Abstract: It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the philosophy of science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a critical analysis of this assumption. The kind of fictionalism that is at present discussed in philosophy of science is characterised, and distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then drawn between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of fiction in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I take to be the argument for the (...) incompatibility of scientific realism with fictionalism. I argue that some of its premises are unwarranted, and are moreover questionable from a fictionalist perspective. The conclusion is that fictionalism is neutral in the realism-antirealism debate, pulling neither in favour nor against scientific realism. (shrink)

This paper defends an inferential conception of scientific representation. It approaches the notion of representation in a deflationary spirit, and minimally characterizes the concept as it appears in science by means of two necessary conditions: its essential directionality and its capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference. The conception is defended by showing that it successfully meets the objections that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable. In addition the inferential conception captures the objectivity of the cognitive representations (...) used by science, it sheds light on their truth and completeness, and it explains the source of the analogy between scientific and artistic modes of representation. (shrink)

On a purely epistemic understanding of experimental realism, manipulation affords a particularly robust kind of causal warrant, which is – like any other warrant – defeasible. I defend a version of Nancy Cartwright’s inference to the most likely cause, and I conclude that this minimally epistemic version of experimental realism is a coherent, adequate and plausible epistemology for science.

It is shown that the before-before (or Suarez-Scarani) experiment refutes hidden variable models with a deterministic (“realistic”) nonlocal part, whereas experiments violating Leggett-type inequalities refute models with biased random local part. Therefore the claim that Gröblacher et al. (Nature 446:871–875, 2007) present “an experimental test of nonlocal realism” is misleading, and Marek Żukowski’s (Found. Phys. 38:1070, 2008) comment misses the point. A new experiment is suggested.

From fields as art history, semiotics and communication theories, a dozen researchers attempt to provide new and compelling approaches about the genesis of the images, their functions in relation to our existence and how we establish and construct our social and power relations, through the book.

Constatant que nos étudiants italiens de FLE ont contracté, au cours des années, de mauvaises habitudes de prononciation, souvent dues à un enseignement lacunaire de la connaissance correcte des sons, et que le temps d’enseignement universitaire est réduit d’année en année, notre propos est de chercher à récupérer le temps perdu en insistant, au début de l’année d’un cours de Langue et Traduction française, sur l’oralité. Partant du poème et du jeu sur les signifiants et jonglant avec les signifiés, nous (...) essayerons de motiver les étudiants, peu enclins à la lecture de la poésie et qui, en outre, négligent de se mettre quotidiennement devant un miroir durant quatre ou sept minutes, temps prescrit par les méthodes phonétiques et phonologiques, et nécessaire pour acquérir de nouvelles habitudes phonatoires. Une partie de cet article sera dédiée aux poètes pour montrer comment la force orale du poème peut devenir un atout majeur pour une bonne prononciation ; une autre, à partir d’un vers, sera une sorte de « cahier de création » phonique, sémantique voire poétique. (shrink)

Scientific representation is a currently booming topic, both in analytical philosophy and in history and philosophy of science. The analytical inquiry attempts to come to terms with the relation between theory and world; while historians and philosophers of science aim to develop an account of the practice of model building in the sciences. This article provides a review of recent work within both traditions, and ultimately argues for a practice-based account of the means employed by scientists to effectively achieve representation (...) in the modelling sciences. (shrink)

L'index detaille de la Metaphysique d'Aristote publie en 1597 par Suarez, constitue une introduction aux Disputes metaphysiques. Il a pour objectif de produire les conditions d'un renouvellement de l'heritage de la Metaphysique d'Aristote en redefinissant le contenu et les limites d'une science de l'etant.Le projet de refondation de la metaphysique comme ontologie s'effectue dans cet ouvrage de presentation en quatre moments:1) L'exposition du probleme de la nature de la connaissance qui implique le depassement de l'equivocite de la notion de sagesse.2) (...) La determination de l'objet, des proprietes et des principes veritables de la metaphysique en tant que science de l'universel, c'est a dire de l'etantite de l'etant selon son abstraction la plus extreme.3) La redefinition du statut de la realite a partir d'une theorie de la representation de l'objet qui fasse abstraction de l'objet, c'est a dire qui procede a l'indifferenciation des etants afin d'en donner une representation universelle et abstraite; ainsi est affirme le primat d'une ontologie de l'essence sur toute ontotheologie.4) Enfin, la mise en place d'un systeme de reference transcendantal rendant possible une fondation universelle de la comprehension de l'etant par la mediation d'une theorie du concept.L'index prefigure ainsi, par son ambition et sa demarche, ce que Heidegger nommera, en evoquant la philosophie de Suarez, l'avenement du "caractere fondamental de la metaphysique moderne". (shrink)

This Element has two main aims. The first one is an historically informed review of the philosophy of probability. It describes recent historiography, lays out the distinction between subjective and objective notions, and concludes by applying the historical lessons to the main interpretations of probability. The second aim focuses entirely on objective probability, and advances a number of novel theses regarding its role in scientific practice. A distinction is drawn between traditional attempts to interpret chance, and a novel methodological study (...) of its application. A radical form of pluralism is then introduced, advocating a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities and frequencies. Finally, a distinction is drawn between two different applications of chance in statistical modelling which, it is argued, vindicates the overall methodological approach. The ensuing conception of objective probability in practice is the 'complex nexus of chance'. (shrink)

O presente artigo procura apresentar algumas das principais características do diálogo de Paul Ricoeur com a psicanálise freudiana no contexto da sua hermenêutica filosófica. Num primeiro momento, o artigo começa por se referir ao contacto inicial de Ricoeur com a problemática da psicanálise na obra La symbolique du mal. Num segundo momento, considerando a obra Essai sur Freud, o artigo procura situar a psicanálise como uma arqueologia do sujeito a ser conjugada com as instâncias teleológica (Hegel) e escatológica (filosofia da (...) religião). A cumplicidade das três instâncias representa o terceiro ponto do presente ensaio: o desejo transforma-se na instância comum entre elas. O quarto ponto explicita a articulação entre o arqueo-lógico/pulsional e o teleológico/espiritual no domínio da arte: o passado pulsional é subsumido nas dimensões teleológica e escatológica do sentido. O quinto ponto trata da figura do pai presente na imagem de Deus que se encontra na Bíblia: ele regressa de um modo que está para além do mero antropomorfismo, assinalado como está pela realização de promessas futuras. Uma tal figura provoca um repensar dos afectos arcaicos referentes ao medo da punição. Um sexto ponto oferece uma apreciação geral da hermenêutica filosófica de Ricoeur e da resistência que ela propõe a todas as formas de subjectivismo. Finalmente, o artigo refere-se ainda ao modo como fé e filosofia se encontram e se afectam mutuamente ao mesmo tempo que uma e outra mantêm as suas características distintas. /// The present article seeks to present some of the main features of Paul Ricoeur's dialogue with Freudian psychoanalysis in the context of his philosophical hermeneutics. To begin with, Ricoeurs initial contact with the problematic of psychoanalysis in La symbolique du mal will be treated. Secondly, considering Essai sur Freud, the article endeavors to place psychoanalysis as an archeology of the subject to be conjugated with teleological (Hegel) and eschatological (philosophy of religion) instances. The complicity of the three instances represents the thirdpoint of the present essay: desiring becomes the common theme between them. The fourth point explicates the articulation between the archeological/pulsional and teleological/ spiritual in the domain of art: the past pulsional is subsumed in a teleological and eschatological dimension of meaning. The fifth point deals precisely with the figure ofpaternity present in the image of God that the Bible produces: it returns in a way that is beyond mere antropomorphism, marked as it is by the realization of future promises. Such a figure provokes a rethinking about archaic affects concerning fear of punishment. A sixth point offers a general appreciation of Ricoeurs philosophical hermeneutics and the resistance it proposes to ali manner of subjectivism. Finally, the article deals with how faith and philosophy meet and affect each other positively while maintaining their distinctive features. (shrink)

This paper argues that if propensities are displayed in objective physical chances then the appropriate representation of these chances is as indexed probability functions. Two alternative formal models, or accounts, for the relation between propensity properties and their chancy or probabilistic manifestations, in terms of conditionals and conditional probability are first reviewed. It is argued that both confront important objections, which are overcome by the account in terms of indexed probabilities. A number of further advantages of the indexed probability account (...) are discussed, which suggest that it is promising as a general theory of objective physical chance. The paper ends with a discussion of the indexical character of the objective chances that are grounded in propensities. (shrink)

1Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TB, UKScience Without Laws Ronald Giere Chicago, IL University of Chicago Press 1999 x + 285 Hardback£17.50.

In this special issue we explore practices of scientific inquiry into human populations in Latin America in order to generate new insights into the complex historical and sociopolitical dynamics that have made certain human groups integral to the production of scientific knowledge in and about the region. In important contributions, other scholars have shown that the science of human difference is racist and all too often has been a mediator of development ideologies. To further unpack these arguments we focus attention (...) on the complex interaction between scientists and the populations they study. We explore cases from across the fields of evolutionary biology, demography, epidemiology... (shrink)

Kant and Heidegger argue that our subjectivity escapes scientific explanation, while also providing the conditions that enable it. This understanding of the relationship between subjectivity and science places limits on the explanatory scope of the sciences. But what makes transcendental reflection on the structure of subjectivity possible in the first place? Fink argues that transcendental philosophy encounters its own limits in attempting to characterize its own conditions of possibility. I argue that the limits of science and transcendental philosophy entail that (...) nature cannot be conceived as a specific object, or as a totality of objects in the world, but only as the ontological ground of phenomenal manifestation in general. Nature is not identical with anything discoverable in either science or phenomenology; it is, rather, the origin from which discovery of phenomena proceeds. (shrink)

It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC) can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, (...) which has moved on to consider the virtues of a generalised PCC-inspired condition, the so-called Causal Markov Condition (CMC). In this paper we argue that the CMC is an appropriate benchmark for debating possible causal explanations of the EPR correlations. But we go on to take issue with some pronouncements on EPR by defenders of the CMC. (shrink)

I argue against an account of scientific representation suggested by the semantic, or structuralist, conception of scientific theories. Proponents of this conception often employ the term “model” to refer to bare “structures”, which naturally leads them to attempt to characterize the relation between models and reality as a purely structural one. I argue instead that scientific models are typically “representations”, in the pragmatist sense of the term: they are inherently intended for specific phenomena. Therefore in general scientific models are not (...) (merely) structures. I then explore some consequences of this pragmatist account of representation, and argue that it sheds light upon the distinction between theories and models. I finish by briefly addressing some critical comments due to Bas Van Fraassen. (shrink)

Riassunto: Gli sviluppi recenti nell’ambito della ricerca sui processi decisionali relativi ai cosiddetti effetti di incorniciamento hanno ricevuto particolare attenzione da parte di quell’ambito della filosofia morale che si occupa di spiegare i dilemmi morali classici legati al famoso problema del carrello. Alcuni filosofi sostengono che illusioni cognitive come l’ effetto di incorniciamento mettano seriamente in discussione alcuni punti di vista classici della filosofia morale come, per esempio, l’ etica normativa e l’ intuizionismo morale. L’obiettivo di questo articolo è cercare (...) di mostrare se, alla luce della ricerca empirica sugli effetti di incorniciamento, possiamo mantenere un punto di vista intuizionista o meno e, più in generale, che cosa implichino questo genere di dati per la filosofia morale. Parole chiave: Filosofia morale; Intuizionismo; Effetti di inconiciamento; Dilemmi morali; Teoria del prospetto Should we Abandon Moral Intuitionism? Framing Effects and Moral Dilemmas: Recent developments in experimental research on decision-making have received attention from moral philosophers trying to explain classical moral dilemmas. The class of cognitive illusions known as framing effects have received particular attention because they appear to play a role in explaining the famous trolley-problem. Some philosophers maintain that cognitive illusions such as framing effects seriously undermine classical point of views in moral philosophy such as normative ethics and moral intuitionism. This essay investigates whether, in light of empirical research on framing effects, we can still maintain an intuitionist point of view, and what the available data imply in general for moral philosophy. Keywords: Moral Philosophy; Intuitionism; Framing Effects; Moral Dilemmas; Prospect Theory. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo analiza las posibilidades actuales de la propuesta de T. W. Adorno en torno a su visión de las relaciones entre el arte y la verdad; para esto se exploran algunos pasajes de Teoría estética, donde plantea dos ideas centrales en su reflexión: por un lado, los contenidos de verdad que se revelan en las obras de arte y, por otro, los alcances de una subjetividad individual que aún puede pensar en las posibilidades de una vida emancipada. Para (...) Adorno, las obras de arte son la expresión de una verdad concebida subjetivamente, pero que excede cualquier intención puramente individual y, como fuerza de resistencia, puede mostrar aquello que escapa a la representación objetiva. De acuerdo con esto, la hipótesis inicial es que, independientemente de la posición o intencionalidad del autor, el arte contribuye al esclarecimiento de diversos fenómenos éticos y políticos debido a la codificación histórica de la forma y, sobre todo, por la autonomía de la obra de arte.This article analyzes the current possibilities of T. W. Adorno’s proposal regarding his vision of the relationships between art and the truth; for this, some passages of Aesthetic Theory are explored, in which he raises two central ideas in his reflection: on the one hand, the truth contents that are revealed in the artworks and, on the other, the scopes of an individual subjectivity that can still think about the possibilities of an emancipated life. For Adorno, works of art are the expression of a truth that is subjectively conceived, but that exceed any purely individual intention and, as a force of resistance, can show what escapes objective representation. According to this, the initial hypothesis is that, regardless of the position or intentionality of the author, art contributes to the clarification of various ethical and political phenomena due to the historical codification of form and, above all, by the autonomy of the work of art. (shrink)

: This paper outlines a genuinely pragmatist conception of propensity, and defends it against common objections to the propensity interpretation of probability, prominently Humphreys’ paradox. The paper reviews the paradox and identifies one of its key assumptions, the identity thesis, according to which propensities are probabilities. The identity thesis is also involved in empiricist propensity interpretations deriving from Popper’s influential original proposal, and makes such interpretations untenable. As an alternative, I urge a return to Charles Peirce’s original insights on probabilistic (...) dispositions, and offer a reconstructed version of his pragmatist conception, which rejects the identity thesis. – Correspondence to: [email protected]. (shrink)

There has been an intense discussion, albeit largely an implicit one, concerning the inference of causal hypotheses from statistical correlations in quantum mechanics ever since John Bell’s first statement of his notorious theorem in 1966. As is well known, its focus has mainly been the so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (“EPR”) thought experiment, and the ensuing observed correlations in real EPR like experiments. But although implicitly the discussion goes as far back as Bell’s work, it is only in the last two decades that (...) it has become recognizably and explicitly a debate about causal inference in the quantum realm. The bulk of this paper is devoted to a review of three influential arguments in the philosophical literature that aim to show that causal models for the EPR correlations are impossible, due to Bas Van Fraassen, Daniel Hausman and Huw Price. I contend that all these arguments are inconclusive since they contain premises or presuppositions that are false, unwarranted, or at least controversial. Five different common cause models are outlined that seem perfectly viable for the EPR correlations. These models are then employed to illustrate various difficulties with the premises and presuppositions underlying Van Fraassen’s, Hausman’s and Price’s arguments. In all these cases it is argued that the difficulties cut deep against these authors’ own theories of causation and causal inference. My conclusions are that causal models for the EPR correlations remain viable, that philosophical work is still required to assess their relative virtues, and that in any case the mere theoretical conceivability and empirical possibility of these models sheds doubts over Van Fraassen’s, Hausman’s and (important elements in) Price’s theories of causation and causal inference. (shrink)

Johannes Kepler dedicated much of his work to discover a law for the refraction of light. Unfortunately, he formulated an incorrect law. Nevertheless, it was useful for anticipating the behavior of light in some specific conditions. Some believe that Kepler did not have the elements to formulate the law that was later accepted by the scientific community, that is, the Snell–Descartes law. However, in this paper, we propose a model that agrees with Kepler’s heuristics and that is also successful in (...) anticipating the behavior of light when it passes through a surface that separates two media with different optical densities. This model adopts strategies that were recommended by Kepler in two types of analogies. The obstacles that led to the failure of the two types of analogies are presented in the article, and we argue that the model proposed here could overcome these specific obstacles. Finally, we show how the proposed model could be articulated with Kepler’s metaphysics of light. (shrink)

En el artículo se ofrece un análisis crítico de la misión como inculturación del Evangelio, desde una perspectiva filosófico-teológica. Para comenzar, se exponen las deficiencias de la evangelización colonizadora en América. Posteriormente, se proponen dos posibles sentidos de la plantatio ecclesiae como meta de la misión. En tercer lugar, se esclarece la manera en la que se entiende la relación entre Evangelio y cultura en la Nueva Evangelización. La tesis por demostrar es que el principal problema al que está expuesta (...) la inculturación del Evangelio es la idolatría. (shrink)

In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show thatthis pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.