This article provides a critical view of the didactic transposition of the dominant approach to psychology, which is now extended to the psychology of education. First, we present the scientific principles used in psychology training. These principles concern the notion of participant, privileged research objects and the activity of the researcher. Following Habermas (1987), we demonstrate that this psychology participates in a “colonization of the lifeworld” and in its historico-cultural narrowing. Finally, we propose an epistemological and methodological alternative allowing a (...) re-reading of these three principles in a historico-cultural perspective. (shrink)

La présente collection d’articles vient clôturer la table ronde internationale « Architecture militaire, une culture partagée entre Grèce et Provence », qui s’est tenue du 23 au 24 novembre 2017 à la Maison méditerranéenne des sciences de l’homme à Aix‑en‑Provence. Cette rencontre a permis de rassembler des spécialistes des fortifications antiques et médiévales du monde méditerranéen, avec un accent particulier porté sur la Grèce et la Provence. L’approche, qui s’illustre par sa portée chrono...

L’automne 2009 vit de violentes pluies s’abattre sur l’Eubée. À Érétrie, plusieurs tombes et stèles funéraires apparurent dans le lit du ruisseau bordant le site à l’Ouest. Ces découvertes apportent un éclairage bienvenu sur les nécropoles érétriennes, encore mal connues. Par ailleurs, plusieurs murs antiques furent documentés : si certains s’apparentent aux murs du canal archaïque déjà relevés à la Porte de l’Ouest, d’autres datent de l’époque classique-hellénistique et ouvrent de nouvelles pistes de recherche concernant l’étude de l’enceinte et la (...) topographie de ce secteur. L’étude des stèles funéraires, dont la date va de l’extrême fin du ve à la seconde moitié du iiie s., donne lieu à des observations nouvelles sur des sujets aussi variés que les techniques de taille, la typologie et l’iconographie des monuments, l’onomastique et les composantes de la population érétrienne. (shrink)

Sylviane Agacinski has never shied away from controversy. Vilified by some--including many feminists--and celebrated by others as a pioneer of gender equality, she has galvanized the French political scene. Her articulation of the theory of "parity" helped inspire a law that went into effect in May 2000 requiring the country's political parties to fill 50 percent of the candidacies in every race with women. Sylviane Agacinski, according to _The New Yorker,_ "is sometimes credited with making _parité_ respectable." Agacinski (...) begins with the notion that sexual difference should be affirmed rather than denied. Sex, Agacinski points out, is not a social, cultural, or ethnic characteristic--it is a universal human trait. In her argument for the necessary recognition of sexual difference, she enters into today's most controversial social territory. Agacinski's model of parity does not strive for the nebulous ideal of "equality" between the sexes; instead, it demands a concrete formula for political contests: an equal number of female and male candidates in every election. It is a theory that has sparked impassioned debate across France: Are female politicians necessarily different from male politicians? Is parity democratic? Is it truly feminist? Agacinski's sophisticated polemic will stimulate debate on American shores as it has in France. _Parity of the Sexes_ sheds light on one of the crucial spheres of public life in which earlier French feminists left their work unfinished--the realm of political power. (shrink)

A review on the educational experience of students with disabilities, based on qualitative and quantitative surveys, questions the stated objectives of inclusive education policies. These studies show a more favourable experience in the specialized classe, due to a deteriorated relationship to schooling in the regular classroom and a sense of isolation and incompetence developed faced of difficulties. Research conducted in a bilingual French sign language-French written device, in secondary school with deaf and hearing students schooled together in the regular classroom, (...) suggests other stories. The way in which school and teaching situations are conducted within this aid system, engages these students in a rewarding and capaciting experience, to be a recognized student in the classroom and among peers. Learning French sign language, the work of translators at the linguistic as well as pedagogical and educational level, the supporting role of auxiliary teaching systems, participate in the process of accessing school situations, especially to educational accessibility, thus providing students with a space of opportunity to attend school. (shrink)

Ubiquitin is the most phylogenetically conserved protein known. This 8,500 Da polypeptide can be covalently attached to cellular proteins as a posttranslational modification. In most cases, the addition of multiple ubiquitin adducts to a protein targets it for rapid degradation by a multisubunit protease known as the 26S proteasome. While the ubiquitin/26S proteasome pathway is responsible for the degradation of the bulk of cellular proteins during homeostasis, it may also be responsible for the rapid loss of protein during the programmed (...) death of certain cells, such as skeletal muscle during insect metamorphosis. In addition, alterations in the expression and regulation of ubiquitin may play significant roles in pathological disorders. For example, dramatic increases in ubiquitin and ubiquitin‐protein conjugates are observed in a wide variety of neurodegenerative disorders, including Alzheimer's disease. Patients suffering from the autoimmune disease systemic lupus erythematosus generate antibodies reacting with ubiquitin and ubiquitinated histones. At present, it is not known whether these changes in ubiquitin expression and regulation initiate pathological changes in these diseases or if they are altered as a consequence of these disorders. (shrink)

What do we mean when we say time passes? How do contingency and anachronism and other philosophical concepts bearing on time affect the more (seemingly) concrete realities of our political and cultural lives? In ways small and great, personal and cultural, we all experience the mutability of time. We feel it expand and contract, speed up and slow down, as it bends to the imperatives of memory, money, and the media. In our own time (itself a pregnant phrase) we have (...) witnessed a disengagement with the past even as technological advances have allowed us to capture and reproduce past time as never before. How are we to make sense of this paradox? In this wide-ranging meditation on the meaning of time, Sylvaine Agacinski weaves together discussions of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Freud, Heidegger, Baudelaire, Barthes, and especially Walter Benjamin--her model for the modern "passer of time"--as she traces a time line of the philosophy of time. After examining how shifting attitudes toward the passage of time have affected everything from art criticism to the development of photography to the rise of modernism itself, Agacinski concludes by proposing a rethinking of democracy that emphasizes patience in the face of our current temporal frenzy. (shrink)

The visual attention (VA) span is defined as the amount of distinct visual elements which can be processed in parallel in a multi-element array. Both recent empirical data and theoretical accounts suggest that a VA span deficit might contribute to developmental dyslexia, independently of a phonological disorder. In this study, this hypothesis was assessed in two large samples of French and British dyslexic children whose performance was compared to that of chronological-age matched control children. Results of the French study show (...) that the VA span capacities account for a substantial amount of unique variance in reading, as do phonological skills. The British study replicates this finding and further reveals that the contribution of the VA span to reading performance remains even after controlling IQ, verbal fluency, vocabulary and single letter identification skills, in addition to phoneme awareness. In both studies, most dyslexic children exhibit a selective phonological or VA span disorder. Overall, these findings support a multi-factorial view of developmental dyslexia. In many cases, developmental reading disorders do not seem to be due to phonological disorders. We propose that a VA span deficit is a likely alternative underlying cognitive deficit in dyslexia. (shrink)

Existing scholarly work on corporate social responsibility frequently emphasizes either normative/ethical claims about social progress or instrumental/strategic claims about corporate effectiveness, yet less often acknowledges the moral conditions of those undertaking CSR within a specific cultural context. In this paper, we draw attention to the social conditions in which CSR takes place and the related ethics of the subjects that must enact it. Our approach is to document the lived experiences of practitioners in Romania, a post-communist society. Drawing from fifty-three (...) depth interviews with both corporate responsibility practitioners, and managers in non-profit organizations who together work on CSR projects, we describe their experiences of the social and organizational environment, the CSR practices that are undertaken in this context, and the intended and unintended consequences of such work. Using Bauman’s theorization of ethics, including adiaphora and moral distancing, and Borţun’s interpretation of Romanianness, we then theorize liquid CSR as an ambivalence between adiaphoric practice and the moral impulse to do good, resulting in both intended and unintended consequences. (shrink)

Employing theoretical resources from Transactional Analysis and drawing from interviews with managers dealing with social or environmental issues in their role, we explain how CSR activity provides a context for dramas in which actors may ignore, or discount aspects of self, others, and the contexts of their work as they maintain and reproduce the roles of Rescuers, Persecutors and Victims. In doing so, we add to knowledge about CSR by providing an explanation for how the contradictions of CSR are avoided (...) in practice even when actors may be aware of them. Specifically, we theorise how CSR work can produce dramatic stories where adversity is apparently overcome, whilst little is actually achieved at the social level. We also add to the range of psychoanalytic tools used to account for organisational behaviours, emphasising how TA can explain the relational dynamics of CSR. (shrink)

Fille de l’Encyclopédie (1751-1772, 28 vol.) de Diderot et d’Alembert, l’Encyclopédie méthodique (1782-1832, 212 vol.) de Panckoucke conserve la palme du gigantisme. Si la Révolution Française pendant laquelle est publié le Dictionnaire de Théologie, n’a rien changé ni aboli dans le domaine de la pensée, elle a changé les conditions d’exercice pour les directeurs scientifiques. De surcroit en synthétisant ce moment particulier des savoirs liant mots et choses, la Méthodique représente un chainon incontournable entre l’épistémé des Lumières et celle du (...) xixè siècle. Alors que l’Encyclopédie dans un Système figuré des connaissances humaines construisait un ordre encyclopédique à partir des trois facultés de l’entendement humain (mémoire, raison, imagination), Panckoucke, qui craint la polémique sur les renvois, réoriente cet ordre. Il découpe chaque article et organise des listes de matières à partir de l’Encyclopédie. L’ordre des matières ne vise que les choses de la science qui, dans chaque Dictionnaire, seront détaillées au mieux. Enfin pour conduire le lecteur dans la connaissance, une table analytique propose un ordre de lecture transformant le dictionnaire en traité didactique. Le Dictionnaire de Théologie relève un autre aspect de la pensée philosophique du Système figuré, à savoir, une séparation de la Théologie ou Science de Dieu, des deux autres sciences que sont la Science de l’homme et la Science de la nature. Le progrès va se faire avec ces deux Sciences, sans la Théologie. Bergier revient sur cette séparation traduite par l’évincement des théologiens de l’entreprise encyclopédique des Lumières. Il remplit alors parfaitement le rôle demandé par Panckoucke de corriger et de compléter celle que ce dernier appelle la « première Encyclopédie» voulant être le directeur de la seconde Encyclopédie. (shrink)

Breast cancer is a major public health challenge. Organized mammography screening (OS) is considered one way to reduce breast cancer mortality. EU recommendations prone mass deployment of OS, and back in 2004, France introduced a national OS programme for women aged 50–74 years. However, in 2012, participation rate was still just 52.7%, well short of the targeted 70% objective. In an effort to re-address the (in) efficiency of the programme, the French National Cancer Institute has drafted an expert-group review of (...) the ethical issues surrounding breast cancer mammography screening. (shrink)

The free-energy principle states that all systems that minimize their free energy resist a tendency to physical disintegration. Originally proposed to account for perception, learning, and action, the free-energy principle has been applied to the evolution, development, morphology, anatomy and function of the brain, and has been called a postulate, an unfalsifiable principle, a natural law, and an imperative. While it might afford a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between environment, life, and mind, its epistemic status is unclear. Also (...) unclear is how the free-energy principle relates to prominent theoretical approaches to life science phenomena, such as organicism and mechanism. This paper clarifies both issues, and identifies limits and prospects for the free-energy principle as a first principle in the life sciences. (shrink)

Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach (...) is overall better supported by the empirical evidence. So, to develop philosophical theories of mind on the basis of a realist interpretation of results from Bayesian cognitive science is unwarranted. Naturalistic philosophers of mind should instead adopt an anti-realist attitude towards these results and remain agnostic as to whether Bayesian models are true. For continuing on with an exclusive focus and praise of Bayes within debates about the predictive processing theory will impede progress in philosophical understanding of scientific practice in computational cognitive science as well as of the architecture of the mind. (shrink)

Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain (PTB) is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we examine a central case: activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems. After reviewing the three most prominent hypotheses of DA activity—the anhedonia, incentive salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses—we conclude that the evidence currently vindicates explanatory pluralism. This vindication implies that the grand unifying claims of advocates of PTB are unwarranted. More generally, (...) we suggest that the form of scientific progress in the cognitive sciences is unlikely to be a single overarching grand unifying theory. (shrink)

Colombo’s (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) plea for neural representationalism is the focus of a recent contribution to Phenomenology and Cognitive Science by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. In that paper, Hutto and Myin have tried to show that my arguments fail badly. Here, I want to respond to their critique clarifying the type of neural representationalism put forward in my (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) piece, and to take the opportunity to make a few remarks (...) of general interest concerning what Hutto and Myin have dubbed “the Hard Problem of Content.”. (shrink)

According to the free energy principle, life is an “inevitable and emergent property of any random dynamical system at non-equilibrium steady state that possesses a Markov blanket” :20130475, 2013). Formulating a principle for the life sciences in terms of concepts from statistical physics, such as random dynamical system, non-equilibrium steady state and ergodicity, places substantial constraints on the theoretical and empirical study of biological systems. Thus far, however, the physics foundations of the free energy principle have received hardly any attention. (...) Here, we start to fill this gap and analyse some of the challenges raised by applications of statistical physics for modelling biological targets. Based on our analysis, we conclude that model-building grounded in the free energy principle exacerbates a trade-off between generality and realism, because of a fundamental mismatch between its physics assumptions and the properties of actual biological targets. (shrink)

A widely shared view in the cognitive sciences is that discovering and assessing explanations of cognitive phenomena whose production involves uncertainty should be done in a Bayesian framework. One assumption supporting this modelling choice is that Bayes provides the best approach for representing uncertainty. However, it is unclear that Bayes possesses special epistemic virtues over alternative modelling frameworks, since a systematic comparison has yet to be attempted. Currently, it is then premature to assert that cognitive phenomena involving uncertainty are best (...) explained within the Bayesian framework. As a forewarning, progress in cognitive science may be hindered if too many scientists continue to focus their efforts on Bayesian modelling, which risks to monopolize scientific resources that may be better allocated to alternative approaches. (shrink)

According to a growing trend in theoretical neuroscience, the human perceptual system is akin to a Bayesian machine. The aim of this article is to clearly articulate the claims that perception can be considered Bayesian inference and that the brain can be considered a Bayesian machine, some of the epistemological challenges to these claims; and some of the implications of these claims. We address two questions: (i) How are Bayesian models used in theoretical neuroscience? (ii) From the use of Bayesian (...) models in theoretical neuroscience, have we learned or can we hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine? From actual practice in theoretical neuroscience, we argue for three claims. First, currently Bayesian models do not provide mechanistic explanations; instead they are useful devices for predicting and systematizing observational statements about people's performances in a variety of perceptual tasks. That is, currently we should have an instrumentalist attitude towards Bayesian models in neuroscience. Second, the inference typically drawn from Bayesian behavioural performance in a variety of perceptual tasks to underlying Bayesian mechanisms should be understood within the three-level framework laid out by David Marr ( [1982] ). Third, we can hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine to the extent that Bayesian models will prove successful in yielding secure and informative predictions of both subjects' perceptual performance and features of the underlying neural mechanisms. (shrink)

Life-science phenomena are often explained by specifying the mechanisms that bring them about. The new mechanistic philosophers have done much to substantiate this claim and to provide us with a better understanding of what mechanisms are and how they explain. Although there is disagreement among current mechanists on various issues, they share a common core position and a seeming commitment to some form of scientific realism. But is such a commitment necessary? Is it the best way to go about mechanistic (...) explanation? In this article, we propose an alternative antirealist account that also fits explanatory practice in the life sciences. We pay special attention to mechanistic models, i.e. scientific models that involve a mechanism, and to the role of coherence considerations in building such models. To illustrate our points, we consider the mechanism for the action potential. 1 Introduction2 Some Core Features of Mechanistic Explanation3 Scientific Realism and Mechanistic Explanation4 Antirealist Mechanistic Explanation: The Case of the Action Potential5 Some Outstanding Issues for the Antirealist Mechanist6 Two Problems for the Realist Mechanist7 Conclusions. (shrink)

This paper brings together results from the philosophy and the psychology of explanation to argue that there are multiple concepts of explanation in human psychology. Specifically, it is shown that pluralism about explanation coheres with the multiplicity of models of explanation available in the philosophy of science, and it is supported by evidence from the psychology of explanatory judgment. Focusing on the case of a norm of explanatory power, the paper concludes by responding to the worry that if there is (...) a plurality of concepts of explanation, one will not be able to normatively evaluate what counts as good explanation. (shrink)

Can facts about subpersonal states and events be constitutively relevant to personal-level phenomena? And can knowledge of these facts inform explanations of personal-level phenomena? Some philosophers, like Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell, argue for two negative answers whereby questions about persons and their behavior cannot be answered by using information from subpersonal psychology. Knowledge of subpersonal states and events cannot inform personal-level explanation such that they cast light on what constitutes persons? behaviors. In this paper I argue against this position. (...) After having distinguished between enabling and constitutive relevance, I defend the claim that at least some facts about subpersonal states and events are constitutively relevant to some personal-level phenomenon, and therefore can, and sometimes should, inform personal-level explanations. I draw some of the possible consequences of my claim for our understanding of personal-level behavior by focusing on the phenomenon of addiction. (shrink)

What is the relationship between the concepts of the predictive processing theory of brain functioning and the everyday concepts with which people conduct and explain their mental lives? To answer this question, we focus on predictive processing explanations of mental disorder that appeal to false inference. After distinguishing two concepts of false inference, we survey four ways of understanding the relationship between explanations of mental phenomena at the personal and sub-personal level. We then argue that if predictive processing accurately accounts (...) for psychological and socio-cultural dynamics, then personal and sub-personal concepts must display a looping relationship that can impact the nature of at least some mental phenomena. In particular, explaining the phenomenon of delusion in terms of the sub-personal concept of false inference should change the nature of delusional experiences themselves. (shrink)

Modularity is one of the most important concepts used to articulate a theory of cognitive architecture. Over the last 30 years, the debate in many areas of the cognitive sciences and in philosophy of psychology about what modules are, and to what extent our cognitive architecture is modular, has made little progress. After providing a diagnosis of this lack of progress, this article suggests a remedy. It argues that the theoretical framework of network science can be brought to bear on (...) the traditional modularity debate, facilitating our progress in articulating a good theory of the human cognitive architecture. (shrink)

Letheby’s "Philosophy of Psychedelics" relies on Predictive Processing to try and find unifying explanations relevant to understanding how serotonergic psychedelics work in psychiatric therapy, what subjective experiences are associated with their use and whether such experiences are epistemically defective. But if Predictive Processing lacks genuinely explanatory unifying power, Letheby’s account of psychedelic therapy risks being unwarranted. In this commentary, I motivate this worry and sketch an alternative interpretation of psychedelic therapy within the Reinforcement Learning framework.

In this volume, a range of high-profile researchers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and empirical cognitive science, critically engage with Clark's work across the themes of: Extended, Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, and Affective Minds; Natural Born Cyborgs; and Perception, Action, and Prediction. Daniel Dennett provides a foreword on the significance of Clark's work, and Clark replies to each section of the book, thus advancing current literature with original contributions that will form the basis for new discussions, debates and (...) directions in the discipline. (shrink)

How should we understand the claim that people comply with social norms because they possess the right kinds of beliefs and preferences? I answer this question by considering two approaches to what it is to believe (and prefer), namely: representationalism and dispositionalism. I argue for a variety of representationalism, viz. neural representationalism. Neural representationalism is the conjunction of two claims. First, what it is essential to have beliefs and preferences is to have certain neural representations. Second, neural representations are often (...) necessary to adequately explain behaviour. After having canvassed one promising way to understand what neural representations could be, I argue that the appeal to beliefs and preferences in explanations of paradigmatic cases of norm compliance should be understood as an appeal to neural representations. (shrink)