Inaccurate body size judgements are associated with body image disturbances, a clinical feature of many eating disorders. Accordingly, body related stimuli have become increasingly important in the study of estimation inaccuracies and body image disturbances. Technological advancements in the last decade have led to an increased use of computer generated (CG) body stimuli in body image research. However, recent face perception research has suggested that CG face stimuli are not recognised as readily and may not fully tap facial processing mechanisms. (...) The current study assessed the effectiveness of using CG stimuli in an established body size estimation task (the ‘bodyline’ task). Specifically, we examined whether employing CG body stimuli alters body size judgments and associated estimation biases. One hundred and six 17- to 25-year-old females completed the CG bodyline task, which involved estimating the size of full-length CG body stimuli along a visual analogue scale. Our results show that perception of body size for CG stimuli was non-linear. Participants struggled to discriminate between extreme bodies sizes and overestimated the size change between near to average bodies. Furthermore, one of our measured size estimation biases was larger for CG stimuli. Our collective findings suggest using caution when employing CG stimuli in experimental research on body perception. (shrink)

According to distributed virtue reliabilism (Palermos, 2020b), epistemic collaborations—such as Transactive Memory Systems and Scientific Research Teams—can be held epistemically responsible at the collective level. This raises the question of whether participants of epistemic collaborations are exempt from being held individually responsible. In response, this paper explores two possible ways in which attributions of individual responsibility may still be appropriate within epistemic collaborations: (I) Individuals can be held epistemically responsible for their individual shortcomings, but no amount of individual epistemic responsibility (...) can replace collective epistemic responsibility. (II) Even if it is denied that participants of epistemic collaborations can be held epistemically responsible at the individual level, they may be held structurally, perhaps morally, and even legally responsible at the individual level for breaking joint commitments necessary for the effective coordination of the epistemic collaboration. (shrink)

The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of individualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds that social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be given priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific aim of radically transforming the latter to fit the results and (...) methodology of the former. We are rather suspicious of this apparent tension, which we believe can be significantly mitigated by paying attention to certain recent advances within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Accordingly, we attempt to explain how extended knowledge, the result of combining active externalism from contemporary philosophy of mind with contemporary epistemology, can offer an alternative conception of the future of social epistemology. (shrink)

Strong epistemic anti-individualism—i.e., the claim that knowledge can be irreducibly social—is increasingly debated within mainstream and social epistemology. Most existing approaches attempt to argue for the view on the basis of aggregative analyses, which focus on the way certain groups aggregate the epistemic attitudes of their members. Such approaches are well motivated, given that many groups to which we often ascribe group knowledge—such as juries and committees—operate in this way. Yet another way that group knowledge can be generated is on (...) the basis of epistemic collaborations, such as scientific research teams and Transactive Memory Systems. To produce knowledge, epistemic collaborations rely heavily on the mutual interactions of their group members. This is a distinctive feature of epistemic collaborations that renders them resistant to aggregative analyses. To accommodate this kind of group knowledge, the paper combines virtue reliabilism with the hypothesis of distributed cognition in order to introduce the hybrid approach of distributed virtue reliabilism. On this view, beliefs produced by epistemic collaborations entertain positive epistemic standing in virtue of the mutual interactions of their group members; this positive epistemic standing is a collective property; epistemic collaborations qualify as epistemic group agents; collaborative knowledge is a special kind of group knowledge, motivating strong epistemic anti-individualism in a distinctive way. (shrink)

The ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry, and the persisting theoretical confusion about the fundamental difference between the hypotheses of embedded (HEMC) and extended (HEC) cognition are three interrelated worries, whose common point—and the problem they accentuate—is the lack of a principled criterion of constitution. Attempting to address the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, mathematically oriented philosophers of mind have previously suggested that the presence of non-linear relations between the inner and the outer contributions is sufficient for cognitive extension. The abstract idea of (...) non-linearity, however, can be easily misunderstood and has, in the past, led to incorrect and counterintuitive conclusions about what may count as part of one’s overall cognitive system. In order to prevent any further mistakes I revisit dynamical systems theory to study the nature of the continuous mutual interactions that give rise to the aforementioned non-linear relations. Moreover, focusing on these interactions will allow us to provide two distinct arguments in support of the ontological postulation of extended cognitive systems, as well as an objective criterion of constitution. Accordingly, I put forward a version of HEC that treats continuous mutual interactions (and the resultant non-linear relations) not just as sufficient but also as necessary for cognitive extension. Such a qualified version of HEC may exclude certain alleged cases of cognitive extension where the agent does not mutually interact with his artifacts (e.g., shopping lists and directory services), but it is immune both to the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy and the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry, and it can be sharply distinguished from HEMC. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the postulation of irreducible, distributed cognitive systems is necessary for the successful explanatory practice of cognitive science and sociology. Towards this end, and with an eye specifically on the phenomenon of distributed cognition, the debate over reductionism versus emergence is examined from the perspective of Dynamical Systems Theory. The motivation for this novel approach is threefold. Firstly, DST is particularly popular amongst cognitive scientists who work on modelling collective behaviors. Secondly, DST (...) can deliver two distinct arguments in support of the claim that the presence of mutual interactions between group members necessitates the postulation of the corresponding group entity. Thirdly, DST can also provide a succinct understanding of the way group entities exert downward causation on their individual members. The outcome is a naturalist account of the emergent, and thereby irreducible, nature of distributed cognitive systems that avoids the reductionists’ threat of epiphenomenalism, while being well in line with materialism. (shrink)

Cognitive integration is a defining yet overlooked feature of our intellect that may nevertheless have substantial effects on the process of knowledge-acquisition. To bring those effects to the fore, I explore the topic of cognitive integration both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism within externalist epistemology and the perspective of extended cognition within externalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science. On the basis of this interdisciplinary focus, I argue that cognitive integration can provide a minimalist yet adequate epistemic norm of (...) subjective justification: so long as the agent’s belief-forming process has been integrated in his cognitive character, the agent can be justified in holding the resulting beliefs merely by lacking any doubts there was something wrong in the way he arrived at them. Moreover, since both externalist philosophy of mind and externalist epistemology treat the process of cognitive integration in the same way, we can claim that epistemic cognitive characters may extend beyond our organismic cognitive capacities to the artifacts we employ or even to other agents we interact with. This move is not only necessary for accounting for advanced cases of knowledge that is the product of the operation of epistemic artifacts or the interactive activity of research teams, but it can further lead to interesting ramifications both for social epistemology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Despite the fact that reproduction of experiments by peers has traditionally been regarded as of the utmost importance in enabling the intersubjectivity of scientific practice, reproductions may yield discordant results and deciding which result should be favored may not be an easy task. According to Harry Collins, experimental disagreement is resolved by the action of social, political and economic factors, but not by means of epistemic and scientific, or so-called internal reasons. His motivation for such a claim is the presence (...) of an infinite regress at the core of experimental activity that, according to him, cannot be stopped with scientific resources alone: the experimenters’ regress. The goal of this... (shrink)

It has been recently suggested that if the Extended Mind thesis is true, mental privacy might be under serious threat. In this paper, I look into the details of this claim and propose that one way of dealing with this emerging threat requires that data ontology be enriched with an additional kind of data—viz., mental data. I explore how mental data relates to both data and metadata and suggest that, arguably, and by contrast with these existing categories of informational content, (...) mental data should not be merely legally protected. Rather, if we value mental privacy as we know it, technological measures should be employed to ensure that one’s mental data are practically—not just legally—impossible for others to obtain. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Data from digital technologies are increasingly integrated in public health research. In April of 2020, we interviewed a subset of participants who completed a survey approximately one month earlier. Using the survey, we contacted and interviewed participants who had expressed their willingness or unwillingness to share digital data for use in public health. We followed a directed content analysis approach for the analysis of the interview data. Among participants who had reported being unwilling to share data, concerns about privacy, (...) confidentiality, and the purpose of the research were cited. During the interviews, 76.9% of the participants who had who had previously indicated that they were unwilling to share their data, expressed willingness to share data in order to assist with COVID-19 prevention. Our results contribute to our understanding of people’s perspectives on sharing personal data and of the way their perspectives can vary as a function of potential uses of their personal information. (shrink)

Il testo analizza tre diverse declinazioni del concetto di illuminismo nella riflessione hegeliana e cerca di mostrare che l’intento di Hegel è quello di dispiegare un nuovo concetto di ragione, nei confronti del quale la ragione illuminista si presenta come istanza necessaria, ma al contempo incompleta. L’Illuminismo rappresenta un’esperienza storica di negazione dell’esistente che si diffonde come una malattia infettiva che distrugge il corpo collettivo che la ospita, ma che non può e non deve essere arrestata. Piuttosto, l’unico modo di (...) produrre gli anticorpi necessari per superare quel contagio dilagante è attraversare il baratro in cui esso fa sprofondare il legame tra io e mondo, tra particolare e universale. (shrink)

After introducing the adoption problem (AP) as the claim that certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted, I offer a characterization of this notion as a two-phase process consisting in (1) the acceptance of a basic logical principle, and (2) the development, in virtue of Phase 1, of a practice of inferring in accordance with that principle. The case of a subject who does not infer in accordance with universal instantiation is considered in detail. I argue that the AP has (...) deep and wide implications for the epistemology of logic, extending well beyond Kripke’s original target, viz. Putnam’s proposal for the empirical revision of logic and its background Quinean epistemology. In particular, the AP questions whether basic logical principles could have a fundamental role in our inferential practices, drawing our attention to the nature of basic inferences and the need to have a clearer conception of them before taking a stand on the matter of the epistemic justification of the logical principles. (shrink)

This article focuses on the epistemic transition to testimonial justice. It argues that the recognition of testimonial injustice in the context of reproductive rights may play a central role in this transition. First, I show how testimonial injustice undermines women’s legal protection against sexual violence and rights triggered by it such as the right to abortion. Second, I argue that the epistemic transition initiated by the #MeToo and #YoSiTeCreo movements call for transitional justice. In support, I review the circumstances of (...) transitional justice for cases like the transition to testimonial justice. Finally, I focus on the area of reproductive rights. I argue that policies of recognition contribute to epistemic transitional justice and complement other strategies aimed to overcome testimonial injustice such as the virtue of the responsible hearer and institutional compensatory virtues. (shrink)

Mainstream epistemologists have recently made a few isolated attempts to demonstrate the particular ways, in which specific types of knowledge are partly social. Two promising cases in point are Lackey’s dualism in the epistemology of testimony and Goldberg’s process reliabilist treatment of testimonial and coverage-support justification. What seems to be missing from the literature, however, is a general approach to knowledge that could reveal the partly social nature of the latter anytime this may be the case. Indicatively, even though Lackey (...) :345–361, 2007) has recently launched an attack against the Credit Account of Knowledge on the basis of testimony, she has not classified her view of testimonial knowledge into any of the alternative, general approaches to knowledge. Similarly, even if Goldberg’s attempt to provide a process reliabilist explanation of the social nature of testimonial knowledge is deemed satisfactory, his attempt to do the same in the case of coverage-support justification does not deliver the requisite result. This paper demonstrates that CAK can in fact provide, pace Lackey’s renunciation of the view, a promising account of the social nature of both testimonial and coverage-supported knowledge. Additionally, however, it can display further explanatory power by also revealing the social nature of knowledge produced on the basis of epistemic artifacts. Despite their disparities, all these types of knowledge count as partly social in nature, because in all these cases, according to CAK, the epistemic credit for the individual agent’s true belief must spread between the individual agent and certain parts of her epistemic community. Accordingly, CAK is a promising candidate for providing a unified approach to several and, perhaps all possible, instances of what we may call ‘weak epistemic anti-individualism’ within mainstream epistemology: i.e., the claim that the nature of knowledge can occasionally be both social and individual at the same time. (shrink)

We very often grant that a person can gain knowledge on the basis of epistemic artifacts such as telescopes, microscopes and so on. However, this intuition threatens to undermine virtue reliabilism according to which one knows that p if and only if one’s believing the truth that p is the product of a reliable cognitive belief-forming process; in an obvious sense epistemic artifacts are not parts of one’s overall cognitive system. This is so, unless the extended cognition hypothesis (HEC) is (...) true. According to HEC when parts of the environment become properly coupled to the agent’s brain then they too can be considered constitutive parts of the overall cognitive mechanism—i.e. cognition potentially extends to the world surrounding the agent. Interestingly, HEC and the broader framework of virtue reliabilism share some intriguing similarities, which render these two views mutually supportive. Making these similarities explicit provides a principled account of the way in which our knowledge-conducive cognitive characters may extend beyond our natural cognitive capacities by incorporating epistemic artifacts. (shrink)

En el último tiempo, han alcanzado especial popularidad en Argentina los tratamientos estéticos mínimamente invasivos, como las inyecciones de ácido hialurónico y toxina botulínica para rellenar y modelar diferentes partes del rostro. También aparece extendido, entre lxs médicxs y las clínicas estéticas, el uso de la plataforma Instagram para la promoción de estos servicios. Así, esta red social se convierte en un espacio donde lxs profesionales muestran, describen, explican y alientan este tipo de procedimientos. Nuestra investigación tiene por objetivo analizar (...) los sentidos que giran en torno a estos tratamientos, enfocándonos en la concepción del cuerpo que subyace en estas prácticas, los criterios estéticos que se ponen en juego, las formas de interpelación a las mujeres en tanto principales consumidoras de estos servicios y las transformaciones que prometen. A partir del análisis de cuatro cuentas de Instagram orientadas a la promoción de tratamientos estéticos en Mendoza y de cuatro entrevistas en profundidad a lxs médicxs responsables de estas cuentas, analizamos, en primer lugar, la concepción del cuerpo como un proyecto continuamente perfectible y las relaciones de tensión y complementariedad entre criterios estéticos clásicos y criterios contemporáneos; en segundo lugar, describimos la noción del alma como proyecto asintótico, con anclajes psíquicos y afectivos particulares y ciertas tensiones paradojales. Concluimos que los tratamientos estéticos se construyen como tecnologías de yo, convergentes con una est/ética propiciada por el ethos neoliberal. (shrink)

This book explores the growing attention that sociology has started to give to environmental issues in terms of peace and social justice. With a focus on sociological theory and its development, it reconstructs the long journey made by the social sciences towards the reconstruction, in a single theoretical paradigm, of the problems associated with the implementation of conditions of peace and sustainability. Beginning from the premise that environmental issues are never purely environmental, but entail political, economic and social implications, Sustainable (...) Development and Peace offers an understanding of where we are heading, and how, reflecting on present challenges and possible directions for the future. It will therefore appeal to scholars of sociology, social theory, development studies, politics and environmental studies. (shrink)

LAS REPRESENTACIONES DE LAS MUJERES EN LAS CANCIONES DE CUARTETO DE CARLITOS “MONA” JIMÉNEZ: APROXIMACIONES.

Nae Ionescu is one of the most influential and controversial Romanian thinkers. The present article explores a less used perspective in studying Nae Ionescu’s philosophical, political and journalistic activity: the philosophical roots of his major political ideas. The anti-democratic position of Nae Ionescu was, theoretically explained, by the criticism to Rene Descartes and J.J. Rousseau’s ideas. The individual is supposed to be an instrument of history and nation. Any individualizing tendency is allegedly a betrayal to the nation. Moreover, the leader (...) has mystical prerogatives therefore the universal suffrage is not consistent. On its turn, the nation is not defined on the basis of the social contract. Nation is “a community of love and life”, in Nae Ionescu’s opinion. Nae Ionescu’s beliefs largely influenced the right-wing Romanian ideology during the years between First and Second World Wars. (shrink)

The idea that experimentation is autonomous is widely shared amongst the New Experimentalists. However, it is not precisely stated how we should understand this thesis, or how to interpret it. In consequence, the aim of this paper is to explicate the different ways in which the autonomy of experiment thesis could be read, and to suggest, taking into account an analysis of the process by which an experimental result is constituted and exemplifying this process by the means of the study (...) of an experiment, the measurement of the speed of light, how this thesis could be clarified and how to establish its scope and limits. (shrink)

In the economic debate, power is defined and studied mainly as an interpersonal relation occurring out of perfect competition. This is a consequence of the combination of methodological individualism and the assumption of competition as a natural and everlasting coordinating mechanism, operating without any sort of coercion. This methodology, however, is not adequate to analyze the forms of social coercion that characterize capitalism. " Economics and Power" criticizes the main theories of power developed in economic literature, analyzing ultraliberal contractualism to (...) radical political economics, and ultimately suggesting a Marxist conception of power and coercion in capitalism. Palermo s ontological argument is rooted in the philosophy of critical realism.This unique volume presents his main finding as being that the essential coercive mechanism of capitalism is competition. Capitalist power is not caused by a lack of competition, but by the central role it plays in this mode of production. Following this, the chapters reconstruct a Marxian conception of power where it is analyzed as a social relation and argues that perfect competition does in fact exist under the disguise of capitalist power. This book criticizes the construct of power and the underlying ideas surrounding perfect competition. This book is of interest to those who study political economy, as well as economic theory and philosophy. ". (shrink)

Combining active externalism in the form of the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses with virtue reliabilism can provide the long sought after link between mainstream epistemology and philosophy of science. Specifically, by reading virtue reliabilism along the lines suggested by the hypothesis of extended cognition, we can account for scientific knowledge produced on the basis of both hardware and software scientific artifacts. Additionally, by bringing the distributed cognition hypothesis within the picture, we can introduce the notion of epistemic group agents, (...) in order to further account for collective knowledge produced on the basis of scientific research teams. (shrink)

In Weaving the Web, Berners-Lee defines Social Machines as biotechnologically hybrid Web-processes on the basis of which, “high-level activities, which have occurred just within one human’s brain, will occur among even larger more interconnected groups of people acting as if the shared a larger intuitive brain”. The analysis and design of Social Machines has already started attracting considerable attention both within the industry and academia. Web science, however, is still missing a clear definition of what a Social Machine is, which (...) has in turn resulted in several calls for a “philosophical engineering” ; Halpin et al. 2010). This paper is a first attempt to respond to this call, by combining contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science with epistemology. The idea of philosophical engineering implies that a sufficiently good conception of Social Machines should be of both theoretical and practical advantage. To demonstrate how the present approach can satisfy both objectives it will be used in order to address one of Wikipedia’s most worrying concerns—i.e., the current and ongoing decline in the number of its active contributors. (shrink)

Within analytic philosophy, the existence of collective knowledge has been motivated by means of two apparently distinct, and in direct competition with one another, theoretical approaches: (i) the commitment model and (ii) the distributed model. This paper agues, however, that to fully account for collaborative knowledge—i.e., a special kind of collective knowledge—both models are required. In other words, there is at least one kind of collective knowledge, the account of which requires treating the two models not as competitors but as (...) complementary to each other. If that’s correct, not only can we gain a deeper understanding of the specifics surrounding collaborative knowledge but also a clearer picture of the broader debate surrounding collective knowledge. (shrink)

This paper presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” implemented between India and France. We use a standard ultimatum game, but in one treatment Indian subjects made offers to French subjects (ItoF treatment) and, in another treatment, French subjects made offers to Indian subjects (FtoI treatment). We observed that FtoI treatment bargaining mostly ended up with unequal splits of money in favor of French, while nearly equal splits were the most frequent outcome in ItoF treatment interactions. The experimental (...) results are organized through a standard social reference model, modified for taking into account the different marginal value of money for bargainers. In our model bargaining is driven by relative standings comparisons between players, occurring in terms of real earnings (that is monetary earnings corrected for a purchasing power factor) obtained in the game. The norm of equity behind the equalization of real earnings is called local equity norm, and contrasted to a global equity norm which would encompass the wealth of players beyond the game. According to what we observed, no beyond-game concern seems to be relevantly endorsed by subjects. (shrink)

¿Podemos adoptar una regla de inferencia como si fuera una hipótesis e inferir algo en virtud de esa regla? ¿Podemos revisar nuestras reglas y principios lógicos en virtud de la evidencia disponible? El antiexcepcionalismo lógico desafía la idea de que la lógica es excepcional y la vincula con el resto de las teorías científicas. Sin embargo, el desafío de la adopción planteado por Kripke y Padró imponen límites a esta concepción. En esta sección, se exploran distintos aspectos vinculados a la (...) imposibilidad de adoptar reglas, el antiexcepcionalismo, la revisión y la normatividad de la lógica. (shrink)

La complejidad de los desafíos que plantea el siglo XXI interpelan a la innovación, especialmente en el ámbito pedagógico, por su presencia, relevancia y potencialidad para la generación de soluciones, formas de acción y formación que sean asumibles por la ciudadanía, principalmente quienes están inmersos en su proceso educativo. Por ello, este trabajo tiene la finalidad de proponer las metodologías activas como medios idóneos para implementar la innovación educativa centrada en los procesos sociales, que ponga a las personas al centro (...) del fenómeno, como seres en formación y, asimismo, como creadores y mantenedores de innovaciones promotoras de bienestar. Inicialmente, se esbozan las dificultades del esfuerzo de renovación pedagógica, en algunos de sus textos y momentos fundamentales, para responder a los retos y amenazas que enfrentan las sociedades contemporáneas, discutiéndose algunas nociones relevantes de teoría y filosofía de la educación. Seguidamente, esta aportación trata de sumarse a las reflexiones en curso sobre filosofía de la innovación, como disciplina en germen, que debe a su vez vincularse con una propuesta para una filosofía de la innovación educativa. Se pretende a continuación problematizar, bajo estas premisas teóricas, la creatividad pedagógica y los programas de acción vinculados a la tradición del activismo y a las recientes propuestas de las Metodologías Activas de Aprendizaje, a través de la aportación del enfoque social de la innovación educativa. (shrink)