Wie ist der Freiwillige Verzicht auf Essen und Trinken und eine medizinische Begleitung dabei ethisch zu bewerten? Die ethische Bewertung des Freiwilligen Verzichts auf Essen und Trinken stellt Patienten und Angehörige, aber auch begleitende Ärzte und Pflegende vor erhebliche Schwierigkeiten. Basierend auf Ergebnissen eigener qualitativer Interviews mit Personen nach dem FVET ihrer Angehörigen legt dieser Artikel die bestehende Unklarheit und inhärente ethische Ambivalenz des Begriffs FVET frei, stellt aber in der Unterscheidung von FVET-Fällen – mit bzw. ohne terminale Erkrankung – (...) einen Weg zur Lösung der Frage nach der ethischen Bewertung des „Sterbefastens“ und seiner medizinischen Begleitung vor: Ethisch wird der Freiwillige Verzicht auf Essen und Trinken und seine medizinische Begleitung erst in der Analyse von Situation und Intention der Handelnden beurteilbar. Ausgehend vom Konzept eines frei gewollten Verzichts auf Essen und Trinken bei einsichts- und einwilligungsfähigen Personen mit dem Bewusstsein, damit ihr Leben zu verkürzen oder zu beenden, wird mit der Philosophie Thomas von Aquins argumentiert, dass eine ethische Bewertung die Begleitumstände und beabsichtigten Ziele miteinschließen muss, ebenso wie die Auswirkungen auf Angehörige und die Implikationen von und für ein Behandlungsteam. (shrink)

In his influential paper “Grasping the Third Realm,” John Bengson raises the question of how we can non-accidentally grasp abstract facts. What distinguishes successful intuition from hallucinatory intuition? Bengson answers his “non-accidental relation question” by arguing for a constitutive relationship: The intuited object is a literal constituent of the respective intuition. Now, the problem my contribution centers around is that Bengson’s answer cannot be the end of the story. This is because, as Bar Luzon and Preston Werner have recently pointed (...) out, this answer leads to the follow-up question of why certain intuitional experiences are constituted by the facts, but others are not. My objective is to answer this question by specifying precisely what is epistemically defective about intellectual hallucinations. My result is that, in stark contrast to perception, intellectual hallucinations are epistemically defective in the sense that something is overlooked. In successful intuition, by contrast, all relevant possibilities/scenarios are considered/imagined. This has crucial epistemological implications. In particular, I argue that intuitions exhibiting a certain phenomenology cannot fail to successfully grasp abstract facts. I call this the non-accidental correctness thesis, which constitutes the main thesis of this paper. (shrink)

This volume presents twelve original essays, by an international team of scholars, on the relation of John Locke's thought to Descartes and to Cartesian philosophers such as Malebranche, Clauberg, and the Port-Royal authors. The essays, preceded by a substantial introduction, cover a large variety of topics from natural philosophy to religion, philosophy of mind and body, metaphysics and epistemology. The volume shows that in Locke's complex relationship to Descartes and Cartesianism, stark opposition and subtle 'family resemblances' are tightly intertwined. Since (...) the turn of the twentieth century, the theory of knowledge has been the main comparative focus. According to an influential historiographical conception, Descartes and Locke form together the spearhead in the 'epistemological turn' of early modern philosophy. In bringing together the contributions to this volume, the editors advocate for a shift of emphasis. A full comparison of Locke's and Descartes's positions should cover not only their theories of knowledge, but also their views on natural philosophy, metaphysics, and religion. Their conflicting claims on issues such as cosmic organization, the qualities and nature of bodies, the substance of the soul, and God's government of the world, are of interest not only in their own right, to take the full measure of Locke's complex relation to Descartes, but also as they allow a better understanding of the continuing epistemological debate between the philosophical heirs of these thinkers. (shrink)

Das Korpus der aristotelischen Schriften enthält drei Ethiken: die Nikomachische Ethik in zehn Büchern, die Magna Moralia in zwei Büchern und die Eudemische Ethik in acht Büchern. Das Verhältnis zwischen diesen drei Abhandlungen ist schwierig zu bestimmen. Auf der einen Seite scheinen die Untersuchungen einander nicht zu ergänzen. Sie behandeln weder verschiedene Themen, noch vertreten sie stark voneinander abweichende Thesen, noch arbeiten sie mit völlig unterschiedlichen Methoden.

White American voters have realigned among the two dominant parties by income and education levels. This article argues that the interaction of education and income provides a more insightful—and stark—display of this change than treating them individually. Each group of voters is associated with distinctive “first dimension” views of economic redistribution and “second dimension” preferences concerning salient sociopolitical issues of civic and cultural liberties, race, and immigration. Macro-level hypotheses are developed about the changing voting behavior of education-income voting groups along (...) with micro-level hypotheses about the propensity of vote switching. The hypotheses are tested with data from the American National Election Studies 1952–2016. A profound realignment is revealed between white voters and the two main US parties that is consistent with the theoretical expectations developed in the article. (shrink)

O objectivo primário do presente artigo é estudar algumas das implicações, sobretudo epistemológicas, associadas com o auto-intitulado movimento da Física Ariana (Deutsche Physikj, movimento esse que aqui se considera como tendo sido iniciado pelos físicos, laureados com o Prémio Nobel, Philipp Lenard e Johannes Stark. Assim, em primeiro lugar, procura-se analisar questões como a da ligação entre ciência e raça, a da função do método experimental e do método dedutivo nas descobertas das ciências naturais, bem como a da relação (...) entre matemática e natureza, já para não mencionar a dimensão histórica da ciência. Em vez de recorrer a conceitos supostamente puros do que sejam ciência ou racionalidade em ordem a instaurar um tribunal da história, cujo veredicto seria a condenação da Física Ariana como irrisória anomalia epistemológica no corpo histórico da ciência, os autores do presente artigo procuram, antes de mais, traçar a origem do movimento a partir das biografias de Lenard e Stark, acreditando que o carácter profundamente conturbado de ambos, coadunado com a conflituosa situação política que antecedeu a ascensão de Hitler ao poder na Alemanha em 1933, seriam razões suficientes para a formação das doutrinas que atacavam a Física Teórica. Nesse sentido, depois de expor os princípios e as ideias defendidas pelos físicos arianos, os autores procuram evidenciar até que ponto uma análise restrita ao campo da física e dos seus documentos não é suficiente para uma compreensão cabal de tal movimento. Ao mesmo tempo, procuram mostrar também por que razão é necessário considerar que algumas objecções levantadas contra a física teórica se constituíam como problemas verdadeiramente relevantes, sendo que alguns deles foram também formulados por autores que não pactuavam com as convicções políticas de Lenard e Stark. Finalmente, o artigo comporta uma análise das posições defendidas por Werner Heisenberg em ordem a mostrar a seriedade com a qual as críticas dos físicos arianos foram recebidas por este autor, nelas reconhecendo algo digno de ser respondido, e isso não meramente por razões políticas, mas antes porque constituíam dilemas reais instalados na prática das ciências naturais. Ou seja, recorrendo aos argumentos esgrimidos por Werner Heisenberg, os autores do artigo pretendem demonstrar que a Física Ariana não merece atenção apenas na sua qualidade de aberração histórica, mas também pelo facto de ela ter levantado questões ainda hoje epistemologicamente relevantes. /// The primary aim of the present article is to study some of the implications, particularly the epistemological ones, associated with the movement of the so called German Physics (Deutsche PhysikJ, a movement that in this article is mainly associated with the work of the physicists, and Nobel laureates, Phillip Lenard and Johannes Stark. The article begins by analyzing questions related to the connection established between science and race, as well as to the function of the experimental and deductive methods in the discoveries of the natural sciences, not to mention the problems associated with the relation between mathematics and nature as well as the historical dimension of science. The goal, therefore, is not to take supposedly pure concepts about what science and rationality might be and establish them as judges in the tribunal of history, whose verdict would be the condemnation of the German Physics as an insignificant epistemological anomaly within the historical body of science. Rather, the authors of the article want to trace the origin of the movement of the German Physics by reading the biographies of Lenard and Stark, whereby it is assumed that the problematic character of these physicists together with the political situation that anteceded Hitlers ascension to power in Germany in 1933 would be reason enough for the formation of doctrines directed against theoretical physics. In this sense, after expounding the principles and the doctrines defended by the Arian physicists, the authors of the article show that an analysis circumscribed to the domain of physics would not be sufficient for a global understanding of this movement. At the same time, however, the authors also want to show the reason why it is necessary to consider some of the objections raised against theoretical physics as serious problems, even though some of them were also formulated by authors that did not share the political convictions of Lenard and Stark. Finally, the article contains an analysis of the positions defended by Werner Heisenberg in order to demonstrate the seriousness with which the criticisms of the Arian physicists were received by this most important author, so much so that he recognized in them something worth a response, and this not only for political reasons, but also because he recognized the problems raised as a dilemma situated at the very heart of the practice of the natural sciences. In other words, by a close reading of the arguments presented by Werner Heisenberg, the authors of the article want to demonstrate that the movement of German Physics is worth attention not only in its quality as an historical aberration, but also due to the fact that it raised questions that are still epistemologically relevant. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) plays a rapidly increasing role in clinical care. Many of these systems, for instance, deep learning-based applications using multilayered Artificial Neural Nets, exhibit epistemic opacity in the sense that they preclude comprehensive human understanding. In consequence, voices from industry, policymakers, and research have suggested trust as an attitude for engaging with clinical AI systems. Yet, in the philosophical and ethical literature on medical AI, the notion of trust remains fiercely debated. Trust skeptics hold that talking about trust (...) in nonhuman agents constitutes a category error and worry about the concept being misused for ethics washing. Proponents of trust have responded to these worries from various angles, disentangling different concepts and aspects of trust in AI, potentially organized in layers or dimensions. Given the substantial disagreements across these accounts of trust and the important worries about ethics washing, we embrace a diverging strategy here. Instead of aiming for a positive definition of the elements and nature of trust in AI, we proceed ex negativo, that is we look at cases where trust or distrust are misplaced. Comparing these instances with trust expedited in doctor–patient relationships, we systematize these instances and propose a taxonomy of both misplaced trust and distrust. By inverting the perspective and focusing on negative examples, we develop an account that provides useful ethical constraints for decisions in clinical as well as regulatory contexts and that highlights how we should not engage with medical AI. (shrink)

Trust constitutes a fundamental strategy to deal with risks and uncertainty in complex societies. In line with the vast literature stressing the importance of trust in doctor–patient relationships, trust is therefore regularly suggested as a way of dealing with the risks of medical artificial intelligence (AI). Yet, this approach has come under charge from different angles. At least two lines of thought can be distinguished: (1) that trusting AI is conceptually confused, that is, that we cannot trust AI; and (2) (...) that it is also dangerous, that is, that we should not trust AI—particularly if the stakes are as high as they routinely are in medicine. In this paper, we aim to defend a notion of trust in the context of medical AI against both charges. To do so, we highlight the technically mediated intentions manifest in AI systems, rendering trust a conceptually plausible stance for dealing with them. Based on literature from human–robot interactions, psychology and sociology, we then propose a novel model to analyse notions of trust, distinguishing between three aspects: reliability, competence, and intentions. We discuss each aspect and make suggestions regarding how medical AI may become worthy of our trust. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 2, Page 154-161, February 2022.

Philippe Urfalino sieht bei kollektiven Entscheidungen eine Verbindung zur Dramentheorie: Obwohl sie oft die Regeln der drei Einheiten befolgten, die in der französischen Tragödie im 17. Jahrhundert zu Normen geschmiedet worden seien – Einheit von Zeit, Ort und HandlungIn pandemischen und generell digitalen Zeiten könnte debattiert werden, ob die Einheit des Ortes weiterhin gilt – viele Entscheidungen werden in online-Sitzungen getroffen, wo alle im einheitlichen digitalen Raum zusammentreffen, dabei aber gleichzeitig an vielen heterogenen Orten sind. – sei ihr Ablauf doch (...) komplex genug, um undurchsichtig zu bleiben, selbst für die Beteiligten (Urfalino 2021, S. 193). Der Frage, wie Theaterkollektive Entscheidungen fällen und was diese mit Interventionen zu tun haben, nähert sich dieser Artikel anhand zweier Beispiele, um diese transparenter zu machen. Wie haben sich kollektive Entscheidungsprozesse auf die Entstehung der Protestoper Wem gehört Lauratibor? und Chöre der Angekommenen ausgewirkt? Dafür sollen drei Kollektive des Gegenwartstheaters beleuchtet werden, die intervenierende ortsspezifische Theaterdemonstrationen schaffen und verschiedene historische Bezüge aufweisen: zum einen zum AgitpropSo erinnert auch das erste Foto der Performancegruppe Schwabinggrad Ballett mit den elektronischen Megaphonen in Margarita Tsomous Artikel „Jenseits des Willkommens“ (Foto: Rasande Tysker) stark an das Filmstill aus Kuhle Wampe (1930), welches die Agitproptruppe „Rotes Sprachrohr“ mit ihren klassischen Flüstertüten zeigt in Konstanze Schmitts Essay „Staying with the trouble. Collective forms and methods in performing arts in the 1920s and today“ (vgl. Tsomou 2016, S. 23 und Schmitt 2023, S. 80). und ArbeitertheaterIm Falle von Wem gehört Lauratibor? der 1920er und 1930er Jahre, zum politischen Straßentheater der 1960er und 1970er Jahre als auch zu den neuen sozialen Bewegungen um 1968. Dabei handelt es sich um das Schwabinggrad Ballett mit ARRiVATi und das Lauratiborkollektiv. Es wird auf Urfalino 2021Titel im Dt. Gemeinsam entscheiden: Die Herstellung der kollektiven Verpflichtung (Übers. JP, wie auch alle nachfolgenden Zitate aus dem Französischen). und gegenwärtige Tendenzen im Theater eingegangen. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to shed light on and develop what I call a phenomenological conception of experiential justification. According to this phenomenological conception, certain experiences gain their justificatory force from their distinctive phenomenology. Such an approach closely connects epistemology and philosophy of mind and has recently been proposed by several authors, most notably by Elijah Chudnoff, Ole Koksvik, and James Pryor. At the present time, however, there is no work that contrasts these different versions of PCEJ. This (...) paper not only bridges this gap, but also reveals problems in current versions of PCEJ. Consequently, I argue for a new version of PCEJ that focuses on what is given within experience and not on how what is given pushes me towards believing something. (shrink)

Machine Learning (ML) is on the rise in medicine, promising improved diagnostic, therapeutic and prognostic clinical tools. While these technological innovations are bound to transform health care, they also bring new ethical concerns to the forefront. One particularly elusive challenge regards discriminatory algorithmic judgements based on biases inherent in the training data. A common line of reasoning distinguishes between justified differential treatments that mirror true disparities between socially salient groups, and unjustified biases which do not, leading to misdiagnosis and erroneous (...) treatment. In the curation of training data this strategy runs into severe problems though, since distinguishing between the two can be next to impossible. We thus plead for a pragmatist dealing with algorithmic bias in healthcare environments. By recurring to a recent reformulation of William James’s pragmatist understanding of truth, we recommend that, instead of aiming at a supposedly objective truth, outcome-based therapeutic usefulness should serve as the guiding principle for assessing ML applications in medicine. (shrink)

Perceptual experiences justify. When I look at the black laptop in front of me and my perceptual experience presents me with a black laptop placed on my desk, my perceptual experience has justificatory force with respect to the proposition that there is black laptop on the desk. The present paper addresses the question of why perceptual experiences are a source of immediate justification: What gives them their justificatory force? I shall argue that the most plausible and the most straightforward answer (...) to this question consists in what I call the phenomenological conception of perceptual justification. Perceptual experiences justify by virtue of their distinctive presentive phenomenology. This is a truly internalist conception that enjoys significant advantages over rival conceptions. In the course of his paper, I demonstrate the advantages of the phenomenological conception and defend it against a recent objection. (shrink)

Dans cet article, l’auteur essaie de souligner la portée phénoménologique de la doctrine des essences d’Adolf Reinach. Loin de représenter un simple retour au platonisme des idées, le projet reinachien porte selon lui, au travers d’une déduction d’une phénoménalité spécifique des essences, l’idée de constitution, comme, a fortiori, celle de fondation ontologique, à leurs limites.This article aims to point out the phenomenological impact of Adolf Reinach’s doctrine of essences. Far from being a simple return to Plato’s universe of ideas, Reinach’s (...) project shows through the deduction of a specific phenomenality of essences the limits of the idea of constitution and a fortiori of the ontological foundation. (shrink)

How ethical have recent banking practices been? We answer this question via an economic analysis. We assess the two dominant practices of the modern banking system – fractional reserves and maturity transformation – by gauging the respective rights of the relevant parties. By distinguishing the legal and economic differences between deposit and loan contracts, we determine that the practice of maturity transformation (in its various guises) is not only ethical but also serves a positive social function. The foundation of the (...) modern banking system – the holding of fractional reserves against deposits – is, however, problematic from economic, legal and ethical perspectives. Starting from a microanalysis of money's function, a reassessment of the current laws concerning the practice is encouraged, with the aim not only to rectify economic irregularities but also to realign depositors' rights with the obligations of the banking sector. (shrink)

Barnett and Block (Journal of Business Ethics, 2009 ) attack the heart of modern banking by claiming that the practice of borrowing short and lending long is illicit. While their claim of illegitimacy concerning fractional reserve banking can be defended, their justification lacks substance. Their claim is herein strengthened by a legal analysis of deposits and loans based on Huerta de Soto (Money, Bank Credit and Economic Cycles, 2006 ). A combined legal and economic analysis shows that while lending deposits (...) can be regarded as illicit, the maturity mismatching of loans is legitimate contrary to Barnett and Block’s claim. No over-issuance of property rights is involved with this practice once the distinction between present and future goods is taken into account. However, while the practice is not illicit per se , it is greatly assisted and developed through the presence of a fractional reserve banking system, and can sometimes breed detrimental effects. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall show that for Husserl, (a) evidence determines epistemic justification and (b) evidence is linked to originary givenness in the sense that one's ultimate evidence consists of one's originary presentive intuitions. This means that in contemporary analytic terminology, Husserl is a proponent of evidentialism and mentalism. Evidentialism and mentalism have been introduced into current debates by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Finally, I shall highlight that there is one significant difference between Husserl and Earl Conee and (...) Richard Feldman. Although Conee and Feldman argue that the fundamental principles of epistemology are principles of best explanation, Husserl opts for phenomenological principles as the most fundamental epistemic principles. The main difference is that for Husserl, experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their phenomenal character, namely, their originary givenness. (shrink)

The debate about the chances and dangers of a patient preference predictor (PPP) has been lively ever since Annette Rid and David Wendler proposed this fascinating idea ten years ago. Given the tec...

Germany is widely seen as a “dualized” economy driven by a powerful and stable “insider” coalition in the manufacturing sectors. In this article, that picture is challenged. An examination of the political economy of the outsider-friendly 2014 Minimum Wage Act, using public opinion data, document analysis, and qualitative interviews, shows how earlier dualizing reforms led to unintended negative feedback effects: First, public opinion reacted negatively to increasing inequality in the years preceding the introduction of the minimum wage. Second, a remarkable (...) shift is found among trade unions toward support of a minimum wage, even in manufacturing. Although the threat of low-wage competition and flexibilization did play a role, trade union solidarity was at least as important. Those endogenous dynamics came together in a self-undermining process unfolding over a relatively short period of time. Potential alternative explanations are explored, including classical partisan politics, party competition, and employer preferences. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 49 Heft: 1 Seiten: 203-274.

Peter Lombard is best known as the author of a celebrated work entitled Book of Sentences, which for several centuries served as the standard theological textbook in the Christian West. It was the subject of more commentaries than any other work of Christian literature besides the Bible itself. The Book of Sentences is essentially a compilation of older sources, from the Scriptures and Augustine down to several of the Lombard's contemporaries, such as Hugh of Saint Victor and Peter Abelard. Its (...) importance lies in the Lombard's organisation of the theological material, his method of presentation, and the way in which he shaped doctrine in several major areas. Despite his importance, however, there is no accessible introduction to Peter Lombard's life and thought available in any modern language. This volume fills this considerable gap. Philipp W. Rosemann begins by demonstrating how the Book of Sentences grew out of a long tradition of Christian reflection-a tradition, ultimately rooted in Scripture, which by the twelfth century had become ready to transform itself into a theological system. Turning to the Sentences, Rosemann then offers a brief exposition of the Lombard's life and work. He proceeds to a book-by-book examination and interpretation of its main topics, including the nature and attributes of God, the Trinity, creation, angelology, human nature and the Fall, original sin, Christology, ethics, and the sacraments. He concludes by exploring how the Sentences helped shape the further development of the Christian tradition, from the twelfth century through the time of Martin Luther. (shrink)

Foundationalism and coherentism are two fundamentally opposed basic epistemological views about the structure of justification. Interestingly enough, there is no consensus on how to interpret Husserl. While interpreting Husserl as a foundationalist was the standard view in early Husserl scholarship, things have changed considerably as prominent commentators like Christian Beyer, John Drummond, Dagfinn Føllesdal, and Dan Zahavi have challenged this foundationalist interpretation. These anti-foundationalist interpretations have again been challenged, for instance, by Walter Hopp and Christian Erhard. One might suspect that (...) inconsistencies in Husserl’s writings are the simple reason for this disagreement. I shall argue, however, that the real question is not so much how to read Husserl, but how to define foundationalism and that there is overwhelming textual evidence that Husserl championed the most tenable version of foundationalism: a moderate foundationalism that allows for incorporating coherentist elements. (shrink)

No detailed description available for "Concepts and language".

Todorčević showed that Rado's Conjecture implies CC*, a strengthening of Chang's Conjecture. We generalize this by showing that also CC**, a global version of CC*, follows from RC. As a corollary we obtain that RC implies Semistationary Reflection and, i.e. the statement that all forcings that preserve the stationarity of subsets of ω1 are semiproper.

This article explores the question of how to understand social media following the Habermasian theory of the structural transformation of the public sphere. We argue for a return to political-economic fundamentals as the basis for analysing the public sphere and seek to establish a characteristic connection between digital-behavioural control and singularised audiences in the context of proprietary markets. In the digital constellation, it is less a matter of immobilising the citizen as a consumer but rather of their political activation – (...) albeit in conditions under which commercial interests have primacy: privatisation without privatism. (shrink)

The focus of this paper are the ethical, legal and social challenges for ensuring the responsible use of “big brain data”—the recording, collection and analysis of individuals’ brain data on a large scale with clinical and consumer-directed neurotechnological devices. First, I highlight the benefits of big data and machine learning analytics in neuroscience for basic and translational research. Then, I describe some of the technological, social and psychological barriers for securing brain data from unwarranted access. In this context, I then (...) examine ways in which safeguards at the hardware and software level, as well as increasing “data literacy” in society, may enhance the security of neurotechnological devices and protect the privacy of personal brain data. Regarding ethical and legal ramifications of big brain data, I first discuss effects on the autonomy, the sense of agency and authenticity, as well as the self that may result from the interaction between users and intelligent, particularly closed-loop, neurotechnological devices. I then discuss the impact of the “datafication” in basic and clinical neuroscience research on the just distribution of resources and access to these transformative technologies. In the legal realm, I examine possible legal consequences that arises from the increasing abilities to decode brain states and their corresponding subjective phenomenological experiences on the hitherto inaccessible privacy of these information. Finally, I discuss the implications of big brain data for national and international regulatory policies and models of good data governance. (shrink)

This paper shows that the law, in subtle ways, may set hitherto unrecognized incentives for the adoption of explainable machine learning applications. In doing so, we make two novel contributions. First, on the legal side, we show that to avoid liability, professional actors, such as doctors and managers, may soon be legally compelled to use explainable ML models. We argue that the importance of explainability reaches far beyond data protection law, and crucially influences questions of contractual and tort liability for (...) the use of ML models. To this effect, we conduct two legal case studies, in medical and corporate merger applications of ML. As a second contribution, we discuss the trade-off between accuracy and explainability and demonstrate the effect in a technical case study in the context of spam classification. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhat is the relation between ethical reflection and moral behavior? Does professional reflection on ethical issues positively impact moral behaviors? To address these questions, Schwitzgebel and Rust empirically investigated if philosophy professors engaged with ethics on a professional basis behave any morally better or, at least, more consistently with their expressed values than do non-ethicist professors. Findings from their original US-based sample indicated that neither is the case, suggesting that there is no positive influence of ethical reflection on moral action. (...) In the study at hand, we attempted to cross-validate this pattern of results in the German-speaking countries and surveyed 417 professors using a replication-extension research design. Our results indicate a successful replication of the original effect that ethicists do not behave any morally better compared to other academics across the vast majority of normative issues. Yet, unlike the original study, we found mixed results o... (shrink)

Recent interest in phenomena of simulation, pretense, and play has given rise to new philosophical debates on the basic structure of human action and action planning. Some philosophers sought to transform Hume's desire-belief-action model by sophisticating its basic structure. For example, they introduced “hypothetical world boxes” or imaginary “i-desires” and “i-beliefs” into the standard model, in order to account for the representational and motivational structures of imaginary scripts. Others used phenomena of behavior driven by imagination to attempt a more fundamental (...) critique of the Humean tradition. This article aims to show how the pragmatist tradition could be used as a resource in reframing current debates on imagination, pretense, and simulation in the cognitive sciences. This will help determine the role of imagination in intelligent human deliberation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to establish a phenomenological mathematical intuitionism that is based on fundamental phenomenological-epistemological principles. According to this intuitionism, mathematical intuitions are sui generis mental states, namely experiences that exhibit a distinctive phenomenal character. The focus is on two questions: what does it mean to undergo a mathematical intuition and what role do mathematical intuitions play in mathematical reasoning? While I crucially draw on Husserlian principles and adopt ideas we find in phenomenologically minded mathematicians such as (...) Hermann Weyl and Kurt Gödel, the overall objective is systematic in nature: to offer a plausible approach towards mathematics. (shrink)

Ontic structural realism refers to the novel, exciting, and widely discussed basic idea that the structure of physical reality is genuinely relational. In its radical form, the doctrine claims that there are, in fact, no objects but only structure, i.e., relations. More moderate approaches state that objects have only relational but no intrinsic properties. In its most moderate and most tenable form, ontic structural realism assumes that at the most fundamental level of physical reality there are only relational properties. This (...) means that the most fundamental objects only possess relational but no non-reducible intrinsic properties. The present paper will argue that our currently best physics refutes even this most moderate form of ontic structural realism. More precisely, I will claim that 1) according to quantum field theory, the most fundamental objects of matter are quantum fields and not particles, and show that 2) according to the Standard Model, quantum fields have intrinsic non-relational properties. (shrink)

Extending previous results from work on the complexity of cut elimination for the sequent calculus LK, we discuss the role of quantifier alternations and develop a measure to describe the complexity of cut elimination in terms of quantifier alternations in cut formulas and contractions on such formulas.

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 264-269, October 2022. Müller's position-taking view of emotions takes issue with the widely endorsed philosophical notion that emotional feelings are a form of consciousness in which we become acquainted with the evaluative properties of objects and events. Müller rejects this perceptual theory of emotions and casts doubt on the idea that it is through emotional feeling that we develop an awareness of value. In so doing, his proposal amounts to a denial of any (...) epistemic function of emotional feeling. Challenging such a radical move, in my commentary, I discuss several affective phenomena in which feelings do seem to serve an epistemic function. These cases pose problems for Müller's version of the position-taking view of emotion, at least in its current form. (shrink)

Aristoteles' Ethik basiert auf der These, dass sich Güter als Strebensziele begreifen lassen. Die vorliegende Arbeit soll dabei helfen, diese These besser zu verstehen. Sie untersucht die Voraussetzungen und die Konsequenzen der teleologischen Konzeption des Guten. Der Gemeinplatz von der Aristotelischen "Strebensethik" wird neu beleuchtet. Als Ausgangspunkt dient eine genaue Lektüre der ersten Kapitel der Nikomachischen Ethik. Hier wird deutlich, dass Aristoteles einer teleologischen Güterkonzeption kritischer gegenübersteht, als üblicherweise angenommen wird. Die Gleichsetzung von Gütern und Zielen bietet zwar den Zugang (...) zur Bestimmung des Glücks; sie ist aber keine Definition des Guten. Aristoteles geht vielmehr davon aus, dass die als Ziele aufgefassten Güter in relevanter Hinsicht verschieden sind. Wie aber kann man dieser Verschiedenheit gerecht werden, ohne die Identifikation von Gütern und Zielen aufzugeben? Die Arbeit zeigt, dass sich wesentliche Bestandteile der Nikomachischen Ethik auf genau diese Frage beziehen lassen. Dazu gehören etwa das "ergon-Argument" und die Einführung des Tugendhaften als "Maßstab" des in Wahrheit Guten. Auf diese Weise wird eine Antwort auf einige Deutungsprobleme gegeben, die die Debatten um diese Schrift nachhaltig geprägt haben. Außerdem eröffnet sich eine andere Sicht auf das Projekt, das Aristoteles in seiner Ethik verfolgt. (shrink)

A great mathematician and teacher, and a physicist and philosopher in his own right, bridges the gap between science and the humanities in this exposition of the philosophy of science. He traces the history of science from Aristotle to Einstein to illustrate philosophy's ongoing role in the scientific process. In this volume he explains modern technology's gradual erosion of the rapport between physical theories and philosophical systems, and offers suggestions for restoring the link between these related areas. This book is (...) suitable for undergraduate students and other readers. 1962 ed. Index. 36 figures. (shrink)