Patina is the word used for the green or brown film formed on the surface of old bronze, an excess of which can mask the true characteristics of the original masterpiece. Filippo Baldinucci used the word patina in a modern sense for first time in his book “Tuscan Vocabulary of the Art of Design”. Metaphors have been part of philosophical speech since the time of Plato. This figure of speech is used to attempt to provide a sensitive presence of an (...) idea to improve understanding and to make a more vivid perception of that concept. On analysing the creative process of contemporary re-search on health topics and its further dissemination, we defend the epistemological thesis that there is always some degree of patina on an original article and this may obscure the underlying scientific work. Conclusion: We consider that patina in scientific papers is very different from the concept of epidemiological bias. We think that any researcher who reads an original article acts as a restorer of knowledge. If a reader is aware of the existence of scientific patina, that reader will know how to look through it and see the masterpiece hidden underneath. (shrink)

Al sur de la iglesia San Sebastián se perciben restos en los cuales se pueden ver dos baños islámicos. El baño de Suso apareció en el curso de excavaciones arqueológicas tras haber documentado unas tenerías de época posterior. En el baño de Yuso se han conservado tres salas abovedadas de medio cañón. Además, en la sala del poniente, identificada como sala caliente, está un arco de herradura, un ábside, y la traza de un arco geminado. El contacto entre la (...) caldera y la sala caliente se ha conservado bajo la forma de un arco de medio punto. En el baño de Suso se han conservado el hipocausto y las toberas. Estos dos baños tienen muchas similitudes. Nos revelan, por primera vez en Toledo, el modo de calefacción de la sala caliente. Hasta el momento, no son conocidos en los documentos medievales. (shrink)

It is widely supposed that evolutionary debunking arguments against morality constitute a type of epistemological objection to our moral beliefs. In particular, the debunking force of such arguments is not supposed to depend on the metaphysical claim that moral facts do not exist. In this paper I argue that this standard epistemological construal of EDAs is highly misleading, if not mistaken. Specifically, I argue that the most widely discussed EDAs all make key and controversial metaphysical claims about the nature of (...) morality or the possibility of moral truth that belie their apparently epistemological character. I show that the debunking force of these EDAs derives largely from metaphysical claims about morality and their implications for the possibility of moral reduction, rather than from epistemological worries associated with the existence of an causal/non-moral explanation of our moral judgments. The paper briefly concludes with a dilemma that I believe confronts all EDAs such as those discussed in this paper: either such arguments are unsound, or else they prove too much, debunking our knowledge of science and the external world, as well as morality. (shrink)

A ‘companions in guilt’ strategy against moral error theory aims to show that the latter proves too much: if sound, it supports an implausible error-theoretic conclusion in other areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie [2016 Cowie, C. 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]] has recently produced what he claims is a ‘master argument’ against (...) all such strategies. The essence of his argument is that CG arguments cannot work because they are afflicted by internal incoherence or inconsistency. I argue, first, that Cowie's master argument does not succeed. Beyond this, I argue that there is no good reason to think that any such argument—one that purports to identify an internal incoherence in CG arguments—can succeed. Second, I argue that the main substantive area of disagreement between error theorists and CG theorists essentially concerns the conceptual profile of epistemic reasons—specifically, whether they are strongly categorical—not the ontological question of whether such reasons exist. I then develop an argument in favour of the CG theorist's position by considering the moral error theorist's arguments in support of the conceptual claim that moral reasons are strongly categorical. These include, notably, criticisms made by Joyce [2011] and Olson [2014] of Finlay's [2008] ‘end relational’ view of morality, according to which moral reasons are relative to some end or standard, hence not strongly categorical. Examining these criticisms, I argue that, based on what moral error theorists have said regarding the conceptual profile of moral reasons, there is a strong case to be made that moral reasons are strongly categorical if and only if epistemic reasons are. (shrink)

In the present paper we study systematically several consequence relations on the usual language of propositional intuitionistic logic that can be defined semantically by using Kripke frames and the same defining truth conditions for the connectives as in intuitionistic logic but without imposing some of the conditions on the Kripke frames that are required in the intuitionistic case. The logics so obtained are called subintuitionistic logics in the literature. We depart from the perspective of considering a logic just as a (...) set of theorems and also depart from the perspective taken by Restall in that we consider standard Kripke models instead of models with a base point. We study the relations between subintuitionistic logics and modal logics given by the translation considered by Došen. Moreover, we classify the logics obtained according to the hierarchy considered inAlgebraic Logic. (shrink)

The term ‘moral resilience’ has been gaining momentum in the nursing ethics literature. This may be due to it representing a potential response to moral problems such as moral distress. Moral resilience has been conceptualised as a factor that inhibits immoral actions, as a favourable outcome and as an ability to bounce back after a morally distressing situation. In this article, the philosophical analysis of moral resilience is developed by challenging these conceptualisations and highlighting the risks of such limiting perspectives. (...) It is argued that moral resilience is best understood as a virtue with two associated vices, faintheartedness and rigidity. The intellectual virtue of practical wisdom is required to express resilience as a virtue. This understanding leads to recommendations for professional education, for practice and for further research. (shrink)

In this article I look for an alternative way in which ‘unreasonable’ people may be included in a liberal society. Differing from Rawls, whose reasonable hope is for unreasonable people gradually to adhere to liberal institutions so that, over time, an overlapping consensus is reached, I propose the alternative way of them supporting these institutions as a special modus vivendi, which does not require them to renounce their non-reasonableness. First I detail the Rawlsian notion of reasonableness and unreasonableness; second, I (...) discuss how the treatment of the unreasonable is addressed by Rawls; third, taking inspiration from two accounts of how to consider the ‘unreasonable’ within a liberal society, I maintain that a subset of ‘unreasonable’ (I call them ‘non-reasonable’) may be included in public debate; fourth, I propose that their way of inclusion is a stable modus vivendi. (shrink)

Following Post program, we will propose a linguistic and empirical interpretation of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and related ones on unsolvability by Church and Turing. All these theorems use the diagonal argument by Cantor in order to find limitations in finitary systems, as human language, which can make “infinite use of finite means”. The linguistic version of the incompleteness theorem says that every Turing complete language is Gödel incomplete. We conclude that the incompleteness and unsolvability theorems find limitations in our finitary (...) tool, which is our complete language. (shrink)

Several studies on research misconduct have already explored and discussed its potential occurrence in universities across different countries. However, little is known about this issue in Spain, a paradigmatic context due to its consolidated scientific evaluation system, which relies heavily on metrics. The present article attempts to fill this gap in the literature through an empirical study undertaken in a specific university: Universitat Jaume I (Castelló). The study was based on a survey with closed and open questions; almost half the (...) total population of the university’s researchers participated (505 out of 1030, i.e. 49.03%), yielding a representative sample of different academic career stages and areas of knowledge. Results show that 71.68% (n = 362) of the respondents consider at least one form of misconduct to be proliferating in their area of knowledge at the national level. This figure falls to 48.95% (n = 247) in reference to misconduct in their own institution. The most frequently reported types of misconduct linked to life with colleagues are especially the use of personal influence (in evaluation or review processes); lax supervision of doctoral theses; and the abuse of power over people in lower positions. Personal ambitions and pressure from the evaluation system are regarded as the most influential causes of misconduct proliferation, according to academics at this Spanish university. (shrink)

Psychology related to areas such as gender, language, education and violence has provided scientific knowledge that is contributing to reducing coercive social relationships and to expanding freedom in sexual-affective relationships. Nonetheless, today there are new challenges that require additional developments. In the area of consent, professionals from the fields of law, gender, education and others, are in need of evidence about conditions in human communication that produce consent differentiating them from conditions that coerce. Up to now, consent has been focused (...) on verbal language, for example, “no means no” or “anything less than yes is no”. Despite the fact that focusing consent on verbal language is a very important part of the problem, and has meant a huge advance, it does not solve most of the issues currently raised, like the famous case of “La Manada” in Spain. This article presents the most recent results of a new line of research, which places the problem and the solution in communicative acts, and not only in speech acts. Even though there might be a “yes” in a sexual-affective relationship, there might be no consent, and it is indeed a coercive relationship if that “yes” has been pronounced in a relationship determined by institutional power or by interactive power. Institutional power may occur if who made the proposal for the relationship is a person in charge of the process of selecting personnel in a company and one of the candidates is the person who received the proposal. Interactive power may occur if who makes the proposal is situated in an equal or inferior position for instance in the company to the person receiving it, but the former threatens to make sextortion to the latter. The potential social impact of this research has been already shown in the cases analyzed for this study. (shrink)

The rapid expansion of computational tools and of data science methods in healthcare has, undoubtedly, raised a whole new set of bioethical challenges. As Laacke and colleagues rightly note,...

O presente ensaio, aqui publicado em tradução original para Português, constitui uma secção muito significativa da conhecida obra de Giovanni B. Sala sobre Lonergan e a sua relação com Kant. Trata-se de um estudo comparativo das teorias do conhecimento de Immanuel Kant e de Bernard Lonergan, tomando-se como ponto de partida uma análise do estatuto do a priori no conhecimento humano tal como no-lo apresenta a Crítica da Razão Pura, de Kant, para depois se apresentarem as respectivas lacunas, insuficiências e (...) contradições mediante o recurso a Insight, a obra mestra de Bernard Lonergan. Para o filósofo jesuíta, com efeito, o interesse primordial consiste em realçar a possibilidade do conhecimento do ser, possibilidade essa fundamentada na natureza do juízo e na natureza do questionamento humano. Para além disso, mostra-se também como em ordem a ultrapassar a impossibilidade do conhecimento numénico, a reflexão lonerganiana sublinha o conhecimento como estrutura empírica, inteligente, racional e responsável, capaz de captar a realidade, uma vez que esta é, segundo Lonergan, intrinsecamente inteligível. /// The present text is a translation into Portuguese of a section of a work by Giovanni Sala on Lonergan and his relation with Kant. It amounts to a comparative study of the gnoseologies of Kand and Lonergan, whereby the starting point is an analysis of the statute of the a priori in human knowledge such as we find it in the Critique of Pure Reason of Kant, so that in the process the author also shows the corresponding insufficiencies and contradictions by means of a reading of the work Insight by Bernard Lonergan. For the Jesuit philosopher, the main interest of his gnoseology consists in an affirmation of the possibility of knowing being, possibility that is grounded in the nature of judgment itself and in the nature of human interro- gation. Moreover, the article also shows how in order to overcome the impossibility of noumenal knowledge, the lonerganian reflexion underlines knowledge as an empirical structure, intelligent, rational and responsible, able to capture reality. In the end, this is possible due to the fact that, for Lonergan, the real is intrinsically intelligible. (shrink)

Within the climate justice debate, the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle holds that those who benefit from greenhouse emissions associated with industrialization ought to pay for the costs of mitigating and adapting to their adverse effects. This principle constitutes a claim of inter-generational justice, and it is widely believed that the non-identity problem raises serious difficulties for any such claim. After briefly sketching the rationale behind ‘beneficiary pays,’ this paper offers a new way of understanding the claim that persons in developed societies (...) have benefited from industrialization. It argues that when we think of the claim in this new way, it evades the non-identity problem entirely. Some objections to this approach are then considered and rebutted. The paper concludes by comparing the present, relatively modest solution to the nonidentity problem with a much more ambitious attempt from the recent literature. (shrink)

Traducción y estudio de la sección 11,2,12-14 del Maymar fi "wupud al-Haliq wa-l-din al-qawim" de Teodoro Abu Qurrah. Buscando demostrar que el cristianismo es la única religión verdadera, Abu Qurrah plantea un método analítico de corte apologético que desarrolla a partir de criterios racionalistas de naturaleza comparatista, adoptando para ello un discurso expositivo, moralista o escriturista en cada caso, de acuerdo con sus necesidades.

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo examinar el significado de la neuropublicidad así como introducir los debates éticos que la acompañan. La búsqueda de la eficacia publicitaria y el conocimiento de las “verdaderas” necesidades de los clientes centran la investigación de esta disciplina que fusiona la publicidad con los nuevos conocimientos sobre el cerebro vinculados con el avance de las neurociencias. El presente artículo analiza esta nueva disciplina y sus características, a la vez que analiza algunas de las problemática morales (...) que plantea. (shrink)

This article explores the transformation of ethics in a globalizing technological society. After describing some basic features of this society, particularly the primacy it gives to a special type of technical rationality, three specific influences on traditional ethics are examined: (1) a change concerning the notion of value, (2) the decreasing relevance of the concept of axiological hierarchy, and (3) the new internal architecture of ethics as a net of values. These three characteristics suggest a new pragmatic understanding of ethics. (...) From a pragmatic perspective, the process of introducing ethical values into contemporary society can be regarded as a beneficial Trojan horse, a metaphor that will be developed further. (shrink)

It is possible to describe certain basic principles that underlie Leibniz’s political activities. These principles do not literally determine the specific steps Leibniz takes, but play a much more decisive role than that due to mere metaphysical principles. They provide a general frame work for his activities and a point of reference towards which his reflections tend. Particular attention is paid here to the concept of perspective and its presence in Leibniz’s correspondence with Bossuet, Pellison and Madame de Brinon and (...) the way in which a theological dialogue enables Leibniz to develop his vision of reality. (shrink)

La filosofía de Wittgenstein, en cada una de sus dos etapas, presenta criterios para evaluar el psicoanálisis. La primera evaluación es explícita al psicoanálisis freudiano y lo rechaza. La segunda evaluación es conjeturada en este texto para aceptar la versión del psicoanálisis lacaniano. Para exponer ambas se realiza un análisis teórico conceptual de la literatura wittgensteiniana sobre Freud y sobre la pragmática lingüística aplicada a: la ruptura de la unidad del significante sobre el significado que tomó Lacan de Saussure; la (...) distinción entre enunciado y enunciación que Lacan tomó de Quine; y la distinción entre decir y mostrar. Ello permitirá comprender la distinta postura de Wittgenstein hacia el psicoanálisis, entre ambas etapas, y las razones para aceptar a Lacan, otorgando evidencia de cómo Lacan se convirtió en un discípulo wittgensteiniano y el valor que tiene la metáfora en dicha consideración. (shrink)

The Mondragon Corporation, a group of cooperatives, is a thriving example of how cooperatives can succeed. The authors describe six features of the corporation and five 'successful cooperative actions' that they consider to be crucial in explaining its accomplishments. Both the specific features and the successful actions are contrasted with those of standard capitalist companies, to show how this case is unique in the field of corporate organization and management. Through a combination of democratic principles, the values of solidarity, and (...) strong competitiveness, Mondragon has simultaneously achieved both efficiency and equity and has become an alternative to the organizational and governance models of traditional capitalist firms. (shrink)

La autonomía constituye uno de los pilares básicos de un sistema político como el democrático que se asocia a la capacidad de toma de decisiones de la ciudadanía como su núcleo moral principal. Los descubrimientos en el ámbito de las neurociencias y su aplicación al campo del marketing y a la comunicación política despiertan hoy en día las sospechas por la posible capacidad de activar el "botón del voto" de los electores. Este artículo tiene como objetivo adentrarse en el estudio (...) de los principales trabajos desarrollados sobre el neuromarketing político y la neuropolítica. La finalidad de esta propuesta consiste en presentar los debates éticos que irrumpen con el neuromarketing político. Autonomy is one of the basic pillars of a political system like democracy, which is associated with citizens’ decision-making capacity as its main moral core. Discoveries in the neurosciences domain and their application to the marketing and political communication field now arouse suspicions about the possible capacity of activating voter’s "voting button". The objective of this article is to examine the main works on political neuromarketing and neuropolitics. The purpose of this proposal consists in presenting the specific ethical debates that emerge around political neuromarketing. (shrink)

It is often thought that bets on the truth of known propositions become irrational if the losing costs are high enough. This is typically taken to count against the view that knowledge involves assigning credence 1. I argue that the irrationality of such extreme bets can be explained by considering the interactions between the agent and the bookmaker. More specifically, the agent’s epistemic perspective is altered by the fact that the bookmaker proposes that unusual type of bet. Among other things, (...) being willing to offer a bet with unnecessarily harmful losing costs is likely to undermine the baseline level of trustworthiness required for it to be rational to engage in betting exchanges. This sort of explanation does not require granting either that we assign credence lower than 1 to known propositions or that knowledge is sensitive to practical stakes. Moreover, I show that, in our ordinary lives, we frequently perform actions that we know would be disastrous if certain conditions did not obtain. This behaviour can be seen as a form of implicit extreme betting and, nevertheless, it is often rational. (shrink)

Why are we so many? Or, in other words, Why is our species so successful? The ultimate cause of our success as species is that we, Homo sapiens, are the first and the only Turing complete species. Turing completeness is the capacity of some hardware to compute by software whatever hardware can compute. To reach the answer, I propose to see evolution and computing from the problem solving point of view. Then, solving more problems is evolutionarily better, computing is for (...) solving problems, and software is much cheaper than hardware, resulting that Turing completeness is evolutionarily disruptive. This conclusion, together with the fact that we are the only Turing complete species, is the reason that explains why we are so many. Most of our unique cognitive characteristics as humans can be derived from being Turing complete, as for example our complete language and our problem solving creativity. (shrink)

During the 2010s, a radical transformation took place in the Spanish philosophical landscape: most philosophy journals started releasing their papers for free under a creative commons licence. Thanks to open access publication, Spanish philosophy has a bigger audience today than never before. Drawing on the authors’ experience as editors of two of these journals, Theoria and Recerca, this paper discusses what made this transformation possible, its consequences for the assessment of the Spanish philosophical output and, finally, how to strengthen Spanish (...) philosophy journals to confront the forthcoming challenges in open access publishing. (shrink)

I criticise Pippin’s understanding of the relation between Hegel, Kant, and pre-Kantian metaphysics. Contrary to Pippin’s view, I contend that Hegel did not see the pre-Kantian investigation of being qua being as essentially hopeless. On the contrary, through an analysis of Hegel’s criticisms of Kant and of Hegel’s notion of thought, I contend that Hegel is much closer to pre-Kantian metaphysics than to Kant.

For Putnam in "Representation and Reality", there cannot be any intentional science, thus dooming cognitive science. His argument is that intentional concepts are functional, and that functionalism cannot explain anything because "everything has every functional organization", providing a proof. Analyzing his proof, we find that Putnam is assuming an ideal interpreting subject who can compute effortlessly and who is not intentional. But the subject doing science is a human being, and we are not that way. Therefore, in order to save (...) cognitive science, we propose to replace the ideal subject with a real and intentional human subject, and we propose to model intentionality by using a problem theory which is an intuitionist set theory where the resolving subject is a computing device. We are intentional because we are living beings, where life is the intention of not to die, so we are embodied intentions designed by evolution. We are real and then we have to compute our resolutions to the survival problem, and fortuitously we are computationally Turing complete, so our language is complete and then full and self referable. In summary, evolutionary subjectivism modeled as problem solving by computing should save cognitive science. Or, in other words, we are proposing to update Kant with Darwin and Turing. (shrink)

In this paper we study some logics related to the logic of place introduced by von Wright and studied by Segerberg. For every we study the logic of the class of frames whose accessibility relation R satisfies the following condition: if then there is such that . For a fixed the logic is the one axiomatized by K , which we call Kn.4B, where . We prove that these logics are canonical and hence complete, and that they have the finite (...) model property, being thus decidable. We also characterize their classes of frames. In the way of studying them we also study the logics , called Kn.4, and , called Kn.B. A translation between these logics and S5 is also presented, and the relation among them all is established. (shrink)

Physicalism is the default position in science and in the philosophy of mind, but it should not be, I argue, because of two errors. By its epistemological error, physicalism gives physics priority over the evidence of first person experience. Only what I experience in first person is certain, so observation is prior to any theory. Physics itself is based on observation, avoiding the epistemological error, and then physics can progress, even changing its own ontology. However, physicalism imposes the ontology of (...) physics on every science, and in physics everything is causal. By its ontological error, physicalism tries to explain causally what is intentional. And it happens that causality and intentionality are mutually exclusive, showing that the ontology of physics is insufficient wherever intentions are present. This ontological insufficiency prevents that physicalism can repeat the success of physics with any science where intentions play a rôle, and thus it is blocking the advance of both the social sciences and the philosophy of mind. To overcome this obstacle, I propose to go back to the essentials: we should consider again the transcendental problem raised by Descartes and its solutions by Hume and Kant. On top of this subjectivist solution, we should take advantage of Darwin and Turing, and we should extend our ontology beyond causality to include intentionality, and here my proposal is problem solving. Then you could join our Post-Kantian subjectivism and say with me: The world is not a huge machine, as physicalism proposes, but an enigmatic problem. (shrink)

Abortion analysis from a conceptual point of view Análise do abordo do ponto de vista conceitual Abortion is one of the most serious attacks against intergenerational solidarity because it directly attacks filiation. The diachrony establishes the protection of the weakest and the love between parents and children. This is broken from the attacks on the figure of the child. This paper moves in the concepts and the need to contribute in favor of life in today’s society. For this, it is (...) necessary to influence in favor of the dignity of human life in the academic and debate circles, spaces in which the different currents of opinion are created. Para citar este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo Aznar-Sala FJ. Análisis del aborto desde un punto de vista conceptual. Pers Bioet. 2019; 23: 34-48. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/pebi.2019.23.1.3 Recibido: 19/07/2018 Aceptado: 01/11/2018. (shrink)

Tall tales presents a sweeping survey of common myths about the mind and brain. In a lighthearted and accessible style, it exposes the truth behind these beliefs, how they are perpetuated, why people believe them, and why they might even exist in the first place.

The dorsal and medial pallial formations of mammals, birds, and reptiles show overall functional striking similarities. Most of these similarities have been frequently considered examples of convergent evolution. However, a considerable amount of neurobiological comparative evidence suggests the presence of a common basic pattern of vertebrate forebrain organization. This common pattern can support functional conservation.