Introduction: Purpose of this essay is to draw attention to some points which are relevant to the underlying philosophy of modern statistics, but which the writer feels have been largely overlooked both by the defenders and the opponents of the classic conceptions of Laplace. There is no quarrel with methodologies as such which have found their introduction under the heads of “maximum likelihood”, “fiducial limits”, etc. But the writer cannot accept arguments ) which would make of such procedures an absolute (...) sine qua non for all decisions based on evidence, and which would relegate human judgment and all considerations of the intended use of a decision to the rubbish heap of outmoded conceptions. To assume that two rational minds, having different backgrounds and different objectives, must necessarily find themselves in agreement in their appraisal of a given objective situation, is simply absurd; yet this is the basis which underlies, so far as I can make out, all the “criticisms” of Laplace and Bayes which constitute the excuses put forward for attempting to displace those procedures in Statistics which involve “inverse probability”. Also the so-called “paradoxes” which have been invented by many writers in order to assail Laplace, contradict only this one assumption; without it they are not paradoxes. (shrink)

Laughter:. Scientific Investigation. By Robert R. Provine. 2000. New York: Viking. $24.95 (cloth).

This paper accepts as given that business students want to get ahead. It criticizes business schools for their failure to reduce the incongruence between doing what is right and doing what it takes to get ahead. Because of this failure business school graduates carry negative ideas, attitudes and behaviors vis-à-vis social responsibility from business schools into the business world. Recommendations are made for increasing the social responsibility of business schools.

Violence can be physical and psychological. It can characterize personal actions, forms of group activity, and abiding social and political policy. This book includes all of these aspects within its focus on institutional forms of violence. Institution is also a broad category, ranging from formal arrangements such as the military, the criminal code, the death penalty and prison system, to more amorphous but systemic situations indicated by parenting, poverty, sexism, work, and racism. Violence is as complex as the human beings (...) who resort to it; its institutional forms pervade our relational lives. We are all participants in it as victims and perpetrators. The chapters in this book were written in the hope that violence can be explicated, even if not fully understood, and that such clarification can help us in devising less violent forms of living, even if it does not lead to its total abolition. The studies bring new aspects of violence to light and offer a number of suggestions for its remedy. (shrink)

A simple Weberian agglomeration is developed and then extended as an innovative fixed-charged, colocation model over a large set of locational possibilities. The model is applied to cases in which external economies (EE) arise due to colocation alone and also cases in which EE arise due to city size. Solutions to the model are interpreted in the context of contemporary equilibrium analysis, which allows Weberian agglomeration to be interpreted in a more general way than in previous analyses. Within that context, (...) the Nash points and Pareto efficient points in the location patterns derived in the model are shown to rarely coincide. The applications consider agglomeration from two perspectives: one is the colocation behavior of producers as the agents of agglomeration and the other is the interaction between government and those agents in the interest of agglomeration policy. Extending the analysis to games, potential Pareto efficiency and Hicks optimality are considered with respect to side payments between producers and with respect to appropriate government incentives toward agglomeration. (shrink)

A sample of 227 business students from the United States and Australia was used to evaluate factors that impact business students' ethical orientation and factors that impact students' perceptions of ethical classroom behaviors. Perceptions of classroom behaviors was considered a surrogate for future perceptions of business behaviors. Independent factors included age, gender, religious orientation, country of origin, personality, and ethical orientation. A number of factors were related to ethical orientation, but only age and religious orientation exhibited much impact upon perceptions (...) of ethical classroom behaviors. (shrink)

Other formats of this book available via https://openeducationalberta.ca/educationaltechnologyethics/.

Though the name of Robert Mallet was once inevitably associated with the scientific study of earthquakes, it is less well known today. As part of an overdue reappraisal, this essay examines Mallet's major seismological projects and publications, emphasizing his theoretical contributions. Mallet's own claim to be a founder of modern seismology is upheld. Beyond that, however, he is also seen to be an important precursor of plate tectonics.

We analyze the role of ethical values in the determination of the social cost of carbon, arguing that the familiar debate about discounting is too narrow. Other ethical issues are equally important to computing the social cost of carbon, and we highlight inequality, risk, and population ethics. Although the usual approach, in the economics of cost-benefit analysis for climate policy, is confined to a utilitarian axiology, the methodology of the social cost of carbon is rather flexible and can be expanded (...) to a broader set of social-welfare approaches. [Open access]. (shrink)

In Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Robert Stern argues that Hegel has a social command view of obligation. On this view, there is an element of social command or social sanction that must be added to a judgment of the good in order to bring about an obligation. I argue to the contrary that Hegel's conception of conscience, and thus the individual's role in obligation, is more central to his account than the social dimension. While agreeing with Stern (...) that Hegel's conception of Sittlichkeit does preserve a role for obligation, and that the social plays an important part in that account, I argue that there is no extra social component that converts the morally good into obligation. Rather, Hegel's conception of Sittlichkeit as the “living good” means that judgments of the moral facts are simultaneously judgments of obligation. (shrink)

‘Molinism’, in contemporary usage, is the name for a theory about the workings of divine providence. Its defenders include some of the most prominent contemporary Protestant and Catholic philosophical theologians.¹ Molinism is often said to be the only way to steer a middle..

Future population growth is uncertain and matters for climate policy: higher growth entails more emissions and means more people will be vulnerable to climate-related impacts. We show that how future population is valued importantly determines mitigation decisions. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy model, we explore two approaches to valuing population: a discounted version of total utilitarianism (TU), which considers total wellbeing and is standard in social cost of carbon dioxide (SCC) models, and of average utilitarianism (AU), which ignores population size (...) and sums only each time period’s discounted average wellbeing. Under both approaches, as population increases the SCC increases, but optimal peak temperature decreases. The effect is larger under TU, because it responds to the fact that a larger population means climate change hurts more people: for example, in 2025, assuming the United Nations (UN)-high rather than UN-low population scenario entails an increase in the SCC of 85% under TU vs. 5% under AU. The difference in the SCC between the two population scenarios under TU is comparable to commonly debated decisions regarding time discounting. Additionally, we estimate the avoided mitigation costs implied by plausible reductions in population growth, finding that large near-term savings ($billions annually) occur under TU; savings under AU emerge in the more distant future. These savings are larger than spending shortfalls for human development policies that may lower fertility. Finally, we show that whether lowering population growth entails overall improvements in wellbeing—rather than merely cost savings—again depends on the ethical approach to valuing population. (shrink)

The health co-benefits of CO2 mitigation can provide a strong incentive for climate policy through reductions in air pollutant emissions that occur when targeting shared sources. However, reducing air pollutant emissions may also have an important co-harm, as the aerosols they form produce net cooling overall. Nevertheless, aerosol impacts have not been fully incorporated into cost-benefit modeling that estimates how much the world should optimally mitigate. Here we find that when both co-benefits and co-harms are taken fully into account, optimal (...) climate policy results in immediate net benefits globally, overturning previous findings from cost-benefit models that omit these effects. The global health benefits from climate policy could reach trillions of dollars annually, but will importantly depend on the air quality policies that nations adopt independently of climate change. Depending on how society values better health, economically optimal levels of mitigation may be consistent with a target of 2 °C or lower. (shrink)

Editor's Note: We are happy to print the following comment by Leonard Dean as a reminder that the arbitrary, improvisatory nature of practical criticism has its origins in a much more homely and familiar phenomenon. A muddler naturally feels flattered by any kind of praise from the world of theory, as, for example, by Robert Scholes' generous remark that "muddling along, in literary theory as in life, is often more humane and even more efficient than the alternatives offered (...) by political, ethical, or aesthetic systems. We may in fact 'know' more than we can systematize about certain kinds of human behavior, so that our intuitions may indeed be superior to our more reasoned positions" . For a moment praise like that makes a muddler feel the way the ghost of Shakespeare must have felt when he was called a natural genius in the days of the Rules, but then you remember how it really was and is. Like Shakespeare and the New Dealers we patched things together under pressure, and like them we borrowed from anybody. New critical methods were a godsend for anyone who was trying to revive an old survey course into a discussion of literature, and equally useful were old critical methods like those used by Dr. Johnson for the job of general public education. (shrink)

Abstract This paper argues that a genuine engagement of Christianity with evolution needs to include a discussion of Christology. Further, it develops a particular approach to Christology through a theo-dramatic account of incarnation. The somewhat static post-Chalcedon theological categories of divine and human natures are hard to square with contemporary evolutionary accounts of human origins. Once the divine Logos is portrayed in the active categories of Wisdom it becomes easier to envisage divine and creaturely wisdom coexisting in the person of (...) Christ. I argue, in particular, that a focus on God's agency through a modified version of Hans Urs von Balthasar's account of theo-drama invites participation and affirms human agency in a way that grand narratives do not. More particularly, drawing on examples from hominid evolution, contemporary discussion of paleontology and cooperative evolutionary theories, I suggest that the most convincing accounts of evolutionary biology fit into this theo-dramatic account more readily than alternatives. As such, in the spirit of Robert Boyle, this paper deliberately blurs the categories of revealed and natural theology by arguing that we can make sense of the former through concentration on the latter. (shrink)

Robert Hopkins _Picture, Image, and Experience_ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 ISBN 0521-58259-8 (hbk) 205 pp.

Attempting to reconcile a robust sense of human freedom with entrenched Church doctrines, Luis de Molina espoused for the first time a complete formulation of the doctrine of divine middle knowledge. However, it immediately sparked vigorous theological and philosophical debate. The debate has been revived, with Robert Adams as the original leading opponent. Adams’s objection is that the doctrine cannot be true since its (alleged) propositional objects lack the requisite metaphysical grounds for their being true. Breaking with many contemporary (...) Molinists, I offer reasons for rejecting popular counterfactual semantics as a means to assess “conditionals of freedom.” I then discuss an alternative way to assess “conditionals of freedom” inspired by Suárez and revived by Richard Gaskin, anticipate an objection to it and argue that it is not as damaging as it first seems. I conclude that a Molinist can respond to Adams-type objections without relying upon popular semantics. (shrink)

Theories of consciousness have a long and controversial history. One well-known proposal — integrated information theory — has recently been labeled as ‘pseudoscience’, which has caused a heated open debate. Here we discuss the case and argue that the theory is indeed unscientific because its core claims are untestable even in principle.

Keith Reader _Robert Bresson_ Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000 ISBN 0 7190 5365 X (hardback) 0 7190 5366 8 (paperback) 166 pp.

Though it is an attractive popular book dealing with some major episodes in the history of nineteenth‐century vertebrate paleontology, The Dragon Seekers fails to establish the connection between Darwin and his predecessors promised by its title. As scholarship, it is seriously deficient except when dealing with ichthyosaurs, about which its Canadian author, a paleontologist, is thoroughly knowledgeable.Of the several persons central to Christopher McGowan's topic, Mary Anning, William Conybeare, and Thomas Hawkins had little or no role in the discovery of (...) dinosaurs. All three of them were instead devoted to ichthyosaurs and plesiosaurs; McGowan writes confidently and reliably about each of these impressive prehistoric families. Despite his subtitle, the fossil reptile depicted on McGowan's title page is not a dinosaur but an ichthyosaur—and an excessively “made up” one at that . He begins and ends the book with Mary Anning and her famously fossiliferous hometown. In the Blue Lias cliffs of Lyme Regis, both ichthyosaurs and plesiosaurs were found—but no dinosaurs. Though Lyell, Agassiz, and Darwin appear as dragon seekers also, none of them was associated importantly with saurians. Cuvier, a French seeker of dragons and much else, is mentioned only in passing.The three dinosaur discoverers important to McGowan's book are William Buckland, Gideon Mantell, and Richard Owen . A more energetic researcher than some, McGowan actually visited the Kirkdale and Paviland caves made famous by Buckland. He provides up‐to‐date information about each cave, as he does about other topics throughout the text. Unfortunately, his exploration of the available literature on Buckland, Mantell, and Owen is less impressive. McGowan is clearly unacquainted with major publications by all three; their later thinking in particular is generally ignored. More broadly, McGowan has too obviously written in haste. He never provides the more coherent reading of Victorian vertebrate paleontology and associated sciences that his audience‐seeking thesis requires.Persons familiar with early dinosaur discoveries will notice the absence from McGowan's book of many useful sources and studies. The weak notes and “further reading” bibliography that he provides are inadequate. Only direct quotations have been identified; all other matters of substance, frequently controversial, are left to be taken on faith. In some introductory remarks , McGowan tells us that fossils have been known since the time of classical Greece. They have actually been found among the grave goods of Neanderthals. Some persons, Greeks among them, realized the significance of fossils long before the latter eighteenth century. McGowan even fails to acknowledge that there were evolutionary theories before Vestiges . He ignores James Secord's recent facsimile of the latter and is apparently unaware that a magnificent new edition of Darwin's correspondence is appearing.A number of factual mistakes are disconcerting. Cuvier's seminal Recherches is dated 1799 . No other foreign publication is considered, though there were several of importance. Mantell and Owen are described as physicians, which they were not; both were instead surgeons, an occupation not involving university education. Mantell joined the Geological Society in 1818, not 1820. McGowan is significantly misleading when he describes the financing of Mantell's first book and the chronology of its writing. It appeared in May 1822, not four months later . The first chapter of Mantell's book was contributed by the Rev. Henry Hoper, not Harper . Mantell was surgeon to three parishes, not just one . McGowan fails to realize that the name “Megalosaurus” had been published by James Parkinson in 1822 . He also distorts the history of Buckland's famous 1824 paper on Megalosaurus by assuming that some later additions were already in it at the time of presentation . Once again, however, he includes some useful modern knowledge.On page 87 McGowan insists that Mantell and Conybeare had not yet met, though they were both present at the meeting of 20 February 1824 and had corresponded earlier. Mantell did not receive Conybeare's most recent letter “shortly after” 10 February 1825 but on 24 November 1824 . On page 89 Robert Trotter is not fully identified, and his later generosity to Mantell is ignored. Though Lyell's geological views influenced Mantell's, they would never be entirely congruent. Mantell was still very much a catastrophist in 1832 . On page 111 McGowan's explanation of British money is erroneous. According to page 113, Mantell and Benjamin Silliman never met. Yet they spent several days together in 1851. In January 1837 Darwin was actually living at Cambridge . On page 179 McGowan claims that “our present preoccupation with dinosaurs dates back less than three decades.” Finally, there is some inadequate editing, as with “their's” and “Gooses” . On page 229 a note from Lyell to Owen is quoted but not cited.Though many of these lapses will be of no consequence to the general reader, scholars should be forewarned. This is not a book on which one can rely, despite occasionally useful points. It should not be recommended to students, for whom better sources are available. It should not be taken as a model. Several would‐be popularizations of the history of the earth sciences have appeared recently, none of them based on sound historical arguments. The writing of defensible history is not so simple a task as these facile popularizers would like the public to believe. (shrink)

Jeffrey T. Dean Getting a Good View of Depiction _Film-Philosophy_, vol. 3 no. 26, June 1999.