The paper argues that new environmental values are needed as the advanced industrial economy becomes global. Reviewing a range of values from hunter-gatherer, agricultural and industrial societies, the paper suggests that environmental value systems should ideally satisfy three criteria. They should be consistent with scientific understanding of natural systems, they should lead to practical ethical and political proposals and, crucially, they should inspire aesthetic responses of pleasure and awe. Current global value systems fall short of this ideal: Gaia has the (...) potential to combine science and awe, but lacks humane decision criteria, while sustainable development is pragmatic but environmentally minimalist and lacks aesthetic inspiration. The short term need is to integrate different strands of current positions as Hinduism combined pre-existing views. A sequence of priorities is suggested: eliminating irreversible environmental change ; stabilising population change through more equitable trade; and reconsidering the boundaries, practical and aesthetic, between society and nature. (shrink)

We take ourselves to have an inner life of thought, and we take ourselves to be capable of linguistically expressing our thoughts to others. But what is the nature of this “inner life” of thought? Is conscious thought necessarily carried out in language? This paper takes up these questions by examining Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression. For Merleau-Ponty, language expresses thought. Thus it would seem that thought must be independent of, and in some sense prior to, the speech that expresses it. (...) He also claims, however, that thinking just is linguistic expression, and thus that language constitutes thought. The primary aim of this paper is to make sense of this constitutive claim while maintaining that, for Merleau-Ponty, there is an inner life of thought that exists independently of linguistic expression, and that this inner life rightly deserves the label “thought”. The upshot of this account is twofold. First, it explains why the mainstream view of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression seems plausible, but is ultimately inadequate. Second, it functions as a corrective to contemporary debates about the nature and scope of phenomenal consciousness and the sense in which conscious experience has content. (shrink)

Although depression is characterized as a mood disorder it turns out that, like moods in general, it cannot be explained independently of a theory of emotion. In this paper I outline one promising theory of emotion and show how it deals with the phenomenon of depressive mood. An important aspect of MAT is the role it assigns to peripheral information processing systems in setting up emotional responses. The operations of these systems are automatic and opaque to consciousness, but they represent (...) information about the significance of the environment for the subject, bias cognition and behaviour, and have a characteristic phenomenology. I show how understanding the nature of peripheral appraisal provides a principled way to link neurochemistry and mood via an information processing theory of the circuitry targeted by antidepressant treatment. The discussion is organized around Matthew Ratcliffe's distinction between pre-intentional and intentional feelings and suggests that the MAT might provide a way to link phenomenological and mechanistic accounts of feeling states characteristic of depression. (shrink)

This book develops a metaphysics which is missing when trust is ordered around economic theories and institutions.

Engaging variously with the legacy of Paul L. Lehmann, these essays argue for a reorientation in Christian theology that better honours the formative power of ...

The orthodox view in contemporary epistemology is that Edmund Gettier refuted the JTB analysis of knowledge, according to which knowledge is justified true belief. In a recent paper Moti Mizrahi questions the orthodox view. According to Mizrahi, the cases that Gettier advanced against the JTB analysis are misleading. In this paper I defend the orthodox view.

This book shows how time is a fundamental element in our perception of the arts and proposes an integrated framework within which to explore and appreciate the subtleties and complexities of this essential key to the reading and understanding of meaning in art. The book is a work of ideas, not abstract theory or pure art history. It offers wide-ranging insight into the aesthetics and philosophies of time across different art forms, cultures, and periods. Intended for both arts practitioners and (...) anyone wishing to extend their understanding of the creative process and its underlying principles, the book reveals the interplay of art and time from technical execution and formal invention to the spiritual and intuitive. It opens up fresh possibilities for artists to develop their work in new directions, and for the visitor to engage with artworks including architecture, drawing, sculpture, painting, and photography, in challenging and fulfilling new ways. (shrink)

The following syllogism is considered: a string is not an expression unless it is tokenable; no one can utter, write, or in anyway token an infinite string; so no infinite string is an expression. The second premise is rejected. But the tokenability of an infinite sentence is not sufficient for it being an infinite expression. A further condition is that no finite sentence expresses that sentence’s truth-conditions. So it is an open question whether English contains infinite expressions.

It is argued that if Kuhn's current attempt to characterize conceptual incommensurability is correct, then the phenomenon of conceptual incommensurability is epistemologically innocuous. The first part of the paper explains why available techniques of reference specification provide rival scientists with sufficient access to one another's languages to compare their views. The second half of the paper attempts to elaborate an account of conceptual incommensurability that will develop (what the author takes to be) Kuhn's fundamental insight.

The Many Faces of Patriotism debate the consequences of the 21st century's patriotic resurgence, examining it both in theoretical and comparative terms that draw on examples of patriotism from ancient Greece to post-apartheid South Africa.

In this review I describe research conducted in my laboratory concerning implicit mood-congruent memory (MCM) bias in clinical depression. MCM is the tendency for depressed individuals to retrieve more unpleasant information from memory than nondepressed controls, and may be an important maintenance mechanism in depression. MCM has been studied frequently with explicit memory tests, but relatively few studies have investigated MCM using implicit memory tests. I describe several implicit memory studies which show that: (a) an implicit MCM bias does not (...) appear to exist when perceptually driven tests are used; (b) implicit memory bias can be found when conceptually driven tests are used, but (c) not all conceptually driven tests show implicit MCM bias. I conclude that conceptual processing is necessary, but is not sufficient for demonstrating implicit memory bias in depression. Future studies should investigate specific components of conceptual elaboration that support implicit memory bias in depression. (shrink)

Either genetically specified modular cognitive architecture for syntactic processing does not exist (neuroconstructivism), or there is a module but its development is so abnormal in Williams syndrome (WS) that no conclusion can be drawn about its normal architecture (moderate nativism). Radical nativism, which holds that WS is a case of intact syntax, is untenable. Specific Language Impairment and WS create a dilemma that radical nativism cannot accommodate.

In this response to the papers on Jonathan Edwards's ethical thought by Stephen A. Wilson, Gerald R. McDermott, William C. Spohn, and Roland A. Delattre, I comment on their efforts to show that ideas drawn from Edwards can be successfully appropriated for use in contemporary ethics. I conclude that the four authors build a strong cumulative case for the view that some elements of Edwards's thought can serve as resources for our ethical reflections. But I also argue for a deflationary (...) view of how much of Edwards we will find it feasible to take on board when we engage in the task of working out a religious ethics we might accept. (shrink)

In cases of sudden, life-threatening illness where the chance of survival appears negligible to the admitting physician, this opinion is not always revealed during the initial meeting with the patient's relatives. Reasons as to why this withholding of the truth may be acceptable are explored through review of available evidence and personal reflection. Factors identified include: the importance of hope in families' coping mechanisms, and the instinct to preserve it; the fallibility of physicians' perception of poor prognosis in the early (...) phase of illness; the need to avoid large swings in relatives' expectations that occur when patients appear to rally during initial resuscitation; and the adverse effect that an atmosphere of hopelessness can have on the provision of medical care. A strategy for the staged disclosure of information and the confirmation of hopelessness is then described, the aim being to find a compromise between providing a true opinion about a patient's prognosis, and regard for the opposing factors described. (shrink)