Humans have arguably become a geological force that is changing the planet in profound and catastrophic ways. But what are the human practices that have such force? In this paper, we argue that work is exactly such a practice and that it is as workers that many of us are agents of global environmental change. When carbon dioxide is emitted or forests are cut down, someone is working. Yet we lack adequate descriptive and normative theories of work to understand how (...) we are a geological force. In this paper, we suggest possible beginnings for an environmental philosophy of work. (shrink)

The trilogy Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition investigates how Aristotle and his ancient and medieval successors understood the relation between the external world and the human mind. It gives an equal footing to the three most influential linguistic traditions - Greek, Latin, and Arabic - and offers insightful interpretations of historical theories of perception, dreaming, and thinking. This first volume focuses on sense perception and discusses philosophical questions concerning the external senses, their classification, and their functioning, from Aristotle (...) to Brentano. (shrink)

In Perception and the Internal Senses Juhana Toivanen offers a philosophical reconstruction of Peter of John Olivi’s (ca. 1248-98) conception of the cognitive psychology of the sensitive or animal soul.

We take up Jason Brennan’s critique of democracy as formulated in his monograph _Against Democracy_ (2016) and discuss the arguments that Åsa Wikforss presents against Brennan’s views in her book _Därför demokrati_ (2021). Both authors grant the importance of knowledge for political decision-making, but they differ in their respective understandings of what counts as knowledge and they draw very different conclusions from the relevant knowledge requirement. Our general aim is to detect problems in democracy as well as in attempts to (...) criticize democracy. We also briefly consider Brennan’s positive proposal to replace democracy by “epistocracy”, a form of government according to which only those citizens are entitled to vote who are “competent” in a sense to be discussed. Our aim is not to propagate any particular form of government. We merely wish to help the reader to recognize that democracy in particular involves a whole lot of assumptions that are in need of a better justification than what is normally provided. (shrink)

In this article, I present a formal semantic framework that renders explicit how to reconcile the condition that a proposition about a contingent future event is true at a moment t0 with the idea that at t0, this proposition is ‘truth-maker indeterminate’: a state of affairs making it true will obtain later on, though no such state of affairs obtains at t0. The semantics I formulate employs ‘open temporal models’. They represent the passage of time by a specific component termed (...) time-resource, which acts on durations construed as model-external inputs. A model does not by itself specify which course of events gets actualized in a given duration depending on the latest moment that has already got actualized. A time-resource merely represents schematically the dependence between a moment t and a course of events that gets actualized in a time-span of a given length counted from t; until that much time has indeed passed, it is not fixed which course of events actually extends t. Further, I introduce evaluations as a fine-grained tool for studying truth-conditions of tensed formulas, and I use this tool to define the notion of truth-maker. I define what it means that a truth-maker will obtain but does not, and what it means for a truth-maker to be determinate. It is proven that my semantic analysis retains the desirable link between determinacy and historical necessity—namely, a truth-maker of a proposition being determinate entails that the proposition is historically necessary. (shrink)

This article presents and analyses a social-practice contextualist version of meaning holism, whose main root lies in American pragmatism. Proposing that beliefs depend on systems of language-use in social practices, which involve communities of people and worldly objects, such meaning holism effectively breaks down the Enlightenment tradition’s philosophical subject–object dualism (and scepticism). It also opens the human mind up for empirical research – in a ‘sociologizing’, ‘anthropologizing’ and ‘historicizing’ vein. The article discusses the implications of this approach for the human (...) sciences, for instance certain parallel developments in anthropology and archaeology. (shrink)

This article discusses the Mekrijärvi boreal lake system in North Karelia, Finland, and the Koitajoki river. It traces historico-cultural interactions with the lake, from its role as an epicenter of Karelian rune singing and traditional practices, to the natural and cultural disruptions caused by large-scale natural resource extraction that shattered forests, peatlands, and waterbodies, and on into a new era of restoration. In the 2000s a community-driven NGO began to document oral histories and scientific evidence of the lake’s condition. In (...) the 2020s, this effort evolved into a landscape-scale eco-cultural revitalization effort. Habitat for endangered whitefish and degraded peatlands are being restored and traditional knowledge has become a central force in rebuilding and re-imagining traditional northern societies. Snippets of personal memories and oral poetry offer a window into a unique boreal world which, though once thought to be lost, is in a state of re-discovery and healing. (shrink)

In 1992, Bengt Hägglund put forward a thesis according to which a codex in his possession is based on material Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646) authored in 1611, maintaining that the codex gives us information about Rudbeckius's lectures on _loci theologici_ in Uppsala during the years 1611–1613 and that it reveals to us characteristic features of Rudbeckius's thinking about dogmatics. Hägglund published the codex in 2001. I point out, first, weaknesses in Hägglund's argumentation. Second, I present indirect evidence against his thesis employing (...) the two series of Rudbeckius's published dissertations on dogmatics (1611–1613, 1620–1644) and his own comments about his lectures. Third, I indicate that three parts of the codex that are particularly important for Hägglund's argumentation stem from other authors: the introductory part on the nature of theo­logy, as well as the chapter on _locus de ecclesia_, have their origin in Jesper Brochmand's _Universae theologiae systema_ (1633), while the conclusion is taken from a dissertation that Balthasar Meisner published in 1614. The codex does not allow us to access a work Rudbeckius would have authored in 1611: it contains too many parts he cannot have authored then. In particular, the introduction and the conclusion of the codex do not tell us anything about Rudbeckius's characteristic thoughts on dogmatics. Hägglund's main reason for thinking that the codex is a transcript of Rudbeckius's work from 1611 is a date mentioned at the end of locus of the church. As it happens, this locus is borrowed from Brochmand, not from Rudbeckius. (shrink)

The present article delves into the history of political philosophy by discussing human sociability in Antonio Montecatini’s (1537–99) commentary on Aristotle’s Politics. The focus is on a philosophical analysis of three interrelated ideas that Montecatini discusses: (1) Aristotle’s dictum that human beings are political animals by nature; (2) naturalness of the household; and (3) the nature and origin of political communities. Montecatini’s views are briefly related to a contemporary of his, John Case (ca. 1546–1600), and they are also contextualized within (...) the late medieval commentary tradition on the Politics, but the main aim is to clarify Montecatini’s philosophical position and examine the ways in which he deviates from Aristotelian naturalism in political philosophy. This paves the way to a deeper understanding of the developments that led to early modern innovations. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the reception of Avicenna’s well-known “flying man” thought experiment in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin philosophy. The central claim is that the argumentative role of the thought experiment changed radically in the latter half of the thirteenth century. The earlier authors—Dominicus Gundissalinus, William of Auvergne, Peter of Spain, and John of la Rochelle—understood it as an ontological proof for the existence and/or the nature of the soul. By contrast, Matthew of Aquasparta and Vital du Four used the flying (...) man as an argument for the soul’s ability to be directly aware of itself. A detailed analysis of the views of these authors shows interesting philosophical differences between them and reveals how one of the crucial premises of the original thought experiment—namely that the flying man is unaware of his body—loses its importance due to the changes in the argumentative role that is assigned to it. The most radical example of a new way of understanding bodily self-awareness is Peter Olivi’s so-called ‘man before the creation.’. (shrink)

In The Political Animal in Medieval Philosophy Juhana Toivanen investigates what medieval philosophers meant when they argued that human beings are political animals by nature. He analyses the notion of ‘political animal’ from various perspectives and shows its relevance to philosophical discussions concerning the foundations of human sociability, ethics, and politics. -/- Medieval authors thought that social life stems from the biological and rational nature of human beings, and that collaboration with other people promotes prosperity and good life. (...) class='Hi'>Toivanen provides a detailed philosophical interpretation of this view across wide range of authors, including unedited manuscript sources. As the first monograph length study on the topic, The Political Animal sheds new light to this significant period in western political thought. (shrink)

In this article, based on my doctoral research, I discuss the appropriation of religious elements from South America by Finnish ‘mystical tourists’. The plant medicine ceremonies are approached as spiritual commodities. Imagining local beliefs and practices as ancient cultural heritage, essentially and authentically spiritual, Finnish mystical tourists adapt these practices for their own therapeutic uses. They are accompanied by singing prayers to various plant spirits. Among the appropriated elements are the ceremonial ingestion of imported organic cacao, sacred tobacco and ayahuasca, (...) as well as praying by singing to plant spirits understood in terms of animism. My findings indicate how the appropriated cultural elements are given therapeutic functions in collectively created musical and ritual spaces for individual well-being. I analyse appropriation in categories introduced by Richard A. Rogers (2006) and understand the ceremonies to provide ‘mystical tourists’ with a role as a racially privileged group over the subaltern indigenous peoples through processes of commercialization, where reimagined cultural elements become spiritual commodities to be bought and sold in commercial networks on the basis of access. I argue that the associated forms of cultural appropriation align with the individualistic spiritual well-being needs of the Finnish participants and are related to the theme of ‘sacralization of the self’. (shrink)

This paper examines a case where Amazon’s cloud-based AI assistant Alexa accidentally ordered a dollhouse for a 6-year-old girl. In the press, the case was defined as a technical recognition problem. Building on this idea, we argue that the dollhouse case helps us to analyze the limits of current AI applications. By drawing on the writings of Gilles Deleuze and François Laruelle, we argue that these limits are not merely technical but more deeply embedded in the structures where the thinking (...) of AI can potentially happen. We point out that AI research has been compromised by the concepts of what constitutes both ‘artificial’ and by what constitutes ‘intelligence’. First, we use the notion of artificial non-intelligence to explain how different modes of digital capitalism such as voice commerce establish limits for AI. Second, we use the notion of non-artificial intelligence to illustrate the limits of associating AI’s modes of thinking with human thought. (shrink)

The paper explores the incentive structures and the structurally rigid social hierarchies inherent in the polarizing logic of modern credit money and the mutual constitution of money’s sovereign and biopolitical dimensions. It is argued that the monetary system constitutes a major transitory channel for the logic of financial capital to transcend the limitations of sovereign spaces and to transform itself into a biopolitical force. The relationship between the material and the subjective – or the sovereign and the biopolitical – dimensions (...) of money is seen as di-polaric rather than di-chotomic – as a mutually constitutive whole between relational dynamics and the normalizing opportunity structures which govern such interaction. If the sovereign and the biopolitical dimensions of money indeed constitute distinct but inseparable moments of the same totality, there would appear to be more room for strategic combination of heterogeneous analytical practices in emancipatory scholarship than what some of the traditional notions of the epistemological politics of power and sovereignty might suggest. (shrink)

The estimative power has been widely discussed in modern scholarly literature. This chapter complements the existing picture by analysing medieval Latin views concerning its role as the explanans of the social behaviour of humans and other animals. Although medieval authors rarely focus on this function, the chapter shows that the estimative power plays an important explanatory role both in philosophical psychology and political philosophy.

The aim of this chapter is to take a closer look at medieval discussions concerning the phenomenon of ‘perceiving as,’ and the psychological mechanisms that lie behind it. In contemporary philosophical literature this notion is usually used to refer to conceptual aspects of perception. For instance, when I perceive a black birdlike shape as a crow, I may be said to perceive the particular sensible thing x as an instance of a universal crowness φ, that is, as belonging to a (...) natural kind and falling under the concept of ‘crow’. In this sense, perceiving x as φ requires mastering the concept φ. However, I use the term ‘perceiving as’ in a wider sense and concentrate on various kinds of non-conceptual sensory processes, which can be understood as forms of ‘perceiving as’. Even though conceptual perception requires intellectual powers, medieval discussions on cognitive psychology can be understood properly only by taking into account the complex forms of perception that fall short of being truly intellectual, but are nevertheless over and above the simple sensation of sensible qualities of external things. The borderline between simple sensation and conceptual perception is unclear, and quite a lot is going on in the grey area between the two. Instead of presupposing any modern notion of ‘perceiving as’ and applying it to medieval discussions, my purpose is the opposite: to look at medieval discussions and see if they can be used to broaden modern discussions by including also non-conceptual varieties of perception. I shall begin the analysis in section two by specifying various types of cogni- tive processes that were discussed by medieval authors and can be considered as forms of ‘perceiving as’. The bulk of the historical work will be done in sec- tion three, where I focus on medieval discussions on three interrelated cogni- tive functions – perceiving different sensible qualities as a synthetic whole, incidental perception of one sensible quality through another, and the possi- bility of perceiving substances and recognising individuals. The reader should bear in mind that I shall use ideas from several medieval authors without pay- ing much attention to the differences between their theories of perception. Although occasionally radical, these differences are not highly relevant in the context of the present chapter. In section four, I propose two theoretical mod- els that can be used for analysing medieval views concerning these psychologi- cal phenomena. Finally, I conclude the chapter by making some remarks on the potential impacts of reading medieval views in relation to the concept of ‘perceiving as’. (shrink)

Synthetic biology offers a powerful method to design and construct biological devices for human purposes. Two prominent design methodologies are currently used. Rational design adapts the design methodology of traditional engineering sciences, such as mechanical engineering. Directed evolution, in contrast, models its design principles after natural evolution, as it attempts to design and improve systems by guiding them to evolve in a certain direction. Previous work has argued that the primary difference between these two is the way they treat variation: (...) rational design attempts to suppress it, whilst direct evolution utilizes variation. I argue that this contrast is too simplistic, as it fails to distinguish different types of variation and different phases of design in synthetic biology. I outline three types of variation and show how they influence the construction of synthetic biological systems during the design process. Viewing the two design approaches with these more fine-grained distinctions provides a better understanding of the methodological differences and respective benefits of rational design and directed evolution, and clarifies the constraints and choices that the different design approaches must deal with. (shrink)

This book develops a novel generalization of possible world semantics, called ‘world line semantics’, which recognizes worlds and links between world-bound objects (world lines) as mutually independent aspects of modal semantics. Addressing a wide range of questions vital for contemporary debates in logic and philosophy of language and offering new tools for theoretical linguistics and knowledge representation, the book proposes a radically new paradigm in modal semantics. This framework is motivated philosophically, viewing a structure of world lines as a precondition (...) of modal talk. The author provides a uniform analysis of quantification over individuals (physical objects) and objects of thought (intentional objects). The semantic account of what it means to speak of intentional objects throws new light on accounts of intentionality and singular thought in the philosophy of mind and offers novel insights into the semantics of intensional transitive verbs. (shrink)

The present essay examines Peter Olivi's (ca. 1248-98) theory of morally bad choices and moral vices, focusing in particular on his view of the substantiality of moral vices, moral psychology, and the role of self-love and its relation to pride.

Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646) var en av de främsta kyrkoledarna i stormaktstidens Sverige. Under studietiden i Wittenberg influerades han av ”luthersk skolastik”, enligt vilken förnuft och uppenbarelse är förenliga som kunskapskällor och logik är ett instrument för teologi. -/- I boken visar Tero Tulenheimo hur Rudbeckius lade vikt vid logik som stöddisciplin för teologi. -/- Inledningsvis behandlas frågan om omfattningen av Rudbeckius teologiska produktion. Här argumenterar Tulenheimo emot Bengt Hägglunds tes, enligt vilken Rudbeckius skulle ha författat en viktig opublicerad handskrift (...) om dogmatik. -/- Med hänvisning till Rudbeckius publicerade dissertationer lyfter Tulenheimo fram Rudbeckius reflektioner över språkanvändning, diskussion om förnuftsargument för uppenbarelsesanningar samt begreppsanalytiska frågeställningar. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 54, Issue 1, pp 22 - 45 This essay discusses the views of Peter Olivi on the foundations of political power and agency. The central argument is that there is a strong connection between Olivi’s voluntarist psychology and his views concerning political power. According to Olivi, political power is ultimately based on the will of God, but in such a way that both the rulers and their subjects have, through their individual freedom, the liberty to use their (...) share of power as they will. In fact, Olivi conceptualises political power as an extension of the dominion that human beings have over their wills, which is essential for being a political agent in the full sense. By providing a philosophical analysis of the role of the freedom of the will within Olivi’s political philosophy, this essay sheds light on his conception of the relation between the human and the divine will, as well as on his understanding of political power. (shrink)

I argue that the semantics of sentences expressing future contingent propositions is best viewed as being based on a clear distinction between a time at which a proposition is true and a time at which a state of affairs that makes it true gets actualized. That a prediction is true here and now means that its truth-maker gets actualized later. This is not to say that if a contingent proposition p concerning the future is true at t, it acquires the (...) truth-value true at t only retrospectively, at a later moment. Nor must this be seen as suggesting that it is a settled, unpreventable fact at t that p is true at t. It just means that the reason for its present truth is something that happens later on: the future happens to evolve in such a way as to make a truth-maker of p obtain. In this case, then, it can be said that at t, p is truth-maker indeterminate, or that it has an indeterminate truth-maker. I develop a formal semantics based on this analysis in the follow-up article ‘A Formal Framework for Future Contingents’. Here, I lay down the conceptual framework and indicate Boethius and Abelard as precursors of the view I wish to defend. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the notion of possibility in biology and demonstrates how synthetic biology can provide understanding on the modal dimension of biological systems. Among modal concepts, biological possibility has received surprisingly little explicit treatment in the philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to argue for the importance of the notion of biological possibility by showing how it provides both a philosophically and biologically fruitful category as well as introducing a new practically grounded way for its assessment. (...) More precisely, we argue that synthetic biology can provide tools to scientifically anchor reasoning about biological possibilities. Two prominent strategies for this are identified and analyzed: the design of functionally new-to-nature systems and the redesign of naturally occurring systems and their parts. These approaches allow synthetic biologists to explore systems that are not normally evolutionarily accessible and draw modal inferences that extend in scope beyond their token realizations. Subsequently, these results in synthetic biology can also be relevant for discussions on evolutionary contingency, providing new methods and insight to the study of various sources of unactualized possibilities in biology. (shrink)

Perception of the external world is an essential part of the animal (including human) life, both as a source of knowledge and as a way to survive. Medieval authors accepted this view, and despite general concerns about the reliability of the senses in the acquisition of certain and objective knowledge, they thought that for the most part our perceptual system gets things right when it comes to the perceptual features of things—but not always. Our article focuses on thirteenth- and fourteenth-century (...) philosophical discussions of illusions and other types of perceptual errors. Reception of incorrect information, misjudgments concerning perceptual objects, the binding problem, and similar cases that explain perceptual errors will be analyzed. We discuss what might be called medieval Aristotelian/Avicennian theories of perception and the internal senses (drawing mainly from Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas), as well as the so-called perspectivist accounts of perception, especially that by Alhacen. Finally, we take up a debate between Peter Auriol and his critics, which contains elements that can be seen as precursors of later skeptical worries. The concern here is that, just like in contemporary discussions leading to disjunctivism, the absence of a secure way to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical perception leads to a general worry about the reliability of our experience of the world. (shrink)

Human beings are not only self-conscious minds but embodied and social beings, whose subjectivity is conditioned by their social surroundings. From this point of view, it is natural to suppose that the development and existence of a subject that is distinctively human requires contact with other people. The present contribution discusses medieval ideas concerning the intersubjective constitution of human being by looking at the medieval reception of two ideas, which Aristotle presents at the beginning of his Politics: (1) human beings (...) are political animals by nature, which means that those who live outside of political communities due to their nature are either deficient or above humanity – they are beasts or gods; and (2) human beings are parts of political communities, and as such, comparable to hands in a body. When medieval philosophers consider these ideas from metaphysical and normative perspectives, they distinguish different senses in which human beings are naturally political. In effect, they draw a nuanced picture of the relation between an individual human being and the political community, and in so doing they distance themselves from a literal reading of Aristotle. An analysis of the medieval discussions reveals how the social aspect of human subjectivity emerges in medieval political philosophy and how medieval philosophers conceptualise the Aristotelian distinction into three kinds of beings – the beast, the human, and the god. (shrink)

This essay discusses how medieval authors from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries dealt with a philosophical problem that social institutions pose for the Aristotelian dichotomy between natural and artificial entities. It is argued that marriage, political community, and language provided a particular challenge for the conception that things which are designed by human beings are artefacts. Medieval philosophers based their arguments for the naturalness of social institutions on the anthropological view that human beings are political animals by nature, but this (...) strategy required rethinking the borderline between nature and art. The limits of nature were extended, as social institutions were considered to be natural even though they are in many ways similar to artificial products. (shrink)

‘@AP: Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is injured’. So read a tweet sent from a hacked Associated Press Twitter account @AP, which affected financial markets, wiping out $136.5 billion of the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index’s value. While the speed of the Associated Press hack crash event and the proprietary nature of the algorithms involved make it difficult to make causal claims about the relationship between social media and trading algorithms, we argue that it helps (...) us to critically examine the volatile connections between social media, financial markets, and third parties offering human and algorithmic analysis. By analyzing the commentaries of this event, we highlight two particular currents: one formed by computational processes that mine and analyze Twitter data, and the other being financial algorithms that make automated trades and steer the stock market. We build on sociology of finance together with media theory and focus on the work of Christian Marazzi, Gabriel Tarde and Tony Sampson to analyze the relationship between social media and financial markets. We argue that Twitter and social media are becoming more powerful forces, not just because they connect people or generate new modes of participation, but because they are connecting human communicative spaces to automated computational spaces in ways that are affectively contagious and highly volatile. (shrink)

This open access volume provides an in-depth analysis of philosophical discussions concerning the common good and its relation to self-interest in the history of Western philosophy. The thirteen chapters explore both renowned and lesser-known thinkers from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century, covering also the relevant ancient background. By bridging the gap between the medieval and early modern periods, they provide fresh insights into how moral and political philosophers understood the concepts of the common good and self-interest, along with (...) their ethical and political implications. The concept of the common good occupies a central role in philosophical reflections on the public and private dimensions of moral and social life in contemporary debates. By exploring the rich and diverse ways in which the relationship between the common good and self-interest has been understood, this volume has the potential to contribute to our ongoing efforts to critically discern the possibilities and limitations of these concepts in the present. Thus, the volume will be useful for scholars interested in the multi-layered role of the notion of the common good both in the history of philosophy and in contemporary moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

Synthetic biology is described as a new field of biotechnology that models itself on engineering sciences. However, this view of synthetic biology as an engineering field has received criticism, and both biologists and philosophers have argued for a more nuanced and heterogeneous understanding of the field. This paper elaborates the heterogeneity of synthetic biology by clarifying the role of design and the variability of design methodologies in synthetic biology. I focus on two prominent design methodologies: rational design and directed evolution. (...) Rational design resembles the design methodology of traditional engineering sciences. However, it is often replaced and complemented by the more biologically-inspired method of directed evolution, which models itself on natural evolution. These two approaches take philosophically different stances to the design of biological systems. Rational design aims to make biological systems more machine-like, whereas directed evolution utilizes variation and emergent features of living systems. I provide an analysis of the methodological basis of these design approaches, and highlight important methodological differences between them. By analyzing the respective benefits and limitations of these approaches, I argue against the engineering-dominated conception of synthetic biology and its “methodological monism”, where the rational design approach is taken as the default design methodology. Alternative design methodologies, like directed evolution, should be considered as complementary, not competitive, to rational design. (shrink)

In Prior’s tense-logical analysis, we can avoid mentioning instants in our language by construing them as propositions of a special kind. Instead of qualifying instants by predicates, we may qualify propositions by modalities. Prior shows that by changing the informal interpretation of our modal-like language, we can similarly attempt to avoid ontological commitments to worlds and even to selves and other bona fide individuals. As he notes, the paraphrasing strategy works too generally to be of direct metaphysical use. I wish (...) to speak of several types of entities within one and the same language. This leads to the issue of cross-context identity: how to make sense of speaking of the same entity of one type relative to distinct entities of another type. My analysis employs the notion of world line. I discern a structure of mutually interrelated categories with three informal interpretations: tense, modal and egocentric. They correspond to different metaphysical views on the interrelations of time, logical alternatives and individuals. Prior’s dilemma regarding the possibility of modalizing, not only our talk concerning times and worlds, but even our discourse pertaining to the ‘real world of individuals’ does not vanish but reappears also in my setting. (shrink)

In this paper, I survey the way Wittgenstein reacts to radical philosophical doubt in his On Certainty.He deems skeptical doubt in some important cases idle, pointless or otherwise negligible. I point out that several passages of On Certainty make it difficult to judge whether Wittgenstein intends to address a skeptic or a metaphysical idealist. Drawing attention to the anti-skeptical nature of Berkeley’s idealism, I go on to argue that the question is far from trivial: rather, it affects the way we (...) should evaluate Wittgenstein’s arguments in On Certainty in general. I finally attempt to explain why Wittgenstein remained ambiguous about the target of his arguments, and discuss the possibility of making room for the idealism/skepticism distinction in On Certainty’s framework. (shrink)

The hybrid logic and the independence friendly modal logic IFML are compared for their expressive powers. We introduce a logic IFML c having a non-standard syntax and a compositional semantics; in terms of this logic a syntactic fragment of IFML is singled out, denoted IFML c . (In the Appendix it is shown that the game-theoretic semantics of IFML c coincides with the compositional semantics of IFML c .) The hybrid logic is proven to be strictly more expressive than IFML (...) c . By contrast, and the full IFML are shown to be incomparable for their expressive powers. Building on earlier research (Tulenheimo and Sevenster 2006), a PSPACE -decidable fragment of the undecidable logic is disclosed. This fragment is not translatable into the hybrid logic and has not been studied previously in connection with hybrid logics. In the Appendix IFML c is shown to lack the property of ‘quasi-positionality’ but proven to enjoy the weaker property of ‘ bounded quasi-positionality’. The latter fact provides from the IFML internal perspective an account of what makes the compositional semantics of IFML c possible. (shrink)

The subject matter of this essay is Peter of John Olivi’s (ca.1248–98) conception of reason from the viewpoint of human action.