To the Editor. A correction is necessary with respect to one of the articles in the Fall 1994 issue of the journal. In the article by Robert Fuentes et al., “Sentinel Effect of Drug Testing for Anabolic Steroid Abuse,” at page 228, the authors say, “…on May 2, 1994, the United States Supreme Court ruled that random drug tests violated the privacy rights of [various people] at the University of Colorado at Boulder…. The Court further stated….” No footnote is given, (...) and thus no citation to the case. The superscripted note at the end of the previous sentence is to an article in the NCAA News, “Court Rules Against Colorado Drug Policy.” The Supreme Court of the United States decided no such thing as what the authors state. If the reference is to a denial of review, the authors should have said something like, “The Supreme Court denied review to … leaving in place a ruling that….” A denial of review is not the Supreme Court ruling anything beyond the announcement that it will not hear a case; inferences can be drawn from the denial, but that is not what happened here: a flat statement—and an erroneous one—was made. Prof. Stephen L. Wasby Dept. of Political Science SUNY at Albany Ed. The authors cite the NCAA News accurately, and the reference refers to both courts; however, the NCAA News article in question fails to make the necessary distinction that Professor Wasby correctly points out. Our thanks to Professor Wasby for his remarks. (shrink)

What are ethical judgments about? And what is their relation to practice? How can ethical judgment aspire to objectivity? The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in metaethics, placing questions such as these about the nature and status of ethical judgment at the very center of contemporary moral philosophy. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches is a unique anthology which collects important recent work, much of which is not easily available elsewhere, on core metaethical issues. Reinvigorated (...) naturalist moral realism and the various versions of moral realism, as well as irrealist, expressivist, and neo-Kantian constructivist theories are all represented in this fine collection, constituting a rich array of approaches to contemporary moral philosophy's most fundamental debates. An extensive introduction by Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton is also included, making this volume the most comprehensive and up-to-date work of its kind. Moral Discourse is ideally suited for use in courses in contemporary ethics, ethical theory, and metaethics. (shrink)

James Madison is the thinker most responsible for laying the groundwork of the American commercial republic. But he did not anticipate that the propertied class on which he relied would become extraordinarily politically powerful at the same time as its interests narrowed. This and other flaws, argues Stephen L. Elkin, have undermined the delicately balanced system he constructed. In Reconstructing the Commercial Republic , Elkin critiques the Madisonian system, revealing which of its aspects have withstood the test of time (...) and which have not. The deficiencies Elkin points out provide the starting point for his own constitutional theory of the republic—a theory that, unlike Madison’s, lays out a substantive conception of the public interest that emphasizes the power of institutions to shape our political, economic, and civic lives. Elkin argues that his theory should guide us toward building a commercial republic that is rooted in a politics of the public interest and the self-interest of the middle class. He then recommends specific reforms to create this kind of republic, asserting that Americans today can still have the lives a commercial republic is intended to promote: lives with real opportunities for economic prosperity, republican political self-government, and individual liberty. (shrink)

Varying conceptions of and purposes for dialogue exist. Recent dialogic theorists and advocates urge exploration of forms of dialogue for learning and applying relational responsibilities within stakeholder networks. A related phenomenon has been the recent emergence of multi-stakeholder dialogues that involve parties significantly affected by major issues or concerns, such as environmental sustainability, that have complex and wide-spread implications. The extent to which these recent multi-stakeholder dialogues assume anything resembling the relationship or caring and the learning potentials of dialogic goals (...) and processes suggested by recent advocates, however, can certainly be questioned. This article explores potential directions for research on enhanced forms of multi-stakeholder dialogues that emphasize goals of dialogic learning, relationship building, and business social responsiveness within a more reflective practice of corporate citizenship. Many issues and questions concerning appropriate antecedents, processes, and outcomes for these enhanced multi-stakeholder dialogues are raised and discussed. (shrink)

have come in for increasing attention and controversy. A good example would be recent debates about moral realism where question of the relation between ethics (or ethical judgment) and the will has come to loom large.' Unfortunately, however, the range of positions labelled internalist in ethical writing is bewilderingly large, and only infrequently are important distinctions kept clear.2 Sometimes writers have in mind the view that sincere assent to a moral (or, more generally, an ethical) judgment concerning what one should (...) do is necessarily connected to motivation (actual or dispositional).s This necessity may be conceptual, or perhaps metaphysical, the thought being.. (shrink)

Various measures related to individual values, ethical attitudes and moral reasoning exist and are being increasingly applied for research in business and professional ethics. The England Personal Values Questionnaire, the Rokeach Value Survey, and Rest's Defining Issues Test have received stronger support and application for management and organizational behavior research than other instruments, such as Gordon's Survey of Personal Values and Hogan's Survey of Ethical Attitudes. Beyond research usage, many of these measures offer potential for instructional purposes. Knowledge of the (...) characteristics and limitations of values and ethics-related measures allows business educators to make better selections of possible supplements to traditional instructional methods. (shrink)

Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? After showing how attempts to vindicate morality have tended to fall back on non-moral values or first-person considerations, Stephen Darwall elaborates the interpersonal nature of moral obligations: their inherent link to our responsibilities to one another as members of the moral community.

My aim in what follows is to sketch with a broad brush fundamental changes involving the concept of obligation in British ethics of the early modern period, as it developed in the direction of the view that obligatory force is a species of motivational force – an idea that deeply informs present thought. I shall also suggest, although I can hardly demonstrate it conclusively here, that one important source for this view was a doctrine which we associate with Kant, and (...) which it may seem surprising to find in British ethics, especially of the early modern period, viz., that rational agents are obligated by motives available through a form of practical thinking necessary for rational autonomy. (shrink)

"Both Thomistic scholars and analytic philosophers interested in theories of human action and accountability will find this book a welcome addition to their libraries. Truly a substantive addition to both Thomistic scholarship and the ongoing analytic investigation into human action and responsible agency."—American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly "A first-rate book...Brock's lucid and illuminating analysis offers much of value to both intellectual historians and theologians, as well as philosophers."—Theological Studies"Brock's treatment of Aquinas's account of action exhibits a rare combination of rigor and (...) learning. It is, no doubt, the best we have."—The Thomist. (shrink)

This chapter defends the property dualism argument. The term “semantic premise” mentioned is used to refers to an assumption identified by Brian Loar that antiphysicalist arguments, such as the property dualism argument, tacitly assume that a statement of property identity that links conceptually independent concepts is true only if at least one concept picks out the property it refers to by connoting a contingent property of that property. It is argued that, the property that does the work in explaining the (...) possibility of a posteriori identities need not be a first-order property of the referent in question. On his view, the property dualism argument requires only a weaker semantic premise, which allows that the property in question be a higher order property. A refined version of the property dualism argument is formulated, which uses the weaker premise, and defends the argument against various objections. (shrink)

The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority--an account that ...

Issues at the major fault-line of political beliefs and debates.

Between the later views of Wittgenstein and those of connectionism 1 on the subject of the mastery of language there is an impressively large number of similarities. The task of establishing this claim is carried out in the second section of this paper.

In this paper I distinguish three alternatives to the functionalist account of qualitative states such as pain. The physicalist-functionalist holds that (1) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states differed in their qualitative character from ours, (2) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states lacked qualitative character altogether and (3) there could not be subjects like us in all objective respects whose qualitative states differed from ours. The physicalist-functionalist holds (1) and (3) (...) but denies (2). The transcendentalist holds (1) and (2) and denies (3). I argue that both versions of physicalist-functionalism inherit the problem of property dualism which originally helped to motivate functionalist theories of mind. I also argue that neither version of physicalist-functionalism can distinguish in a principled way between those neurophysiological properties of a subject which are relevant to the qualitative character of that subject's mental states and those which are not. I conclude that the only alternative to a functionalist account of qualitative states is a transcendentalist account and that this alternative is not likely to appeal to the critics of functionalism. (shrink)

Two characterizations are given of those structural consequence operations on a propositional language which can be defined via proofs from a finite number of polynomial rules.

This paper introduces Leo Strauss’s thematic question, “Progress or return?” to the context of psychoanalysis. the conversation within psychoanalysis. Progress signifies development or advancement, a mode that Freud embraced wholeheartedly. Strauss’s pursuit of a return questions the presumption of the goodness of progress. Freud’s thinking forecloses critical considerations within religion and metaphysics, circumscribing his consideration to adaptation within a given particular time and place. By contrast, a return transcends the particular setting. I address the question, “Progress or Return?” to historical (...) and individual development. If a life of progress points away from nature toward civilization, the life of return points away from civilization and toward nature. Freud epitomizes the idea of progress and pathologizes the notion of return, consequently foreclosing the questioning of authority as well as the quest for a natural law that would supersedes authority. True progress, I argue, is not linear but dependent on return. (shrink)

How we age and what we can do about it have been uppermost in human thought since antiquity. The many false starts have frustrated experimentalists and theoretical arguments pronouncing the inevitability of the process have created a nihilistic climate among scientists and the public. The identification of single gene alterations that substantially extend life span in nematodes and flies however, have begun to reinvigorate the field. Drosophila's long history of contributions to aging research, rich storehouse of genetic information, and powerful (...) molecular techniques make it an excellent system for studying the molecular mechanisms underlying the process of aging. In recent years, Drosophila has been used to test current theories on aging and explore new directions of potential importance to the biology of aging. One such example is the surprising finding that, as opposed to the commonly held assumption that adult life is a period of random passive decline in which all things are thought to fall apart, the molecular life of the adult fly appears to be a state of dynamic well‐regulated change. In the fly, the level of expression of many different genes changes in an invariant, often age‐dependent, manner. These as well as other molecular genetic studies and demographic analyses using the fly have begun to challenge widely held ideas about aging providing evidence that aging may be a much more dynamic and malleable process than anticipated. With the enormous success that Drosophila molecular genetics has demonstrated in helping understand complex biological phenomena such as development there is much optimism that similar approaches can be adapted to assist in understanding the process of aging. BioEssays 25:134–141, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This note concerns the ultraproduct construction. It is observed that in the class of SCI models ultraproducts may be constructed by a method apparently dierent from the standard one. Since the standard models of veryday model theory form a subclass of SCI models, one obtains a new view of ultraproducts. Aside from a few remarks, the paper is self-contained.

In these essays Stephen White examines the forms of psychological integration that give rise to self-knowable and self-conscious individuals who are responsible, concerned for the future, and capable of moral commitment. The essays cover a wide range of basic issues in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, moral psychology, and political philosophy, providing a coherent, sophisticated, and forcefully argued view of the nature of the self. Beginning with mental content and ending with Rawls and utilitarianism, each essay argues a distinctive line. (...) Together they are a unified and powerful philosophical position of considerable scope, one that provides a unique vision of the mind, consciousness, personhood, and morality. White argues that the unity of the self revealed in personal identity and moral responsibility is best understood in normative terms. Basic to such features of the self are the patterns of self-concern in which they are characteristically displayed and the internal justification that supports such concern. The treatment of intentionality and consciousness that grounds this account emphasizes privileged selfknowledge and practical rationality and their corresponding contributions to the unity of the self. A final source of unity emerges from the analysis of our fundamental commitments, an analysis that ensures a central place in moral theory for the notion of the self. (shrink)

A variety of arguments have been advanced that deliberation should be at the center of any good political regime in which there is popular self-government. Deliberation is to be the basis for lawmaking, that is, for the making of the collectivity's binding decisions. Thus, John Rawls says, “[O]f course, actual constitutions should be designed as far as possible to make the same determinations as the ideal legislative procedure.” This procedure, in turn, is defined as having laws that result from “rational (...) legislators … who are conscientious, trying to follow the principles of justice as their standard.” These legislators “are not to take a narrow or group-interested standpoint.” Joshua Cohen broadly agrees with Rawls and characterizes Rawls's view as one that argues for a democratic politics that is built around public deliberation. Cohen says that “an ideal pluralist scheme, in which democratic politics consists of fair bargaining among groups each of which pursues its particular or sectional interest, is unsuited to a just society.” John Dryzek shares these views and comments that the “essence of democratic legitimacy should be sought … in the ability of all individuals subject to a collective decision to engage in authentic deliberation about that decision.” Others have argued along similar lines, including James Bohman, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, David Gauthier, and Jurgen Habermas. (shrink)

It has been a commonplace since the 2012 coup to hear how fragile the Malian democracy had become. Among the many causes is the political role that non-governmental organizations have played as a fourth branch of government. As deliberative democratic processes were replaced by a corrupt elite consensus during the past eight years, NGOs assumed an important place in this system. This included humanitarian NGOs. However, these same NGOs until recently were blind to the political impact they were having. This (...) essay suggests one explanation for this blindness and argues for the importance of a conception of humanitarian aid that balances moral responsibility with political responsibility. (shrink)

We develop the theory of the nonadiabatic geometric phase, in both the Abelian and non-Abelian cases, in quaternionic Hilbert space.

We review the argument that latent image formation is a measurement in which the state vector collapses, requiring an enhanced noise parameter in objective reduction models. Tentative observation of a residual noise at this level, plus several experimental bounds, imply that the noise must be colored, and hence frame dependent and non-relativistic. Thus a relativistic objective reduction model, even if achievable in principle, would be incompatible with experiment; the best one can do is the non-relativistic CSL model. This negative conclusion (...) has a positive aspect, in that the non-relativistic CSL reduction model evades the argument leading to the Conway–Kochen “Free Will Theorem”. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore Turkish students’ perceived relevance of Facebook, the value of Facebook advertisements and the ethics of Facebook targeting users with advertisements. Design/methodology/approach Latent class cluster analysis is estimated to determine whether segments exist and whether covariates differ among segments. Findings Segments differ on Facebook relevance and advertisement targeting ethics and usefulness and the covariates gender, hours spent on Facebook during the week and personality. The segment that finds Facebook most relevant and uses (...) it the most disapproves of Facebook’s targeted advertisements. Facebook is an organization that relies heavily on advertising dollars for survival. This fact should be emphasized; otherwise, Facebook may not be able to sustain itself. Originality/value The paper provides an understanding of Facebook from a marketing perspective for a country at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. (shrink)

In _The New Constitutionalism_, seven distinguished scholars develop an innovative perspective on the power of institutions to shape politics and political life. Believing that constitutionalism needs to go beyond the classical goal of limiting the arbitrary exercise of political power, the contributors argue that it should—and can—be designed to achieve economic efficiency, informed democratic control, and other valued political ends. More broadly, they believe that political and social theory needs to turn away from the negativism of critical theory to consider (...) how a good society should be "constituted" and to direct the work of designing institutions that can constitute a "good polity," in both the economic and civic senses. Stephen L. Elkin and Karol Edward Soltan begin with an overview of constitutionalist theory and a discussion of the new constitutionalism within the broader intellectual and historical context of political and social thought. Charles Anderson, James Ceaser, and the editors then offer different interpretations of the central issues regarding institutional design in a constitutionalist social science, consider various ways of performing the task, and discuss the inadequacy of recent political science to the job it ought to be doing. The book concludes with essays by Ted Lowi, Cass Sunstein and Edwin Haefele which apply these themes to the American regime. (shrink)