Pockett has drawn an alternative conclusion from the data of Libet, Alberts, Wright, and Feinstein , and suggested that it takes 80 ms, rather than 500 ms, for the sensation evoked by a stimulus to enter awareness. Here, I suggest that our conscious sensation evolves over time, during the period from 80 to 500 ms after a stimulus, until the sensation is stably localized in space.

Early modern humans developed mental capabilities that were immeasurably greater than those of non-human primates. We see this in the rapid innovation in tool making, the development of complex language, and the creation of sophisticated art forms, none of which we find in our closest relatives. While we can readily observe the results of this high-order cognitive capacity, it is difficult to see how it could have developed. We take up the topic of cave art and archeoacoustics, particularly the discovery (...) that cave art is often closely connected to the acoustic properties of the cave chambers in which it is found. Apparently, early modern humans were able to detect the way sound reverberated in these chambers, and they painted artwork on surfaces that were acoustic “hot spots,” i.e., suitable for generating echoes. We argue that cave art is a form of cross-modality information transfer, in which acoustic signals are transformed into symbolic visual representations. This form of information transfer across modalities is an instance of how the symbolic mind of early modern humans was taking shape into concrete, externalized language. We also suggest that the earliest rock art found in Africa may constitute one of the first fossilized proxies for the expression of full-fledged human linguistic behavior. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a possible reinterpretation of phenomenology using a newly defined concept of ‘mediation.’ First, I address the question: What are the ‘things themselves’ that are given as the result of the phenomenological epoché? I would answer that they are neither material objects nor merely subjective experiences, but rather specific occurrences of ‘mediations.’ Second, under the influence of the Japanese philosopher Hajime Tanabe, I will define ‘mediation’ as a non-separable occurrence of differentiating and connecting. Third, I shall (...) claim that the concept of ‘phenomenon’ itself should be reinterpreted in terms of its character of mediation. Then, I will discuss central issues in phenomenology such as intentionality, time, and intersubjectivity in order to test the applicability of the proposed concept of mediation. To conclude, I shall summarize the potential of the idea that phenomenology can be reinterpreted using the concept of mediation. (shrink)

本書の第1部は近代日本の思想家がグリーンの理想主義をどのように受容し、それをどう批判し、日本の伝統的思想とどのように融合させ、独自の思想を展開してきたかを中心問題とする。とりあげられる思想家・学者は中 島力造・高山樗牛、綱島梁川、西田幾多郎、河合榮治郎の五人である。第2部はグリーンの形而上学、道徳哲学、政治哲学、宗教思想の中心問題を永遠意識の視点から体系的に再検討することを目的とした。.

This article considers Socrates's conception of courage in Plato's Socratic dialogues. Although the Laches, which is the only dialogue devoted in toto to a pursuit of the definition of courage, does not explicitly provide Socrates's definition of courage, I shall point out clues therein which contribute to an understanding of Socrates's conception of courage. The Protagoras is a peculiar dialogue in which Socrates himself offers a definition of courage. Attending to the dramatic structure and personalities of the dialogue, I will (...) point out that Socrates does not commit to the definition and that the hedonism and the definition of courage are used to disclose Protagoras's confusion regarding virtue. Following one of the clues within the Laches I will turn to the Apology and indicate Socrates's conception of courage which is based on his awareness of lack of knowledge of death and his religious conviction that nothing will happen for the good in life or in death. Finally I will show that such conception of Socratic courage satisfies the criteria in the Laches. (shrink)

In theLysisSocrates deals with the problem of what is a friend and what is friendship. After giving an introduction and a synopsis of theLysisin section one, I explain, in section two, Socrates’ view that a true friend is “what is akin” or “what is belonging to oneself” which is what is taken from oneself and discovered in another person. When this happens among two persons, they become friends to each other. The content of what is akin is either a good (...) characteristic or ways or form of the soul. Friendship is the desire for what is akin. In section three I show that Socrates remains inaporiawhile he faces several problems. Unless he is able to answer such problems, he will not be truly confident about what is a friend. In section four I deal with and refute Penner’s and Rowe’s view that a true friend means wisdom. In section five I examine the view of friendship which occurs among people who share common deficit. As a conclusion, in section six, I reflect on the significance of my interpretation and the role of theLysisin Plato’s philosophy. (shrink)

Husserl’s theory of the phenomenological reduction is often explained by a radicalchange of attitude. Such an explanation is useful but sometimes misleading. TheIdea of Phenomenology clearly shows that the original idea of the reduction wasachieved through a radicalized critique of evidence. Although Husserl’s appealto evidence has often been criticized as an unjustified limitation of philosophicalthinking, a close examination of Husserl’s lectures reveals that the very ‘limitation’ to the phenomenological evidence breaks our naturalinclination toward objective identities and liberates our thinking from (...) the naturalbut misleading division between ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence.’ Thus, thephenomenological reduction can be interpreted as a transition from the thinkingwithout regard to evidence to the philosophizing intrinsically mediatedby evidence, which can secure access for intuitive analysis to every conceivabletype of givenness insofar as it manifests itself. (shrink)

Using artificially synthesized stimuli, previous research has shown that cotton-top tamarin monkeys easily learn simple AB grammar sequences, but not the more complex AnBn sequences that require hierarchical structure. Humans have no trouble learning AnBn combinations. A more recent study, using similar artificially created stimuli, showed that there is a neuroanatomical difference in the brain between these two kinds of arrays. While the simpler AB sequences recruit the frontal operculum, the AnBn array recruits the phylogenetically newer Broca’s area. We propose (...) that on close inspection, reported vocal repertoires of Old World Monkeys show that these nonhuman primates are capable of calls that have two items in them, but never more than two. These are simple AB sequences, as predicted by previous research. In addition, we suggest the two-item call cannot be the result of a combinatorial operation that we see in human language, where the recursive operation of Merge allows for a potentially infinite array of structures. In our view, the two-item calls of nonhuman primates result from a dual-compartment frame into which each of the calls can fit without having to be combined by an operation such as Merge. (shrink)

Nous avons trois objectifs dans cet article. Le premier est de montrer la pensée et le comportement de Yasuma Takata (1883-1972), auteur quasiment inconnu en Occident, mais qui donna pourtant au Japon ses premières théories sociologiques et socio-économiques générales. Le deuxième est d’examiner comment ces pensée et comportement sont liés à la responsabilité de la guerre dans la seconde guerre mondiale. Le troisième consiste à montrer que cette pensée est profondément connectée au courant de la pensée japonaise moderne à travers (...) la théorie de Maruyama et des opinions des Ôe et Kawabata. Classification JEL : B15, B31, N45. (shrink)

In this essay we critically evaluate the progress that has been made in solving the problem of meaning in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. We remain skeptical about solutions based on deep neural networks and cognitive robotics, which in our opinion do not fundamentally address the problem. We agree with the enactive approach to cognitive science that things appear as intrinsically meaningful for living beings because of their precarious existence as adaptive autopoietic individuals. But this approach inherits the problem of (...) failing to account for how meaning as such could make a difference for an agent’s behavior. In a nutshell, if life and mind are identified with physically deterministic phenomena, then there is no conceptual room for meaning to play a role in its own right. We argue that this impotence of meaning can be addressed by revising the concept of nature such that the macroscopic scale of the living can be characterized by physical indeterminacy. We consider the implications of this revision of the mind-body relationship for synthetic approaches. (shrink)

We revisit the EPR problem and make clear what is a correct comprehension of its problem. When one applies the quantum mechanics correctly, it will be shown that there is no paradox. According to these lines of thought, a quantum teleportation scheme without resort to the von Neumann projection postulate is presented.