In this book, Patrick G. Stefan argues that the subversive message of resurrection was instrumental in Christianity’s expansion. Using Foucault’s analysis of how material conditions shape and create individual subjects, Stefan shows how the idea of resurrection undermined Caesar’s control over those living in his domain.

In this introduction to a special subsection of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics comprising separate reviews of the Springer Handbook of the Philosophy of Medicine, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine, and The Bloomsbury Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Medicine, I compare the three texts with respect to their overall organization and their approach to the relation between the science and the art of medicine. I then indicate two areas that merit more explicit attention in developing a comprehensive philosophy of (...) medicine going forward: health economics and systematic relations within the field as a whole. The reviews that follow speak for themselves. (shrink)

Albert Einstein's attitude towards quantum mechanics—and statistical physics in general—was a puzzle to many of his contemporaries, and has remained a puzzle to the present. Though he made many significant contributions to statistical physics, he continually refused to regard that branch of science as fundamental. The present essay demonstrates that his attitude towards statistical physics was formed during his earliest investigations—between 1901 and 1903. In particular, it is shown that in Einstein's view, statistical laws are based upon non-statistical assumptions. This (...) view influenced much of his later thinking. A few illustrations are offered, concluding with a discussion of his opposition to quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Many professional associations have policies explaining when it is or is not acceptable for health-care professionals to refuse to participate in the administration of certain interventions on grounds of conscience. In both Canada and the United States, nursing associations tend to have much more detailed, permissive policies than medical associations. There are reasons to think that this distinction is not justifiable, and I argue that some specific North American medical associations should endorse policies regarding conscientious refusals that are modeled on (...) those endorsed by nursing associations and the United Kingdom’s General Medical Council. (shrink)

L’essentiel des œuvres de Patočka et du dernier Foucault peut se lire à la lumière de la figure de Faust. Celle-ci éclaire en effet, au fil de ses variantes, ce qui oppose savoir de spiritualité et savoir de connaissance. Si l’on entend par spiritualité l’effort pour penser ensemble l’acte de connaissance et une transformation dans l’être du sujet, la légende faustienne illustre autant qu’elle questionne la pratique qui établit l’individu comme un être à même de se soucier de soi. Nous (...) préciserons cette idée à partir d’un exemple, celui de l’idéalisme allemand, en nous demandant s’il a su prendre la mesure de cette dimension faustienne de la philosophie et chercherons à savoir si c’est effectivement « le souci du souci de soi » qui l’a mis en mouvement ou l’a conduit à rechercher les conditions d’une spiritualité moderne. Nous nous demanderons, pour le dire dans des termes plus proches de ceux de Patočka, si l’on peut déjà apercevoir dans le postkantisme quelque chose qui anticipe l’idée d’une vue intellectuelle rendue possible par le phénomène. (shrink)

In this paper, I advocate a value realist interpretation of Kant’s ethics by examining, in some detail, both Kant’s discussion of the grounding of the moral law in Groundwork II and his discussion of the “paradox of method” in the Critique of Practical Reason. On a plausible reading of both the Groundwork and second Critique, Kant maintains that human beings, and more generally, rational beings, have dignity or inner worth. We cognize through the moral law that our existence and inner (...) value is the objective ground of the law and that we are the “subject[s] of the moral law.” This dignity of rational beings is fundamental and irreducible. This qualifies as a distinctive kind of value realism. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of ethics in design. Traditionally, ethical questions have been seen as marginal issues in the design of technology. Part of the reason for this stems from the widely held notion of technology being “out of control.” This notion is a barrier to what I call “ethical design” because it implies that ethics has no role to play in the development of technology. This view, however, is challenged by recent work in the field of Science and (...) Technology Studies (STS). Looking into the dynamics of technological change, STS scholars argue that human choices are present at every stage of a technology’s development and, furthermore, that human values are reflected in the very design of artifacts. This alternative view suggests that ethics can and should be included in the design process. Drawing on examples from the privacy arena. I point to some of the potential advantages of addressing ethical concerns early on in the design of a technology. I conclude with some general strategies for bringing ethics back into design. (shrink)

PREFACE The six themes chosen for study in the following text are themes deeply embedded within the respective structures of phenomenology and pragmatism, ...

All worldviews have some sort of moral vision for why and how they pursue their goals, though these moral visions may be more or less explicitly stated. Transhumanism is no different, though sometimes people forget that transhumanism is not the alien dream of a posthuman mind but is instead a very human ideology driven by very human interests and moral ideals. In this paper, I lay out some of those ideals in very general terms, advocating a high-minded moral vision for (...) transhumanism that is born of and extends the desire for human flourishing. Though taken to new heights, transhumanism coheres with age-old views of ourselves as our own projects. What the end and direction and scope of those projects can be, however, is generated by, but not limited to, human nature. (shrink)

Perhaps, nothing matters. Life might be devoid of value and meaning. Such thoughts can prompt feelings of angst. What kind of philosophical view could provide us with comfort? Some moral realists think that moral realism can. Moral realism does not comfort me. I think the comfort it gives others is an illusion. If we are moral realists, moral facts may be forever beyond our grasp. However, if we are anti-realist sentimentalists, then moral facts are built for us to find. If (...) we want to avoid angst, we can find solace in sentimentalism. That is not a reason to think sentimentalism is true. However, it is a reason to prefer that it is true. (shrink)

This article sets out the basic principles of a new theory of intellectual interventions centred round the notion of positioning. Intellectual interventions are seen as ways in which intellectuals locate themselves in the socio-political and intellectual field, thereby also positioning others. The existing contributions to the study of intellectuals often take the self-concepts or dispositions of intellectuals to be fixed, and they tend to focus on the causes and motivations behind intellectual interventions. Challenging this perspective, the theory proposed substitutes a (...) vocabulary of effects for the existing vocabulary of intentions and causes: rather than speculating on the sociological determinants or purposes that underlie an intellectual intervention, this theory explores its effects for the symbolic and institutional recognition of the author(s) and for the diffusion of the ideas propagated. (shrink)

Occupation, intellectual collaboration and the resistance -- The purge of collaborationist intellectuals -- Intellectual debates around the purge : responsibility, purity, patriotism -- The autumn of 1945 -- Sartre's committed literature in theory and practice -- Rise and demise : a synthesis -- Explaining intellectuals : a proposal.

Harm minimisation has been proposed as a means of supporting people who self-injure. When adopting this approach, rather than trying to stop self-injury immediately the person is allowed to injure safely whilst developing more appropriate ways of dealing with distress. The approach is controversial as the health care professional actively allows harm to occur. This paper will consider a specific objection to harm minimisation. That is, it is a misguided collaboration between the health care professional and the person who self-injures (...) that is morally and clinically questionable. The objection has two components. The first component is moral in nature and asserts that the health care professional is complicit in any harm that occurs and as a result they can be held morally responsible and subject to moral blame. The second component is clinical in nature and suggests that harm minimisation involves the health care professional in colluding in the perpetuation of self-injury. This element of the objection i... (shrink)

This paper provides a response to Hanna Pickard and Stephen Pearce’s paper ‘Balancing costs and benefits: a clinical perspective does not support a harm minimisation approach for self-injury outside of community settings.’ This paper responded to my article ‘Should healthcare professionals sometimes allow harm? The case of self-injury.’ There is much in the paper that I would agree with, but I feel it is important to respond to a number of the criticisms of my paper in order to clarify my (...) position and to facilitate ongoing debate in relation to this important issue. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide the outlines of an alternative metaphilosophical orientation for Continental philosophy, namely, a form of scientific naturalism that has proximate roots in the work of Bachelard and Althusser. I describe this orientation as an “alternative” insofar as it provides a framework for doing justice to some of the motivations behind the recent revival of metaphysics in Continental philosophy, in particular its ecological-ethical motivations. In the second section of the paper, I demonstrate how ecological-ethical issues motivate new (...) metaphysicians like Bruno Latour, Jane Bennett, Timothy Morton, Ian Bogost, and Graham Harman to impute to objects real features of agency. I also try to show how their commitments lead to deep ambiguities in their metaphysical projects. In the final section, I outline a type of scientific naturalism in Continental philosophy that parallels the sort of naturalism championed by Quine, both conceptually and historically, and suggest that it might serve our ecological-ethical purposes better. (shrink)

This paper argues that it is permissible for computer scientists and engineers—working with advanced militaries that are making good faith efforts to follow the laws of war—to engage in the research and development of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Research and development into a new weapons system is permissible if and only if the new weapons system can plausibly generate a superior risk profile for all morally relevant classes and it is not intrinsically wrong. The paper then suggests that these conditions (...) are satisfied by at least some potential LAWS development programs. More specifically, since LAWS will lead to greater force protection, warfighters are free to become more risk-acceptant in protecting civilian lives and property. Further, various malicious motivations that lead to war crimes will not apply to LAWS or will apply to no greater extent than with human warfighters. Finally, intrinsic objections—such as the claims that LAWS violate human dignity or that it creates ‘responsibility gaps’—are rejected on the basis that they rely upon implausibly idealized and atomized understandings of human decision-making in combat. (shrink)

Cognitive states as well as cognitive commodities play central though distinct roles in our epistemological theories. By being attentive to how a difference in their roles affects our way of referring to them, we can undoubtedly accrue our understanding of the structure and functioning of our main epistemological theories. In this paper we propose an analysis of the dichotomy between states and commodities in terms of the method of abstraction, and more specifically by means of infomorphisms between different ways to (...) classify states of information, information-bases, and evidential situations. (shrink)

There is a consensus among interpreters that Kant denies non-human animals possess discursive abilities but that he ascribes to them conscious representations in some more primitive sense. I argue this latter interpretive claim is not justified by the textual evidence. There is in Kant’s early published writings and unpublished remarks extensive evidence that he denies animals possess conscious representations. I examine this material in detail. I explain the competing view of Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777), at which some of Kant’s early (...) remarks are directed. I then explain Kant’s denial of animal consciousness with reference to his early views on the relation between faculty psychology, the capacity for judgment, and consciousness. Corroborating evidence for Kant’s denial of animal consciousness occurs in remarks in the student lecture notes that span thirty years. I explain why the strongest textual evidence to which interpreters have typically appealed is inadequate for ascribing to Kant a commitment to animal consciousness. This paper helps clarify the interpretive challenges for those who wish to claim the Critical Kant ascribes consciousness to animals. (shrink)

This article discusses some orthographical questions which relate to the text of Sophocles. It pays special attention to the editor’s duty to present the evidence for ancient orthography accurately, consistently, and efficiently.

Our work is aimed at studying the optimization of a complex motor behaviour from a global perspective. First, free climbing as a sport will be briefly introduced while emphasizing in particular its psychomotor aspect called route finding. The basic question raised here is how does the optimization of a sensorimotoricity-environment system take place. The material under study is the free climber's trajectory, viewed as the signature of climbing behaviour (i.e., the spatial dimension). The concepts of learning, optimization, constraint, and degrees (...) of freedom of a system will be discussed using the synergistic approach to the study of movement (Bernstein, 1967; Kelso, 1977). Measures of a trajectory's length and convex hull can be used to define an index whose equation resembles that of an entropy. This index is a measure of the trajectory's overall complexity. Some important concepts related to the thermodynamics of curves will also be discussed. The optimization process will be studied by examining the changes in entropy over time for a set of trajectories generated during the learning of a route (ten successive repetitions of the same climb). It will be shown that the entropy of the trajectories decreases as learning progresses, that each level of expertise has its own characteristic entropy curve, and that for the subjects tested, the mean entropy of skilled climbers is lower than that of average climbers. Basing our analysis on the concepts of degrees of freedom and constraint equations, an attempt is made to relate trajectory entropy to system entropy. Based on the postulate that trajectory entropy is equal to the difference in entropy between the unconstrained and constrained system, a model of motor optimization is proposed. This model is illustrated by an entropy graph reflecting a dynamic release process. In the light of our results, two opposing views will be examined: movement construction vs. movement emergence. (shrink)