Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomeno logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it can become mundanized, We see straightaway that it can do that only by means of a certain participation in (...) transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become really human and animal (tierischen), and only thereby does it achieve a place in the space and in the time of Nature. l Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness, thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now" (ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it. Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a conse quence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal body which is for it its own animate organism. (shrink)

Is there an explanation of why the state of x's bearing the non-symmetric binary relation R to y is different from its differential opposite, the state of y's bearing R to x? One traditional view has it that the explanation is that non-symmetric relations hold of objects in an essentially directional way, ordering the relevant relata. We call this view ‘directionalism’. Kit Fine has suggested that this approach is subject to significant metaphysical difficulties, sufficient to motivate seeking an alternative analysis. (...) He considers two such alternative explanations, which he labels ‘positionalism’ and ‘anti-positionalism’. Of these he endorses the latter. We argue that anti-positionalism fails to provide a coherent explanation of the distinction between differential opposites, and that one should simply hold the minimalist position that there is no explanation for this metaphysical difference. (shrink)

SHOEMAKER IS WRONG TO CLAIM THAT ALL THE GENUINE PROPERTIES OF THINGS ARE NOTHING BUT POTENTIALITIES FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE CAUSAL POWERS OF THINGS. FOR THE ONLY GROUNDS FOR ATTRIBUTING CAUSAL POWERS TO THINGS ARE IN TERMS OF THE EFFECTS WHICH THOSE THINGS TYPICALLY PRODUCE. BUT ALL EFFECTS ARE ULTIMATELY INSTANTIATIONS OF PROPERTIES, AND IF THESE WERE NOTHING BUT POTENTIALITIES TO PRODUCE EFFECTS, THERE WOULD BE A VICIOUS INFINITE REGRESS, AND NO ONE WOULD EVER BE JUSTIFIED IN ATTRIBUTING PROPERTIES TO (...) OBJECTS. (shrink)

As Laudan and Fine show, and Boyd concedes, the attempt to infer the truth of scientific realism from the fact that it putatively provides the best explanation of the instrumental success of science is circular, since what is to be shown is precisely the legitimacy of such abductive inferences. Hacking's "experimental argument for scientific realism about entities" is one of the few arguments for scientific realism that purports to avoid this circularity. We argue that Hacking's argument is as dependent on (...) inference to the best explanation (IBE), and therefore as weak, as the other realist arguments. (shrink)

Frege's intention in section 31 of Grundgesetze is to show that every well-formed expression in his formal system denotes. But it has been obscure why he wants to do this and how he intends to do it. It is argued here that, in large part, Frege's purpose is to show that the smooth breathing, from which names of value-ranges are formed, denotes; that his proof that his other primitive expressions denote is sound and anticipates Tarski's theory of truth; and that (...) the proof that the smooth breathing denotes, while flawed, rests upon an idea now familiar from the completeness proof for first-order logic. The main work of the paper consists in defending a new understanding of the semantics Frege offers for the quantifiers: one which is objectual, but which does not make use of the notion of an assignment to a free variable. (shrink)

An analysis of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology.

Disputes regarding the ethics of work by children have intensified in recent years, with little resolution. The impasses stem from failure to recognize the diverse forms of child work and a lack of empirical research regarding its causes and consequences. We report on data gathered in Brazil’s export-oriented shoe industry, which is notorious for the employment of children. Central findings are: 1) the causes of child work have less to do with backwardness and more to do with how shoe workers (...) are integrated into the global order; 2) local employers and children regard this work as benign, but the U.S. government sees it as hazardous to children and unfair to U.S. producers; 3) efforts to remove children from the shoe industry have been frustrated by local resistance and raise ethical questions; and 4) in certain circumstances, efforts to eliminate hazards from the workplace are morally superior to campaigns to remove childworkers from employment. (shrink)

With the growth in income inequality now regarded as a crucial social issue, business and society scholars need to prepare themselves for the ambitious task of studying how corporate practices, intentionally or not, contribute to this trend. This article offers starting points for scholars wishing to explore this topic but lacking the necessary background for doing so. First, it offers suggestions as to finding the extant empirical work necessary for informed analysis. This is followed by an examination of alternate methods (...) of theory construction relevant to this topic, which transcend the limitations of the experimental science model of theory building. It then provides an example of a social science theory that exemplifies how empirically informed open theory can illuminate the dynamics behind growing inequality. The article concludes by suggesting that progress in this area requires embracing the spirit of earlier approaches to business and society scholarship while abandoning some outdated assumptions. (shrink)

In this fascinating look at the philosophy of self-esteem, Richard Keshen develops and defends the idea of reasonable self-esteem -- a concept based on an ideal of reasonableness -- and argues that individuals who think of themselves in terms of this paradigm will lead happier and more fulfilling lives.

A notable achievement of T.M. Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other is its sustained critique of welfarist consequentialism. Consequentialism is the doctrine that one morally ought always to do an act, of the alternatives, that brings about a state of affairs that is no less good than any other one could bring about. Welfarism is the view that what makes a state of affairs better or worse is some increasing function of the welfare for persons realized in it. I (...) shall argue that Scanlon’s critique, though containing much of interest, fails on its own terms. (shrink)

During the 1840s and the 1850s botanist Joseph Hooker developed distinct notions about the proper characteristics of a professional man of science. While he never articulated these ideas publicly as a coherent agenda, he did share his opinions openly in letters to family and colleagues; this private communication gives essential insight into his and his X-Club colleagues' public activities. The core aspiration of Hooker's professionalization was to consolidate men of science into a dutiful and centralized community dedicated to national well-being. (...) The nation in turn owed the scientific community for its ministration. When the government bestowed funds and status on men of science it was rewarding science -- not purchasing it. His proposed reforms were piecemeal, immediate, and above all practical. He harbored no taste for vast millenarian transformation, and rested his conception of scientific professionalism upon a respectable High Victorian foundation of patronage and pillars of duty, reciprocity, intimacy, and inequality. The process of professionalization he envisioned was as much shrewd compromise between existing interests as a vindication of principle. His power and prestige from the mid-1850s onward gave him considerable ability to carry out his reform program, although his general success did occasion some undesired consequences for the status of natural-history pursuits. (shrink)

Several philosophers have questioned the possibility of a genetic epistemology, an epistemology concerned with the developmental transitions between successive states of knowledge in the individual person. Since most arguments against the possibility of a genetic epistemology crucially depend upon a sharp distinction between the genesis of an idea and its justification, I argue that current philosophy of science raises serious questions about the universal validity of this distinction. Then I discuss several senses of the genetic fallacy, indicating which sense of (...) ‘genesis’ is relevant to epistemology. Next I consider the objection that psychology is irrelevant to epistemology, and that since "genetic epistemology" is really psychology, "genetic epistemology" is irrelevant to a real epistemology. Finally, I take up the objection that nothing discovered in genetic psychology could be relevant to a genetic epistemology. These last two arguments are based upon what I claim to be a mistaken notion of the nature of psychology. Suitably interpreted, psychology can assist genetic epistemology precisely in the way that the history of science assists current philosonhv of science. *I owe considerable thanks to Jann Benson, Ken Freeman, Bernie Rollin and Ron Williams for their helpful discussions concerning many of the issues discussed in this paper. I also wish to thank David Hamlyn, John Heil, William Lycan, Harvey Siegel and an anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions. It goes without saying that none of these individuals (especially Hamlyn and Siegel) necessarily agree with me. An earlier version of this paper was read at Colorado State University where the audience's comments were beneficial. (shrink)

Traditional spiritual literature contains rich anecdotal reports of spontaneously arising experiences occurring during meditation practice, but formal investigation of such experiences is limited. Previous work has sometimes related spontaneous experiences to the Indian traditional contemplative concept of kundalini. Historically, descriptions of kundalini come out of Tantric schools of Yoga, where it has been described as a “rising energy” moving within the spinal column up to the brain. Spontaneous meditation experiences have previously been studied within Buddhist and Christian practices and within (...) eclectic groups of contemplative practitioners. Prior explorations of kundalini have emphasized extreme experiences, sometimes having clinical consequences. We conducted a first such investigation of kundalini-related experiences within a sample of meditators from a single Tantric Yoga tradition (known as Ananda Marga) that emphasizes the role of kundalini. We developed a semi-structured questionnaire to conduct an exploratory pilot investigation of spontaneous sensory, motor and affective experiences during meditation practice. In addition to identifying the characteristics of subjective experiences, we measured quantity of meditation, supplemental practices, trait affect and trait mindfulness. We administered it to 80 volunteers at two Ananda Marga retreats. Among reported experiences, we found the highest prevalence for positive mood shifts, followed by motor and then sensory experiences. The frequency of spontaneous experiences was not related to the quantity of practiced meditation or trait measures of mindfulness and affect. Self-reports included multiple descriptions of rising sensations, sometimes being directly called kundalini. Experiences with rising sensations were complex and many included references to positive affect, including ecstatic qualities. There were also reports of spontaneous anomalous experiences. These experiences of rising sensations resemble prior clinical descriptions that were considered kundalini-related. The individuals who reported rising sensations could not be distinguished from other participants based on the incidence of experiences, quantity of meditation practice, or trait measures of mindfulness and affect. In contrast, greater amount of Tantric Yoga meditation practice was associated with greater positive affect, less negative affect and greater mindfulness. Further study of these exploratory findings and how they may be related to spiritual and well-being goals of meditation is warranted along with scientific investigation of purported kundalini phenomena. (shrink)

Philosophers have often raised the question what kind of information is available to vision. For instance, Berkeley argued that one could not see depth, Hume argued that one could not see necessary connections and, according to Paul Guyer, Kant held that there is no perception of change, but only change of perception (Guyer 2004).

Understanding Elias -- Origins of Elias's synthesis -- Norbert Elias and Karl Mannheim -- The civilizing process : the structure of a classic -- Involved detachment : knowledge and self-knowledge in Elias -- The symbol theory : secular humanism as a research programme -- Concluding remarks : the fourth blow to man's narcissism.

In their excellent book Disadvantage, Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit (hereafter: the Authors) state that their aim “is to provide practical guidance to policy makers by providing a version of egalitarian theory which can be applied to actual social policy.”1 This is a worthy project and their execution of it is full of insight. However, I doubt that they succeed in fulfilling their stated aim.

Through constructive arguments covering the principal topics and controversies in epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, Autonomy and Normativity demonstrates how truth, right and beauty can retain universal validity without succumbing to the mistaken Enlightenment strategy of seeking foundations for rational autonomy. Presenting a compact, yet comprehensive statement of a powerful and provocative alternative to the reigning orthodoxies of current philosophical debate, Richard Winfield employs Hegelian techniques and presents a radical and systematic critique of the work of mainstream thinkers including: Kant, (...) Rawls, Husserl and Habermas. This book offers an invaluable resource for students of both analytic and continental philosophical traditions, and related areas of law, social theory and aesthetics. (shrink)

Crisis management can be simultaneously a content specific problem solving process and an opportunity for stimulating and enabling an organization's ethical tradition. Crisis can be an opportunity for ethical organizational development. Kierkegaardian "upbuilding" dialog method builds from within the internal ethical tradition of an organization to respond to crises while simultaneously adapting and protecting the organization's tradition. The crisis itself may not be a directly ethical crisis, but the method of responding to the crisis is built upon the ethical foundations (...) of an organization's tradition. A limitation of this method is that it may be less applicable to organizations with questionably ethical traditions. The concept of "upbuilding" dialog is derived from Kierkegaard, but here is applied to organizational crisis management. The method is illustrated and discussed in the context of a wrongful death crisis of the Dana- Farber Cancer Institute, a non-profit organization, and an economic survival crisis at Ben and Jerry's, a business organization. (shrink)

First, this article summarizes major arguments levied against codes. Second, standards for a sound ethical code are presented. Third, a trend is described toward more concrete codes developed by specific communication organizations. Finally, positive functions of codes are examined, with special emphasis on two: the argumentative function and the character?depiction function.

While Rawls himself put contractualism to work at the national level, his more cosmopolitan followers have argued that the full requirements of international justice can be reached only by way of a global contractualist argument. Both positions neglect a resource from within the contractualist tradition, The need for iteration of the nation-level contract gives rise to strong and reasonably definite moral requirements. A good-faith adoption of the contractual argument entails, first, a duty to assist those whose potential recourse to just (...) arrangements is blocked by tyranny or political collapse. Second, understood as a net risk-reducing project, a nation-level contract entails a duty not to impede the iterated risk-reduction projects of other national soceties. Envisaging the duty in this contractualist way avoids problems that beset both "natural duty" and "interactionist" approaches to international justice. The non-impedance requirement bears especially on international economic arrangements. The institutional representation of those affected by such arrangements would connect this abstract requirement with practical conclusions. (shrink)

The enterprise of state punishment requires the use of limited resources for which there are other competitors, such as national defense, market regulation, and social welfare. How resource-demanding retributive justice will turn out to be depends on how retributivists answer a series of questions concerning the theory’s structure. After elaborating these questions and the varieties of retributive justice that answers to them might generate, I consider the resource demands of retributive justice in the context of competing theories of distributive justice. (...) Various tensions and outright conflicts between the pursuit of retributive and distributive justice are then explored. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials ed. by Roger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom SorellRichard A. WatsonRoger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorell, editors. Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xviii + 170. Cloth, $54.95. Paper, $18.95.This volume includes primarily source materials from authors who were contemporary to Descartes’s composition of the Meditations. Thus there are no selections from Augustine, Aquinas, and Montaigne, for (...) example, who were more influential on the Meditations than some of the authors excerpted. Of course their influence is already amply documented by such scholars as Gilson and Gouhier. Probably the most important source included is Suárez, whose role is championed by Jean-Luc Marion in several works. Readers should look for the forthcoming Index Augustino-Cartèsian: Textes et Commentaire by Zbigniew Janowski (Paris: J. Vrin) for a startling challenge to the view that Descartes is Suárezian.In the volume under review, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo is of special interest because Descartes thought of refuting him item by item (but decided exposition of his own view would be adequate). In his youth Descartes had a definite interest in Petrus Ramus, although Beeckman told him his method consisted of tired old tricks. Francisco Sanches and Pierre Charron are important for their expositions of sceptical arguments and attitudes. Christopher Clavius is Descartes’s direct predecessor in mathematical analysis, and none of Descartes’s protests that he never read the man has convinced anyone. Scipion Dupleix is a fine example of how the Old Philosophy appeared to the New Philosophers, and Marin Mersenne, of course, compiled material on every subject Descartes ever had an interest in. Pierre Gassendi exercised Descartes’s ire more than any other commentator on the Meditations, and Descartes again probably read Gassendi’s continuing criticisms even though he claimed he wouldn’t. [End Page 366]Of special interest is Jean de Silhon, an old friend of Descartes’s who published a book containing a proto-cogito three years before the Meditations appeared. François de la Mothe le Vayer represents the libertine strain many detect in Descartes’s writings, while Jean-Baptiste Morin provides fodder for those who detect Descartes’s piety, although Descartes asserts that the man is an idiot for defending the immobility of the earth. Finally, Charles Sorel provides an example of the deductive mode of exposition in a text that shows that the notion of a unified science was more than Cartesian. One contemporary who was left out and should have been included was the Augustinian Guillaume Gibieuf.But overall, this is an interesting and useful collection of works Descartes doubtless knew. [End Page 367]Richard A. WatsonWashington UniversityCopyright © 1999 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)