This paper considers the place of children within liberal-democratic society and its related political morality. The genesis of the paper is two considerations which are in tension with one another. First, that there must be some point at which children are divided from adults, with children denied the rights which go along with full membership of the liberal community. The justification for the difference in the statue between these two groups must be rooted in some notion of capacities, since these (...) are the only relevant differences between adults and children. Second, that linking an individual's capacities to her status undermines the central liberal commitment of political equality. This dilemma explains what I term the threshold view, which holds that children become adult citizens upon reaching an age of competence and that above this level differences in abilities cease to matter to an individual's status. While this view has attractions, this paper argues that this view must eventually be rejected because of its inability to deal with the actual process of human development. In its place, the paper proposes a modification to this view which sees the threshold constrained by moral demands and applied indirectly to age groups rather than individuals. These constraints preserve the commitment to equality in a way consistent with a plausible view of children's place in society. (shrink)

John Tomasi’s Free Market Fairness introduces several powerful arguments in favour of a novel and surprising thesis: the best way to realize Rawls’s principles of justice is a free market society, rather than the arrangements that Rawls himself believed would best promote justice. In this paper, I adduce three arguments against Tomasi. First, I suggest that his view rests on a faulty understanding of what constitutes conventional property rights. Second, I argue that many market solutions generate choices which are not (...) valuable ones for the agent to have to make. Third, I show that many choices created by the market systems Tomasi favours create the illusion that citizens are making their own choices when in fact they are not. I suggest that taken together these three arguments are sufficient to defend Rawlsian institutional arrangements against Tomasi’s challenge. (shrink)

Bevir's doctrine of ?weak intentionalism?, developed in the course of his criticism of the work of Quentin Skinner, at once modifies and qualifies Skinner's approach by specifying the beliefs of individuals rather than their utterances as the loci of their intentions and the things that fix the meaning of their utterances. This has the effect of broadening the scope of meaning, by disengaging the meaning of utterances from their status as speech acts, of narrowing the relevance of linguistic contexts, by (...) denying that historians are required to study those contexts in order to understand the intended meaning of texts, and of blurring the historicity of texts, by suggesting that the utterances of which they are comprised may mean different things to author and audience. The paper draws attention to ambivalences in Skinner's position that Bevir does not take into account, and draws out continuities in Skinner's thought that Bevir's narrative does not register. (shrink)

We live in an ageing society, where people are living longer, and where decreases in the birth rate mean that the proportion of the population above retirement age is steadily increasing. An ageing population has considerable implications for health services and care provision. Consequently there is a growing interest among researchers, medical practitioners, and policy makers in older adults, their capabilities, and the changes in their cognitive functioning. This book offers an up-to-the-minute account of the latest methodological and theoretical issues (...) in cognitive ageing. Part of the Debates in Psychology series, it sets out the arguments surrounding the currently controversial questions in cognitive ageing. What is the appropriate methodology for understanding cognitive change? How many factors are necessary to understand the patterns of age-related change? What might these factors be? The topics and arguments are explored in a series of chapters by the leading researchers in the field. Each contributor offers their view of how cognitive ageing can be best understood, and together they cover a broad range of cognitive functions including language use, cognitive slowing, and memory loss. Each of the chapters stands alone as the latest review of work in the area. Taken together, the chapters form a coherent theoretical debate through which the reader will learn about the dynamic nature of cognitive ageing research, and about the direction this research will be taking in the future. Models of Cognitive Aging will be an invaluable resource for anyone with an interest in the elderly, and in their cognitive abilities. (shrink)

This, the third seminar organised by the AREC university sector committee, included short presentations followed by parallel workshops. These proposed and explored basic principles for ethical review in the context of current models within the university REC sector. In this report, following an introduction, each of the speakers/workshop leaders summarizes their own perspective on the issues raised and discussed.

In the previous issue of this journal I detailed a programme for building mental health ethics literacy with a regular column dedicated to critical discussions of mental health ethics issues in i lm. The i rst section of this commentary provides background on the problems of stigma attached to schizophrenia and how i lm can be used to i ght stigma by providing a point of para-personal contact between the general public and narrative accounts of persons living with schizophrenia. The (...) next section provides a critical review of The Soloist, a recent feature i lm that tells the true story ) of how journalist Steve Lopez befriended and wrote a series of columns in the Los Angeles Times about Nathaniel Ayers, a talented musician living with schizophrenia on the streets of Skid Row. The last section explains some of the prevalent socio-economic disadvantages faced by persons living with schizophrenia and concludes with the hope that this movie will be taken up critically to build a greater sense of social responsibility for those in our society living with schizophrenia. (shrink)

This article seeks to explore the challeges raised by Germain Grisez to Karl Rahner’s theory of fundamental option. Dr. Grisez holds that Fr. Rahner misunderstood the Tridentine teaching on justification, and posited the inaccessability of fundamental option to reflection. After reviewing Dr. Grisez’ position and the Tridentine doctrine of justification, the article will explore Fr. Rahner’s writings on fundamental option, and form conclusions regarding the conversation between Karl Rahner and Germain Grisez.

This paper explains and defends the idea that metaphysical necessity is the strongest kind of objective necessity. Plausible closure conditions on the family of objective modalities are shown to entail that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. Evidence is provided that some objective modalities are studied in the natural sciences. In particular, the modal assumptions implicit in physical applications of dynamical systems theory are made explicit by using such systems to define models of a modal temporal logic. Those assumptions (...) arguably include some necessitist principles. -/- Too often, philosophers have discussed ‘metaphysical’ modality — possibility, contingency, necessity — in isolation. Yet metaphysical modality is just a special case of a broad range of modalities, which we may call ‘objective’ by contrast with epistemic and doxastic modalities, and indeed deontic and teleological ones (compare the distinction between objective probabilities and epistemic or subjective probabilities). Thus metaphysical possibility, physical possibility and immediate practical possibility are all types of objective possibility. We should study the metaphysics and epistemology of metaphysical modality as part of a broader study of the metaphysics and epistemology of the objective modalities, on pain of radical misunderstanding. Since objective modalities are in general open to, and receive, natural scientific investigation, we should not treat the metaphysics and epistemology of metaphysical modality in isolation from the metaphysics and epistemology of the natural sciences. -/- In what follows, Section 1 gives a preliminary sketch of metaphysical modality and its place in the general category of objective modality. Section 2 reviews some familiar forms of scepticism about metaphysical modality in that light. Later sections explore a few of the many ways in which natural science deals with questions of objective modality, including questions of quantified modal logic. (shrink)

The article reviews two books by Bernard Williams including "Philosophy As a Humanistic Discipline" and "The Sense of the Past.".

This paper aims to identify the constitutive rule of assertion, conceived by analogy with the rules of a game. That assertion has such rules is by no means obvious; perhaps it is more like a natural phenomenon than it seems. One way to find out is by supposing that it has such rules, in order to see where the hypothesis leads and what it explains. That will be done here. The hypothesis is not perfectly clear, of course, but we have (...) at least a crude conception of constitutive rules, which we may refine as we elaborate the hypothesis. Although no attempt will be made here to define ‘rule’, some remarks on constitutive rules will focus the discussion. (shrink)

Timothy B. Noone - The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 258-259 Book Review The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century Steven P. Marrone. The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century. 2 Vols. Leiden: Brill, 2001. Pp. x + 611. Cloth, $90.00. In (...) this, the most complete study of the tradition of divine illumination ever produced in English, Steven Marrone has set the standard for further studies in thirteenth-century epistemology as well as inaugurated a revival in the historiographical significance of philosophical schools for analyzing medieval thought. He conducts his investigation of thirteenth-century epistemology by focusing upon eleven figures seen as belonging.. (shrink)

Analogical cognition, extensively researched by Dedre Gentner and her colleagues over the past thirty five years, has been described as the core of human cognition, and it characterizes our use of many words. This research provides significant insight into the nature of word meaning, but it has been ignored by linguists and philosophers of language. I discuss some of the implications of the research for our account of word meaning. In particular, I argue that the research points to, and helps (...) account for, a key explanatory role that linguistic meaning must play. The research also shows how words contribute to thought as opposed to merely being a means of conveying thought. (shrink)

We draw a distinction between the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift and the Aharonov–Bohm effect. Although the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift occurring when an electron beam passes around a magnetic solenoid is well-verified experimentally, it is not clear whether this phase shift occurs because of classical forces or because of a topological effect occurring in the absence of classical forces as claimed by Aharonov and Bohm. The mathematics of the Schroedinger equation itself does not reveal the physical basis for the effect. However, the (...) experimentally observed Aharonov–Bohm phase shift is of the same form as the shift observed due to electrostatic forces for which the consensus view accepts the role of the classical forces. The Aharonov–Bohm phase shift may well arise from classical electromagnetic forces which are simply more subtle in the magnetic case since they involve relativistic effects of the order v 2 /c 2 . Here we first review the experimentally observable differences between phenomena arising from classical forces and phenomena arising from the quantum topological effect suggested by Aharonov and Bohm. Second we point out that most discussions of the classical electromagnetic forces involved when a charged particle passes a solenoid are inaccurate because they omit the Faraday induction terms. The subtleties of the relativisitic v 2 /c 2 classical electromagnetic forces between a point charge and a solenoid have been explored by Coleman and Van Vleck in their analysis of the Shockley–James paradox; indeed, we point out that an analysis exactly parallel to that of Coleman and Van Vleck suggests that the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift is actually due to classical electromagnetic forces. Finally we note that electromagnetic velocity fields penetrate even excellent conductors in a form which is unfamiliar to many physicists. An ohmic conductor surrounding a solenoid does not screen out the magnetic field of the passing charge, but rather the time-integral of the magnetic field is an invariant; this time integral is precisely what is involved in the classical explanation of the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift. Thus the persistence of the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift when the solenoid is surrounded by a conductor does not exclude a classical force-based explanation for the phase shift. At present there is no experimental evidence for the Aharonov–Bohm effect. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Denying the Body? Memory and the Dilemmas of History in DescartesTimothy J. ReissIn an essay first published in The New York Review of Books in January 1983, touching her apprenticeship as writer, the Barbadian /American novelist Paule Marshall described the long afternoon conversations with which her mother and friends used to relax in the family kitchen. She recalled how they saw things as composed of opposites; not torn, (...) but completed and made whole by them.Theirs was not a Manichean brand of dualism that sees matter, flesh, the body, as inherently evil, because they constantly addressed each other as “soully-gal”—soul: spirit; gal: the body, flesh, the visible self. And it was clear from their tone that they gave one as much weight and importance as the other. They had never heard of the mind/body split. 1This closing claim is surely less than self-evident. Whether or not the companions had heard of the mind/body split depends on the meaning given to the verb “hear.” Certainly it was embedded in their language, however much the phrase “soully-gal” might recombine its parts.Did the split come from Descartes and early European debates, linguistically colonizing all those who came within its sphere—Africans, Barbadians, Brooklynites? Did it come from a Christian heritage, with its haggling over bodily mortality and immortality of soul? Who knows? A first point is that it is still an everyday experience, deeply buried in language and so in the ideas, feelings, and meanings expressed in language. A second point is that the post-Cartesian debates—to simplify for a moment with an overly heavy [End Page 587] hand—were and are themselves but a variant within a much longer received wisdom. Nonetheless, such wisdom is now bound to that variant, which, willy-nilly, does give one set of parameters to a common experience—at least, to that of those of us who dwell under Western hegemonies. It gives them also, no doubt, to many who live within them at once less clearly and more contentiously.I would like to offer a further powerful instance here, simply to emphasize what and how much is at stake in the questions to be addressed. It occurs in a writing by the Guyanese novelist Wilson Harris, his Palace of the Peacock. First in a tetralogy, this novel recounts something like a journey away from a life of colonial and postcolonial violence and oppression towards a hoped-for rebirth in “fulfilment and understanding.” 2 Early on, the harsh protagonist, Donne, mocks the narrator, his mysterious “double” and “brother,” Dreamer, who has remarked their distance from “the folk.” “Is it a mystery of language and address?” asks Donne. Slightly bewildered, Dreamer struggles to suggest that the obstacle is less of language than of a deeper disjunction:“it’s an inapprehension of substance,” I blurted out, “an actual fear of the substance of life, fear of the substance of the folk, a cannibal blind fear in oneself. Put it how you like,” I cried, “it’s a fear of acknowledging the true substance of life. Yes, fear I tell you, the fear that breeds bitterness in our mouth, the haunting sense of fear that poisons us and hangs us and murders us. And somebody,” I declared, “must demonstrate the unity of being, and show...” I had grown violent and emphatic... “that fear is nothing but a dream and an appearance....” 3Recovery of unity might become a way to defeat political and historical violences. In the next novel in the sequence, one of two self-indulgently whining characters, accused of pining for a woman who has run away to seek education, explodes: “I don’t believe you can begin to see how some body like they born seeking for mind.” 4 For peoples of the colonized Americas, imbued with “the great civilization of the American Indian,” this urge, Harris then wrote in a critical essay, was simply the personal form of a social and political necessity to recover still-living elements of a culture for which “matter truly bore the imprint of genius,” refusing “the taboo of spirituality removed from sensuous direction.” 5 Recently, Harris has worried this... (shrink)

This critical review focuses on the problems of modernity as outlined by Žižek and Milbank in The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? It argues that both Žižek’s nihil-a-theology and Milbank’s radical orthodoxy cannot provide satisfactory resolutions to the problem of the universal and the particular in both its epistemic and ethical inflections on account of being unable to make intelligible the deeper problem of order and chaos. Both authors generate a flat actualist ontology characteristic of the epistemic fallacy, (...) and hold to some form of either perspectival realism or superidealism. It is argued that it is only by affirming something like a dialectical critical realist ontology that these problems are able to be addressed while maintaining the intelligibility of scientific understanding, paradox, progress, the universal and the particular and our ethical relation to the Other. (shrink)

We propose that firms that engage in morally imaginative sensemaking will manage society's changing ethical expectations more effectively than those engaging in habituated sensemaking. Specifically, we argue that managers engaging in habituated sensemaking will tend to view changes in expectations as threats and respond to them defensively. In contrast, morally imaginative managers will tend to see these same changes as opportunities and address them by proactively or interactively engaging stakeholders in learning processes. We contribute to the literature on moral imagination (...) by highlighting the value of moral imagination relative to conventional sensemaking, and by positioning moral imagination as an ongoing mode of sensemaking. While we recognize that managers' capacity to continuously address changing ethical expectations using moral imagination is constrained by cognitive limitations, we posit that morally imaginative sensemaking may economize on cognitive resources over time by enabling managers to avoid managing ethical issues unproductively based on habit. We also contribute to the issues management literature by calling attention to two underlying factors, managerial sensemaking mode and firm enterprise strategy, that drive companies' approaches to issues management. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.1 (2002) 129-149 [Access article in PDF] Lord Acton and "the Insanity of Nationality" Timothy Lang "I hope I need not warn you against Montalembert's declamation about Poland—He has no idea of the insanity of nationality...." Acton to Richard Simpson, 25 September 1861 The sixty-year period that culminated in the First World War witnessed a momentous transformation in the European state system. (...) Italian and German unification, the expulsion of the Ottomans from southeastern Europe, the destruction of the three remaining empires—the Austrian, German, and Russian—as casualties of the war, their replacement by a band of successor states stretching from the Baltic to the Balkans: these developments completely altered the face of Europe, as dynastic states gave way to nation-states. Looking back on this transformation once the war was over, many Europeans believed the decision to rebuild their continent on the basis of nation-states made perfect sense. To establish the principles of self-determination and democracy would contribute to peace and prosperity by solving the nationalities problem that had caused such mischief in the past. But in the 1860s, as this transformation was just beginning, the question looked very different, especially to the young John Dalberg Acton—the future Lord Acton, famous for the Cambridge Modern History—as he contemplated without benefit of hindsight the rise of the modern nation-state. 1 [End Page 129]Acton's views on the nation-state appeared in an article on "Nationality," which he wrote in 1862 for the Home and Foreign Review. 2 Nationality—today we would call it nationalism—was, Acton pointed out to his colleague Richard Simpson, a "new question in political philosophy" 3 ; and Acton's essay was a remarkably precocious treatment of the subject. In this tour de force he placed nationalism in its historical context, enabling readers to understand its significance for their own time and to see in nationalism the most potent force unleashed by the French Revolution. For Acton the Revolution had given a new direction to social protest. Whereas in the past, people had resisted oppression by calling for a return to traditional ways, now, after 1789, they demanded a new social and political order. The Revolution thus spawned protest movements of a wholly unprecedented kind. These movements were "spontaneous and aggressive," he warned. They were "popular, unreasoning, and almost irresistible." They appealed to the masses, encouraging them to be "arbitrary as well as insubordinate" and to disregard tradition, prescription, and established rights. Nationalism, with Mazzini as its representative figure, was the most formidable of these new mass movements; for it subverted the existing order by attacking the territorial arrangement and sovereignty of legitimate states, and it provided the impetus behind contemporary revolution. 4 In contrast to later generations, who may have regarded nation-states as likely to promote peace and prosperity, Acton believed that to create these states by imposing the principle of nationality would damage irreparably the Europe he knew and valued.Acton clearly appreciated the power of nationalism—and for this he deserves credit—but too much can, and has, been made of his foresight. He was disturbed by nationalism not because he was clairvoyant, not because he saw in nationalism the twentieth century's totalitarian nightmare, but rather because he was preoccupied with very nineteenth-century concerns. 5 When in 1859 Cavour and Louis Napoleon contrived their war against Austria, hoping to drive the [End Page 130] Habsburgs from Italy and capture the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia for Piedmont, they exacerbated the nationalities problem in much of southern Europe. In Italy this problem was solved by the creation of a unified nation-state. The war against Austria was the first step in the process of unification that culminated in 1861 with the founding of the Kingdom of Italy. As a result of unification, inhabitants of the Italian peninsula found themselves subject to a highly centralized state, with an administration modeled on the Napoleonic system that was adverse to regional autonomy. The Italian war also aggravated the nationalities problem in... (shrink)

Hittite Local Cults. By Michele Cammarosano. Writings from the Ancient World, vol. 39. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2018. Pp. xxv + 510, illus. $69.95 (paper).

Ethical issues surrounding the marketing and trade of controversial products such as tobacco require a better understanding. Virginia Slims, an exclusively women’s cigarette brand first launched in 1968 in the USA, was introduced during the mid 1980s to major Asian markets, such as Japan and Korea, dominated by male smokers. By reviewing internal corporate documents, made public from litigation, we examine the marketing strategies used by Philip Morris as they entered new markets such as Japan and Korea and consider the (...) extent that the company attempted to appeal to women in markets where comparatively few women were smokers. The case study of Virginia Slims reveals that the classification of “vulnerable” consumers is variable depending on culture, tobacco firms display responsive efforts and strategies when operating within a “mature” market, and cultural values played a role in informing Philip Morris’ strategic decision to embrace an adaptive marketing approach, particularly when entering the Korean market. Finally, moral questions are raised with tobacco being identified as a priority product for export and international trade agreements being used by corporations, governments, or trade partners in efforts to undermine domestic public health policies. (shrink)

Euthanasia and assisted suicide was openly permitted but not technically legal in the Netherlands for decades. In 2002, it was formally legalised through the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Review Procedures Act, subject to two main criteria: the patient had to be capable of making voluntary decisions and the patient had to experience unbearable suffering without prospect of improvement. Within the Netherlands, EAS has wide acceptance, and the public in general seems to favour a liberal interpretation (...) of both of these requirements. Physicians are expected to use ‘their own moral compass’ to decide about personal participation, and it is generally possible and permissible to find a substitute physician if the patient meets the legally required criteria but the physician is not comfortable assisting. Over the years, multiple quantitative and qualitative studies have explored the Dutch practice of EAS,1–3 but relatively little is known about the edges of what counts as meeting these criteria and how acceptable the practice is for physicians who participate. The study by Snijdewind et al gives a glimpse of these boundaries and suggests that at least sometimes the criteria are being stretched and adapted to meet the perceived needs of patients, and some participating physicians are relatively uncomfortable with some of the requests with which they are faced.4 Just how rare or common these ‘edgy’ cases are within the larger practice of EAS in the Netherlands cannot be answered by …. (shrink)

Crucial to the establishment of a scientific discipline is a body of knowledge organized around a set of instruments, interpretive techniques, and regimes of training in their application. In this paper, we trace the involvement of scientists and engineers at Varian Associates in the development of nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometers from the first demonstrations of the NMR phenomenon in 1946 to the definitive takeoff of NMR as a chemical discipline by the mid-1960s. We examine the role of Varian scientists in (...) constructing several models of NMR instruments for research scientists in the 1950s and the Varian efforts to influence the adoption of NMR as a standard tool for chemical analysis through Varian-supported publications, participation in scientific meetings, collaborations with academic chemists, workshops, and postdoctoral fellowships. Special attention is devoted to the development of the Varian A-60, the first commercial NMR instrument intended for the broadly trained chemist rather than a custom-built tool for the research specialist. Drawing on an examination of the use-rate of NMR instruments in chemical literature, the assessment of NMR in the chemical review literature by practitioners, and indicators of the establishment of a suitable funding environment for the growth of physics-based scientific instrumentation in the post-Sputnik era, we argue that the establishment of NMR as a discipline coincided with the adoption of the A-60 in the mid-1960s. During the period of our study, Varian Associates was a primary military contractor. This paper is intended to contribute to recent interest in the relation of military fundingto scientific enterprise during the Cold War and to the larger question of university-industry interactions in the growth of knowledge. (shrink)

BackgroundIt is commonly reported by editors that it has become harder to recruit reviewers for peer review and that this is because individuals are being asked to review too often and are experiencing reviewer fatigue. However, evidence supporting these arguments is largely anecdotal.Main bodyWe examine responses of individuals to review invitations for six journals in ecology and evolution. The proportion of invitations that lead to a submitted review has been decreasing steadily over 13 years (2003–2015) for (...) four of the six journals examined, with a cumulative effect that has been quite substantial (average decline from 56% of review invitations generating a review in 2003 to just 37% in 2015). The likelihood that an invitee agrees to review declines significantly with the number of invitations they receive in a year. However, the average number of invitations being sent to prospective reviewers and the proportion of individuals being invited more than once per year has not changed much over these 13 years, despite substantial increases in the total number of review invitations being sent by these journals—the reviewer base has expanded concomitant with this growth in review requests.ConclusionsThe proportion of review invitations that lead to a review being submitted has been declining steadily for four of the six journals examined here, but reviewer fatigue is not likely the primary explanation for this decline. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cognition and Commitment in Hume's PhilosophyTimothy M. CostelloeDon Garrett. Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. 270. Cloth, $49.95Given that the Hume literature abounds in interpretive disagreements, it is striking to read of Don Garrett's aim "to solve... to be the last word about... [a] set of problems that have long stood in the way of understanding Hume's philosophy" (10); and, as if (...) that were not enough, to see him defining success in terms of grasping Hume's aims, understanding his arguments, and explicating conclusions and interrelations between them (8-9). Somewhere between honesty and hubris, Garrett then investigates various "puzzles" within Hume scholarship. The first three chapters undertake work of clarification. The first addresses "imagination" and "understanding," emphasizing Hume's "rejection of the intellect" within rationalist and empiricist thought, before raising difficulties with and offering solutions to Hume's use of the terms. Garrett then distinguishes five types of empiricism which "produce and reinforce" Hume's status as a cognitive psychologist developing a "theory of representational faculties" (39). Chapters two and three examine Hume's "fundamental principles" (Copy Principle and Separablity Principle) leading Garrett into informative discussions of various doctrines—space and time (152ff), the missing shade of blue (50-53, 73), and "distinctions of reason" (59ff)—arguing that none contradict the principles in question. At the end of the chapter, Garrett concludes Hume's interest in both principles lies less in doctrines each "forbids" than in "investigations... [each] motivates" (75).Armed with a battery of distinctions, the remaining chapters focus on seven such "investigations," each situating the problem, reconstructing Hume's arguments, considering extant interpretations, and offering original solutions to the puzzles posed. In chapter five, for example, Garrett argues that Hume endorses two definitions of "cause," which, neither logically equivalent nor co-extensive, involves Hume in contradiction. Having considered and rejected interpretations by other commentators, Garrett proposes a solution: Since Hume holds both that a "relation" exists only where two or more relations are compared (102-4); and that necessary connection involves "pairs of objects" and "ideas of pairs" (105-6), cause and effect can be defined either as constant conjunction or association. The "contradiction" thus removed, Garrett supports [End Page 441] his case by arguing that since Hume accepts two definitions of "virtue" (107ff.), he can do the same with causality. Finally, Garrett raises four objections to his conclusion and, responding to each, completes his solution to the Humean puzzle.As scholarly and engaging as Garrett's book is, however, the spirit of Hume is often missing from its pages. Although important, an approach which focuses on discrete fundamental principles, sets and solves puzzles, and transforms philosophical prose into lists of numbered propositions, belies Hume as a thinker obsessed with the medium of his message. Philosophy, in Hume's view, is also a matter of taste and character; a way of being and thinking which, as Garrett acknowledges, is integral to the "conduct of...[Hume's] life" (241).No single study can capture Hume's philosophy in its entirety. Yet a book claiming the "last word" might acknowledge the necessary partiality of its approach especially when it affects its own conclusions. First, with few exceptions, Garrett makes almost perfect sense of everything Hume says; and even when found wanting, it is "less philosophically vitiating that one might expect" (39). Charitable readings and Hume's greatness, notwithstanding, for his work to be free of all contradiction would be extraordinary. Second, Garrett's "puzzles" are not always genuine. Emphasizing, for example, how Hume's definitions of cause are the same thing viewed from different perspectives might prevent such a puzzle arising at all; and the evidence for Hume's putative "propositional theory of moral evaluation" is so thin (191) that one suspects Garrett's method to have a hand in generating the alleged contradiction.The same is true of the concluding chapter. Presenting the "puzzle" as a contradiction between skepticism and science, and looking to "human reason" for solace (207), it comes as no surprise that Hume's skepticism should ground and reconfirm "our commitment to reason and its products" (208). Hume's... (shrink)

In this essay, Timothy Justus reviews the book Brain and Music (2012) by Stefan Koelsch, first providing a sketch of the book’s contents, including examples of Koelsch’s empirical work from four core areas (1) musical syntax, (2) musical semantics, (3) music and action, and (4) music and emotion. Justus then proceeds to discuss the continuous nature of cognitive domains and the continuous nature of mental activity.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Empire of the Tetrarchs: Imperial Pronouncements and Government a.d. 284–324T. D. BarnesSimon Corcoran. The Empire of the Tetrarchs: Imperial Pronouncements and Government a.d. 284–324. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. xv 1 406 pp. Cloth, $85. (Oxford Classical Monographs)The four decades between the accession of Diocletian on 20 November 284 and the abdication of Licinius on 19 September 324 witnessed profound changes in the government and administrative structure of (...) the Roman world. These changes are naturally reflected in the legislation of the period, which survives in relative abundance—indeed, a larger proportion of the emperors’ legal decisions and enactments probably survives from these four decades than from any previous period of forty years in the history of the Roman Empire. The high rate of survival is due in part to the activity of the commissioners who compiled the Theodosian Code in the 430s and the Codex Justinianus in the sixth century: the former set out to collect general laws and edicts of the Christian Roman Empire since the conversion of Constantine, while the latter included in their compilation a large part of two Diocletianic collections of imperial rescripts, the Codex Gregorianus and the Codex Hermogenianus. But the legislation of Diocletian and his imperial colleagues and successors is also known from a wide variety of other sources—papyri, inscriptions, nonofficial collections of laws, Lactantius’ account of the decade of Christian persecution from 303 to 313 in his On the Deaths of the Persecutors, and Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History. Moreover, Eusebius’ Life of Constantine quotes important documents from the last months of 324.Simon Corcoran includes all this varied and historically significant material in his purview, and he provides a reliable guide to it. His monograph is a revised version of an Oxford doctoral thesis which he began in 1987 under the supervision of Fergus Millar and completed in 1992 under that of John Matthews, and he has also taken advice from Tony Honoré. His work is technically proficient. I have not noticed any careless errors of any consequence, and Corcoran has used my work on the period of Diocletian and Constantine in the spirit in [End Page 145] which I intended it to be used: he has understood the underlying principles upon which it rests, then applied them critically, sometimes to reach conclusions which not only differ from my own but are superior to them.Corcoran begins with two introductory chapters which succinctly survey the subject and the evidence available. On interpolation in legal texts, he is cautious and sensible. He proceeds on the assumption that though “the transmitted texts are seldom identical with what the imperial chancery originally issued,” they have seldom undergone drastic alteration: “abbreviation is the most common fate of constitutions in the legal sources” (19). Yet he provides a salutary reminder and example of what can happen (16–18): whereas a rescript in the Fragmenta Vaticana denies that the temporary gift of estates subject to tax is valid (Frag. Vat. 283, si stipendariorum proprietatem dono de-disti,... donatio inrita est), the same rescript in the Codex Justinianus directly contradicts and asserts that such a gift is valid (CJ 8.54.2, si praediorum proprietatem dono dedisti,... donatio valet). On a priori grounds alone, it seems highly probable that something similar has happened to some texts which are known only through the Codex Justinianus—and where the alteration may not be at all obvious.What of the date and contents of the two Diocletianic codes? Corcoran confronts the problems of dating and attribution squarely and honestly. Most of his conclusions may not be new, but his discussion has been able to proceed from the fact that an Aurelius Hermogenianus, who can hardly be anyone other than the jurist, is now securely attested as praetorian prefect between 293 and 305 with Julius Asclepiodotus as his colleague (AE 1987, 456). Corcoran argues that Gregorius published the Codex Gregorianus in 291/2 or ca. 292, after serving as magister libellorum with Diocletian from 285 to 290: he accounts for the ascription of some later constitutions to this code by postulating a second edition compiled ca. 306, possibly at the court of Maximinus or... (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty’s explication of concrete or practical movement by way of the Schneider case could be read as ending up close to automatism, neglecting its flexibility and plasticity in the face of obstacles. It can be contended that he already goes off course in his explication of Schneider’s condition. Rasmus Jensen has argued that he assimilates a normal person’s motor intentionality to the patient’s, thereby generating a vacuity problem. I argue that Schneider’s difficulties with certain movements point to a means of (...) broadening Merleau-Ponty’s account of concrete movement, one that he broaches without exploiting. What could do more work is his recognition of a transposition capacity - and hence of a plasticity - in the healthy body’s skill schema. As well as avoiding vacuity, he could forestall the appearance of a dichotomy between practical coping and creativity. (shrink)

In this remarkably ambitious book, Robert Pasnau has sought to trace out the story of medieval epistemology during its formative years, 1250 to 1350, and to draw conclusions both regarding the tenability of views advanced during the High Middle Ages and regarding the relation of medieval epistemology to early modern epistemology. In the history of cognitive theories, Pasnau discusses mainly the figures of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi, and William of Ockham, although brief treatments are also included (...) of Roger Bacon and William Crathorn. The conclusions that Pasnau draws are that none of the epistemological theories advanced by the principal authors treated is altogether satisfactory and that medieval epistemology provides a direct antecedent to early modern epistemology since, on Pasnau’s reading, even the cognitive theory of a figure such as Aquinas relies on a kind of representationalism. (shrink)

A noteworthy development that has transpired in American sociology in the past quarter century has been the increasingly sophisticated interest in the analysis of human cultural systems. Sadly, however, these analyses reveal that social scientists rarely appreciate the profoundly evolutionary aspects of human culture. The chief purpose of this essay is to address this shortcoming and to offer some tentative suggestions toward its rectification. The essay begins by briefly reviewing recent developments in the analysis of cultural systems, primarily by reference (...) to the influential work of Wuthnow. Second, a common flaw in these approaches is addressed—namely, the absence of any recognition of the value of grounding sociocultural theory in an informed evolutionary framework—and the case is made that this shortcoming is avoidable, even within the context of the intellectual traditions of the social sciences. Third, the evolutionary foundations of human cultural behavior are explored in terms of an analysis of relevant theoretical and empirical developments in the evolutionary neurosciences. Fourth, the value of these insights is illustrated by reference to an evolutionary critique of a recent and thought-provoking contribution to the study of modern political culture—Douglas and Wildavsky’s analysis ofRisk and Culture. Finally, the article concludes by emphasizing the value of and the necessity for incorporating evolutionary reasoning into the domain of sociocultural theory. (shrink)

In this clearly written and impressive volume, Giorgio Pini has provided the first systematic book-length study of Duns Scotus’s doctrine of the categories and an extremely useful sketch of his views on logic generally. Divided into six chapters, the work covers the gamut of interpretations of Aristotle’s Categories over the course of the thirteenth century, ranging from the views of Robert Kilwardby and Albertus Magnus in the 1240s to the leading opinions of the 1280s and 1290s, those held by Radulphus (...) Brito, Simon of Faversham, and Peter of Auvergne. Through this survey of historical background to Scotus’s logical, metaphysical, and theological works, the reader becomes readily acquainted with the systematic options for understanding categories, both in logic and in metaphysics, while appreciating all the more keenly the full bearing of Scotus’s own teaching. (shrink)

The Snake and the Mongoose: The Emergence of Identity in Early Indian Religion. By Nathan McGovern. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xi + 313. $105.

The existing literature on moral imagination proposes that actors can best respond to ethical dilemmas by tailoring their actions to the practical demands of the situation. It has done little to develop this insight, however. To address this gap, I used institutional theory to identify six ideal type approaches to moral imagination. I proposed that in addressing ethical dilemmas, the morally imaginative actor takes account of two situational factors: first, the social construction of the unmet ethical claim or obligation which (...) constitutes the ethical dilemma, and in particular whether or not it is broadly perceived to be legitimate; and second, its own degree of power. The framework presented represents the first attempt to systematically enumerate approaches to moral imagination and identify their boundary conditions. (shrink)

This chapter reviews the field of music perception and cognition, which is the area of cognitive psychology devoted to determining the mental mechanisms underlying our appreciation of music. The chapter begins with the study of pitch, including the constructive nature of pitch perception and the cognitive structures reflecting its simultaneous and sequential organization in Western tonal‐harmonic music. This is followed by reviews of temporal organization in music, and of musical performance and ability. Next, literature concerning the cognitive neuroscience of music (...) is examined, including studies of neuropsychology, neuroimaging, and event‐related potentials. The chapter concludes with a discussion of developmental music cognition, cross‐cultural music cognition, and the evolutionary psychology of music. (shrink)

In this second revised edition of his now classic history of thirteenth-century philosophy, the late Canon Van Steenberghen has given philosophers and historians of philosophy a masterful restatement of his fundamental outlook on thirteenth-century philosophy. Drawing upon the research of a lifetime and fully cognizant of recent contributions to the field, Van Steenberghen defends in a combative and engaging style the soundness of his interpretations and his historical categorizations, while tracing the development of thirteenth-century thought in a series of chapters (...) devoted to its chief figures and movements. Although one may question his method of organizing parts of thirteenth-century philosophy or his reading of a given philosophical author or movement, the erudition of the author, prominently displayed in his command of the primary and secondary literature bearing on each topic treated, is probably unmatched by any living historian of medieval philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter tries to resolve the lingering questions about the divide between theoretical reduction and elimination, and about the justifications for insisting on placing a single face of desire at the center of a theory of desire. It is shown that by reviewing the points of agreement and disagreement between the reward theory and common sense, the reward theory passes the test. Research on desire has suffered from the incompleteness of the knowledge applied. By putting together all the evidence available (...) and all the theoretical resources available, a theory of desire that is neither particularly scientific nor particularly philosophical have been built. (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts; Studien und TexteTimothy B. Noone, Ph.D., M.S.L.Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr., and Andreas Speer, editors. Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts; Studien und Texte. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001. Pp. x + 1033. Cloth, DM (...) 498.00In this masterful volume of essays, we have one of the most thorough examinations of the Parisian condemnation of 1277 since the appearance of the groundbreaking study by Roland Hissette (Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277) in 1977. Presenting the work of some 38 contributors, the volume allows the reader to have access to a wide variety [End Page 339] of interpretations of the condemnation as well as studies devoted to its context and impact upon later thought. Indeed, the studies range from assessing the character of the period around the condemnation by comparing it with the thought of the early Scholastic author William of Auvergne to detailing rememberances of the condemnation among sixteenth century authors.Though no radically new approaches to the condemnation emerge from the volume, many of the new research findings presented modify and amplify the standard interpretations. For example, Prof. Marrone's article indicates that the period just prior to the condemnation may well be one that, on balance, was surprisingly receptive to Aristotelian learning, even in the case of an "Augustinian" author such as St. Bonaventure; consequently, Marrone argues, there may well be some truth in the now mainly discarded Duhemian thesis that the Church restored a more non-Aristotelian manner of thinking through the condemnation (297-98). Prof. Courtenay's study, moreover, suggests that the Parisian theological faculty may well have reached its institutional zenith, at least in terms of the independence of its judgments and the reverence shown its opinions, in the period just prior to the condemnation, inasmuch as in the succeeding period the faculty became increasingly an instrument in the hands of royal authority.Of the many fine studies included in the volume, the following especially deserve mention. Prof. Emery's detailed analysis of the image of God in the recesses of the mind (abditum mentis) in the teaching of Henry of Ghent gives an overarching and convincing account for Henry's eventual rejection of intelligible species and the continuity of his illuminationist theory from his earlier to his later writings. Prof. Pini shows in his study of Giles of Rome how Giles avoided explicit discussion of the eternity of the world following his 'exile' from Paris, but managed to advance his own metaphysical ideas on the nature of creatures as a result, a possibly happy, though doubtless unintended, consquence of the condemnation. Prof. Aertsen analyzes the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent regarding their views on whether God's essence may be an object of knowledge and their respective doctrines of the distinction between essence and existence. Prof. Dumont's study of the textual history of Scotus's doctrine of the will and his demonstration that the Subtle Doctor's later writings veer back towards a more voluntaristic position is a landmark contribution to Scotistic scholarship as well as a solid indication of how the autonomy of the will, a matter of tremendous concern in the condemnatory documents, remained a sensitive topic into the early fourteenth century at Paris.Significant additions to our knowledge of medieval authors and their works are also found in the volume. Profs. Goris and Pickavé present a partial edition of the anonymous Commentary on the Sentences found in Bruge, Stadtbibliothek, MS 491, showing how its discussion of angelic knowledge continued the earlier discussion of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, while itself serving as a principal source for William Peter Godinus's influential Lectura Thomasina. Prof. Brown's edition and study of the part of Prosper of Reggio's prologue to his Commentary on the Sentences also points to the importance of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, but this time apropos of one of their... (shrink)