The human brain is an extraordinary organ. It has allowed us to walk on the moon, *to discover the of matter and life,* and to play chess almost as well as a computer. But this virtuosity raises a puzzle. The brain of Homo sapiens achieved its modern form and size between fifty and a hundred thousand years ago, well before the invention of agriculture, civilizations, and writing in the last ten thousand years. Our foraging ancestors had no occasions to do (...) astrophysics or play chess, and natural selection would not have rewarded them with more babies if they had. How, then, did our outsize, *science-ready* brain evolve? (shrink)

This article examines the grounds for Plato's negative attitude towards trade, commerce and currency in the Laws. The author shows that commerce and trade are condemned because they are fundamentally private, and demonstrates that Plato rejects gold and silver currency because its use encourages a kind of cosmopolitanism. Rather than condemning the competitiveness or licentiousness of the economic sphere, Plato critiques it for turning the citizens' attention away from civic life.

An unrestricted conception of actors and their interdependence in action has now been deployed effectively in various fields of study, but the question remains how we can discriminate reasonably in our action sharing if there is more to consider than simply putting persons ahead of things. By what general practical realizations can a universal action sharer be guided? I identify four primary levels of action sharing—-coexistence, cooperation, collaboration, and communion—-showing a distinctive complex of factual and directive considerations in each. I (...) further show how three orientations in which we approach fellow actors—-need, desire, and delight—-sustain different, partly divergent and partly complementary understandings of action sharing. This analysis helps us to anticipate the character of the strongest appeal that can be made for consideration of a fellow actor. (shrink)

The movement to assess teacher competency is becoming a central concern for professional educators, state departments of education, and the public. The major underlying assumption of this concern is that primary and secondary school-aged children are falling far behind in basic skills as compared with their counterparts in other countries. A further concern is that, within this country, variability in teacher competency may exacerbate differences among children of various socioeconomic, racial and ethnic backgrounds and thus perpetuate long-term educational and economic (...) inequalities. To support these assumptions, critics of teacher preparation institutions cite declining SAT and ACT test scores of those entering teacher training, and also this constitutes sufficient grounds for assuming that becoming a teacher is less intellectually demanding than preparing for other fields. (shrink)

Theorem A. Let M be a left R-module such that Th(M) is small and weakly minimal, but does not have Morley rank 1. Let $A = \mathrm{acl}(\varnothing) \cap M$ and $I = \{r \in R: rM \subset A\}$ . Notice that I is an ideal. (i) F = R/I is a finite field. (ii) Suppose that a, b 0 ,...,b n ∈ M and a b̄. Then there are s, r i ∈ R, i ≤ n, such that sa + (...) ∑ i ≤ n r ib i ∈ A and $s \not\in I$ . It follows from Theorem A that algebraic closure in M is modular. Using this and results in [B1] and [B2], we obtain Theorem B. Let M be as in Theorem A. Then Vaught's conjecture holds for Th(M). (shrink)

Habermas's recent work in epistemology has been marked by a decisive rejection of his earlier epistemic conception of truth in which he understood truth as 'what may be accepted as rational under ideal conditions'. Arguing that no 'idealization of justificatory conditions' can do justice to both human fallibility and the unconditional nature of truth, he has attempted to develop a realistic conception of truth that severs any conceptual link between truth and justification while respecting the epistemic relevance of justification for (...) ascertaining the truth. But realizing this second goal has proved elusive for Habermas because he veers too close to a form of metaphysical realism in his epistemology. By contrast, Hilary Putnam's recent turn to what he calls 'natural realism' is more successful in articulating a form of realism that, in taking its leave of an epistemic conception of truth, still manages to keep its distance from metaphysical realism. (shrink)

In a previous article in _Philosophia, I claim that one can be a metaphysical relativist without being a truth relativist. One premise my argument for this claim relies on is (R2) truth relativism is inconsistent with the deflationary theory of truth. Peter Davson-Galle criticizes my argument for (R2), and also argues directly for the falsity of (R2). I try to show that Davson-Galle's effort to undermine (R2) founders due to his blurring the distinction between a taxonomy or classification system on (...) the one hand, and on the other, a conceptual framework in the sense use by truth relativists. (shrink)

In this reply I consider David O’Connor’s article “A Variation on the Free Will Defense” in which he tries to show that natural evil is necessary for free will by showing that it is required for the possibility of “morally creditable free choice.” I argue that O’Connor’s reply to an anticipated objection was unsuccessful in showing that humans can be moral without the property he calls “p.” that an altered understanding of what “morally creditable free choice” is would not help. (...) and finally, that if God’s moral condition is fundamentally different than ours, it could not be used as an example of p being inessential for humans being moral. (shrink)

Understanding spoken language involves far more than decoding a linear sequence of phonetic elements. In view of the inherent variability of the acoustic signal in spontaneous speech, it is not entirely clear that the sort of representation derived from locus equations is sufficient to account for the robustness of spoken language understanding under real-world conditions. An alternative representation, based on the low-frequency modulation spectrum, provides a more plausible neural foundation for spoken language processing.

Philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. I agree that we have this sort of control over our actions and that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness. But I deny that anything like this is true of belief.

By Jerome Rothenberg. Contributions by Steven Clay.