Some nuclear‐encoded proteins are imported into higher plant plastids via the endomembrane (EM) system. Compared with multi‐protein Toc and Tic translocons required for most plastid protein import, the relatively uncomplicated nature of EM trafficking led to suggestions that it was the original transport mechanism for nuclear‐encoded endosymbiont proteins, and critical for the early stages of plastid evolution. Its apparent simplicity disappears, however, when EM transport is considered in light of selective constraints likely encountered during the conversion of stable endosymbionts into (...) fully integrated organelles. From this perspective it is more parsimonious to presume the early evolution of post‐translational protein import via simpler, ancestral forms of modern Toc and Tic plastid translocons, with EM trafficking arising later to accommodate glycosylation and/or protein targeting to multiple cellular locations. This hypothesis is supported by both empirical and comparative data, and is consistent with the relative paucity of EM‐based transport to modern primary plastids. (shrink)

Die Philosophie bringt Ideen hervor. Nur von ihnen - von ihrer theoretischen Tragkraft und Neuigkeit hängt die Stellung eines Denkers in einer Kultur ab; ausschließlich von seinem Werk. Sie ist jedoch mit bloßem Auge und auf den ersten Blick nicht zu erkennen. Die Mühlsteine der Geschichte mahlen grob, erst nach Jahrhunderten klären sich die Leistungshierarchien auf. Die Inkubationszeit in einer Kultur dauert lange. Man bedenke nur, dass fünf Jahrhunderte nach Aristoteles dieser neben Plato größte griechische Denker nur einer von 80 (...) Philosophen im Werke von Diogenes Laertios war. Letzterer widmete Aristoteles gerade mal drei Prozent seines Manuskripts. Heute bezweifelt keiner die herausragende Stellung dieses Philosophen. Vor dem Hintergrund zufälliger Geschichtsfaktoren geraten besonders diejenigen menschlichen Erzeugnisse schnell ins Vergessen, um die man sich wenig kümmerte. Aber das ist kein Zufall. Es überdauern nicht diejenigen, die zu Lebzeiten große Scharen von Anhängern hatten, sondern jene, die durch die Jahrtausende hindurch in jeder Generation wenigstens einen vernünftigen Vertreter haben. (shrink)

Recent developments in virtual reality technology raise a question about the experience of presence and immersion in virtual environments. What is immersion and what are the conditions for inducing the experience of virtual presence? In this paper, we argue that crucial determinants of presence are perception of affordances and sense of embodiment. In the first section of this paper, we define key concepts and introduce important distinctions such as immersion and presence. In the second and third sections, we respectively discuss (...) presence, immersion and their determinants in detail. In the fourth and fifth sections, we argue for the importance of perception of affordances and sense of embodiment in increasing the degree of presence. Finally, we show the consequences of our view and discuss possible future implications. (shrink)

This paper presents Michael Heller’s notion of “philosophy in science” and re-introduces Michael Heller’s classical text that first presented this concept of philosophy entitled How is “philosophy in science” possible?. The paper discusses the historical context of Heller’s idea as it emerged from the discussions and works of the Krakow philosophical scene and discusses the basic tenants of this philosophy, its analytic character, the role of intellectual tradition in the development of this philosophy, and the critical role played by an (...) interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy, science, and theology. Despite the idea of philosophy in science having emerged about 40 years ago, this concept still inspires and fuels innovative research. The notion of “philosophy in science” lies at the foundations of the philosophy published in two journals: Philosophical Problems in Science and Philosophy in Science. (shrink)

According to the expertise defense, practitioners of the method of cases need not worry about findings that ordinary people’s philosophical intuitions depend on epistemically irrelevant factors. This is because, honed by years of training, the intuitions of professional philosophers likely surpass those of the folk. To investigate this, we conducted a controlled longitudinal study of a broad range of intuitions in undergraduate students of philosophy (n = 226), whose case judgments we sampled after each semester throughout their studies. Under the (...) assumption, made by proponents of the expertise defense, that formal training in philosophy gives rise to the kind of expertise that accounts for changes in the students’ responses to philosophically puzzling cases, our data suggest that the acquired cognitive skills only affect single case judgments at a time. There does not seem to exist either a general expertise that informs case judgments in all areas of philosophy, or an expertise specific to particular subfields. In fact, we argue that available evidence, including the results of cross-sectional research, is best explained in terms of differences in adopted beliefs about specific cases, rather than acquired cognitive skills. We also investigated whether individuals who choose to study philosophy have atypical intuitions compared to the general population and whether students whose intuitions are at odds with textbook consensus are more likely than others to drop out of the philosophy program. (shrink)

This note discusses P. Oppenheimer and E. Zalta's ?A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument? [this journal, 2011]. I try to explain why the simplification presented there was successful and comment on the technical aspects of the method they applied.

Przedstawiciele dwóch głównych podejść do badania rozumowania w odmienny sposób opisują poznawczy mechanizm wyciągania poprawnych i błędnych wniosków. Przedstawiciele teorii reguł zakładają, że rozumowanie ma charakter syntaktyczny i polega na uruchamianiu reguł podobnych do tych z logiki klasycznej. Przedstawiciele drugiej teorii — teorii modeli umysłowych opisują rozumowanie jako proces semantyczny polegający na tworzeniu modeli umysłowych, które odzwierciedlają strukturę relacji pomiędzy elementami opisanymi w przesłankach. Zgodnie z tak zwaną zasadą prawdziwości każda możliwa sytuacja jest reprezentowana przez odrębny model umysłowy, który odzwierciedla (...) jedynie te elementy, które rzeczywiście występują w danej sytuacji. Zasada ta jest wykorzystywana w teorii modeli do opisywania mechanizmu zarówno poprawnych, jak i błędnych rozumowań. Innymi źródłami błędów w rozumowaniu mogą być: zbyt duża liczba modeli, zbyt wiele relacji między elementami nazwanymi w modelach, zbyt wiele elementów, które należy zintegrować w jednym modelu. W artykule przedstawione są szczegółowo różne typy błędów wynikające z tych czterech powodów. (shrink)

Über sein Verhältnis zu Friedrich Nietzsche sagte Leszek Kolakowski: „ ich habe ihn nie studiert, im wahren Sinne des Wortes, habe auch niemals über ihn geschrieben, außer daß ich ihn hier und da kurz erwähnte." Diese Erklärung könnte im allgemeinen stimmen, obwohl Leszek Kołakowski eine Abhandlung, die den Ansichten Nietzsches gewidmet ist, geschrieben hat. Es handelt sich um den Kommentar zum Heideggers Kommentar des vermutlichen Kommentars Nietzsches zum Hegels Kommentar über das Erfordernis der Negativität. Das Ziel meiner Ausführungen besteht darin, (...) nachzuweisen, daß Kołakowski unter beachtlichem Einfluß der Nietzscheanischen Philosophie steht. Den Beweis dafür liefern nicht nur die gelegentlichen Berufungen auf Schriften des deutschen Philosophen, sondern auch die Art und Weise, wie er theoretische Probleme stellt und wie er sie löst, in weiterer Folge sein Stil des Schreibens und schließlich sein entschieden kritischer, oft spottender Abstand von der heutigen Kultur. Diese Abhängigkeit darzustellen - bei bescheidener Berufung Kolakowskis auf Nietzsches Werke - ist weder eine leichte, noch eine dankbare Aufgabe, da man ihr immer eine willkürliche Manipulation der Interpretation vorwerfen kann. Die Errungenschaften des großen Philosophen der Vergangenheit bilden das allgemeine Gut, und jeder hat das Recht, sich auf sie zu berufen, ohne seine Gedanken unbedingt zu beschreiben, die auf diese oder andere Weise in der Kultur verwurzelt sind. (shrink)

Retrieval Induced Forgetting refers to the finding that the retrieval of some items from memory impairs the retrieval of related items. The RIF effect is indicated by a comparison of RP- with unrelated but also tobe- remembered items. Since RIF appears during intentional memorizing of words, therefore we checked whether it depends on attentional control involved in goal maintenance, and also if implicit evaluations of to-be-remembered contents moderate this process. In three experiments, each including AC as the independent variable, we (...) found AC to be related to the RIF effect. Only high but not low AC subjects showed the presence of RIF. The results of the affective priming procedure showed that implicit evaluations of NRP items moderate the relationship of high AC and the RIF effect. The explanation why temporarily devaluated NRP could enhance the RIF effect and suggestion concerning future research summarize the article. (shrink)

Paweł Gładziejewski, Is empathy is mental simulation? Remarks on the representative approach based on the concept of mirror neurons., Diametros 27 This paper draws on the theoretical achievements of analytic philosophy of mind and the empirical results of psychology and cognitive neuroscience in order to understand the nature of empathy and the sub-personal mechanisms upon which it is based. The paper distinguishes two types of empathy, which are often not sufficiently clearly distinguished in the literature, empathy as a kind (...) of social perception and empathy as compassion. The argument attempts show to that neither of these can be identified with a mental simulation process understood as a sub-personal process. Nevertheless mental simulation may play a limited explanatory role with respect to these two types of empathy. (shrink)

Beebe and Buckwalter (2010) made the surprising discovery that people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when norms are violated than when they are conformed to. The epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE) is the analogue of the Knobe effect (Knobe 2003a). ESEE was replicated in a number of experiments. It was also studied under various conditions. We have carried out a meta-analysis of research on ESEE. The results suggest that ESEE is a robust finding but its magnitude is highly variable. Two (...) study-level covariates influence its size: the subject of the knowledge attribution (agent vs third-party) and the type of norm that is violated or complied with. The effect size is not influenced, however, by the manipulation of chances, by whether the story is about a side effect or not, by language or by question phrasing. The impact of the Gettierization of the story is marginally significant. (shrink)

Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. (...) I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition. (shrink)

The first aim of this paper is to remind the reader of a very original theory of meaning which in many aspects has not been surpassed by subsequent theories. The theory in question is Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning. In the first section I present a version of this theory which, I trust, retains the gist of the original but loses its outdated language. In the second section I analyze some problematic consequences of the directival theory and show how (...) they can be addressed. The second aim of this paper is exploiting some of the similarities between the directival theory and later theories of meaning. In the third section I argue that using the directival theory as an interpretative tool enables us to create explications of some of the notoriously vague notions which contemporary theories of meaning employ. (shrink)

We prove that the homeomorphism relation between compact spaces can be continuously reduced to the homeomorphism equivalence relation between absolute retracts, which strengthens and simplifies recent results of Chang and Gao, and Cieśla. It follows then that the homeomorphism relation of absolute retracts is Borel bireducible with the universal orbit equivalence relation. We also prove that the homeomorphism relation between regular continua is classifiable by countable structures and hence it is Borel bireducible with the universal orbit equivalence relation of the (...) permutation group on a countable set. On the other hand we prove that the homeomorphism relation between rim-finite metrizable compacta is not classifiable by countable structures. (shrink)

Pavel Florensky (1882–1937), a Russian theologian, philosopher, and mathematician, argued that the religious discourse is essentially contradictory and put forward the idea of the logical theory of antinomies. Recently his views raised interesting discussions among logicians who consider him a forerunner of many non-classical logics. In this paper I discuss four interpretations of Florensky’s views: paraconsistent, L-contradictory, non-monotonic and rhetorical. In conclusion I argue for the integral interpretation which unites these four approaches.

Author: Bytniewski Paweł Title: “WHAT IS AN AUTHOR?” ON FOUCAULT’S CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN AUTHORSHIP („Kim jest Autor?” O krytycznej świadomości autorstwa) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2010, vol:.10, number: 2010/1, pages: 73-106 Keywords: FOUCAULT, AUTHOR, LITERATURE, LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:One of the major obstacles to reconstructing Foucault’s attitude towards an authorship issue is multiplicity of his own roles which as an author he fulfilled. An Authorship as a (...) theme of his texts, as a prefiguration of nonexistent “Man” and his own authorship as a problem, as a way of “detaching myself from myself” – all these are the forms of Foucauldian ideas about an authorship and, at the same time, forms of his consciousness of his own authorship. Foucault historicizes and dissipates an authorship: an author is a function rather than the originator of texts. Writing, in this perspective, is a kind of conversion, decomposition of subjectivity into something else and even explosion. To say “I” doesn’t prove to be an ego. Additionally, Foucault notoriously suggests that his books are fiction. To be an author in this way is a way of being within the discourse and, as a consequence of it, to be trapped in its power. Foucault’s own rewriting of his theoretical biography includes turns and returns: as he repeatedly claims, he wrote in order to transform himself. He uses the processes of writing to simulate production of his subjective identity and, at the same time, to summarize, recapitulate his own oeuvre from current position. To cope with this suggestive and bizarre claims one should employ Roland Barthes distinction: écrivains (authors) et écrivants (writers). When Foucault-écrivain decomposes his ego, his own mode of existence by the use of writing, Foucault-écrivant, in an act of writing, writes himself, as an author. When Foucault-écrivain “writes fictions”, Foucault écrivant, in an act of “self-writing” (l’écriture de soi), establishes the object of a critique – Foucault. (shrink)

Book review: Adam Adamandy Kochański, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Korespondencja Adama Adamandego Kochańskiego i Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza z lat 1670-1698, D. Sieńko, wyd. Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, Warszawa 2019, ss. 256.

N. Cartwright's recent results on invariance under intervention and causality (2003) are reconsidered. Procedural approach to causality elicited in this paper and contrasted with Cartwright's apparently philosophical one unravels certain ramifications of her results. The procedural approach seems to license only a constrained notion of intervention and in consequence the "correctness to invariance" part of Cartwright's first theorem fails for a class of cases. The converse "invariance to correctness" part of the theorem relies heavily on modeling assumptions which prove to (...) be difficult to validate in practice and are often buttressed by independently acquired evidence. (shrink)

The paper sets out to prove that Leszek Kołakowski remained under a considerable influence of Friedrich Nietzsche’s ideas, which is evidenced by the way he poses and solves theoretical problems as well as his critical and often ironical detachment from the modern culture. He devoted a great deal of attention to nihilism, and searched for mythical conditioning of the thinking of the man of today; from the late 1950s, he was a follower of the philosophy of freedom and opposed philosophical (...) and historical determinism. He rejected systemic thinking and any fundamentalism in science. (shrink)

Über sein Verhältnis zu Friedrich Nietzsche sagte Leszek Kolakowski: „ ich habe ihn nie studiert, im wahren Sinne des Wortes, habe auch niemals über ihn geschrieben, außer daß ich ihn hier und da kurz erwähnte." Diese Erklärung könnte im allgemeinen stimmen, obwohl Leszek Kołakowski eine Abhandlung, die den Ansichten Nietzsches gewidmet ist, geschrieben hat. Es handelt sich um den Kommentar zum Heideggers Kommentar des vermutlichen Kommentars Nietzsches zum Hegels Kommentar über das Erfordernis der Negativität. Das Ziel meiner Ausführungen besteht darin, (...) nachzuweisen, daß Kołakowski unter beachtlichem Einfluß der Nietzscheanischen Philosophie steht. Den Beweis dafür liefern nicht nur die gelegentlichen Berufungen auf Schriften des deutschen Philosophen, sondern auch die Art und Weise, wie er theoretische Probleme stellt und wie er sie löst, in weiterer Folge sein Stil des Schreibens und schließlich sein entschieden kritischer, oft spottender Abstand von der heutigen Kultur. Diese Abhängigkeit darzustellen - bei bescheidener Berufung Kolakowskis auf Nietzsches Werke - ist weder eine leichte, noch eine dankbare Aufgabe, da man ihr immer eine willkürliche Manipulation der Interpretation vorwerfen kann. Die Errungenschaften des großen Philosophen der Vergangenheit bilden das allgemeine Gut, und jeder hat das Recht, sich auf sie zu berufen, ohne seine Gedanken unbedingt zu beschreiben, die auf diese oder andere Weise in der Kultur verwurzelt sind. (shrink)

Wollen (Libertarianism and conjoined twins) argues that libertarianism premised on absolute property rights founders where physical boundaries between two persons cannot be discerned, as is the case with conjoined twins. In this rejoinder, we make a three-pronged argument against Wollen’s claim. First, it is demonstrated that even if conjoined twins really do not hold self-ownership rights against one another, they still have one bodily ownership right against the rest of the world. Second, two alternative resolutions of Wollen’s hypothetical dispute between (...) conjoined twins that derive from two different versions of libertarianism are set forth. Third, it is shown that the quandaries engendered by the existence of conjoined twins not only are not specific for libertarianism but there also are political philosophies to which conjoined twins pose even greater a challenge. (shrink)

W swojej książce Tropy i uniwersalia: Badania ontologiczne zaproponowałem systematyczną i historyczną analizę problemu uniwersaliów. Odróżniłem trzy podstawowe pojęcia powszechników, rozumianych kolejno jako wspólne własności, wspólne aspekty i wspólne całości, a następnie zastosowałem je do szczegółowej analizy teorii Romana Ingardena, św. Tomasza z Akwinu i Georga Wilhelma Friedricha Hegla. W tym tekście przedstawiam założenia metodologiczne mojej pracy, przyjmowane przeze mnie rozumienie powszechników i główne rezultaty moich interpretacji. Następnie omawiam krótko dyskusje, jakie wywołała moja książka. Katarzyna Barska i Marek Piwowarczyk kwestionowali (...) moje odczytanie teorii Ingardena, a Tomasz Tiuryn i Michał Głowala krytykowali moją interpretację stanowiska św. Tomasza. Na koniec pokazuję, w jaki sposób Karol Kleczka ciekawie rozwinął interpretację pojęcia konkretnego powszechnika w ramach współczesnej teorii uprawdziwiania. (shrink)