William Roche and Elliott Sober argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant. This conclusion is surprising since it conflicts with a plausible assumption—the fact that a hypothesis best explains a given set of data is evidence that the hypothesis is true. We argue that Roche and Sober's screening-off argument fails to account for a key aspect of evidential strength: the weight of a body of evidence. The weight of a body of evidence affects the resiliency of probabilities in the (...) light of new evidence. Thus, Roche and Sober are mistaken. Explanatoriness is evidentially relevant. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

This article proposes to elucidate Wilfrid Waluchow’s notion of constitutional morality by explaining how it relates to the classical common law idea of artificial reason. It examines how Waluchow’s effort to reconcile insights from the thought of H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin through the idea of constitutional morality is both reminiscent of the artificial reason of the common law and distinct from it. It shows that constitutional morality evokes the subtle union of custom and reason found in artificial reason, but (...) also that it proposes, under the influence of Hart’s notion of rule of recognition, a narrower understanding of law’s foundation in established practices, and that it gives, consistent with Dworkin’s vision of law as integrity, a greater theoretical scope to law’s rationality. (shrink)

Many have claimed that whenever an investigation might provide evidence for a claim, it might also provide evidence against it. Similarly, many have claimed that your credence should never be on the edge of the range of credences that you think might be rational. Surprisingly, both of these principles imply that you cannot rationally be modest: you cannot be uncertain what the rational opinions are.

David Bohm is a physicist with a broad range of other interests including religion, philosophy, education, art, and linguistics. This book surveys Bohm's physical theories including the quantum potential theory and the implicate order or holomovement theory.

"Mystic Maybe's": the title comes from Augustine Birrill's words on the death of Matthew Arnold. Is it true that Richard Kearney's philosophy of religion, like Arnold's reflections on the Bible, are "mystic maybe's," mere flirtations with possibility? In order to answer this question I seek to understand Kearney's expression "the God who may be" and to see if it fits into a non-metaphysical philosophy of religion. The expression is clarified by way of comparisons with Wolfhart Pannenberg's eschatological understanding of God (...) and Eberhard Jungel's theology of possibility. One weak point in Kearney's philosophy of religion, it is argued, is its avoidance of theology in the name of the philosophy of religion. A sound philosophy of religion needs to engage with theology. /// "Mystic Maybe's" (Possibilidades místicas): Este titulo deriva das palavras de Augustine Birrill acerca da morte de Mathew Arnold. O autor do artigo pergunta até que ponto a filosofia da religião de Richard Kearney não será, tal como as reflexões de Arnold acerca da Bíblia, um mew "místico talvez", um simples namoro com a possibilidaãe. Em ordem a responder à questão, o autor procura compreender o sentido da expressão de Richard Kearney acerca do "Deus que pode ser" de modo a avaliar até que ponto a expressão se adequa a uma filosofia não-metafísica da religião. O artigo clarifica a expressão de Kearney mediante uma comparação quer com a compreensão escatológica de Deus de Wolfhart Pannenberg quer com a teologia da possibilidade de Eberhard Jüngel. Mostra-se, desta forma, que um dospontos maisfracos na filosofia da religião de Richard Kearney consiste na sua tentativa de escapar à teologia em nome da filosofia da religião. Com efeito, argumenta o autor do artigo, uma autêntica filosofia da religião não pode deixar de estar num diálogo eficaz com a teologia. (shrink)

David Bohm's thinking has become widely publicized since the 1982 performance of a form of the Einstein‐Podolsky‐ Rosen (EPR) experiment. Bohm's holomovement theory, in particular, tries to explain the nonlocality that the experiment supports. Moreover, his theories are close to his metaphysical and religious thinking. Fritjof Capra's writings try something similar: supporting a theory (the bootstrap theory) because it is close to his religious beliefs. Both Bohm and Capra appear to use their religious ideas in their physics. Religion, their source (...) for physical hypotheses, provides the motivation to develop and uphold them. (shrink)

This paper argues that John Hick's commitment to the moral principle of altruism undermines his pluralistic claim that all of the major world religions are equally efficacious from a soteriological perspective. This argument is placed in a context of a discussion evaluating the theoretical virtues of various hypotheses about religious diversity. (Published Online April 7 2006).

Throughout his ministry, Jesus spoke frequently and unabashedly on the now-taboo subject of money. With nothing good to say to the rich, the New Testament -- indeed the entire Bible -- is far from positive towards the topic of personal wealth. And yet, we all seek material prosperity and comfort. How are Christians to square the words of their savior with the balances of their bank accounts, or more accurately, with their unquenchable desire for financial security? While the church has (...) developed diverse responses to the problems of poverty, it is often silent on what seems almost as straightforward a biblical principle: that wealth, too, is a problem. By considering the particular context of the recent economic history of Ireland, this book explores how the parables of Jesus can be the key to unlocking what it might mean to follow Christ as wealthy people without diluting our dilemma or denying the tension. Through an engagement with contemporary economic and political thought, aided by the work of Karl Barth and William T. Cavanaugh, this book represents a unique and innovative intervention to a discussion that applies to every Christian in the Western world. (shrink)

Andrew Feenberg, in his book Questioning Technology, offers his theory of “democratized rationalization” as a critical alternative to Jacques Ellul’s essentialist perspective. Feenberg argues that Ellul has confused the tendency toward efficiency in technological discourse with the essence of technology, thereby disallowing for a “positive program” of technological change. This article suggests that Feenberg’s “critical theory of technology” does not accurately portray Ellul’s ideas about technology, which were crafted over 40 books and hundreds of articles, and that a reading of (...) Feenberg from an Ellulian perspective reveals Questioning Technology to be: (a) a trend that Ellul predicted in technological scholarship, (b) an unfavorable trend that does not answer the problems posed by Ellul, and (c) an actual furthering of the “technological ideology” that Ellul carefully described in detail over several decades of research. This article concludes that the current trends toward praising democratization should be revisited in light of this Ellulian analysis. (shrink)

Many churches are being asked to support new environmental initiatives, including those of the new food movement. In today’s cultural environment, it requires courage even to raise a question about programs to save the planet, protect helpless animals, or feed developing nations. Yet it is important for Christians to be aware of the agenda behind these initiatives, which looks to creation not for visible signs of God’s power and divinity but with a view to immortalizing the earth itself as the (...) source of life. It sees man not as uniquely made in the image and likeness of God, with the responsibility for stewardship over His creation, but as an animal himself, co-equal with other animals. Environmentalism has become in effect a new religion, with the food movement its frontier mission. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 465–475. (shrink)

Proof and perception : the context of the argumentum cartesianum -- Refutations of atheism : ontological arguments in English philosophy, 1652-1705 -- Being and intuition : Malebranche's appropriation of the argument -- An adequate conception : the argument in Spinoza's philosophy -- Ontological arguments in Leibniz and the German enlightenment -- Kant's systematic critique of the ontological argument -- Hegel's reconstruction of the argument.

A comprehensive and accessible introduction to the development of and current debates in the aesthetics of food and drink.

Abstract“[A]n der Front des Kampfes um den Menschen selbst”. Anthropogenetics and Anthropotechnics in Soviet Thought. The period between 1920 and 1930 reveals in Russia a practical manifestation of the technologies of the self, which see the body not only in a poetic‐symbolical way, but practically as a material of shaping and rebuilding. In this bio‐social discourse of a genetically perfected ‘new man’, Russian theorists of eugenics are looking back on traditional parallels of animal and plant breeding. The most influential group (...) of eugenics were the Russian biologists, especially the key players and the founders of the Russian genetics research Nikolai Kol′tsov (1872–1940) and Aleksandr Serebrovskii (1892–1948). It will be demonstrated that ‘human breeding’ (Russ. ‘Antropotekhnika’) is based both on the semantics and on the methodology of traditional animal and plant breeding. (shrink)

In her article, “Melancholia, temporal disruption, and the torment of being both unable to live and unable to die,” Emily Hughes offers a provocative and powerful analysis of an experiential aspect of depression that is often overlooked in the psychiatric literature. Drawing on Heidegger’s account of ontological death, what he calls “dying” in Being and Time, Hughes illuminates how episodes of major depression can disrupt the synchronous unity of time that structures our experience and gives meaning to our lives. When (...) this happens, the sufferer enters a paradoxical liminal space, one in which we live through our own death, where death is understood ontologically as an inability-to-be. For Heidegger, “to... (shrink)