This article raises the question of how we acquire self-information through self-talk, i.e., of how self-talk mediates self-awareness. It is first suggested that two social mechanisms leading to self-awareness could be reproduced by self-talk: engaging in dialogues with ourselves, in which we talk to fictive persons, would permit an internalization of others' perspectives; and addressing comments to ourselves about ourselves, as others do toward us, would allow an acquisition of self-information. Secondly, it is (...) proposed that self-observation is possible only if there exists a distance between the individual and any potentially observable self-aspect; self-talk, because it conveys self-information under a different form , would create a redundancy -- and with it, a wedge -- within the self. (shrink)

People talk not only to others but also to themselves. The self talk we engage in may be overt or covert, and is associated with a variety of higher mental functions, including reasoning, problem solving, planning and plan execution, attention, and motivation. When talking to herself, a speaker takes devices from her mother tongue, originally designed for interpersonal communication, and employs them to communicate with herself. But what could it even mean to communicate with oneself? To answer that question, (...) we need a theory of communication that explains how the same linguistic devices may be used to communicate with others and oneself. On the received view, which defines communication as information exchange, self talk appears to be an anomaly, for it is hard to see the point of exchanging information with oneself. However, if communication is analysed as a way of negotiating commitments between speaker and hearer, then communication may be useful even when speaker and hearer coincide. Thus a commitment-based approach allows us to make sense of self talk as well as social talk. (shrink)

Despite the popularity of research on intrapersonal communication across many disciplines, there has been little attention devoted to the factors that might account for individual differences in talking to oneself. In this paper, I explore two possible explanations for who people might differ in the frequency of their self-talk. According to the “social isolation” hypothesis, spending more time alone or having socially-isolating experiences will be associated with increased self-talk. According to the “cognitive disruption” hypothesis, having self-related experiences (...) that are cognitively disruptive will be associated with increased self-talk frequency. Several studies using the Self-Talk Scale (Brinthaupt, Hein, & Kramer, 2009) are pertinent to these hypotheses. Results indicate moderate support for the social isolation hypothesis and strong support for the cognitive disruption hypothesis. I conclude the paper with a wide range of implications for future research on individual differences in self-talk and other kinds of intrapersonal communication. (shrink)

For anyone who wishes to make philosophy relevant to our everyday life, the Meditations by the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius is a fascinating text. It is fascinating because it not only presents a deep conception about life, but also mentions practical ways of applying this conception to everyday life.The Meditations is a Stoic text which contains some central ideas already found in earlier Stoic writings and develops them in an engaging way. Several prominent historians of philosophy, notably Pierre Hadot2 and (...) A.A. Long3 , interpret it as a personal notebook of Stoic exercises, or what Hadot calls “spiritual exercises.”4 The idea is that the emperor’s primary purpose in writing this text was not to describe or speculate, but rather to practice. His purpose was not to record his thoughts and actions but to influence them, and thus to direct himself towards the good life.The view that the Meditations is a book of Stoic exercises makes this text especially relevant for philosophical practice. Philosophical practice is a modern approach that seeks to use philosophical thought for dealing with our personal predicaments, enriching our self-understanding, and thus living more deeply, fully, and with greater wisdom.5 Philosophical practice can take different shapes: as philosophical counseling between a philosopher and a counselee; as a workshop of self-examination directed by a philosopher; as a companionship of fellow philosophical seekers; but it can also be practiced by an individual who seeks to live philosophically, just like Marcus Aurelius. Thus, the Meditations can be seen as one of the ancient precursors of modern philosophical practice. (shrink)

The current study investigates whether self-talk phrases can influence behavior in Ultimatum Games. In our three self-talk treatments, participants were instructed to tell themselves (i) to keep their own interests in mind, (ii) to also think of the other person, or (iii) to take some time to contemplate their decision. We investigate how such so-called experimenter-determined strategic self-talk phrases affect behavior and emotions in comparison to a control treatment without instructed self-talk. The results demonstrate that other-focused (...) self-talk can nudge proposers towards fair behavior, as offers were higher in this group than in the other conditions. For responders, self-talk tended to increase acceptance rates of unfair offers as compared to the condition without self-talk. This effect is significant for both other-focused and contemplation-inducing self-talk but not for self-focused self-talk. In the self-focused condition, responders were most dissatisfied with unfair offers. These findings suggest that use of self-talk can increase acceptance rates in responders, and that focusing on personal interests can undermine this effect as it negatively impacts the responders’ emotional experience. In sum, our study shows that strategic self-talk interventions can be used to affect behavior in bargaining situations. (shrink)

This reflection essay examines the poem “My own heart,” one of Gerard Manley Hopkins’ Terrible Sonnets, to inspect Hopkins’ articulation of his changed attitude in how he talks to himself. After introducing the concept of self-talk as it figures in Psalms 42 and 43 and identifying its place in the Ignatian tradition, this essay offers a close reading of the poem to see how Hopkins learns to talk to himself more graciously during the spiritual phase of desolation. His desire (...) to “have more pity on” himself expresses a desire to surrender to God's compassion and timing. Hopkins’ ability to render this human experience of struggle and surrender, without any real change in circumstance or without the arrival of consolation, helps us understand both why this faculty of gracious self-talk is so life giving and how we can practice it ourselves. (shrink)

A pIausibicRi2;if not self-cvidcntRi2;Ri2;hypoth@sis readily comes to mind: when 0nc tries t0 understand oncsclf, that is, when 0nc works at building a self-image, cme talkx t0 07i656% A stronger formulation of this hypothesis could bc that the more one talks to oneself to construct a self-image, the more this image will gain coherence and sophistication. A corrclational study is presented in which the existence of a relation between thc complexity (or richness) of thc seIfRi2;concept and a more (...) or less frequent use of seifRi2;taik is examined. The results are preliminary because scifRi2;taIk was measured with 21 pilotdnvcntory and the complexity of thc self-concept was scored using a new system. For a detailed discussion of thc role played by self-talk in the acquisition 0f sclfdnformation and its organisation into a seIfRi2;conccpt, scc.. (shrink)

This research aim to investigate the effects of motor imagery, focused on the trajectory of the ball and the target area, and self-talk before the actual strike on the performance of the service in skilled tennis players. Thirty-three participants, competing in regional to national competitions, were randomly divided into three groups: Control, MI, and MI + self-talk. They performed a pre-test, 20 acquisition sessions, and a post-test similar to the pre-test, in match situations. The percentage of the first (...) service, their speed, and the efficiency scores, evaluated by experts, were use as dependent variables and indicators of performance. While there was no difference in service speed, this study showed an improvement in the first service percentage and efficiency in the participants of the MI and MI + self-talk groups. Additionally, analyses revealed greater efficiency when MI was combined with self-talk compared to other conditions. It, therefore, seems advantageous for skilled tennis players to use MI and motivational self-talk before performing the first service balls. (shrink)

Summary.— Recent empirical work in social cognition suggests that in building a self-concept people make inferences about themselves based on overt behavior or private thoughts and feelings. This article addresses the question of how, exactly, people make these inferences about themselves and raises the possibility that they do so through self-talk. It is proposed that the more on talks to oneself to construct a selfimage, the more this image will gain coherence and sophistication. A correlational study was conducted (...) to explore the relation between richness of the self-concept (using the W-A-Y) and natural disposition to talk to oneself (using a pilot questionnaire). A moderate but positive correlation of .30 is obtained. The article concludes with clinical implications. (shrink)

Reflective processing is a joint social action that develops in interaction. Using conversation analysis and discursive psychology, this article focuses on self-reflective turns of talk in group counselling for adults at risk of type 2 diabetes. We show how reflective processing unfolds in patterns of interaction, wherein group members take an observing, evaluating or interpreting position towards their own actions and experiences. Self-reflective talk is neither exclusively dependent on counsellors’ actions nor limited to the niches the counselling programme (...) structure offers. Self-reflective talk is one method of generating joint reflective processing. Such talk makes a topic available for discussion by connecting details of counselling with individuals’ experiences and enabling sharing. Self-reflective talk thus serves as a way for group members to participate in constructing a lifestyle problem, to invite or provide sharing of experiences and to display their orientation to the institutional task at hand. (shrink)

Scholars are divided over the question of whether managerial aspirational talk that contradicts current business practices can contribute to corporate social responsibility (CSR). In this conceptual article, we explore the rhetorical dynamics of aspirational talk that either impede or foster CSR. We argue that self-persuasive CSR rhetoric, as one enactment of aspirational talk, can attract attention and scrutiny from organizational members. Continued adherence to this rhetoric, however, creates and perpetuates tensions that lead to a vicious circle of disengagement. A (...) virtuous circle, by contrast, requires a shift toward an agonistic rhetoric that transcends tensions by rearticulating aspirations in concurrence with situated understandings of responsible corporate practice. Our arguments contribute to a better understanding of how communication becomes constitutive of CSR and address the debate on decoupling between talk and action. (shrink)

CONCLUSION :Whoever wants to pursue just social reforms, breathe new life into political democracy, and improve the welfare of the weak will have to do more than convince people to speak differently about themselves. The first ailment that must be cured is not an improper use of language, but the anxiety that gives rise to that language.Anxiety cannot be removed by socially uninspired philosophies. Anxiety is not a problem of individuals but of society’s consciousness. The individualistic attitude of the dominant (...) group of Anglo-Saxon thinkers has hitherto hindered any consideration of group mentality. There is too little known about the processes at work in this trans-individual domain.If people felt that they were being respected concerning their meaning, then they would probably be easier to reconcile with their finitude and the finitude of those around them. They would be more willing to think about the welfare of the community. Respect, however, is not manipulable like an object that one can give and take. Respect only exists in a context of participation. Improving the quality of that context implies not only that people pay more attention to an honest use of language, but also to craftsmanship, art and culture. If there is anything that allows people to go on in spite of anxiety, it is their participation in the community that gives them courage, whose patterns of expectation give everyone a feeling of self-respect and whose internal solidarity curbs the economic sufferings of backward social groups.I had the impression while writing this that Bellah would agree with many points. Although some of his texts argue that social change will only be achieved through a return to biblical and republican narratives, others seem to indicate that he has a better sense than most Americans of how strong the pre-reflexive influence of the social temperament can be. (shrink)

Metaphors may present some challenges in cases of self-illness ambiguity, yet they remain necessary to access a person’s perspective on illness and her relationship with it. The paper outlines the main functions of metaphors (i.e., naming, framing, changing functions) to explain why they can be valuable tools for reducing self-illness ambiguity. First, metaphor is presented as a creative way for a patient to (re)claim her ‘self’ through her own speaker’s meaning. Metaphor is not merely a way to (...) name internal processes and make them more communicable to others (compactness and inexpressibility theses), but primarily a way to represent what the mental illness means for herself (for-me-ness thesis). Second, particularly when extended in mental health narratives, metaphor can frame a person’s experiences of illness by offering a specific affective perspective for self-understanding (perspectivalness thesis). Third, the changing function of metaphor offers a new perspective on the experience of self-illness ambiguity in the narrative, allowing to look at the relationship with the illness, without fully identifying with it. The metaphorical functions can facilitate the discovery of new forms of affective coherence in a person’s mental health narrative and serve as crucial tools for clinicians’ understanding in the therapeutic process. (shrink)

This article explores the discursive uses of a self-quotation in adolescent talk. The self-quotation uses the quotative marker be + like to convey or project bold statements as part of a larger narrative. We will demonstrate how the preface leading up to the self-quotation is designed as hard to counter, and instructs the hearer how to understand what comes next. The self-quotation, on the other hand, constitutes the assessment as a `mere characterization' that provides the speaker (...) with a number of opportunities for testing the proposed view. Speakers are thus able to bolster potentially controversial views against refutation while also giving them a preliminary status. These features make for an interesting conversational resource that enables speakers and recipients to engage in a collaborative process of putting potentially bold statements to the test. (shrink)

One of the human dynamics that spiritual formation must address is the set of messages that play over and over in our minds. This self-talk or personal commentary frames our reactions to life and its circumstances and shapes how we relate to God and others. Often, the pattern of self-talk that we employ is negative, and in the past decade Christopher Germer and Kristin Neff have developed a series of self-compassion exercises designed to dispute this negative thinking. (...) Their research and program of Mindful Self-Compassion have been widely reported in the mainstream media and are marketed as being secular and religiously neutral. This article explores ways in which self-compassion practices can be used as a Christian spiritual practice. This article also examines some of the implicit theological assumptions in what is presented as a religiously neutral program and considers how Christians, from a spiritual formation standpoint, might view both self-critical self-talk and its remediation through the practice of self-compassion. (shrink)

This paper adds a phenomenological account to the discussion on what constitutes the favorable prospects of the peer-relation in the context of self-help. By drawing on Heidegger’s lectures on St Paul’s First Thessalonians, and engaging in dialogue with a fictive case, we show that more attention needs to be given to how meaning is enacted, rather than simply adopted, in the peer-relation; that is, away from experiential content towards the process of how experiential knowledge is transferred communicatively. This, we (...) argue, may clarify the underpinnings of the peer-relation and its emancipatory potential. Our findings propose a reconsideration of the role played by communicative activities in self-help. And, whereas storytelling has often been propounded as a way to facilitate agency among self-helpers, also the act of listening should receive more attention. By considering listening as an expression of agency, attention is reversed from self-narration on behalf of the person expected to be helped from it, to participation in another person’s story. The enaction approach to the peer-relation elaborated on in this paper invites the reader to rethink the value of talking and listening in helping relationships. (shrink)

“Talking Back to Frida: Houses of Emotional Mestizaje” is, in part, a historical meditation on the silencing of three women, Frida Kahlo, Maria Enríquez, a Mexican woman who was sexually assaulted in 1924, and me. Written in an innovative historical fashion that joins techniques drawn from fiction, journalism, and history, the article attempts to understand specific assaults on women’s voices by drawing readers into the historical worlds of the protagonists. “Talking Back” also seeks to respond to Hans Kellner’s incisive theoretical (...) challenge: how do historians’ person histories affect their historical choices? The article’s organization depends on my understanding of language, color, and physicality, as the emotional architecture of the Deep Southern and Mexican places tend to both enclose and partially free the protagonists. The essay begins by leading the reader into my own past in the Deep South, a past where German Jewish and Russian Jewish relatives engaged in a cultural battle over form, personal style, and will. Confronting a German Jewish world where only things—never feelings—seemed to matter, I found solace in the friendship of a black servant. That friendship, in turn, helped prompt a particularly empathic historical voice. The southern section is followed by a journey into Frida Kahlo’s Mexican world. In that world, Kahlo’s severe physical pain and solitude construct inner and outer universes. The people who populate these worlds are friends, lovers, husband, and the Mexican poor. Kahlo’s artistic renditions of these people reflect, the article suggests, both the depth of her love for them and a tendency to use them in response to her despair. Finally, “Talking Back” reconstructs the world of María Enríquez, a Michoacán peasant woman assaulted in public by her former boyfriend. Abandoned by friend, sister, and Catholic women on the way to church, Enríquez develops a voice laced with generosity, cultural insight, and a rare self-possession. (shrink)

Through a critical reading of Maxine Hong Kingston’s novel, Woman Warrior, this paper addresses Amy Allen’s criticism that Seyla Benhabib’s conception of narrative agency involves the idea of a gender-neutral core self. Allen’s criticism of Benhabib is found wanting and the notion of an ungendered self is judged incoherent. Rather, gender is one of a number of markers at work in the open-ended narrative construction of identity.

This article examines the embeddedness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) communications in strategic planning. By drawing on the idea that talk and texts about CSR are an essential part of responsibility practices, I study how CSR aspirations—responsibility-related organizational self-descriptions, goals, and ideals that the organization cannot yet live up to or that the organizational constituents deem necessary to maintain—are intertwined with strategy texts and strategic episodes. Conducting a qualitative case study on a series of biennial strategy processes over a (...) 20-year period, I show how CSR aspirations are established in authoritative strategy documents during stakeholder interactions, elaborated in consecutive strategic episodes, extended to new business areas, and evaluated in subsequent communications. These findings contribute to the CSR and strategy literature by showing how (a) aspirational talk can be established and perpetuated through recurrent communicative processes, (b) stakeholder engagement in CSR issues can influence strategy texts and how strategy texts become a part of intertextual organizational communications, and (c) strategic context can be conducive to progressive performativity. (shrink)

If there is one value that seems beyond reproach in modernity, it is that of the self and the terms that cluster around it, such as self-esteem, self-confidence and self-respect. It is not clear, however, that all those who invoke the self really know what they are talking about, or that they are all talking about the same thing. What is this thing called 'self', then, and what is its psychological, philosophical and educational salience? (...) More specifically, what role do emotions play in the creation and constitution of the self? This book proposes a realist, emotion-grounded conception of selfhood. In arguing for a closer link between selfhood and emotion than has been previously suggested, the author critically explores and integrates self research from diverse academic fields. This is a provocative book that should excite anyone interested in cutting-edge research on self-issues and emotions that lies at the intersection of psychology, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy and moral education. (shrink)

This essay unfolds within the wider theological project of an apophatic relationalism. The moral intention of political theology, in its progressive hope, takes refuge here in the apophatic folds of a Cusan cosmological mysticism that, in turn, lends depth to a polyvocal Whiteheadian theology. In this paper hope finds itself tangled in the question of religio-political peace, vis-à-vis a specific thousand-year loop of Western history. In the knotty present, this cosmopolitics—with an eye to each new wave of Islamophobia—lives with uncertainty (...) as to the realism of its pluralistically complicated peace-talk. Partners in the pilgrimage of this paper include (with Whitehead) certain political theorists who read him, especially William Connolly and Paulina Ochoa, along with William Cavanaugh, Enrique Dussel, and Eduourd Glissant, who do not. The aim will be to convert—at the level of symbolic resonance at least—what I call the crusader peace complex into the complex conviviality of peace. The pulses of this transdisciplinary exercise (an effort in self-education rather than specialization) will proceed through eight theopolitical vignettes. (shrink)

This article approaches work talk, a neglected but vital object of sociological inquiry, as a possible key to unlocking the mystery of the contemporary work ethic as it appears among male professionals living and working in the United States and Western Europe. This analytical task is carried out through a close examination of the contrasting rhetorics, scripts, and vocabularies anchoring French, Norwegian, and American forms of hard work talk. This comparative exercise capitalizes on material from over one hundred in-depth interviews (...) with comparable French, Norwegian, and American male business professionals working in finance, law, consulting, engineering and other professional fields. Scrutinizing the scripts that members of these three groups use to address their motives for working hard in demanding jobs, this article maps a legitimation divide between the American respondents and their French and Norwegian counterparts. The hard work commentaries of the French and Norwegian respondents feature script repertoires that focus exclusively on the stimulating and enriching character of their work activities. By contrast, the commentaries of the American respondents incorporate overachievement scripts addressing both the extrinsic rewards of work and the personality traits that make hard work a natural expression of personality. These hard work commentaries invoke career success and moneymaking as inducements to hard work. But they also invoke personality traits such as drive and the innate aversion to leisure. This transatlantic divide reflects the greater cultural resonance of self-realization in the two European contexts and the fact that the French and Norwegians have embraced a more Maslowian approach to working life. As I argue in the article’s conclusion, these transatlantic differences in script repertoires can be viewed as the product of the societally specific cultural configurations at work in the three countries. Such cultural configurations define what it means—in terms of status and authenticity—to work hard in a remunerative and rewarding job. (shrink)

The problem -- Fearless speech -- Talking versus writing -- The critical method -- Reasons and causes -- Elucidations -- Back to the rough ground -- The self and images -- A non-foundational therapy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals, and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and PlatoJo-Ann SheltonJohn Heath. The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals, and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. viii + 392 pp. Cloth, $90.In The Talking Greeks, John Heath has produced a provocative exploration of the significance of language capacity in ancient Greek society. In his Introduction, he investigates how the Greeks came (...) to associate speech—the word he uses to denote language capacity—with rationality and how, correspondingly, logos came to mean not simply the articulation of a thought, but the thought itself. Heath presents three major theses about the Greeks and speech. First, the Greeks believed that the most important difference between themselves and other animals was that humans were capable of speech and animals were not. They thus considered speech to be a defining characteristic of humanity. The dichotomy of the talking man and the speechless animal was established early on and persisted in Greek thought of all periods. Heath contends that the speechless animal Other also became the primary metaphor for Other humans—women, slaves, and non-Greeks, for example—who, though capable of speaking, were considered to be incapable of the effective use of speech. In turn, the seeming inability of these Others to be "fully human" (a phrase that Heath uses frequently) provided Greek men with the justification to relegate them to subordinate positions and, in effect, to silence them. Heath maintains that language capacity was central to all judgments about status, and that the Greeks granted authority to their leaders on the basis of mastery of speech.Second, the Greeks believed that speech enabled humans to create culture and thus evolve away from the bestial. Speech was fundamental to the development of systems of justice and morality and therefore to the rise of the polis.Third, because men in Greece, and in Athens in particular, attached such great value to the mastery of speech, they were keen to engage in debates. Heath asserts that one of the most important legacies of the ancient Greek world is its emphasis on open inquiry about political, social, and cultural traditions. He chides scholars who focus negatively on the Greek construction of dichotomies and hierarchies and therefore fail to acknowledge that the Greeks continually challenged these very constructions. Heath insists that we have inherited from them a pattern of public self-criticism, and that this pattern has brought about progress in the modern western world in improving the status of the "muted" members of the community.These three propositions underlie Heath's discussions throughout the book as he examines the ways in which Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato used the [End Page 603] metaphorical framework of the talking human and the speechless animal to explore the definition of humanity. Heath recognizes that the terms "mastery of speech" and "fully human" resist easy definition, and he devotes the book to illustrating how the Greeks variously employed these terms. Throughout, as Heath develops his own arguments, he draws on and provides extensive discussions of the work of many other scholars in a wide range of disciplines. His arguments are also reinforced by his close philological analyses of the Greek texts.In chapter 1, Heath begins his investigations of speech and human status in Homer. He notes that, in the many animal similes in the Iliad and the Odyssey, Homer attributes to the animals the same motivations for actions as the humans with whom they are being compared. The animals, however, are not capable of communicating their thoughts through speech. Within the human community, it is control over speech that characterizes humans with authority and distinguishes them from men of lower status and from non-Greeks, women, and slaves. The Trojans, when engaged in attack, for example, are depicted as bleating like sheep. And, according to Heath, Helen is portrayed as speaking impetuously and inappropriately. The voices of even royal Greek women carry no authority in public matters. In Homer, a hero is a person who is accomplished both at speaking words and at doing deeds, and only a man has the potential to combine these skills.Heath maintains in chapter... (shrink)

Mulhaüsler and Harré contend that pronoun systems set out fields of expression ‘within which people can be... presented as agents of one kind or another’. Despite interest in pronominal forms by various discourse researchers, analysis of pronouns-in-use from this perspective remains underdeveloped. This article undertakes such an analysis, drawing on Rees’s theories about the ‘distance from the self ’ encoded in different pronouns. Our data, from interviews analysed as talk-in-interaction, show participants shifting between pronominal registers as a way of (...) presenting their social world and positioning themselves as agents within it. ‘Fourth-person’ pronouns allow the distancing of reports of lack of agency from the deictic centre of self and express a ‘deontic modality’ through which one can position oneself in relation to moral imperatives. Along with shifts into and out of the first-person register, this is notably used to maintain an agentive self-positioning in talk about situations of relative powerlessness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Talking Cures, the Clinic, and the Value of the IneffableDaniel Berthold (bio)KeywordsMadness, disease, the normal, the abnormal, the ineffable, Hegel, Kierkegaard, LacanI am most grateful to my readers, James Phillips and Louis Sass, who have led me to several new insights by suggesting ways of complicating my reading of a Lacanian approach to Hegel's and Kierkegaard's conceptions of madness. I am a Kierkegaard and Hegel scholar, with very little (...) pretense to expertise about Lacan and regrettably even less about the theory and practice of psychiatry. In submitting my essay to Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Philosophy, I was hoping to entice a community of practitioners and theoreticians I have great respect for to consider the musings of a philosopher on topics which engage them as thinkers and actors in their professions. I could not possibly have hoped for more intelligent and provocative replies than I have been given by my two respondents.Phillips' framing of his response in terms of the distinction between the "madness of the philosophers" and the "madness of the clinic" is very helpful. It is a distinction that is indeed central to the question of the possibility of dialogue between philosophers and clinicians—so central, in fact, that it is generous of Phillips not to reproach me for failing to mention it. On the one hand, the challenge for philosophers is to show that their descriptions are not merely metaphoric and that their preoccupation with the dark side of human experience connects in some way with the reality of disease, so that there is some way for clinicians to translate their language into the language of psychiatry. Otherwise, philosophers will have only poetic or literary interest for the psychiatrist or psychologist.On the other hand, the challenge for clinicians is the extent to which they are open to moving beyond a reduction of "mental illness" to a purely biological conception of disease. One needn't go so far—nor should we—as Thomas Szasz or Michel Foucault in seeing "mental disease" as itself merely a metaphor. But granting the evidence of underlying organic disorder, symptoms nevertheless display themselves as mental and behavioral states (what Hegel calls "shapes of consciousness") that, as Hegel argued, are paralleled in "normal" experience, so that the distinction between disease and normality (and hence illness and metaphor) is often elusive. Madness "has the healthy consciousness for its presupposition," Hegel writes, because the healthy mind is still grappling with the same sorts of contradictions and feelings of alienation, the same "infinite pain" which characterizes insanity. Madness is not the absolute "other" of rationality, but an echo of it (1978, 3:382, 408).Hegel himself accepted the medicalization of madness that began to occur in the late eighteenth [End Page 325] century, and rejected the metaphysical and theological categories of what was called "romantic medicine." But he also cautioned against the narrowness of the "somatic" school which he felt lacked sufficient explanatory value if not connected to a "speculative" (i.e., philosophic) framework (see Berthold-Bond 1995, ch. 2).It might even be argued that every person seeking therapy is first of all suffering from "philosophic" madness, at least in the sense that initially she does not understand her own suffering as "disease," but experiences her torment in the vocabulary of the philosopher. Thus the philosopher's descriptions are the closest to the subject's own self-understanding, and while the therapist must seek to rephrase these descriptions into the vocabulary of the clinic (just as Hegel, for example, translated his own philosophic description of the madness of his friend Hölderlin in the Phenomenology as the "lost soul" whose "light dies away within it" into the medical category of Wahnsinn—mania or frenzy, which today we would call schizophrenia—in the classificatory scheme of mental disorder he gives in the Encyclopaedia; 1977, 400; 1978, 408)—there is a real question about which vocabulary is a metaphor for the other.The second main point Phillips addresses, which is taken up in different ways by Sass as well, has to do with the relation between speech and silence in madness. Phillips finds that Kierkegaard offers a more complex and subtle view than... (shrink)

Do we know what we're doing, and why? Psychological research seems to suggest not: reflection and self-awareness are surprisingly uncommon and inaccurate. John M. Doris presents a new account of agency and responsibility, which reconciles our understanding of ourselves as moral agents with empirical work on the unconscious mind.

The problem -- Fearless speech -- Talking versus writing -- The critical method -- Reasons and causes -- Elucidation -- Back to the rough ground -- The self and images -- A non-foundational therapy.

This book stems from more than 30 years of experience in the development of practical law enforcement ethics training. It is written based on the real-world application of a wide variety of approaches to enhancing ethics awareness and decision-making skills. There has been an explosion of efforts to increase the emphasis on ethics in law enforcement. The most effective of these efforts involve our law enforcement officers themselves in (1) sharing ideas, experiences, and wisdom with each other and (2) analyzing (...) long-term consequences in a risk-free learning environment, before the need arises for making actual decisions or engaging in conduct. Accomplishing those objectives can be attempted with a variety of formats, presentations, and approaches. Instead of being shown how to “teach” ethics, readers will be given material and ideas on how to enhance existing ethics awareness and ethics skills with their personnel. Readers are provided with pointers on talking with staff, not “at” them, in order to foster awareness about how ethical values and standards to which they already subscribe apply in real-world law enforcement decision-making and conduct. A unique aspect of this text is that it is written primarily for line sergeants and lieutenants to use with their own in-service personnel. It contains material that is designed to be easy-to-present and non-intimidating. It is adaptable to briefings of limited duration as well as longer training sessions. There is substantial content to enable an agency to maintain an on-going program of recurrent, short-but-meaningful discussions with and among personnel. Most importantly, it is practical and down-to-earth–not theoretical or abstract. Also, the book is based on the belief that with a combination of interest and practice, any sergeant or lieutenant, or any officer or deputy, can overcome any self-perceived weakness and become an accomplished “ethics awareness discussion leader.” In addition to its primary audience, the book will also be a helpful resource for field-training officers, senior officers, non-sworn personnel, and law enforcement executives. (shrink)

The language used to talk about computers is uniquely colorful and sometimes extraordinarily difficult. This paper examines ‘computer discourse’ and points out its highly metaphorical nature. While the use of metaphor is unavoidable, it often leads, especially in informal settings, to the mannered use of words we call jargon. Metaphor becomes jargon when it is used too literally in a self-conscious manner. Experts often use their metaphors as though they were literally true. Technical details fall away and the metaphor (...) is taken for the reality it represents. The less expert sometimes mimic the language they hear, in a self-conscious manner, without truly understanding it. (shrink)

Human beings talk to themselves; sometimes out-loud, other times in inner speech. In this paper, I present a resolution to the following dilemma that arises from self-talk. If self-talk exists then either, we know what we are going to say and self-talk serves no communicative purpose, and must serve some other purpose, or we don’t know what we are going to say, and self-talk does serve a communicative purpose, namely, it is an instance of us communicating (...) with ourselves. Adopting was the strategy taken by Bart Geurts, who claims that the primary purpose of self-talk is to entrain commitments, and is not communicative. While accepting that self-talk can usefully play this role, I criticise the view that entraining commitments is self-talk’s fundamental role. I argue that adopting the view that we are self-blind, at least to a significant degree, means that we can accept that self-talk does play a communicative role. (shrink)

How does one make the right choices when faced with ethical dilemmas? Social service professionals use a unique set of principles to guide their decisions within a broad and complex array of situations. Straight Talk about Professional Ethics, Second Edition provides readers with the guidelines that will help them make decisions in a manner that is clinically and ethically effective. This book explains the seven core concepts that guide ethical practice in the helping professions: self-determination, informed consent, competence, confidentiality (...) and privacy, attention to conflicts of interest, maintenance of professional boundaries, and professionalism and integrity. Developing a commitment to the ethics of a profession and an understanding of how those ethics apply to commonly occurring workplace situations is a major element of professional preparation. (shrink)

In the late preschool years children acquire a "theory of mind", the ability to ascribe intentional states, including beliefs, desires and intentions, to themselves and others. In this paper I trace how children's ability to ascribe intentions is derived from parental attempts to hold them responsible for their talk and action, that is, the attempt to have their behavior meet a normative standard or rule. Self-control is children's developing ability to take on or accept responsibility, that is, the ability (...) to ascribe intentions to themselves. This is achieved, I argue, when they possess the ability to hold an utterance or rule in mind in the form of a quoted expression, and second, when they grasp the causal relation between the rule and their action. The account of how children learn to ascribe intention to themselves and others will then be used to explore the larger question of the relations amongst language, intentional states and the ascription and avowal of those states. (shrink)

Dualism, but he seems at least to have acknowledged the possibility that Descartes might be right on this issue, i.e., that the real self is a _res cogitans_. Maybe this is why talk of.

Through a close study of T. Yunkaporta's 2019’s Sand Talk, this article explores fractal thinking and the pattern of creation in Indigenous cosmology; the role of custodianship in respectful interaction between living systems; alternative Indigenous understandings of nonlinearity, time, and transience; the process-panpsychism and animism present in Indigenous perceptions of cosmos as living Country, illustrated in the Dreaming and Turnaround creation event; the role of embodied cognition and haptic and situated knowledge in Indigenous science; Indigenous holistic reasoning and the mind-body (...) connection; the process-relational metaphysic embedded in ritual and yarning practice; the knowledge encoded in place-based totemic mythology, lore, and ritual; and Indigenous understandings of complex systems as adaptive, self-organizing, and patterned. This article does not offer a process reading of Indigenous thought but rather demonstrates the significant contribution to process metaphysics that may be provided by an Aboriginal Australian perspective. Yunkaporta's text carves out a language of resistance to the McDonaldization of Indigenous research. While historic scholarly engagement with Aboriginal culture has overemphasized content, Yunkaporta demonstrates how this has occurred to the exclusion of the processes of Indigenous knowledge transmission and creation. Yet a process view requires engagement with the how, not only with the what. Such knowledge transmission is discerned in daily lived relationships among land, spirit, and people—binding epistemology to participation in a specific landscape embedded within a living culture. Place-making for Indigenous knowledges requires exploring how Indigenous ways of valuing, knowing, and being, shaped by cultural activities on Country, offer new understandings for Western metaphysics. (shrink)

Ian Hacking proposes that ways of talking about autistic experience can shape, or even transform, what it is like to be autistic. I explore the grounds for two nonexclusive interpretations of this thesis. The informative interpretation holds that, because nonautistics cannot read mental states into autistic behaviour as they normally do with one another, autistic self‐narratives give nonautistics unique insights into what it is like to be autistic. This in turn affects how nonautistics interact with autistic individuals, enriching their (...) social environment in various ways. The more radical, transformative interpretation holds that autistic experience is itself moulded under the influence of developing a language‐game for talking about autistic experience. I endorse both theses, albeit with some cautionary remarks. (shrink)