Η μελέτη ασχολείται μέ τά μικρά χειροποίητα αγγεία του τύπου τών « Άργίτικων Μονόχρωμων », τά όποια έχουν έμπίεστη διακόσμηση. Κατ' αρχήν επιχειρείται μία κατάταξη τών δημοσιευμένων κομματιών σέ εργαστήρια σύμφωνα μέ τήν τεχνοτροπία τους καί συζητούνται εκτενώς τά σημαντικώτερα άπό αυτά. Στή συνέχεια μελετάται ή τεχνολογία τους καί μετρούνται οί θερμοκρασίες ψησίματος σέ δείγματα άπό διάφορα εργαστήρια. Στά ϊδια δείγματα εφαρμόσθηκαν άκτινογραφήματα κόνεως μέ τή μέθοδο XRD καί ακτινοβολία CuKa γιά νά πιστοποιηθούν οί κρυσταλλικές φάσεις τών κεραμεικών. Τέλος, μικροσκοπική (...) εξέταση δειγμάτων του εργαστηρίου του « οδοντωτού τροχού » καί του εργαστηρίου της « έλευσινιακής ρουλέτας » έδειξε δτι πρόκειται γιά δύο διαφορετικά εργαστήρια, τά όποια, ωστόσο, πρέπει νά εντοπισθούν καί τά δύο κάπου στην 'Αττική. (shrink)

How can we know we are not dreaming? In this essay, I tackle this and related questions from a transcendental standpoint, by building a philosophical narrative centred upon three “giants”: Descartes, Kant, and Putnam. From each, I take some ideas and discard others, to develop a historically informed, yet original, transcendental approach to dream skepticism. I argue that dreams can be distinguished from objective cognitions, since they do not regularly fulfil the transcendental conditions of such cognitions, e.g. the conditions of (...) linguistic reference. Indeed, drawing on some insights by G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein, I further argue that the formulations of dream skepticism prove nonsensical: they cannot be linguistically understood. However, reflection on these skeptical formulations may lead us to a clear aesthetic understanding of the transcendental conditions of sense, as well as of the meaning of philosophically problematic words like “dream,” “perception,” and “reality.”. (shrink)

Si sente spesso parlare di due diversi Wittgenstein, corrispondenti ai due capolavori del filosofo austriaco: il Tractatus e le Ricerche. Il presente saggio mette in questione tale netta distinzione – e qualsiasi altra – mostrando come il pensiero di Wittgenstein sia in una costante e graduale transizione. La tesi principale è che soffermarsi retrospettivamente sulla fluidità di questa transizione, esaminandone i passaggi fondamentali, può essere più illuminante che isolare assunti teorici utili a “contare i Wittgenstein”. In particolare, dopo una discussione (...) di alcune idee del Tractatus, l’articolo si soffermerà sulla transizione dai concetti di proposizione elementare e sintassi logica a quelli di sistema proposizionale e grammatica, mostrando come, attraverso un costante ripensamento del concetto di forma, Wittgenstein giunga a identificare il significato delle parole col loro uso effettivo nei nostri giochi linguistici. (shrink)

Conversation is a time-pressured environment. Recognizing a social action (the ‘‘speech act,’’ such as a question requesting information) early is crucial in conversation to quickly understand the intended message and plan a timely response. Fast turns between interlocutors are especially relevant for responses to questions since a long gap may be meaningful by itself. Human language is multimodal, involving speech as well as visual signals from the body, including the face. But little is known about how conversational facial signals contribute (...) to the communication of social actions. Some of the most prominent facial signals in conversation are eyebrow movements. Previous studies found links between eyebrow movements and questions, suggesting that these facial signals could contribute to the rapid recognition of questions. Therefore, we aimed to investigate whether early eyebrow movements (eyebrow frown or raise vs. no eyebrow movement) facilitate question identification. Participants were instructed to view videos of avatars where the presence of eyebrow movements accompanying questions was manipulated. Their task was to indicate whether the utterance was a question or a statement as accurately and quickly as possible. Data were collected using the online testing platform Gorilla. Results showed higher accuracies and faster response times for questions with eyebrow frowns, suggesting a facilitative role of eyebrow frowns for question identification. This means that facial signals can critically contribute to the communication of social actions in conversation by signaling social action-specific visual information and providing visual cues to speakers’ intentions. (shrink)

Projects to restore nature inevitably disrupt the plants and animals that inhabit the land to be restored. This essay addresses the significance of feral animals. Can feral animals remain in a restored nature? I argue that an answer depends on what we mean by nature and restoration. I present several different conceptions of nature and discuss what their differences mean for the goals of restoration. While the presence of feral animals is not compatible with the dualist conception of nature as (...) that which is untouched by humans, other conceptions are more accommodating. Restoration to a benchmark of nature prior to human impact is both practically and conceptually implausible, thus more analysis is needed of alternative conceptions and their impacts on domesticated and feral plants and animals. (shrink)

In this thesis, I compare Kant and Wittgenstein’s critical philosophies with respect to Transcendental Idealism, as a doctrine meant to “prove” the possibility of Metaphysics. My Central Question is: Is the early Wittgenstein a transcendental idealist? In virtue of a distinction between Transcendentalism and Transcendental Idealism, I answer “No”, by arguing that the early Wittgenstein is a transcendental philosopher, but not a transcendental idealist of any kind. In particular, I distinguish two variants of Transcendental Idealism, namely an effable variant, which (...) Kant endorsed, and an ineffable variant, often ascribed to Wittgenstein. And I argue that Wittgenstein cannot commit to either variant. This raises questions as to what kind of transcendental philosopher Wittgenstein is, if not an idealist one, and how his stance may bear on Metaphysics. I answer both questions by the end of the work. -/- The dissertation’s core is structured into two parallel Parts, one on Kant (PartK) and one on Wittgenstein (PartW). Each Part is composed of 3 Chapters. In PartK, I give a general account of -/- (1K) Transcendental Philosophy—based on Kant’s one, but less restrictive than his; (2K) Effable Transcendental Idealism—by expounding Kant’s doctrine; (3K) Ineffable Transcendental Idealism—inspired by Kant, but not strictly Kantian. -/- In PartW, I argue that -/- (1W) the early Wittgenstein is a transcendental philosopher; (2W) the early Wittgenstein is not an effable transcendental idealist; (3W) the early Wittgenstein is not an ineffable transcendental idealist. -/- By the final Chapter of the work, I argue that -/- (7) the early Wittgenstein is a transcendental quietest, -/- namely, someone who accepts that there are transcendental conditions of cognition, while refraining from commitment over their metaphysical nature and status. However, Wittgenstein’s (ineffable) version of Transcendental Quietism is extreme, as it turns the whole of Metaphysics into mere nonsense. I will thus conclude the work by sketching a moderate (effable) version, whereby Transcendental Metaphysics is possible, but while we should engage with it, we should not engage in it. (shrink)