This paper presents the design and development of intelligent tutoring system for teaching Oracle. The Oracle Intelligent Tutoring System (OITS) examined the power of a new methodology to supporting students in Oracle programming. The system presents the topic of Introduction to Oracle with automatically generated problems for the students to solve. The system is dynamically adapted at run time to the student’s individual progress. An initial evaluation study was done to investigate the effect of using the intelligent tutoring system on (...) the performance of students. (shrink)

We prove the following main theorem: Let be an abstract elementary class satisfying the joint embedding and the amalgamation properties with no maximal models of cardinality μ. Let μ be a cardinal above the the Löwenheim‐Skolem number of the class. If is μ‐Galois‐stable, has no μ‐Vaughtian Pairs, does not have long splitting chains, and satisfies locality of splitting, then any two ‐limits over M, for, are isomorphic over M.

Critics of multiple realizability have recently argued that we should concentrate solely on actual here-and-now realizations that are found in nature. The possibility of alternative, but unactualized, realizations is regarded as uninteresting because it is taken to be a question of pure logic or an unverifiable scenario of science fiction. However, in the biological context only a contingent set of realizations is actualized. Drawing on recent work on the theory of neutral biological spaces, the paper shows that we can have (...) ways of assessing the modal dimension of multiple realizability that do not have to rely on mere conceivability. (shrink)

Basic results on the model theory of substructures of a fixed model are presented. The main point is to avoid the use of the compactness theorem, so this work can easily be applied to the model theory of L ω 1 ,ω and its relatives. Among other things we prove the following theorem: Let M be a model, and let λ be a cardinal satisfying λ |L(M)| = λ. If M does not have the ω-order property, then for every $A (...) \subseteq M, |A| \leq \lambda$ , and every $\mathbf{I} \subseteq M$ of cardinality λ + there exists $\mathbf{J} \subseteq \mathbf{I}$ of cardinality λ + which is an indiscernible set over A. This is an improvement of a result of S. Shelah. (shrink)

Luck (2009) argues that gamers face a dilemma when it comes to performing certain virtual acts. Most gamers regularly commit acts of virtual murder, and take these acts to be morally permissible. They are permissible because unlike real murder, no one is harmed in performing them; their only victims are computer-controlled characters, and such characters are not moral patients. What Luck points out is that this justification equally applies to virtual pedophelia, but gamers intuitively think that such acts are not (...) morally permissible. The result is a dilemma: either gamers must reject the intuition that virtual pedophelic acts are impermissible and so accept partaking in such acts, or they must reject the intuition that virtual murder acts are permissible, and so abstain from many (if not most) extant games. While the prevailing solution to this dilemma has been to try and find a morally relevant feature to distinguish the two cases, I argue that a different route should be pursued. It is neither the case that all acts of virtual murder are morally permissible, nor are all acts of virtual pedophelia impermissible. Our intuitions falter and produce this dilemma because they are not sensitive to the different contexts in which games present virtual acts. (shrink)

A natural starting point for theories of perceptual states is ordinary perception, in which a subject is successfully related to her mind-independent surroundings. Correspondingly, the simplest theory of perceptual states models all such states on perception. Typically, this simple, common-factor relational view of perceptual states has received a perfunctory dismissal on the grounds that hallucinations are nonperceptual. But I argue that the nonperceptual view of hallucinations has been accepted too quickly. I consider three observations thought to support the view, and (...) argue that all three are dealt with equally well by an alternative view, illusionism, on which hallucinations do involve perception. Since this is so, adopting a common-factor relational view of all perceptual states remains a tenable option. (shrink)

The gamer’s dilemma offers three plausible but jointly inconsistent premises: (1) Virtual murder in video games is morally permissible. (2) Virtual paedophelia in video games is not morally permissible. (3) There is no morally relevant difference between virtual murder and virtual paedophelia in video games. In this paper I argue that the gamer’s dilemma can be understood as one of three distinct dilemmas, depending on how we understand two key ideas in Morgan Luck’s (2009) original formulation. The two ideas are (...) those of (1) occurring in a video game and (2) being a virtual instance of murder or paedophelia. Depending on the weight placed on the gaming context, the dilemma is either about in-game acts or virtual acts. And depending on the type of virtual acts we have in mind, the dilemma is either about virtual representations or virtual partial reproductions of murder and paedophelia. This gives us three dilemmas worth resolving: a gaming dilemma, a representation dilemma, and a simulation dilemma. I argue that these dilemmas are about different issues, apply to different cases, and are susceptible to different solutions. I also consider how different participants in the debate have interpreted the dilemma in one or more of these three ways. (shrink)

How do we assign values to virtual items, which include virtual objects, properties, events, subjects, worlds, environments, and experiences? In this article, I offer a framework for answering this question. After considering different value theses in the literature, I argue that whether we think these theses mutually exclusive or not turns on our view about the number of value-salient kinds virtual items belong to. Virtual monism is the view that virtual Xs belong to only one value-salient kind in relation to (...) X. Virtual pluralism is the view that they belong to more than one value-salient kind. I argue for two claims. First, virtual monism is mistaken. Minimally some virtual Xs are Xs, while others are not. Second, dualistic virtual pluralism is also mistaken because it is too coarse grained. Instead, I argue for fourfold pluralism: virtual items either represent an original's properties or reproduce essential properties and do so to lesser or greater extents. This gives us four value-salient kinds of virtual X: virtual reproductions, simulations, representations, and simulacra of X. I apply this view to various debates in the literature and conclude with a discussion of less basic hybrid kinds. (shrink)

We present a self-contained exposition of the basic aspects of simple theories while developing the fundamentals of forking calculus. We expound also the deeper aspects of S. Shelah's 1980 paper Simple unstable theories. The concept of weak dividing has been replaced with that of forking. The exposition is from a contemporary perspective and takes into account contributions due to S. Buechler, E. Hrushovski, B. Kim, O. Lessmann, S. Shelah and A. Pillay.

Recently, several critics of the multiple realizability thesis have argued that philosophers have tended to accept the thesis on too weak grounds. On the one hand, the analytic challenge has problematized how philosophers have treated the multiple realization relation itself, claiming that assessment of the sameness of function and the relevant difference of realizers has been uncritical. On the other hand, it is argued that the purported evidence of the thesis is often left empirically unverified. This paper provides a novel (...) strategy to answer these worries by introducing a role for multiple realizability in the context of biological engineering. In the field of synthetic biology, bioengineers redesign the evolutionary realizations of biological functions, even constructing artificial chemical surrogates in the laboratory. I show how in the rational design approach to biological engineering, multiple realizability can function as a design heuristic in which the sameness of function and difference of realizers can be controlled. Although practically motivated, this engineering approach has also a theoretical, exploratory component that can be used to study the empirical limitations of multiple realizability. Successful realization of the engineering designs would amount to a concrete demonstration of multiple realizability, taking evidence for MRT beyond what is readily found in nature. (shrink)

We introduce tame abstract elementary classes as a generalization of all cases of abstract elementary classes that are known to permit development of stability-like theory. In this paper, we explore stability results in this new context. We assume that [Formula: see text] is a tame abstract elementary class satisfying the amalgamation property with no maximal model. The main results include:. Theorem 0.1. Suppose that [Formula: see text] is not only tame, but [Formula: see text]-tame. If [Formula: see text] and [Formula: (...) see text] is Galois stable in μ, then [Formula: see text], where [Formula: see text] is a relative of κ from first order logic. [Formula: see text] is the Hanf number of the class [Formula: see text]. It is known that [Formula: see text]. The theorem generalizes a result from [17]. It is used to prove both the existence of Morley sequences for non-splitting and the following initial step towards a stability spectrum theorem for tame classes:. Theorem 0.2. If [Formula: see text] is Galois-stable in some [Formula: see text], then [Formula: see text] is stable in every κ with κμ=κ. For example, under GCH we have that [Formula: see text] Galois-stable in μ implies that [Formula: see text] is Galois-stable in μ+n for all n < ω. (shrink)

Our sense of entitlement influences our interactions and attitudes in a range of specific relational contexts, one of them being aging parents’ relationships with their adult children. This study aimed to examine the factor structure of the Sense of Relational Entitlement—aging parents toward their offspring, an 11-item questionnaire that assesses aging people’s sense of relational entitlement toward their children, and examine the associations of its subscales with related personality and mental health constructs. One thousand and six participants, aged 65–99, with (...) at least one child, completed the SRE-ao, Brief Symptom Inventory, Loneliness Scale, and General Belongingness scale. The SRE-ao demonstrated good construct structure using confirmatory factor analysis. Both SRE-ao subscales were significantly and positively associated with anxiety, depression, somatization and sense of loneliness and negatively with sense of belonging. When all variables were entered into a regression model, age, anxiety, and low sense of belonging, but not sense of loneliness, positively predicted both restricted and inflated sense of entitlement. Somatization negatively predicted inflated sense of entitlement. The SRE-ao is a reliable and valid scale that can be used in clinical practice and research to enhance our understanding of parent–child relationships throughout the lifespan. (shrink)

Coference papers from the X National Seminar of Theory and History of the Art carried out in Medellín to address certain implications that the question entails, for both art and philosophy. For art: Why and since when do we think that art without aesthetics is something reprehensible or desirable? For philosophy: Is it irremovable or not the turn that the philosophical aesthetic took towards the experience of art from the eighteenth century? At the heart of these questions is a basic (...) concern: Who needs more aesthetics (taste, pleasure, beauty): art or human life?. (shrink)

The global spread of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices is widely explained in institutional-isomorphic terms: Corporations worldwide adopt CSR in reaction to isomorphic pressures exerted on them by a pro-CSR global environment, including normative calls for CSR, activist targeting, civil regulation frameworks, and educational activities. By contrast, this article considers the proactive agency of corporations in CSR diffusion, which is informed by nonmarket strategies that seek to instrumentally reshape the political and social environment of corporations. Applying a “channels-of-diffusion” perspective, we (...) show that in the initial phase of CSR’s transnational diffusion—as exemplified by the cases of Venezuela (1962-1967) and Britain (1977-1981)—CSR traveled through learning exchanges between business elite “exporters” and “importers” whose engagement in diffusion addressed crisis-enhanced political threats and opportunities in the receiving country. The focal agents established national CSR business associations, which disseminated among local corporations CSR practices adapted to confront the challenges at hand. We identify the features of such “business-led cross-national diffusions of CSR”; formulate propositions regarding their conditions, dynamics, and effects; and suggest that further research of this mode of diffusion would advance a more nuanced and balanced understanding of CSR’s globalization. (shrink)

A widely held assumption is that hallucinations are not a type of perception. Coupled with the idea that hallucinations possess phenomenal character, this assumption raises a problem for naive realism, which maintains that phenomenal character is at least partly constituted by perceived worldly objects. Naive realists have typically responded by adopting a disjunctive view of phenomenal character. But in what follows, I argue that to resolve the conflict we should instead reject the idea that hallucinations are not a type of (...) perception. I argue that this idea is supported by six alleged differences between hallucination and perception, but these differences are all accommodated for in a particular type of perception, picture perception. Drawing on picture perception’s resources, I offer an account of hallucinations which construes them as a type of perception, and does so in a way that that preserves their idiosyncrasies and varieties, and in a way compatible with naive realism. (shrink)

Besides having potential medical and biosafety applications, as well as challenging the foundations of biological engineering, xenobiology can also shed light on the epistemological and metaphysical questions that puzzle philosophers of science. This paper reviews this philosophical aspect of xenobiology, focusing on the possible multiple realizability of life. According to this hypothesis, what ultimately matters in understanding life is its function, not its particular building blocks. This is because there should, in theory, be many different ways to build the same (...) function. The possibility of multiple realizability was originally raised in the context of AI’s hypothesized capacity to realize mental functions. Because we still do not have any incontrovertible examples of digital minds, not to mention alien life of foreign biochemistry, the best way to test this philosophical idea is to examine the recent results and practices of synthetic biology and xenobiology. (shrink)

In this paper, I will show that typical formal semantic reconstructions of the rigidity of proper names neglect the important aspect that the rigidity of names is determined by our ordinary use of a name relative to the actual world. This fact was clearly pointed out by Kripke, but overlooked by the subsequent discussion concerning this topic. Based on this diagnosis, I will distinguish three different actualized notions of rigidity. Firstly, I will introduce two different new varieties of known versions (...) of rigidity; namely, actualized persistent and actualized obstinate rigidity. Secondly, I will make use of the tools provided by free logic and introduce a new and overlooked version of rigidity, which I will call actually restricted rigidity. Against this background, I will argue that we have different options to formally model the rigidity of proper names in natural languages. Which option we choose, mainly depends on our philosophical background assumptions. For someone who believes in non-existent objects and the possibility of naming such objects, it is the best choice to hold that proper names are actually obstinately rigid designators. For someone who rejects non-existent objects and the possibility of naming such objects, actually restricted rigidity is a better choice than actualized persistent rigidity. (shrink)

Let M be a given model with similarity type L = L(M), and let L' be any fragment of L |L(M)| +, ω of cardinality |L(M)|. We call $N \prec M L'$ -relatively saturated $\operatorname{iff}$ for every $B \subseteq N$ of cardinality less than | N | every L'-type over B which is realized in M is realized in M is realized in N. We discuss the existence of such submodels. The following are corollaries of the existence theorems. (1) If (...) M is of cardinality at least $\beth_{\omega_1}$ , and fails to have the ω order property, then there exists $N \prec M$ which is relatively saturated in M of cardinality $\beth_{\omega_1}$ . (2) Assume GCH. Let ψ ∈ L_{ω_1, ω, and let $L' \subseteq L_{\omega 1, \omega$ be a countable fragment containing ψ. If $\exists \chi > \aleph_0$ such that $I(\chi, \psi) , then for every $M \models \psi$ and every cardinal $\lambda of uncountable cofinality, M has an L'-relatively saturated submodel of cardinality λ. (shrink)

We present Saharon Shelah's Stability Spectrum and Homogeneity Spectrum theorems, as well as the equivalence between the order property and instability in the framework of Finite Diagrams. Finite Diagrams is a context which generalizes the first order case. Localized versions of these theorems are presented. Our presentation is based on several papers; the point of view is contemporary and some of the proofs are new. The treatment of local stability in Finite Diagrams is new.

This study probes whether a prosopagnosic patient can make accurate explicit affective judgements towards faces. Patient MJH was shown photographs of faces of well-liked family members and public figures rated as “evil” by opinion polls. MJH was asked to rate each face on two 7-point scales (Likeability and Pleasantness). Since he is unable to explicitly recognise faces, his ratings were based on his evaluative reaction to the faces presented. In a second phase of the experiment, MJH was told the name (...) of the faces previously presented and asked to rate them using the same scales. MJH's Likeability ratings during the picture-viewing phase of the experiment and the explicit phase were highly correlated. Based on these findings, we propose that thought consists of an explicit declarative and an implicit emotional aspect, which may become dissociated in prosopagnosia. (shrink)

There is a complex interplay between the models in dark matter detection experiments that have led to a difficulty in interpreting the results of the experiments and ascertain whether we have detected the particle or not. The aim of this paper is to categorise and explore the different models used in said experiments, by emphasizing the distinctions and dependencies among different types of models used in this field. With a background theory, models are categorised into four distinct types: background theory, (...) theoretical, phenomenological, experimental and data. This taxonomy highlights how each model serves a unique purpose and operates under varying degrees of independence from their respective frameworks. A key focus is on the experimental model, which is shown to rely on constraints from both data and phenomenological ones. The article argues that while theoretical models provide a backdrop for understanding the nature of dark matter, the experimental models must stand independently, particularly in their methodological approaches. This is done via a discussion of the inherent challenges in dark matter detection, such as inconsistent results and difficulties in cross-comparison, stemming from the diverse modelling approaches. (shrink)

A central debate in the philosophy of virtual reality (VR) focuses on the reality of virtual items. Broadly, there are two main disagreements. Some views accept a metaphysical orientation to VR, and disagree on the reality of virtual items. For instance, David Chalmers (Disputatio 9(46):309-352, 2017, Disputatio 11(55):453- 486, 2019, 2022) defends digitalism, the view that virtual items are real digital items. Neil McDonnell & Nathan Wildman (Disputatio 11(55):371-397, 2019), by contrast, defend fictionalism, which maintains that virtual items are unreal (...) fictions. Other views, like Grant Tavinor’s (2021), reject the metaphysical orientation, argu- ing that focusing on the reality of virtual items is a mistake. In what follows I evalu- ate these two disagreements. I argue that experiences of virtual items depend on episodes of picture perception. Recognizing this reveals that the current debates are either easily resolved in favor of one view, or are not disagreeing about the reality of virtual items, but about what virtual items are. (shrink)

Volume 23, Issue 2, April 2024, Page 187-223.

My dissertation contributes to a central and ongoing debate in the philosophy of perception about the fundamental nature of perceptual states. Such states include cases like seeing, hearing, and tasting, as well as cases of merely seeming to see, hear, and taste. A central question about these states arises in light of misperceptual phenomena. While a commonsensical view of perceptual states construes them as simply relating us to the external and mind independent world, some misperceptual cases suggest that these states (...) fall short of such world-contact. The result is that perceptual states are either thought to fundamentally consist in a highest common factor that falls short of perceptual contact with the world, or are thought to be disjunctive in nature, with some cases involving perceptual contact, and others receiving a different analysis. Contrary to these views, I argue that no misperceptual cases compromise perceptual contact with the world. So perceptual starts should be thought in terms of a relation to the external and mind-independent world. I call this view I defend 'pure relationalism', and the view of misperceptual cases that makes pure relationalism possible 'illusionism'. (shrink)

Several recent accounts of modeling have focused on the modal dimension of scientific inquiry. More precisely, it has been suggested that there are specific models and modeling practices that are best understood as being geared towards possibilities, a view recently dubbed modal modeling. But modalities encompass much more than mere possibility claims. Besides possibilities, modal modeling can also be used to investigate contingencies, necessities or impossibilities. Although these modal concepts are logically connected to the notion of possibility, not all models (...) are equal in their affordances for these richer modal inferences. This paper investigates the modal extent of selected models and argues that analyzing singular model-target pairings by themselves is typically not enough to explain their modal aptness or to identify the kinds of modalities they can be used to reason about. Furthermore, it is argued that some important concepts that are not explicitly modal - like biological robustness - can be understood modally through their relational nature to a background space of possibilities. In conclusion, it is suggested that the strategy of modal modeling is contrastive, situating particular possibilities in larger modal spaces and studying the structural relations within them. (shrink)

Metaphors of mind and their elaboration into models serve a crucial explanatory role in psychology. In this article, an attempt is made to describe how biology and engineering provide the predominant metaphors for contemporary psychology. A contrast between the discursive and descriptive functions of metaphor use in theory construction serves as a platform for deliberation upon the pragmatic consequences of models derived therefrom. The conclusion contains reflections upon the possibility of an integrative interdisciplinary psychology.

I contrast two notions of cognition offered in Joseph LeDoux’s (2019) The Deep History of Ourselves toward arguing for the functional role of affect and consciousness in the evolution of matter. I argue that an emphasis on the cultural construction of emotions misrepresents the relationship between culture and biology. A more parsimonious story about the evolution of mind requires leaving behind some aspects of a cognitivist epistemology.

The idea that reason can justify induction was famously criticized by David Hume. Hume concluded that there is no rational justification for inductive inferences and hence, no rational justification for most of our daily beliefs. Many philosophers attempted to solve Hume's problem with no success. Bertrand Russell commented regarding Hume's problem: "[if we cannot justify induction] we have no reason to expect the sun to rise tomorrow, to expect bread to be more nourishing than a stone, or to expect that (...) if we throw ourselves off the roof we shall fall." The New Riddle of Induction was introduced by Nelson Goodman in his book Fact, Fiction and Forecast, published in 1954. Goodman's problem raised some serious doubts about our ability even to describe inductive principles. In this Book Rami Israel is attempting to solve Both Hume's and Goodman's philosophical problems by introducing a new approach to the subject and by drawing a new picture of our inductive practices. (shrink)