dr Tadeusz Adam Ożóg, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

The article is a comparative analysis of the philosophy of the Russian Religious Renaissance and the views of Marian Zdziechowski (1861–1938), a Polish religious thinker, historian of ideas, and historian of literature. Zdziechowski was also an expert on and promoter of Russian religious thought. As a thinker, he was influenced by it and attempted to cope with the same problems that were plaguing the Russians: the Bolshevik revolution, the decline of Christian religion and culture, and the imminent catastrophe of the (...) whole civilization. The paper describes the affinities between Zdziechowski and the Russian thinkers in detail, yet its main task is to grasp the differences between them, i.e., the distinctive features of Zdziechowski’s thought. The conclusion is that Zdziechowski, who—in contrast to the Russians—was not interested in the recent currents of Western philosophy, as a critic of historical Christianity and an eschatological thinker was less radical than the Russians, but as a philosopher of history he turns out to be a greater pessimist. An important part of the analysis is confrontation of literary styles typical for the Polish thinker and the Russians. A specific feature of Zdziechowski was his tendency to express his own views not in a straightforward manner, but rather by commenting and reconstructing other authors’ ideas. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the secrecy of politics in the context of sources and mechanisms of the legitimization of state power. The author formulates a thesis according to which the category of secrecy is inapplicable and inadequate beyond the form of power that is based on broad, purposive and rational legitimacy. Secret politics – which is in principle heteronomous and unjustifiable on the basis of the broadly understood idea of representation – is a technique that allows the power to (...) mediate between the subjective motivations of individuals and social groups and the objective good of a political community. This, in turn, exposes the multifaceted contradiction between real political subjectivity and autonomy and the ‘objective’ metaphysical horizon that lies at the foundations of this subjectivity. (shrink)

It is obvious that every inventor should be rewarded for the intellectual effort, and at the same time be encouraged to successively improve his or her discovery and to work on subsequent innovations. Patents also ensure that patent owners are officially protected against intellectual piracy, but protection of intellectual property may be difficult to accomplish. Nevertheless, it all comes down to this basic question: Does a contradiction exist between medical ethics and the “Medical and Surgical Procedure Patents” system? It may (...) well turn out that medical-procedure patents can have a negative influence on the standard of medical care. Medical-method patents may also interfere with the physician-patient relationship. At present, physicians do not question the usefulness of patent protection for medicines, biotechnology, equipment and devices, but they strongly oppose it for surgical procedures. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to pose a problem for theories that claim that belief reports are context dependent. Firstly, I argue that the claim is committed to verbalism, a theory that derives the context sensitivity of belief reports from the context sensitivity of the psychological verbs used in such reports. Secondly, I argue that verbalism is not an attractive theoretical option because it is in conflict with the non-proto-rigidity of verbs like ‘believe’. Finally, I describe various consequences that (...) the argument has for invariantism and moderate contextualism. (shrink)

The article presents two concepts of indexicality. The first, more standard and narrow, identifies indexicality with systematic (meaning controlled) context-sensitivity. The second, broader (derived from the work of Jerzy Pelc), conceives indexicality in terms of the potential variability of the general semiotic characteristics expressions (with respect to the context of use). The text introduces the concept of a pragmatic matrix that serves for a schematic representation of contextual variation. I also recapitulate briefly the views of Jerzy Pelc on the meaning (...) (manner of use) and use of expressions, and briefly indicate its relationship approaches with contemporary debates around contextualism and status of non-sentential speech acts. Finally, the relationship between the broader notion of indexicality and the directival theory of meaning is analyzed. (shrink)

Among ethical norms teleological and formal ones are distinguished. The former admit that a behaviour which tends to a realisation of a moral Good is ethical, and the latter determine an ethical behaviour as consonant to a norm. Teleological norms determine a behaviour showing its purpose, and the formal norms emphasize the relation to other people as their characteristics. The former determine a duty through the Good, the latter instead adopt the concept of duty as primordial. Therefore, the former may (...) be called axiological norms and the latter deontic ones. The deontic norms are either egalitarian, when they contain a postulate of equal rights: what I should have, under certain conditions, the same should have everybody when he fulfils these conditions, or elitarian, when they deny the postulate of egalitarism and grant larger rights to some chosen individuals or to some groups to a detriment of others. A possible third situation, when the rights of other people are considered to be above our owns can be connected with any of the two mentioned. A full system of norms should determine both a complex of Goods being aims of an ethical action and behaviour towards other individuals. It must contain, therefore, both axiological and deontic norms. In various ethics, in which only norms of one kind are specified, norms of the second kind are included in the former. (shrink)

I defend an alternative to the two traditional accounts of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognition as primary versus social cognition as primary. These accounts have complementary explanatory vices and virtues. They also share a natural assumption: that interpretation in terms of mental states is “spectatorial”, aiming exclusively for an objective description of the mental facts about self and others. I argue that if one rejects this assumption in favor of the view that interpretation in terms of mental (...) states also plays important regulative roles with respect to minds and behavior, a new and superior conception of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition comes into view. On this conception, person-level metacognitive concepts are socio-cognitive tools that shape us into better cognitive agents and more predictable cognitive objects, thereby enhancing our abilities at social coordination. Mastery of these metacognitive concepts relies on subpersonal, non-conceptual, procedural metacognition. This reconceptualization of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition combines the complementary explanatory virtues of the two traditional conceptions, while avoiding their complementary explanatory vices. (shrink)

Pod pewnymi względami niezaawansowany stan badań wirtualności w naukach informatycznych wskazuje na konieczność zgłębienia podstawowych kwestii jej dotyczących, tj. kwestii ontologicznych. Dopiero ich rozstrzygnięcie pozwoli rozwiązać zagadkę tworzenia i istnienia obiektów wirtualnych. Rozpatrzenie tych kwestii utrudnia fakt usuwania z dziedziny zainteresowań współczesnej filozofii metafizyki, a wraz z nią ontologii. Dlatego z powodów merytorycznej trafności odwołuję się do koncepcji ontologicznych oraz epistemologicznych, które mogą być wykorzystane do konstrukcji ontologicznych, wypracowanych dawniej w filozofii, które przez analogie lub inspiracje – jak wykazuję – (...) są obiecującymi kandydatami do zgłębienia zagadnień powstawania i istnienia obiektów wirtualnych. W artykule przedstawiam w skrótowej ekspozycji alternatywne rozstrzygnięcia tych dwóch problemów oraz status istnienia obiektów wirtualnych. Ujęcia te są inspirowane głównie przez relewantne poglądy Platona, Arystotelesa, Franza Brentano i Karla Poppera oraz zbiór koncepcji reprezentacji. (shrink)

In this paper, we are going to analyze the phenomenon of modal incompleteness from an algebraic point of view. The usual method of showing that a given logic L is incomplete is to show that for some L and some cannot be separated from by a suitably wide class of complete algebras — usually Kripke algebras. We are going to show that classical examples of incomplete logics, e.g., Fine logic, are not complete with respect to any class of complete BAOs. (...) Even above Grz it is possible to find a continuum of such logics, which immediately implies the existence of a continuum of neighbourhood-incomplete Grz logics. Similar results can be proved for Löb logics. In addition, completely incomplete logics above Grz may be found uniformly as a result of failures of some admissible rule of a special kind. (shrink)

The paper considers certain properties of intermediate and moda propositional logics.The first part contains a proof of the theorem stating that each intermediate logic is closed under the Kreisel-Putnam rule xyz/(xy)(xz).

Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context (...) as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative. (shrink)

The paper concerns the principles presupposed in political protest against the totalitarian regime. In contrast to the utilitarian view of participating in political protest the author tries to suggest the moral model of political protest. According to this model, the main reason and motif for challenging the regime is the transgression of the limits of concession, which jeopardizes the spiritual identity and essential qualities of the individuals and all groups. The participants of the protest do not calculate in terms of (...) egoistic or private interests and utilities but in terms of moral values. They consider what action is morally "good" and "bad" or morally "better" or "worse" in this situation, disregarding their personal profits and happiness. The overthrow of the communist system is an incalculating and contingent result of combating the extreme manifestations and worst excesses of the system. (shrink)

Artykuł omawia postać Jerzego Grobickiego, który służył jako oficer armii cesarsko-królewskiej i został pułkownikiem Wojska Polskiego w II RP. Brał udział w I i II wojnie światowej, a po wojnie wyemigrował do Kanady.