Este artículo analiza el Test de Turing, uno de los métodos más famosos y controvertidos para evaluar la existencia de vida mental en la Filosofía de la Mente, revelando dos mitos filosóficos comúnmente aceptados y criticando su dogma. En primer lugar, se muestra por qué Turing nunca propuso una definición de inteligencia. En segundo lugar, se refuta que el Test de Turing involucre condiciones necesarias o suficientes para la inteligencia. En tercer lugar, teniendo presente el (...) objetivo y el tipo de evidencia que recopila, se considera si el Test de Turing cuenta como un experimento científico a la luz de la concepción de Fodor. Finalmente, se argumenta que Turing simpatiza con una forma de Conductismo, confundiendo la simulación -un proceso epistémico que, gobernado por la verosimilitud, es eficaz cuando alguien es causado a creer que el computador es inteligente- con la duplicación de la inteligencia en cuanto propiedad, lo que ocurre a nivel ontológico. Tal confusión implica un dogma y explica por qué, a pesar de haber sido propuesto como una solución final a la problemática de si las máquinas programadas piensan, el Test de Turing ha tenido precisamente el efecto contrario en más de cinco décadas, estimulando el debate filosófico en torno a la naturaleza de lo mental. (shrink)

Existe un problema en filosofía, a saber, qué es el pensamiento; en torno a esta cuestión, hay otras preguntas, tales como qué se requiere para que algo piense, siendo la pregunta de si las máquinas pueden pensar un caso especial de este último cuestionamiento. Una forma de abordar este problema es por medio de la búsqueda de un conjunto de condiciones necesarias y suficientes que, si son reunidas por algo, entonces estaremos justificados para responder afirmativamente a la pregunta de si (...) esa cosa en particular piensa. (shrink)

Según la versión estándar del juego de la imitación, la determinación del sexo de los participantes no desempeña ningún papel en el testeo de la inteligencia de máquina. Desafortunadamente, tal simplificación soslaya la teoría de la mente que fundamenta dicho juego. Teniendo en consideración este problema, en este ensayo argumento en contra de la simplificación del Test de Turing. En efecto, tal como sostengo, la determinación del sexo de los participantes no debe obviarse: la mente de una mujer (...) y su inteligencia son imitables y no dependen de realización física específica. Esto ocurre porque el funcionalismo de Turing supone un vínculo entre imitación, engaño y aprendizaje, tres claves para que el proyecto de la Inteligencia Artificial tenga éxito. (shrink)

Quand on se penche sur l’héritage philosophique de Turing, deux risques se posent. Le premier, c’est de le réduire à son test célèbre (Turing 1950). Ce qui a toutefois le mérite de la clarté. N’importe qui peut reconnaître la contribution en question et la situer dans le débat important sur la philosophie de l’intelligence artificielle. Le second risque est de le diluer dans un récit universel, faisant des idées deTuring les graines de tout ce que nous faisons (...) et savons aujourd’hui. Ceci a l’avantage de reconnaître la grandeur de ce génie. Cependant, dans un cas comme dans l’autre, nous allons probablement moins identifier les contributions conceptuelles deTuring qui nous ont aidés à forger un discours philosophique contemporain et qui méritent d’être approfondies et développées. Pour éviter ces deux risques, je me concentrerai dans les pages suivantes sur trois leçons philosophiques spécifiques, qui me semblent particulièrement significatives pour l’émergence de la philosophie de l’information et ses développements. Je ne propose pas ici une analyse philologique ni savante,mais un exercice minimaliste, herméneutique. Façon de faire écho àla démarche deTuring et de rendre hommage àson génie extraordinaire :ses interprètes n’ont pas fini de tirer parti de son héritage intellectuel. Je souhaite qu’un jourTuring devienne aussi important que Frege dans notre canon philosophique. (shrink)

El Test de Turing es un método tan controvertido como desafiante en Inteligencia Artificial. Se basa en la imitación de la conducta lingüística de humanos, y tiene como objetivo recabar evidencia empírica en favor de la tesis de que las máquinas programadas podrían pensar. Alan Turing, su creador, ha sido catalogado como conductista por la mayor parte de los comentaristas. En este capítulo muestro que no lo es. Por el contrario, Turing es un funcionalista, porque todo (...) el énfasis del juego de la imitación está en el engaño de la máquina hacia los humanos. Por ello el género es importante en dicho juego, al menos en su versión preliminar. (shrink)

RESUMO : Será que um dia serão desenvolvidos computadores digitais capazes de pensar de modo similar ao nosso? Ou será que, independentemente da tecnologia, os computadores digitais estarão sempre limitados a manipularem dados sem compreendê-los? Neste trabalho, apresentarei duas concepções antagônicas de Filosofia da Mente: a Inteligência Artificial Forte, que responde afirmativamente à primeira questão, e a crítica de John Searle a esta corrente, que, por sua vez, responde de maneira afi rmativa à segunda questão. Para tanto, iniciarei o artigo (...) apresentando o famoso jogo da imitação proposto por Alan Turing para decidir se uma máquina é ou não inteligente, jogo este que ficou conhecido como teste de Turing. Logo em seguida, analisarei minuciosamente o experimento mental do quarto chinês, que é uma crítica ao teste de Turing e ao programa de pesquisa da Inteligência Artificial Forte. PALAVRAS-CHAVE : Teste de turing; Inteligência artificial; Quarto chinês; John Searle. (shrink)

Alan Turing advocated a kind of functionalism: A machine M is a thinker provided that it responds in certain ways to certain inputs. Davidson argues that Turing’s functionalism is inconsistent with a cer-tain kind of epistemic externalism, and is therefore false. In Davidson’s view, concepts consist of causal liasons of a certain kind between subject and object. Turing’s machine doesn’t have the right kinds of causal li-asons to its environment. Therefore it doesn’t have concepts. Therefore it doesn’t (...) think. I argue that this reasoning is entirely fallacious. It is true that, in some cases, a causal liason between subject and object is part of one’s concept of that object. Consequently, to grasp certain propositions, one must have certain kids of causal ties to one’s environment. But this means that we must rethink some old views on what rationality is. It does not mean, pace Davidson, that a precondition for being rational is being causally embedded in one’s environment in a certain way. If Tur-ing’s machine isn’t capable of thinking (I leave it open whether it is or is not), that has nothing to do with its lacking certain kinds of causal con-nections to the environment. The larger significance of our discussion is this: rationality consists either in one’s ability to see the bearing of purely existential propositions on one another or rationality is simply not to be understood as the ability see the bearing that propositions have on one another. (shrink)

En este artículo examino dos criterios para la existencia de estados mentales, el de Descartes y el de Turing. Mientras que el primero plantea que las máquinas no pueden pensar en principio, el segundo defiende la inteligencia de máquina. Pese a esto, ambos parecen coincidir en que la decisión sobre la presencia de estados mentales es tomada por alguien que juzga internamente la misma. Si bien ello es esperable del racionalismo cartesiano, en el funcionalismo de Turing es sorprendente. (...) En efecto, ningún comentarista de su Juego de la Imitación repara en el hecho de que los interrogadores son una instancia que no parece reemplazable y, además, que dichos interrogadores aplican un criterio internalista para decidir si están frente a una mente o un computador. Tal aproximación internalista a la mente, argumento, representa una dificultad para que una máquina pase el Test de Turing. Por este motivo concluyo que dicho test no solo no reemplaza la pregunta ¿pueden pensar las máquinas?; adicionalmente traslada de modo dramático el foco del debate a la filosofía de la mente. (shrink)

En este trabajo me concentro en las formas en las que los seres humanos interactuamos con los sistemas con IA actualmente existentes en nuestras sociedades. Muestro que son cierto tipo de formas de interacción las que están a la base de la consideración de tales sistemas como “inteligentes” dado el origen mismo del desarrollo de la IA en base al “Test de Turing”. Distingo dos tipos de desarrollos y sus efectos, tomando como criterios las formas de interacción que (...) estos sistemas demandan. Finalmente, destaco algunos de los desafíos que enfrentamos en nuestros días, el rol central que las humanidades y ciencias sociales tendrán en este ámbito, y sugiero algunas líneas posibles de acción. (shrink)

Alan Turing, einer der Gründerväter der modernen Informatik, diskutierte in seinem 1950 veröffentlichten Artikel »Computing Machinery and Intelligence« die Frage, ob Maschinen denken können. Dies wirft jedoch die schwierige Frage auf, was Denken denn sei. Um diese Frage zu umgehen, schlägt Turing vor, stattdessen eine Frage zu stellen, die sich durch bloße Beobachtung klären lässt, nämlich ob eine Maschine ein bestimmtes Spiel erfolgreich spielen könne.

This paper argues that the Turing test is based on a fixed and de-contextualized view of communicative competence. According to this view, a machine that passes the test will be able to communicate effectively in a variety of other situations. But the de-contextualized view ignores the relationship between language and social context, or, to put it another way, the extent to which speakers respond dynamically to variations in discourse function, formality level, social distance/solidarity among participants, and participants' (...) relative degrees of power and status. In the case of the Loebner Contest, a present day version of the Turing test, the social context of interaction can be interpreted in conflicting ways. For example, Loebner discourse is defined 1) as a friendly, casual conversation between two strangers of equal power, and 2) as a one-way transaction in which judges control the conversational floor in an attempt to expose contestants that are not human. This conflict in discourse function is irrelevant so long as the goal of the contest is to ensure that only thinking, human entities pass the test. But if the function of Loebner discourse is to encourage the production of software that can pass for human on the level of conversational ability, then the contest designers need to resolve this ambiguity in discourse function, and thus also come to terms with the kind of competence they are trying to measure. (shrink)

En este artículo se examina de qué forma los investigadores de la Inteligencia Artificial han asumido un desafío propuesto por Descartes: la imposibilidad de construir máquinas programadas que, al entender lenguaje, evidencien que son pensantes. Tal desafío, que se enmarca en la filosofía metafísica cartesiana, distingue entre cosa pensante y extensa, siendo imposible la existencia de pensamiento en esta última. El lenguaje evidencia la imposibilidad de la inteligencia de máquina, de hecho. Como se examina, al enfrentar el desafío cartesiano, dichos (...) investigadores han debido suponer como verdadera parte de la teoría cartesiana, a saber, que el uso flexible de lenguaje implica la existencia de pensamiento. Por ello califico de ambivalente la relación que tiene la Inteligencia Artificial con el filósofo francés: por una parte, rechazan la imposibilidad en principio de la inteligencia de máquina; por otra, están de acuerdo con Descartes en que el uso flexible de lenguaje es suficiente para mostrar que alguien piensa. Si bien el carácter ambivalente entre la IA y Descartes parece anecdótico, no lo es. El hecho de que aún se considere el Test de Turing como una evaluación adecuada de la inteligencia corrobora la compleja relación entre la IA y el pensamiento cartesiano. (shrink)

Recientes avances en Inteligencia Artificial (IA) como el Project Debater de IBM son indicadores de que la IA lingüística perfecta, es decir, capaz de superar el test de Turing y simular la conducta lingüística humana de manera indiscernible, es una realidad cercana que implicará numerosos efectos sobre nuestras vidas. Como propone la filosofía de la técnica de Langdon Winner, esos efectos deben ser evaluados antes de que la tecnología sea implantada para proporcionar así a la sociedad la posibilidad (...) de decidir si el posible cambio es conforme a su proyecto ético y político. Para contribuir a esa decisión, en este artículo pronosticamos las consecuencias de esa tecnología sobre la autopercepción del ser humano mediante dos argumentos. Por un lado, un argumento principal utilizando como premisas la caracterización de esa IA y varias teorías de la psicología social y de la personalidad. Y, por el otro, una inferencia por analogía con la antropología cartesiana. (shrink)

The 20th Century is the starting point for the most ambitious attempts to extrapolate human life into artificial systems. Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics, Claude Shannon’s Information Theory, John von Neumann’s Cellular Automata, Universal Constructor to the Turing Test, Artificial Intelligence to Maturana and Varela’s Autopoietic Organization, all shared the goal of understanding in what sense humans resemble a machine. This scientific and technological movement has embraced all disciplines without exceptions, not only mathematics and physics but also biology, sociology, psychology, (...) economics etc. New terms were developed, such as “information”, “organization”, “entropy”, “communication”, “encryption”, “computation” and “algorithmics” to mention a few, all which had an enormous impact on artificial systems. Our work follows this historical track but with a reversed order of priorities. Instead of deducing a reduced group of human acts into an artificial environment, we deduce the human aspects of machines by extrapolating algorithmic methodologies into everyday life acts. The present informational theories were insufficiently powered to achieve this objective without developing a new theoretical approach. Hence, our research is directed towards an expansion of the current informational theories. (shrink)

En partant des derniers paragraphes de la cinquième parti du Discours de la Méthode, on a reconstitué la formulation cartésienne de la perception d’un autre moi. Les critères de l’usage du langage et de la plasticité du comportement ont été analysés à la lumière de l’idée d’une machine universelle et du test de Turing. On conclut de la faiblesse de l’argument cartésien sur l’irréductibilité de la pensée à un dispositif machinal. En tant qu’issue de la difficulté, on propose (...) une révision de la façon cartésienne de caractérisation de la pensée à partir du concept d’expérience, tout en abandonnant le thème d’une perception interne incommunicable et intémoignable. (shrink)

What happens to philosophy when philosophical activities migrate to the AI lab? My article explores the philosophical work that has gone into the machine simulations of language and understanding after Alan Turing. The early experiments by AI practitioners such as Karen Spärck Jones, Richard Richens, Yorick Wilks, and others at the Cambridge Language Research Unit (CLRU) led to the creation of the machine interlingua, semantic networks, and other technological innovations central to the development of AI in the 1950s–1970s. I (...) attempt to show how, in the midst of their computational work, the CLRU pioneers engaged with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ferdinand de Saussure, Rudolf Carnap, and other philosophers and developed startling new ways of formulating fundamental questions about language and human understanding. More significantly, their philosophical activities on the machine present an inclusive and culturally diverse picture of the world that profoundly negates the ethnocentric metaphysics of human-machine conundrums that John Searle and his critics represent in the Chinese Room debate. The familiar legacy of that debate has long distorted the narrative of AI origins through its simultaneous reiteration and repudiation of the Turing test. My study seeks to clarify those origins, but my primary goal is to demonstrate what it is like to practice philosophy on the machine and how the critique of metaphysics is made possible in the AI lab. (shrink)

Dans son célèbre article de 1950 «Computing Machinery and Intelligence», Alan Turing suggère qu'un critère d'intelligence pour une machine serait qu'elle puisse se faire passer pour un interlocuteur humain. Ce test, appelé «Test de Turing», a été critiqué par John Searle, qui a remis en cause sa pertinence en s'appuyant sur une expérience mentale connue sous le nom de l'argument de la chambre chinoise. L'expérience tend à montrer que l'intelligence artificielle au sens propre du terme est (...) impossible, parce que les symboles manipulés par les programmes de prétendue «intelligence artificielle» sont dépourvus de signification. L'intentionalité propre à certains êtres vivants peut seule faire naître le sens. L'imitation d'un comportement intentionnel ne le peut pas. Le test de Turing serait done insatisfaisant, parce qu'il ne permettrait pas de distinguer les systèmes intentionnels de systèmes qui ne le sont pas, et que par conséquent il ne permettrait pas de distinguer l'intelligence authentique de la simulation de l'intelligence. (shrink)

Review of Mitchell, Melanie. Artificial Intelligence: A guide for thinking humans. New York: Macmillan, 2019.

Uno de los principales retos del transhumanismo lo encontramos en su antropología. Nos encontramos ante un reduccionismo en el que el cuerpo aparece despojado de su dignidad y el espíritu no existe. El ejemplo que más me llama la atención de esto es el de la endogénesis: no se valora el hecho de que el ser humano sea gestado dentro del vientre de otro ser humano; para ellos sería preferible tener una máquina que pudiese hacer la misma misión, en lugar (...) de que el embarazo sea un acto de amor que tiene impacto en toda la vida de la persona. Creo que este es el mayor obstáculo en el que nos encontraremos al valorar el transhumanismo, y es especialmente importante: la persona es un edificio de múltiples dimensiones inextricablemente ligadas. Es necesario reconocer la dignidad de nuestro cuerpo, que va más allá de ser sustrato material de nuestra consciencia. El cuerpo forma parte de nuestra naturaleza, en la que cuerpo, emoción, pensamiento y espíritu son dimensiones que están íntimamente ligadas. No podemos renunciar a nuestro cuerpo. Además, me gustaría proponer que dentro del cuerpo existen portales ante la trascendencia. no es lo mismo ser que parecer. Muchos defienden que pronto tendremos robots que estarán dotados de consciencia. Que podrán pasar el test de Turing. Además, la Inteligencia Artificial permite generar mensajes de manera sintética. En algunos casos, estos mensajes son relativamente simples, pero en otros casos, como los chatbots, resultan muy interesantes. Algunos autores estiman que, dentro de poco, estos chatbots podrían llegar a pasar el test de Turing. Una vez tengamos máquinas que pasen el test de Turing, ¿podremos decir que son conscientes? ¿Es lo mismo una máquina que pase el Test de Turing que una máquina consciente? Para algunos, la respuesta es «es indiferente». Yo digo que no, que no es lo mismo. (shrink)

. A comparison is made between two unlikely debates over intelligence. One debate took place in 1550 at Valladolid, Spain, between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepúlveda over the intelligence of the Amerindian. The other debate is contemporary, between John Searle and various representatives of the “strong” artificial intelligence community over the adequacy of the Turing test for intelligence. Although the contemporary debate has yet to die down, the Valladolid debate has been over for four (...) hundred years. The question asked here is whether the contemporary debate can profit from the previous one. The common bond providing the basis for contrast is the issue of the “other” which is present in both debates. From this contrast, the observation is made that the question of meaning is intimately tied to the question of intelligence. (shrink)

We present here solutions of a non-linear Schrödinger equation in presence of an arbitrary linear external potential. The non-linearity expresses a self-focusing interaction. These solutions are the product of the pilot wave with peaked solitons the velocity of which obeys the guidance equation derived by Louis de Broglie in 1926. The degree of validity of our approximations increases when the size of the soliton decreases and becomes negligible compared to the typical size over which the pilot wave varies. We discuss (...) the possibility to reveal their existence by implementing a humpty-dumpty Stern-Gerlach interferometer in the mesoscopic regime. (shrink)

Scientists, the medical profession, philosophers, social scientists, policy makers, and the public at large have been quick to embrace the accomplishments of genetic science. The enthusiasm for the new biotechnologies is not unrelated to their worthy goal. The belief that the new genetic technologies will help to decrease human suffering by improving the public’s health has been a significant influence in the acceptance of technologies such as genetic testing and screening. But accepting this end should not blind us to the (...) need for an evaluation of whether a particular means is adequate to achieve it. Lack of such evaluation notwithstanding, discussions of the ethical, legal, and social implications have tended to presuppose that the development and implementation of genetic testing will be an appropriate means to reduce human suffering in significant ways. I argue here that such an assumption is mistaken. In part this is the case because human biology is more complex than sometimes it is made to appear in these debates. But, the idea that human suffering resulting from disease can be reduced in significant ways with the use of genetic testing also ignores the social contexts in which these technologies are being developed and implemented. (shrink)

Defendemos a necessidade de que se atue com rigor ético durante a pandemia do novo coronavírus e que não se afrouxem os padrões científicos e normativos nas pesquisas sobre possíveis medicamentos, em especial a Cloroquina, para a COVID-19. Argumentamos que, excepcionalmente, seria justificado pular algumas etapas na realização de testes clínicos ou tratamentos experimentais, mas que é inadequado fazer um uso indiscriminado de medicamentos off label para tratar pacientes enquanto os resultados das pesquisas não forem publicados em veículos de comprovada (...) reputação científica. Para sustentar essa posição, aplicamos princípios bioéticos e da ética médica. Defendemos que políticas públicas para o uso de Cloroquina durante a pandemia não devem ser implementadas até que sejam divulgados os resultados das pesquisas realizadas pela “Coalizão COVID Brasil” e pela Solidarity da OMS. (shrink)

Background: Moral case deliberation is a form of clinical ethics support to help healthcare professionals in dealing with ethically difficult situations. There is a lack of evidence about what outcomes healthcare professionals experience in daily practice after moral case deliberations. The Euro-MCD Instrument was developed to measure outcomes, based on the literature, a Delphi panel, and content validity testing. To examine relevance of items and adequateness of domains, a field study is needed. Aim: To describe experienced outcomes after participating in (...) a series of moral case deliberations, both during sessions and in daily practice, and to explore correlations between items to further validate the Euro-MCD Instrument. Methods: In Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway, healthcare institutions that planned a series of moral case deliberations were invited. Closed responses were quantitatively analyzed. The factor structure of the instrument was tested using exploratory factor analyses. Ethical considerations: The study was approved in Sweden by a review board. In Norway and the Netherlands, data services and review boards were informed about the study. Results: The Euro-MCD Instrument was completed by 443 and 247 healthcare professionals after four and eight moral case deliberations, respectively. They experienced especially outcomes related to a better collaboration with co-workers and outcomes about individual moral reflexivity and attitude, both during sessions and in daily practice. Outcomes were experienced to a higher extent during sessions than in daily practice. The factor structure revealed four domains of outcomes, which did not confirm the six Euro-MCD domains. Conclusion: Field-testing the Euro-MCD Instrument showed the most frequently experienced outcomes and which outcomes correlated with each other. When revising the instrument, domains should be reconsidered, combined with theory about underlying concepts. In the future, a feasible and valid instrument will be presented to get insight into how moral case deliberation supports and improves healthcare. (shrink)

We offer a new outlook on the vexed question of the reference of natural-kind terms. Since Kripke and Putnam, there is a widespread assumption that natural-kind terms function just like proper names: they designate their referents directly and they are rigid designators: their reference is unchanged even in worlds in which the referent lacks some or all the properties associated with it in the actual world, and which are useful to us in identifying that referent. There have, however, been heated (...) debates about what should be taken as a natural-kind term. Some challenge the very existence of a separate category of natural-kind terms ; some their being directly referential ; some raise the possibility that direct reference extends to terms beyond those usually assumed to fall under the category, e.g. to ‘polemical’ terms. When these debates turn on the question of what natural kinds are, they take on a strong epistemological or metaphysical dimension. We think the issues can be clarified within the limits of the philosophy of language: by looking into what ranges of general terms are perceived by speakers as rigid designators of natural kinds. The first step to take is to ground the various kinds of semantic externalism in distinct brands of semantic deference. This we define as speakers’ being disposed to use words in line with the norms of their linguistic community and as consenting to being corrected when it is manifest that their use and understanding of a word does not match common practice. When those dispositions are present, speakers defer semantically to something beyond themselves. Here, our focus is on spotting the words for which speakers would defer not to the current usage of the word in the linguistic community, nor to the current experts of the field to which the word pertains, but ultimately to the very nature of the referent of the term. When speakers’ deference conforms to that pattern, we argue, that is evidence that indexical externalism provides the right metasemantic account of how the meaning of the word is determined. In other words, one can say that the word is treated like a natural-kind term. But how can patterns of deference be measured? In an ongoing survey, participants are confronted with conditions that may prompt them to revise certain classificatory statements, e.g. An emu is a bird. Each condition makes salient one of the targets we have identified for deference: the community usage, the experts, the ‘world as it is’. In the condition that seeks to tap into the latter kind of deference, participants are presented with a scenario in which future scientific discoveries result in excluding from the extension of a term certain members currently thought to fall under that extension, e.g. discoveries that require excluding certain species now thought to be birds from the Aves class. The scenario is such that it is clear that the ‘discoveries’ bring us closer to the actual essence, if there is one, of birds. Our reasoning is that, if participants significantly modify their statements in the light of that scenario, they can be taken to ‘defer’ to the nature of the referent, thus vindicating indexical externalism. We test if words not normally assumed to be natural-kind terms – for instance summer, contract or rape – exhibit patterns of deference similar to those for bird. If so, then there’s a case for an extension of indexical externalism beyond the usual set of terms. What would be shown in this way is that speakers have something like realist intuitions with respect to words whose meaning is usually taken to be purely conventional or polemical. We are at the pre-test stage for the survey. We cannot yet report on our results. We should, however, have initial results by March, which, we believe, will enrich the observations made by previous empirical studies. References: Braisby, N., Franks, B. & Hampton, J. 1996. Essentialism, word use, and concepts. Cognition 59, 247-74./Genone, J. & Lombrozo, T. 2012. Concept possession, experimental semantics, and hybrid theories of reference. Philosophical Psychology 25, 717-742./Häggqvist, S. & Wikforss, Å. 2015. Experimental semantics: the case of natural kind terms, in J. Haukioja, Experimental Philosophy of Language, London, Bloomsbury./Jylkkä, J., Railo, H. & Haukioja, J. 2009. Psychological essentialism and semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use. Philosophical Psychology 22, 37-60./Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S. & Stich, S. 2009. Against arguments from reference, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79, 332-356./ Marconi, D. 1997. Language, Speech, and Communication. Lexical Competence. Cambridge : MIT Press./Moravcsik, J. 2016. Meaning, Creativity, and the Partial Inscrutability of the Human Mind, 2nd ed. Stanford: CSLI./Schroeter, L. & Schroeter, F. 2014. Normative concepts: a connectedness model, Philosophers’ Imprint 14, 1-26./ Wikforss, Å. 2010. Are natural kind terms special?, in H. Beebee and N. Sabbarton-Leary, The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, New York, Routledge, 64-83. (shrink)

Dans l'un des rares textes de Wittgenstein où il est question des machines de Turing, l'auteur écrit que celles-ci « sont les hommes, qui calculent ». L'étrangeté apparente de l'aphorisme disparaît si l'on dissipe certaines confusions fréquentes relatives aux machines de Turing. Une fois éclairci le sens littéral de ce passage des Remarques sur la philosophie de la psychologie, on peut s'interroger sur ce que Wittgenstein veut dire, dans le § 1096. Comme souvent chez l'auteur, on peut lire (...) dans ce paragraphe une remarque grammaticale qui vise à éclaircir une difficulté philosophique : la possibilité de définir ce qu'est un calcul. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to make a rational reconstruction of the use of the proportionality test in contexts of judicial adjudication of constitutional social rights. This reconstruction will be developed in two stages. Firstly, I will deal with the question of whether the proportionality test in its variation by omission (that is, in cases of positive rights) exhibits or not a different structure with respect to its (better known and developed) variation by excess (that is, in (...) cases of negative rights). Secondly, I will describe the rules and forms of argumentation implied in the use of the proportionality test by omission, which constitute its respective sub-tests of suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu. Lastly, I will present a brief summary. (shrink)

En este trabajo examino cómo el Funcionalismo de Máquina de Turing resulta compatible con una forma de dualismo, lo que aleja a la IA clásica o fuerte del materialismo que la inspiró originalmente en el siglo XIX. Para sostener esta tesis, argumento que efectivamente existe una notable cercanía entre el pensamiento cartesiano y dicho funcionalismo, ya que el primero afirma que es concebible/posible separar mente y cuerpo, mientras que el segundo sostiene que no es estrictamente necesario que los estados (...) mentales se realicen en las propiedades físicas de engranajes y máquinas reales. This article deals with how Turing Machine Functionalism turns out to be compatible with a form of Dualism, which involves that strong AI is not close to the original Materialism that inspired it in the nineteenth century. To support this thesis, I argue that there is a compelling coincidence between Descartes' philosophy and this version of Functionalism, since the former holds that it is conceivable/possible to separate mind and body, while the latter holds that it is not strictly necessary that mental states are realized by the physical properties of real cogs and machines. (shrink)

Lors de la séparation des parents, l’enfant est confronté à leur demande implicite de confirmer leur généalogie. Au travers d’une étude de situation, nous montrerons l’intérêt de l’utilisation du test de l’arbre généalogique, comme outil de compréhension de la dynamique conflictuelle et des enjeux de la transmission de la filiation.

In the centenary year of Turing’s birth, a lot of good things are sure to be written about him. But it is hard to find something new to write about Turing. This is the biggest merit of this article: it shows how von Neumann’s architecture of the modern computer is a serendipitous consequence of the universal Turing machine, built to solve a logical problem.

A questão da clareza e objetividade dos critérios utilizados na avaliação e interpretação dos testes psicológicos é uma das preocupações dos profissionais da Psicologia que trabalham com a avaliação psicológica. O objetivo deste trabalho consistiu em verificar em que medida os critérios de avaliação..

Leibniz’s De incerti aestimatione, which contains his solution to the division problem, has not received much attention, let alone much appreciation. This is surprising because it is in this work that the definition of probability in terms of equally possible cases appears for the first time. The division problem is used to establish and test probability theory; it can be stated as follows: if two players agree to play a game in which one has to win a certain number (...) of rounds in order to win the pool, but if they break the game off before either of them has won the required number of rounds, how should the pool be distributed?Our article has two aims: it provides the readers with the first published English translation of De incerti aestimatione, and it also gives them a brief commentary that explains Leibniz’s philosophical and mathematical concepts necessary in order to understand this work. The translation is as literal as possible throughout; it shows how Leibniz struggled at times to find a solution to the division problem and how he approached it from different angles. The commentary discusses Leibniz’s views on four key concepts: fairness, hope, authority and possibility. The commentary then outlines how Leibniz attempted to solve the problem of division. (shrink)

Millions of Chinese children learn English at increasingly younger ages. Yet when it comes to measuring proficiency, educators, and researchers rely on assessments that have been developed for L1 learners and/or for different cultural contexts, or on non-validated, individually designed tests. We developed the Assessment of Chinese Children’s English Vocabulary test to address the need for a validated, culturally appropriate receptive vocabulary test, designed specifically for young Chinese learners. The items are drawn from current teaching materials used in (...) China, and the depictions of people and objects are culturally appropriate. We evaluated the instrument’s reliability and validity in two field tests with a combined sample size of 1,092 children analyses show that the ACCE-V is sufficiently sensitive to capture different proficiency levels and that it has good psychometric properties. ACCE-V scores were correlated with Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test scores, indicating concurrent validity. We found that children’s age and English learning experience can significantly predict the scores of ACCE-V, but the effect of English learning experience is greater. The ACCE-V thus offers an alternative to existing vocabulary tests. We argue that culturally appropriate assessments like the ACCE-V are fairer to learners and help promote an English learning and teaching environment that is less dominated by Western cultures and native speaker norms. (shrink)