Algorithmic decision-making increasingly shapes people's daily lives. Given that such autonomous systems can cause severe harm to individuals and social groups, fairness concerns have arisen. A human-centric approach demanded by scholars and policymakers requires considering people's fairness perceptions when designing and implementing algorithmic decision-making. We provide a comprehensive, systematic literature review synthesizing the existing empirical insights on perceptions of algorithmic fairness from 58 empirical studies spanning multiple domains and scientific disciplines. Through thorough coding, we systemize the current empirical literature along (...) four dimensions: (1) algorithmic predictors, (2) human predictors, (3) comparative effects (human decision-making vs. algorithmic decision-making), and (4) consequences of algorithmic decision-making. While we identify much heterogeneity around the theoretical concepts and empirical measurements of algorithmic fairness, the insights come almost exclusively from Western-democratic contexts. By advocating for more interdisciplinary research adopting a society-in-the-loop framework, we hope our work will contribute to fairer and more responsible algorithmic decision-making. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce a new technique of proving undecidability results. This technique is based on the notion of a Thue tree. We also give examples of applications of this method to term rewriting, Horn implication problem and database dependencies.

The paper considers certain properties of intermediate and moda propositional logics.The first part contains a proof of the theorem stating that each intermediate logic is closed under the Kreisel-Putnam rule xyz/(xy)(xz).

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

This volume addresses foundational issues of context-dependence and indexicality, which are at the center of the current debate within the philosophy of language. Topics include the scope of context-dependency, the nature of content and the character of input data of cognitive processes relevant for the interpretation of utterances. There's also coverage of the role of beliefs and intentions as contextual factors, as well as the validity of arguments in context-sensitive languages. The contributions consider foundational issues regarding context-sensitivity from three different, (...) yet related, perspectives on the phenomenon of context-dependence: representational, structural, and functional. The contributors not only address the representational, structural and/or functional problems separately but also study their mutual connections, thus furthering the debate and bringing competing approaches closer to unification and consensus. This text appeals to students and researchers within the field. This is a very useful collection of essays devoted to the roles of context in the study of language. Its essays provide a useful overview of the current debates on this topic, and they put forth novel contributions that will undoubtedly be of relevance for the development of all areas in philosophy and linguistics interested in the notion of context. Stefano Predelli Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK. (shrink)

The problem of evil is a metaphysical problem bound up with the conditions of human existence. The radical evil of fascism and communism, according to Józef Tischner, opens up the possibility that we live in the time of a modern Manichaeism, understood as having two faces: nihilism and pessimism. The possibility of thinking of such a modem form of Manichaeism necessarily calls for a new inquiry into the question of evil. For Tischner, evil, like good, is not an object, but (...) something in which man participates, and for this reason it cannot be objectified and defined. One can only ask how it appears. (shrink)

Most theories of semantic competence in natural language implicitly assume the Language of Thought Hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, all human cognition consists in the deployment of a language of thought. This language of thought is supposed to be independent of natural language, yet at the same time, it is supposed to be semantically isomorphic with natural language. Given this assumption, it is easy to answer basic questions regarding semantic competence in natural language. What are semantic properties of natural language, (...) and how did they originate? Natural language inherits the semantic properties of the language of thought it is used to express. What does semantic competence consist in? It consists in knowing how to translate items in one's language of thought into a public medium. ;The starting point of this dissertation is the rejection, by some prominent paradigms in cognitive science, of the view that human cognition consists in the deployment of a language of thought that is, at the same time, independent of natural language, yet semantically isomorphic with it. The dissertation constitutes a fledgling attempt to explore an alternative approach to explaining semantic competence in natural language, an approach that is compatible with this rejection of the Language of Thought Hypothesis. ;Rather than conceive of natural language as a tool for expressing items in a pre-existing, semantically isomorphic, language of thought, I urge that language be conceived of as a norm-governed social practice. On this view, the semantic properties of natural language are determined by the inferential norms governing linguistic performances. In order to explain the origin of its semantic properties, one must explain the origin of the inferential norms that govern language. In order to explain what semantic competence consists in, one must explain how individuals learn to abide by these inferential norms. The bulk of the dissertation is devoted to showing that neither of these explanatory projects requires endorsing the Language of Thought Hypothesis. I do this by sketching the form that such explanations might take, and showing that they are consistent with much current research in ethology, comparative psychology, developmental psychology, and evolutionary biology. (shrink)

The paper contains a critical analysis of pluripropositionalism (or: multiple proposition approach), the view defended in recent years by authors such as Eros Corazza, Kepa Korta and John Perry.

I defend an alternative to the two traditional accounts of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognition as primary versus social cognition as primary. These accounts have complementary explanatory vices and virtues. They also share a natural assumption: that interpretation in terms of mental states is “spectatorial”, aiming exclusively for an objective description of the mental facts about self and others. I argue that if one rejects this assumption in favor of the view that interpretation in terms of mental (...) states also plays important regulative roles with respect to minds and behavior, a new and superior conception of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition comes into view. On this conception, person-level metacognitive concepts are socio-cognitive tools that shape us into better cognitive agents and more predictable cognitive objects, thereby enhancing our abilities at social coordination. Mastery of these metacognitive concepts relies on subpersonal, non-conceptual, procedural metacognition. This reconceptualization of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition combines the complementary explanatory virtues of the two traditional conceptions, while avoiding their complementary explanatory vices. (shrink)

The article analyzes the scope and depth of systemic differences between national economies in the modern world, focusing on the experience of Central Europe in the process of the enlargement of European Union. The core argument of the article is that the world needs not one model of development, but more diversity and more experimentation, encouraging entrepreneurship and institutional change. There is no one best model that can be implemented in any country, independent of its tradition and culture. Globalization as (...) well as integration is, beyond certain limits, harmful to future development. (shrink)

Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context (...) as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative. (shrink)

The article presents two concepts of indexicality. The first, more standard and narrow, identifies indexicality with systematic (meaning controlled) context-sensitivity. The second, broader (derived from the work of Jerzy Pelc), conceives indexicality in terms of the potential variability of the general semiotic characteristics expressions (with respect to the context of use). The text introduces the concept of a pragmatic matrix that serves for a schematic representation of contextual variation. I also recapitulate briefly the views of Jerzy Pelc on the meaning (...) (manner of use) and use of expressions, and briefly indicate its relationship approaches with contemporary debates around contextualism and status of non-sentential speech acts. Finally, the relationship between the broader notion of indexicality and the directival theory of meaning is analyzed. (shrink)

I review recent evidence that very young, pre-verbal infants attribute belief-like states when anticipating the behavior of others. This evidence is drawn from infant performance on non-verbal false belief tasks. I argue that, contrary to typical interpretations, such evidence does not show that infants attribute belief-like states. Rather, it shows that infants apply an enhanced version of what Gergely ( 2011 ) calls the “teleological stance” to brief bouts of behavior. This requires them to parse behavioral sequences into goals and (...) rationally/informationally-constrained means of achieving them; however, it does not require the attribution of unobservable mental states, like beliefs, that are causally responsible for behavior. (shrink)

Author: Wojewódzki Tadeusz Title: REMARKS BASED AN A WAY OF THINKING (Uwagi na kanwie sposobu myślenia) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 213-237 Keywords: JERZY KMITA, THEORY OF CULTURE, WAY OF THINKING, KNOWLEDGE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In the interpretation of the actions of communities, teams or organizations – it is crucial, according to the author of this publication, to consider their way of thinking. Referring to (...) Professor Jerzy Kmita’s theory of culture, the way of thinking adopted in the publication is identified based on values and knowledge that are shaped within the frame of the intellectual partnership, as well as being respected and applied in practice. The way of thinking – reproduced on the basis of the actual actions – can significantly deviate from that which is stated, accepted, or articulated as desired. Mental barriers determine this. Their identification is based – in the proposed concept – on an analysis of syndromes. The more significant the share of mental barrier syndromes is for the organization’s way of thinking, the greater the difference between the actual and desired state of affairs. The competences achieved through academic humanistic education are necessary in the blocking of mental barrier syndromes. From the perspective of the needs of modern organizations, skills in information processes appear to be very useful. The author attributes a special role to the quantification of knowledge. Reflections on the mental barrier syndromes are included by the author in The Theory of a thinking organization analogously to The Theory of a learning organization or The Theory of constraints. At the same time he highlights its interdisciplinary character and intellectual pedigree, pointing at the methodological school of Poznań, especially the thoughts of Professor Jerzy Kmita. (shrink)

This article contributes to the debate around the abilities of large language models such as GPT-3, dealing with: firstly, evaluating how well GPT does in the Turing Test, secondly the limits of such models, especially their tendency to generate falsehoods, and thirdly the social consequences of the problems these models have with truth-telling. We start by formalising the recently proposed notion of reversible questions, which Floridi & Chiriatti propose allow one to ‘identify the nature of the source of their answers’, (...) as a probabilistic measure based on Item Response Theory from psychometrics. Following a critical assessment of the methodology which led previous scholars to dismiss GPT’s abilities, we argue against claims that GPT-3 completely lacks semantic ability. Using ideas of compression, priming, distributional semantics and semantic webs we offer our own theory of the limits of large language models like GPT-3, and argue that GPT can competently engage in various semantic tasks. The real reason GPT’s answers seem senseless being that truth-telling is not amongst them. We claim that these kinds of models cannot be forced into producing only true continuation, but rather to maximise their objective function they strategize to be plausible instead of truthful. This, we moreover claim, can hijack our intuitive capacity to evaluate the accuracy of its outputs. Finally, we show how this analysis predicts that a widespread adoption of language generators as tools for writing could result in permanent pollution of our informational ecosystem with massive amounts of very plausible but often untrue texts. (shrink)