The current study investigates whether self-talk phrases can influence behavior in Ultimatum Games. In our three self-talk treatments, participants were instructed to tell themselves (i) to keep their own interests in mind, (ii) to also think of the other person, or (iii) to take some time to contemplate their decision. We investigate how such so-called experimenter-determined strategic self-talk phrases affect behavior and emotions in comparison to a control treatment without instructed self-talk. The results demonstrate that other-focused self-talk can nudge proposers (...) towards fair behavior, as offers were higher in this group than in the other conditions. For responders, self-talk tended to increase acceptance rates of unfair offers as compared to the condition without self-talk. This effect is significant for both other-focused and contemplation-inducing self-talk but not for self-focused self-talk. In the self-focused condition, responders were most dissatisfied with unfair offers. These findings suggest that use of self-talk can increase acceptance rates in responders, and that focusing on personal interests can undermine this effect as it negatively impacts the responders’ emotional experience. In sum, our study shows that strategic self-talk interventions can be used to affect behavior in bargaining situations. (shrink)

This paper brings two major research lines in current sociology together. Research on social networks has long focused primarily on network effects but meanwhile also addresses the emergence and dynamics of networks. Research on trust in social and economic relations shows that networks have effects on trust. Using game theory, we provide a simple model that allows for an integrated and simultaneous analysis of network effects on trust and for the endogenous emergence of the network. The model also allows for (...) characterizing the value of the network. We use standard assumptions on full strategic rationality. Testable implications of the model as well as model extensions are sketched. (shrink)

In his Generalization in Ethics, Marcus Singer distinguishes between individual and collective consequences. According to Singer, the collective consequences of everyone's acting in a certain way is for certain kinds of acts not the sum of—or, more exactly, is greater than the sum of—the individual consequences of each individual act. The point is put more straightforwardly by Sir Roy Harrod:There are certain acts which when performed on n similar occasions have consequences more than n times as great as those resulting (...) from one performance.... For example, it may well happen that the loss of confidence due to a million lies uttered within certain limits of time and space is much more than a million times as great as the loss due to any one in particular. (shrink)

A premise of Corballis's theory is that speech arose when vocalization co-opted existing gestural functions in the left ventral premotor cortex. Yet, visuomotor functions in this region remain largely unchanged between humans and macaques and have no discernible connection to gestural communication. This functional continuity suggests that language production is not the result of modifying existing motor functions in this region.

The present paper reports the results of a vignette- and questionnaire-based research project investigating the influence of Moral Intensity (MI) on decision making in a New Zealand business context. The use of a relatively sensitive research design yielded results showing that – in contrast to previous research – objective manipulations, as well as subjective perceptions, of three of the six MI components were of particular importance in accounting for a comparatively large proportion of the variation in four outcome variables. There (...) were no interactions of appreciable magnitude between MI components, or variations across scenarios. Also, no support was found for a reliable multi-dimensional structure of perceptions of Moral Intensity. Implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

It is rarely, if at all, thought that Socrates committed suicide; but such was the case, or so I want to suggest. My suggestion turns not upon any new interpretation of ancient sources but rather upon seeking a determination of the concept of suicide itself.

Nicht erst durch sein antibürgerliches Engagement verdient sich Brecht den Namen eines politischen Schriftstellers, sondern vor allem dadurch, dass die höchst kommunikative Sprache seiner Dichtung aktiv ins Bewusstsein eingreift. Im vorliegenden Buch wird gezeigt, wie die semantische Wirkung der sich im Gestischen festbeissenden Brechtschen Bilder durch strukturalistische und sprachwissenschaftliche Forschungsmethoden voll erfasst werden kann. Sich auf ein Drittes beziehend, bewirken Metaphern und Symbole im aktionsfördernden Kontext, verallgemeinernd und anschaulich zugleich, tiefgründig politische Klärung.

Glover suggests that representational systems for planning versus control are mapped exclusively to the inferior (IPL) versus superior (SPL) parietal lobules respectively. Yet, there is ample evidence that the IPL and SPL both contribute to action planning and control. Alternatively, I distinguish between the parietal-frontal systems involved in the representation of acquired manual skills versus nonskilled actions.

Rede und Gegenrede, pro und contra - jeweils von derselben Person zu einem bestimmten Thema? Wer kennt das nicht von sich selbst? Auch beim Philologen und Philosophen Friedrich Nietzsche finden sich solche Stellen in seinem Werk. Systematisch aufbereitet durch den Autor, umfasst das Buch 287 Schlagwörter und 5527 Zitate, geordnet nach pro und contra und ein Fundstellenverzeichnis. Das Buch will sein: Ein Zugang und Schlüssel zu Nietzsches Schriften Ein Nietzsche-Nachschlagewerk Ein Nietzsche-Brevier Eine Aufforderung an den Leser, von der Oberfläche der (...) Zitate in die Tiefen der Gedankengänge Nietzsches vorzudringen Ein Rüstzeug zum Selbst-Überdenken der Probleme Ein Buch von Studiendirektor i.R. Erich Frey-Teschen (1922 - 2016), posthum herausgegeben von Roman Seidl. (shrink)

Classic change blindness is the phenomenon where seemingly obvious changes which coincide with visual disruptions (such as blinks or brief blanks) go unnoticed by an attentive observer. Some early work into the causes of classic change blindness suggested that any pre-change stimulus representation is overwritten by a representation of the altered post-change stimulus, preventing change detection. However, recent work revealed that even when observers do maintain memory representations of both the pre- and post-change stimulus states, they can still miss the (...) change, suggesting that change blindness can also arise from a failure to compare the stored representations. Here we study slow change blindness, a different but related phenomenon that occurs even in the absence of visual disruptions when the change occurs sufficiently slowly, to determine whether it could be explained by conclusions from classic change blindness. Across three different slow change blindness experiments we found that observers, who consistently failed to notice the change, had access to at least two memory representations of the changing display. One representation was precise but short-lived: a relatively detailed representation of the more recent states of slow-change display, but fragile. The other representation lasted longer but was fairly general: stable but too coarse to differentiate the various stages of the changing display. These findings suggest that although multiple representations are formed, the failure to compare hypothesis might not explain slow change blindness; even if a comparison were made, the representations formed would be either too sparse (longer term stores) or too fragile (short-lived stores) for such a comparison to be informative about a change. (shrink)

Economics and psychology are both sciences of human behaviour. This paper gives a survey of their interaction. First, the changing relationship between the two sciences is discussed: while economics was once imperialistic, it has become a science inspired by psychological insights. In order to illustrate this, recent developments and evidence for three major areas are presented: bounded rationality, non-selfish behaviour, and the economics of happiness.

Distortions in memory impose important bounds on rationality but have been largely disregarded in economics. While it is possible to learn, it is more difficult, and sometimes impossible, to unlearn. This retention effect lowers individual utility directly or via reduced productivity, and adds costs to principal-agent relationships. The engraving effect states that the more one tries to forget a piece of information the more vivid it stays in memory, leading to a paradoxical outcome. The effects are based on, and are (...) supported by, psychological experiments, and it is shown that they are relevant in many economic situations and beyond. (shrink)

An alleged moral right to informational privacy assumes that we should have control over information about ourselves. What is the philosophical justification for this control? I think that one prevalent answer to this question—an answer that has to do with the justification of negative rights generally—will not do.

In his paper "rights" ("the philosophical quarterly", Volume 15, 1965, Pages 115-127), H j mccloskey maintains that only beings who can possess interests can possess rights; and he goes on to argue that animals cannot satisfy this requirement. In his paper "mccloskey on why animals cannot have rights" ("the philosophical quarterly", Volume 26, 1976, Pages 251-257), Tom regan disputes mccloskey's requirement. First, He queries whether mccloskey's "is" a requirement for the possession of rights; second, He tries to show that animals (...) can nevertheless satisfy it. On both counts, I contend that regan's arguments do not work. I also set out a mccloskey-Like position which is not open to regan's attack upon its legitimacy. I conclude with an example designed to show why regan has failed to establish that animals have interests. (shrink)

Der Band fragt nach der Rolle des Körpers im Recht. Vertreter:innen der Philosophie, Theologie und Rechtswissenschaft untersuchen ein vielseitiges und komplexes Spektrum an Fragen, die sich aus dem Verhältnis der Begriffe „Recht" und „Körper" ergeben. In welcher rechtlichen Gestalt tritt ein (menschliches) Rechtssubjekt als Körper auf? Wie wird seine Körperlichkeit vom Recht erfasst, geschützt und normativ bestimmt und gestaltet? Was unterscheidet aus einer rechtlichen Perspektive den menschlichen vom tierischen Körper? Kann der menschliche Körper als Eigentum verstanden werden oder gehorcht er (...) einer fundamental anderen Logik? (shrink)

Deontisch logische Systeme im engeren Sinne sind nicht axiologisch. Um aber auch axiologisch relevante Rahmen-Normen aufstellen und angeben zu können, kommt es wesentlich auf die Art der verwendeten Formalismen an. Wie ein Beispiel zeigt, geht dies bis in die Voraussetzungen des zugrundegelegten Logikkalküls.

Menschliches Leben ist grundlegend dadurch charakterisiert, dass dem Menschen bewusst ist, dass er sich in unterschiedlicher Gestalt verwirklicht. Dieses Bewusstsein ist tief im Bewusstsein seiner selbst, in seinem Selbstbewusstsein also, verankert. In diesem Buch wird gezeigt, dass ein Subjekt nur dadurch ein adäquates Bewusstsein seiner selbst haben kann, dass es sich in Differenz zu anderen gleichermaßen selbstbewussten Subjekten begreift. Mir als einzelnem Menschen, als Individuum, ist bewusst, dass ich so bin, mein Mitmensch hingegen anders und wir beide trotzdem gleich – (...) nämlich Mensch. Das Bewusstsein, das ein einzelner Mensch von sich selbst als partikularem Individuum hat, enthält also notwendig das Verhältnis zu anderen Menschen, die auf eine andere Art und Weise leben als er selbst. In diesem Bewusstsein verwirklicht sich der Anspruch des selbstbewussten Subjekts, letzte Quelle dessen zu sein, was es tut. Es weiß, dass es selbst bestimmen kann, was zu tun und wie zu leben für es allgemein richtig ist. Es weiß, dass es frei ist. -/- Um dies zu verstehen, muss das selbstbewusste Subjekt, das als solches die Idee der Freiheit verwirklicht, jedoch als Widerspruch begriffen werden. Es verkörpert die Identität von Identität und Nicht-Identität. (shrink)

Dans les sociétés démocratiques contemporaines, les individus revendiquent le droit d'aimer librement. Ils sont attachés à la réussite de leur vie sentimentale et à l'épanouissement de leur sexualité. Mais le corps épris nous permet-il d'accéder à l'existence heureuse que nous désirons? Dans ce livre, Jean-Marie Frey met au jour les ressorts de l'inquiétude suscitée par l'amour charnel. Il montre comment la pudibonderie et le libertinage expriment, chacun à leur manière, une tentative pour se rassurer. Les prudes désireux de voiler (...) les femmes et les libertins exhibant un corps morcelé dans l'imagerie pornographique, n'éprouvent-ils pas les uns et les autres une crainte devant la chair désirable? L'auteur oppose les figures du pudibond et du libertin à celle d'un amant disposé à jouer le jeu d'une passion amoureuse à la fois inquiétante et joyeuse. (shrink)

In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams is rather severe on what he thinks of as an ethics of obligation. He has in mind by this Kant and W. D. Ross. For many, obligation seems the very core of ethics and the moral realm, and lives more generally are seen through the prism of this notion. This, according to Williams, flattens out our lives and moral experience and fails to take into account things which are obviously important to (...) our lives. Once we take these things into account, what do we do if they come into conflict with some of our moral obligations, as Williams, in his earlier writings on moral luck, thought to be the case. I want here to explore some of these ideas, in a way that I think harmonious with Williams's general bent though not one that I intend as in any way detailed exegesis of Williams's work. (shrink)

Eight of the eleven essays were written expressly for this book; all of the authors are deeply engaged in the debate over utility and rights, and their essays build upon and extend current thinking on the subject.

The most common view of suicide today is that it is intentional self-killing. 1 Because of the self-killing component, suicide is often described as self-inflicted death or as dying by one's own hand, and the victim is in turn often described as having done himself to death or as having taken his own life. But must one's death be self-inflicted in order to be suicide? The answer, I want to suggest, is arguably no.

This paper analyses whether the aggregation of individual happiness scores to a National Happiness Index can still be trusted once governments have proclaimed their main objective to be the pursuit—or even maximization—of this National Happiness Index. The answer to this investigation is clear-cut: as soon as the National Happiness Index has become a policy goal, it can no longer be trusted to reflect people’s true happiness. Rather, the Index will be systematically distorted due to the incentive for citizens to answer (...) strategically and the incentive for government to manipulate the Index in its favour. Such a distortion would arise even if the measurement of subjective well-being correctly reflected actual happiness before the intervention of government. Governments in a democracy should establish the conditions enabling individuals to become happy. The valuable and important results of happiness research should be introduced into the political process. Each person should be free to pursue happiness according to his or her preferences. This process is supported by obedience to the rule of law, human rights and free media, as well as by extended political participation rights, decentralized public decision-making, an open and effective education system fostering upward mobility and the possibility to find suitable employment. (shrink)