and (2) moving away from the belief-desire, propositional attitude, framework for understanding the intentional realm toward an interactive, pragmatic model of intentionality. These shifts provide natural approaches to: (1) understanding the normativities of social realities; (2) the sense in which social ontology is often constituted in implicit relations among the participants rather than elaborated and iterated explicit beliefs and desires; (3) and language. (shrink)

Charlotte Witt's finely crafted book offers an original and powerful account of social role normativity––the normativity of norms associated with social ro.

Charlotte Witt covers a remarkable amount of ground in this concise and elegantly written book. Coming in at under 150 pages, she artfully weaves together Aristotle’s theory of functions with contemporary work on cultural transmission and apprenticeship, ideas about self-creation with theories of aspiration and transformative experience, and reflections on the relationships among social norms and games with thoughts about social roles and the nature of hierarchy. At the heart of it is an elaboration and defense of a thoroughly externalist (...) account of social normativity. Witt takes skilled experts, especially artisans like chefs and carpenters, as paradigm cases for theorizing about social normativity. She uses them to argue that the ultimate source of many normative obligations is found not in the acquiescence, attitudes, or any other features internal to those on whom those obligations fall. Rather, the demands are rooted in the world itself, and flow from specific circumstances, especially from the constraints those circumstances impose on different actors in virtue of the tasks they need to perform. The result is a view that depicts social normativity not just as external to individuals but also unavoidably role specific; what is right for a chef is not necessarily right for a carpenter, and what makes for a good nurse might make for a poor drill sergeant. Witt’s presentation of this package of ideas is both careful and austere, and it makes for a wonderfully thought provoking read. Social Goodness: On the Ontology of Social Norms will reward the careful attention of anyone interested in social ontology, especially the metaphysical foundations of normativity, the nature of social norms, and the relationship between social roles and the self. (shrink)