The almost immediate Western detection and news reportage of the Chernobyl nuclear accident underscored the urgency of Gorbachev's call for glasnost and perestroika. While state-sanctioned church leaders played a minimal role in the coming of glasnost, other believers, through clandestine samizdat, figure prominently in the launching of the Soviet information revolution. In contrast to the USSR, the churches and the media, especially television, played an immediate, transparent, and successful part in the East European upheavals of 1989.

후쿠시마 원전 사고 이후 한국 사회에서도 이전과 달리 원전 위험 인식이 확실히 증가하고 있다. 여론 조사에 의하면 원전 필요성 인식에서는 큰 차이를 보이지 않고 있지만 원전 위험 인식은 높아진 것이 사실이다. 유사한 원전 사고였던 체르노빌 원전 사고 이후에는 한국 사회는 원전 위험을 둘러싼 논쟁은 거의 진행되고 있지 않았다고 할 수 있다. 사고에 대한 보도도 제한적으로 이루어졌고 정부의 위험 관리에 대한 비판의 목소리도 낮았다. 시민단체들에 의한 반핵 운동이 아직 출현하지 않으면서 원전 위험에 대한 사회적 증폭 현상이 제한적이었던 것이다. 이에 비해 후쿠시마 (...) 사고는 언론을 통한 보도의 양 자체가 증가하였고 핵폐기장 반대 운동 과정을 통해 학습을 한 시민 단체들이 늘어나면서 정부의 위험 관리 능력은 비판에 직면하게 되었다. 이런 여러 사회적 요인들에 의해 후쿠시마 원전 사고 이후 한국 사회의 원전 위험 인식은 강화될 수 있었던 것이다. 위험의 사회적 구성을 잘 보여주고 있다. (shrink)

I argue, firstly, that the accounts of 'accident' in Aristotle's Met. V 30 and in Top. I 5 cannot be used to elucidate each other: the Metaphysics passage tries to disentangle the uses of a Greek word, the Topics passage introduces technical terms for Aristotle's semantics. I then argue that the positive definition in Top. I 5 is to be understood in the following way: X is an accident of Y iff X belongs to Y and if there (...) is a Z such that X can belong to Z and also not belong to Z. Thus, being white is an accident of snow. I finally argue that certain shortcomings in the Topics account lead Aristotle to redefine accident in the Posterior Analytics. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called ‘accident’. This fallacy often occurs when people let their attention become distracted by factors, which may be true, other than those relevant in an argument. While the fallacy of accident is an informal fallacy, people can imagine that it has something like this as a form: General principle or rule X applies across the board; particular case x is an example of X; and thus X (...) applies to x. One way to detect or to avoid this fallacy is to ask themselves what generalization is being applied. Once they have that figured out, they can ask themselves whether it really does apply in all cases across the board or whether there is a reason to make an exception in some particular case. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called “converse accident (CA)”. The fallacy of CA occurs in much the same way as the fallacy of hasty generalization. Not unlike its other related fallacy, accident, which applies a general principle to a particular case to which it does not apply, CA instead generalizes over some cases, or even over one particular case, to make a more sweeping conclusion. This fallacious way of thinking is especially (...) noxious since it often grounds racist, sexist, or other prejudiced beliefs. It should be obvious to most readers how to detect or avoid this fallacy. Thinking of any counter‐example will usually suffice to reveal this fallacy's error. We might conclude that all other fallacies covered in this book are boring and not very exciting to read about. It's up to the reader to discover whether this is an example of the fallacious reasoning that is CA. (shrink)

It is important to determine the attitudes of employees towards occupational accidents and diseases and whether these events are perceived as inevitable or out of control. Inaccurate interpretation of the perception of fatalism towards occupational accidents and diseases may lead to more occupational accidents and diseases. The use of scales to determine the perception of fatalism in the context of occupational accidents and diseases allows for a quantitative assessment of these issues. This approach makes it possible to objectively measure and (...) analyze the perception of fatalism, thus paving the way for a more in-depth examination of related phenomena. This study is a scale development study to determine the level of fatalism towards occupational accidents and diseases. This methodological study was conducted between October 2021 and June 2023. The scale was shaped by taking expert opinions for the scale items prepared by making use of the literature, pre-applied and pilot applied with 75 people; Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory Factor Analysis were conducted with 242 people; and all evaluated with validity and reliability analyzes. In the exploratory factor analysis for the developed scale of fatalism towards occupational accidents and diseases, it was seen that the scale items were gathered under 4 factors and the explanatory coefficient was 53.68%. In order to measure the applicability of exploratory factor analysis for the scale, KMO value was 0.854 and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity value was χ2=1996.527; df=153, p. (shrink)

Charles Perrow used the term normal accidents to characterize a type of catastrophic failure that resulted when complex, tightly coupled production systems encountered a certain kind of anomalous event. These were events in which systems failures interacted with one another in a way that could not be anticipated, and could not be easily understood and corrected. Systems of the production of expert knowledge are increasingly becoming tightly coupled. Unlike classical science, which operated with a long time horizon, many current forms (...) of expert knowledge are directed at immediate solutions to complex problems. These are prone to breakdowns like the kind discussed by Perrow. The example of the Homestake mine experiment shows that even in modern physics complex systems can produce knowledge failures that last for decades. The concept of knowledge risk is introduced, and used to characterize the risk of failure in such systems of knowledge production. (shrink)

This paper investigates the late medieval controversy over the causal role of substantial forms in the generation of new substances. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, when there were two basic positions in this debate (section II), an original position was defended by Walter Burley and Peter Auriol, according to which accidents alone—by their own power—can generate substantial forms (section III). The paper presents how this view was received by the next generation of philosophers, i.e., around 1350 (section IV), (...) and how, even though some of the initial theoretical motivations for this view were quickly abandoned, the view was still defended by several philosophers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (section V). It is finally shown that this theory, still discussed by Suárez and early modern scholastics, and despite being generally rejected, contributed in its own way to the evolution of hylomorphism in the late Middle Ages and, to a certain extent, its gradual decline (section VI). (shrink)

The essence of an accident consists in its relationship to a substance. For we should not imagine that an accident is a thing in its own right to which gets attached a relationship or a link to a substance in which that accident exists. For if so, an accident would be something in its own right, dependent on substance only as extrinsic, and on this view, an accident could be cognized apart from the substance. These (...) outcomes are impossible, however. Hence, what an accident is to something of the substance: either a measure, or a state, and so on. Thus, the Philosopher says that an accident has being only because it belongs to something that has being. (shrink)

Margaret Cavendish is widely known as a materialist. However, since Cavendishian matter is always in motion, “matter” and “motion” are equally important foundational concepts for her natural philosophy. In Philosophical Letters (1664), she takes to task her materialist rival Thomas Hobbes by assaulting his account of accidents in general and his concept of “rest” in particular. In this article, I argue that Cavendish defends her continuous-motion view in two ways: first, she claims that her account avoids seeing accidents as capable (...) of generation and annihilation, which she argues is inconceivable; and second, she contends that according to Hobbes’s own view “rest” is an absurd conception since it cannot be drawn from experience. Beyond its function as a defense, I claim that Cavendish’s focused criticism of “rest” shows that she is a perceptive reader of Hobbes’s natural philosophy, insofar as her criticisms undercut the two a priori principles of Hobbesian physics. Finally, I show how her views developed in more detail in Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1663) and Observations upon Experimental Philosophy ([1666] 2001) avoid the worries she raises for Hobbesian materialism. (shrink)

Résumé — Alexandre d’Aphrodise a été étudié plus intensément en Europe continentale que dans le monde anglophone. Cet article s’interroge sur les raisons culturelles d’un tel fait. L’une des raisons de l’étude de la philosophie antique en général dans le monde anglophone est la volonté de montrer qu’elle est reliée, et peut rendre service, à des débats philosophiques contemporains. Un cas emblématique nous est fourni par le débat concernant le libre arbitre et le déterminisme. Susanne Bobzien a défendu la thèse (...) qu’alors que les termes du débat contemporain peuvent être décelés au IIe siècle après J.-C., et en particulier dans le traité d’Alexandre Sur le destin, il serait anachronique de les faire remonter à la période hellénistique. La partie finale du présent article se penche sur la façon dont elle rend compte de l’approche post-hellénistique de la question, vue comme le développement, à partir d’un certain nombre de textes aristotéliciens, d’une nouvelle doctrine de la contingence, reflétée dans une série de textes généralement décrits comme médioplatoniciens. On se demande, finalement, quelle relation il faut supposer entre ce développement et les changements, dans la forme et dans le fond, du déterminisme stoïcien.L’accident du déterminisme— Alexander of Aphrodisias has been studied more intensively in continental Europe than in the English-speaking world. This paper examines the cultural reasons for this. One factor in the study of ancient philosophy generally in the English-speaking world is the pressure to show that it relates to, and can be of service in, contemporary philosophical debates. One such case is the debate concerning free-will and determinism. Susanne Bobzien has argued that while the terms of the contemporary debate can be recognised in the second century AD, and in particular in Alexander’s treatise On Fate, it is anachronistic to read them back into the Hellenistic period. The latter part of the present paper examines her account of the origin of the new approach to the question in the development from a number of Aristotelian texts of a new account of contingency, reflected in a range of texts commonly described as Middle Platonist, and asks what relation we should suppose between this development and changes in the formulation and conception of Stoic determinism. (shrink)

We say that things happen accidentally when they do indeed happen, but only by chance. In the opposite situation, an essential happening is inescapable, its inevitability being the sine qua non for its very occurrence. This paper will investigate modal logics on a language tailored to talk about essential and accidental statements. Completeness of some among the weakest and the strongest such systems is attained. The weak expressibility of the classical propositional language enriched with the non-normal modal operators of essence (...) and accident is highlighted and illustrated, both with respect to the definability of the more usual modal operators as well as with respect to the characterizability of classes of frames. Several interesting problems and directions are left open for exploration. (shrink)

Collapsing buildings, unexpected meetings in the marketplace, monstrous births, encounters with pirates at sea - these and other unforeseen 'accidents' at the turn of the seventeenth century in England acquired unprecedented significance in the early modern philosophical and cultural imagination. Drawing on intellectual history, cultural criticism, and rhetorical theory, this book chronicles the narrative transformation of 'accident' from a philosophical dead end to an astonishing occasion for revelation and wonder in early modern religious life, dramatic practice, and experimental philosophy. (...) Alongside texts by such canonical figures as Shakespeare and Bacon, this study draws on several lesser known authors of sensational news accounts about accidents that occurred around the turn of the seventeenth century. The result is a cultural anatomy of accidents as philosophical problem, theatrical conceit, and spiritual landmark. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CRUCIFIXION: ACCIDENT OR DESIGN? Sebastian Moore, O.S.B. Downside Abbey Lastyear I was visited by an old friend from my Liverpool days. Mike and I had worked together with the young of the parish, and one summer the two of us took a couple of boys camping in France, a trial of patience which made us known to each other at some depth. He was in fact a passionately (...) convinced Catholic, and very pastoral with it. We had many and long theological discussions. On his recent visit to Downside, I was showing him and some friends round our church, when, à propos ofquite what I don't remember, he made a remark about the Catholic cult of suffering, and said, "and it's all because ofthe crucifixion, isn't it? Why don't we recognize that the crucifixion was an accident?" I didn't react, because I was dumbfounded at what seemed to be the denial ofthe mystery ofthe cross by a friend who I had no reason to believe had stopped being a Catholic. And I'm sure he hasn't. He would certainly have told me ifhe had. It has taken me over a year to figure out what is going on here, and this would not have been possible without intensive study of the work of René Girard. The only alternative to saying that the crucifixion was an accident is to say that it was "ordained by God." It is only as ordained by God that this horrible event could be presented to people as a divine affirmation that suffering is to be sought and espoused. Also, it is only as ordained by God that the crucifixion can be thought of as "appeasing God" in some way. Both the moral and the dogmatic implication ofthe crucifixion—that suffering is a good thing, and that God required a victim—are grounded in the notion that God required the crucifixion ofhis Son. And it is because this idea is quite unacceptable, unworthy of God and ofthe human mind made in God's image, that my friend concludes that the crucifixion was not required by God, not written into the eternal scheme ofthings, but an accident. 156Sebastian Moore Once the problem is clarified in these terms, more and more instances come to mind, of rejection, by Christians and others, of the whole divine ordination ofthe cross. Gore Vidal refers to Christianity as "that lugubrious religion." Mary Hunt, a prominent American Catholic feminist, introduced a workshop with the statement, "we are not about naked guys nailed to crosses, blood all over the place!" Where divine ordering is accepted the special painfulness and darkness ofthe idea is noted. Anselm refers to the doctrine as the Narnia Chronicles, to commend the notion, by referring to a dark law written into the nature ofthings beyond our comprehension. The children's suggestion that Asian should simply not comply with the Snow Queen's requirement is rejected by Asian with a mysterious impatience—the children justhaven't grown up, like the romantics who, according to Matthew Arnold, "did not know enough." Again, during a day on "the roots of violence" that I led here yesterday there was much questioning about the role ofGod die Father in the crucifixion. The problem is crystallized in the famous cry from the cross, "Why have you forsaken me?" To my confessedly lame suggestion that Jesus was "only quoting a psalm," someone remarked, "to quote that psalm at thatjuncture and not mean it, is somewhatmisleading!" Again it's the same problem. How can God be understood as ordaining the crucifixion, compatibly with the notion of God as all-loving which Christianity of course affirms? Hans Urs Von Balthasar, who is 90% pro-Girard, in the other 10% wants to hold on to something he calls "the wrath of God." Thus the seeming necessity of having God require and ordain the crucifixion is the main crisis of Christian belief. The six-year-old Willie, in Thomas Klise's amazing novel, The Last Western, puts the problem with childlike directness. He keeps interrupting catechism class with, "Why did God kill Jesus?" and is shushed by Sister. I recall that Illtyd Trethowan said to... (shrink)

Scholars paid scant attention to Giles of Rome’s Quaestiones methaphisicales. This is due to many reasons. The Quaestiones are likely the first of the Aristotelian commentaries written by Giles and all XVI-century printed editions conserve but a reportatio of the course on Metaphysics that Giles probably gave in Paris between 1268/1269 and 1271. Since Giles never edited the text of his lectures, we cannot be sure that Giles approved the list and the contents of the questions we may read today. (...) Moreover, the current list is also incomplete because a study of cross-references in Giles’ Aristotelian commentaries showed that Giles wrote other questions, not included in the list we have today. Despite of these features, Giles’ Quaestiones are import both historically and philosophically. They contribute to fixing the chronology of Giles’ first works and to illustrating the metaphysics of the early Giles. In particular, a close examination of the questions on Books VII and VIII of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, devoted to substance and accidents, shows various things. For example, the influence exerted by Averroes’s Commentary on Giles’s teaching and, accordingly, the pivotal role played by the notion of definition in the explanation of the essence of substance and accidents. More generally, such an examination permits us bringing to light the exegetical devices Giles used in order to reconcile Thomas Aquinas’s view of the primacy and unicity of substantial form with his idiomatic position that indeterminate dimensions must precede in some way substantial form. If this were not the case, Giles argues, we could not explain the process of particularization and multiplication of a form that is in itself ‘unparticular’. (shrink)

An accidental glance at a newspaper notice causes Rousseau to collapse under the force of a vision. A car accidentally hits Giacometti, and he experiences an epiphany. Darwin introduces accident to the basic process of life, and Freud looks to accident as the expression of unconscious desire. Accident, Ross Hamilton claims, is the force that makes us modern. Tracing the story of accident from Aristotle to Buster Keaton and beyond, Hamilton’s daring book revives the tradition of (...) the grand history of ideas. _Accident _tells an original history of Western thought from the perspective of Aristotle’s remarkably durable categories of accident and substance. Throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages, Aristotle’s distinction underwrote an insistence on order and subordination of the inessential. In a groundbreaking innovation, Hamilton argues that after the Reformation, the concept of accident began to change places with that of substance: accident became a life-transforming event and effectively a person’s essence. For moderns, it is the accidental, seemingly trivial moments of consciousness that, like Wordsworth’s “spots of time,” create constellations of meaning in our lives. Touching on a broad array of images and texts—Augustine, Dante, the frescoes of Raphael, Descartes, Jane Austen, the work of the surrealists, and twentieth-century cinema—Hamilton provides a new way to map the mutations of personal identity and subjectivity. (shrink)

On September 12, 2008 a Los Angeles commuter train collided with a freight train, killing 25 people and injuring another 135. In chapter 56 of Charles Dickens's Dombey and Son, a passing train collides with a character, running him over and casting "his mutilated fragments in the air."The first of these we might well call an accident. No malicious human agent was at work in that fatal Los Angeles encounter; whenever you have large numbers of vehicles traveling on shared (...) tracks with massive inertial force, then occasionally there will be fatalities—certainly there have been since the dawn of the railway age. Indeed, it was precisely the public's lurid and sensational interest in those railway fatalities that made .. (shrink)

This article interrogates postmodern and Levinasian conceptions of ethics with recourse to Quentin Tarantino's Reservoir Dogs and certain psychoanalytical concepts formulated in Jacques Lacan's Ethics of Psychoanalysis. Since Levinas, ethical thinking has, in some quarters, moved away from conventional questions about moral agency, rights and social justice, on to a concern towards the ultimate unknowability of `the other'. Ethics depends, for Levinas, on an unpredictable, accidental encounter with something Other, that, in its singularity, demands a response; it is precisely the (...) contingency of the encounter that constitutes the ethical difference from the realm of morality and law. Tarantino's movie narratives are also structured around accidents, disclosing the pain and jouissance of accidental expenditures that lie at the heart of any relation to the Other. In the midst of trauma, the Thing ( das ding) emerges, around which goods and signification circulate, that both delimits the identification of the Good and marks a space beyond moral law that becomes the site of radical ethical questioning. (shrink)

ArgumentUsing a striking example from the history of applied psychology, the concept of accident proneness, this paper suggests that historians of science may still find viable the idea of simultaneous discovery or construction of a scientific idea. Accident proneness was discovered independently in Germany and in Britain during the period of World War I. Later on, in 1926, the idea was independently formulated and named in both countries. The evidence shows not only striking simultaneity but true novelty and (...) commensurateness of the two formulations that crystallized at the same time in parallel, but distinctly separate, settings. (shrink)

The author explores the idea that no behavior, even that of criminals, has any ultimate intentional basis, and that all decisions and beliefs occur by accident only.

In this paper I will attempt a unified analysis of the various examples of the fallacy of accident given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations. In many cases the examples underdetermine the fallacy and it is not trivial to identify the fallacy committed. To make this identification we have to find some error common to all the examples and to show that this error would still be committed even if those other fallacies that the examples exemplify were not. Aristotle (...) says that there is only one solution “against the argument” as opposed to “against the man”, and it is this solution the paper attempts to find. It is a characteristic mark of my analysis that some arguments that we might normally be inclined to say are fallacious turn out to be valid and that some arguments that we would normally be inclined to say are valid turn out to be fallacious. This is (in part) because what we call validity in modern logic is not the same as the apodicticity that Aristotelian syllogisms require in order to be used in science. The fallacies of accident, uniquely among the fallacies, are failures of apodicticity rather than failures of, in particular, semantic entailment. This makes sense in a tensed and token-based logic such as Aristotle’s. I conclude that the closest analogue to the fallacy of accident that we can point to is a fallacy in modal logic, viz., the fallacy of necessity. (shrink)

I explore how agent-regret and its object—faultlessly harming someone—can call for various responses. I look at two sorts of responses. Firstly, I explore responses that respect the agent’s role as an agent. This revolves around a feature of “it was just an accident”—a common response to agent-regret—that has largely gone ignored in the literature: that it can downplay one’s role as an agent. I argue that we need to take seriously the fact that those who have caused harms are (...) genuine agents, to ignore this fails to allow these agents to move on. Secondly, following Sussman and MacKenzie, I explore responses that benefit the victim. I argue that we should strive to understand how to configure these responses in a way that does not blame the agent. To do this I look at the role of actions in our self-understanding, as people who have done particular things. I end by briefly considering the ways in which tort law and restorative justice might help us to understand how to appropriately respond to accidentally harming someone. I urge that we need to take this as a starting point to find a better way to respond to the agents of faultless harms. (shrink)

This new translation of four revised radio interviews, conducted in December 2002 at France Culture with Elie During, is the best introduction to Stiegler's Time and Technics series. This collection includes a new interview conducted specially for this volume and an interview with Artpress from 2001. In Philosophising By Accident, Stiegler introduces some of the key arguments about the technical constitution of the human and its relation to politics, aesthetics and economics. He reads philosophical texts from the perspective of (...) his controversial thesis about the three types of memory and speaks about concepts central to his later works, such as synchrony/diachrony, grammatisation and the industrial temporal object. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to explore the significance of the terms ‘accident’ and ‘chance’ when they are used in connection with events that are sometimes said to happen ‘by accident’ and sometimes ‘by chance’. The significance of these terms is not always made clear in everyday conversation, and here I shall try to discuss the distinction between them and the sorts of situation therefore to which they properly apply. Perhaps an example will show that these expressions are (...) different. Thus ‘I met Smith in the library by chance’ is different from ‘I met Smith in the library by accident’, different because these statements reflect different interpretations of the events referred to. We see accidental and chance events in a different light. And this is the point; ‘accident’ and ‘chance’ are terms of interpretation, not of description. And I hope to show that the expression ‘by chance’ is appropriate in contexts which develop as a result of human decisions and intentions in a way in which the expression ‘by accident’ is not appropriate. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Banks provide a valuable but inherently unstable combination of deposit‐taking and lending functions that were successfully held together for several decades after the New Deal by tough banking rules. The weakening of the rules after the 1970s promoted the displacement of traditional relationship‐based banking with securitized, arms‐length alternatives that encouraged banks to undertake activities about which bankers lacked deep relationship‐based knowledge of the risks. Ironically, this risky behavior, encouraged by loosened regulation, was reinforced by progressively tightened securities regulation, which (...) promoted stock‐market liquidity but also deprived large banks (and other publicly traded companies) of oversight by investors with “insiders’” knowledge. Both the underregulation of banking and the overregulation of securities were underpinned by economic theories that favored blind diversification in liquid, anonymous markets, and that ignored the value of relationship‐based knowledge and case‐by‐case due diligence. (shrink)

I explore and develop the idea that (NA) knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. The applicable notion of non-accidentality differs from that of ‘epistemic luck’ discussed by Pritchard. Safety theories may be seen as a refinement of, or substitute for, NA but they are subject to a fundamental difficulty. At the same time, NA needs to be adjusted in order to cope with two counterexamples. The Light Switch Case turns on the ‘directionof-fit’ between a belief and the facts, while the Meson (...) Case concerns knowledge of nomological necessities. A proposed revision to NA is: (ENA) S knows that P when S’s belief that P is non-accidentally true because (i) it is based on good evidence, and (ii) in and of themselves, beliefs based on good evidence tend to be true. ‘knowledge-as-credit’ accounts have been offered as an alternative way of sharpening NA. I argue that such accounts face serious objections that don’t apply to ENA. Finally, I take up Lackey’s worry that the credit-based approach mishandles knowledge via testimony. ENA faces no difficulty on that score, which counts in its favor. (shrink)

The essay constructs an ontological theory designed to capture the categories instantiated in those portions or levels of reality which are captured in our common sense conceptual scheme. It takes as its starting point an Aristotelian ontology of “substances” and “accidents”, which are treated via the instruments of mereology and topology. The theory recognizes not only individual parts of substances and accidents, including the internal and external boundaries of these, but also universal parts, such as the “humanity” which is an (...) essential part of both Tom and Dick, and also “individual relations”, such as Tom’s promise to Dick, or their current handshake. (shrink)

Gene therapy is still a very crude way of treating very complicated problems. It's hard to get new genes to go where they're needed, and hard to keep them from going where they're not wanted. The worst‐case scenario is that they find their way into a patient's germ cells—eggs or sperm—and end up harming the patient's offspring. Yet this possibility is hard to study in human trials, and would be hard to deal with in the clinic. It should, instead, simply (...) be avoided. Doing so requires fundamentally changing our approach to gene therapy. (shrink)

Widespread commercial use of the internet has significantly increased the volume and scope of data being collected by organisations. ‘Big data’ has emerged as a term to encapsulate both the technical and commercial aspects of this growing data collection activity. To date, much of the discussion of big data has centred upon its transformational potential for innovation and efficiency, yet there has been less reflection on its wider implications beyond commercial value creation. This paper builds upon normal accident theory (...) to analyse the broader ethical implications of big data. It argues that the strategies behind big data require organisational systems that leave them vulnerable to normal accidents, that is to say some form of accident or disaster that is both unanticipated and inevitable. Whilst NAT has previously focused on the consequences of physical accidents, this paper suggests a new form of system accident that we label data accidents. These have distinct, less tangible and more complex characteristics and raise significant questions over the role of individual privacy in a ‘data society’. The paper concludes by considering the ways in which the risks of such data accidents might be managed or mitigated. (shrink)

In acting intentionally, it is no accident that one is doing what one intends to do. In this paper, I ask how to account for this non-accidentality requirement on intentional action. I argue that, for systematic reasons, the currently prevailing view of intentional action – the Causal Theory of Action – is ill-equipped to account for it. I end by proposing an alternative account, according to which an intention is a special kind of cause, one to which it is (...) essential that it represents its effect. (shrink)

What are properties? Examples are easy. Consider a particular billiard ball. The ball is red, spherical, and has a definite mass. The ball's redness, sphericity, and mass are properties: properties of the ball. Putting it this way invites a distinction between the ball, a bearer of properties, and the ball's properties. Some philosophers deny that there are properties. To say that the ball is red or spherical, for instance, is just to say that the predicates "is red" and "is spherical" (...) apply truly to the ball. But it is hard not to think that "is red" applies truly to the ball, if it does, because the ball is a particular way, the red way; and "is spherical" applies to the ball because it is a particular way, the spherical way; and the ways in question are distinct ways the ball is. Ways the ball is are, or appear to be, properties of the ball. (shrink)

Problem solving in a materially rich environment requires interacting with chance. Sixty-four participants were invited to solve 5-letter anagrams presented as movable tiles in conditions that either allowed the participants to move the tiles as they wished or only allowed random shuffling (without rearranging the tiles post shuffling) thus contrasting pure luck with an interactive model. We hypothesised that shuffling would break unhelpful mental sets and introduce beneficial unplanned problem-solving trajectories. However, participants performed significantly worse when shuffling, which suggests luck (...) plays less of a role than has been previously suggested. Granular analysis of seven critical cases revealed arbitrary path dependency across both conditions and moments of missed luck. It also questions current models of non-agentic luck and the ability to separate agent and luck. This research has implications for fostering better problem solving in an uncertain and fluid world. (shrink)

This book provides a current analysis of the legal and ethical challenges in preparing for and responding to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive crises. From past events like the Chernobyl nuclear incident in Russia or the Bhopal chemical calamity in India, to the more recent tsunami and nuclear accident in Japan or the Ebola crisis in Africa, and with the on-going threat of bioterrorism, the need to be ready to respond to CBRNE crises is uncontroversial. What is (...) controversial is whether we are on a path that adequately prepares us for the next event. The ethical and legal scholars in this volume hold that much work remains to be done and offer this book to stimulate further reflection and dialogue around CBRNE crises. This is an indispensable book for both students and scholars of bioethics, international law, public health, as well as for regulators and administrators developing policy and legislation related to public health planning and emergency responses. (shrink)

This essay explores the faultlines, poetic pressures and social structures of feeling determining poetry “after” Hiroshima. Nuclear bombs, accidents and waste pose theoretical and poetic challenges. The argument outlines a model of nuclear implicature that reworks Gricean conversational implicature. Nuclear implicature helps to describe ways in which poems “represent” nuclear problems implicitly rather than explicitly. Metonymic, metaphorical, and grammatical modes of implication are juxtaposed with recognition of social attitudes complicit with nuclear problems. Mushroom and lichen metaphors are analysed and distinguished. (...) There are brief accounts of The Chernobyl Herbarium, The Nuclear Culture Source Book and poems by Aidan Semmens, Lorine Niedecker, George Oppen, Denise Levertov, Adrienne Rich, Allen Ginsberg and Gerry Loose. The argument attempts to keep open the fragile agency of writing in poems that confront nuclear power. Poetry after Hiroshima is also contrasted with Adorno’s provocative questions about poetry after Auschwitz, amid Cold War arguments that have distorted recognition of the reality of nuclear production. The essay concludes by considering the emergence of poetry within E.P. Thompson’s theoretical account of “Exterminism,” sketching ways in which poetics and theory might inform both the nuclear imagination and the difficulties of nuclear song. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes often includes powers and abilities in his descriptions of the world. Meanwhile, Hobbes’s philosophical picture of the world appears quite reductive, and he seems sometimes to say that nothing exists but bodies in motion. In more extreme versions of such a picture, there would be no room for powers. Hobbes is not an eliminativist about powers, but his view does tend toward ontological minimalism. It would be good to have an account of what Hobbes thinks powers are, and (...) how they fit into his understanding of the world. In this chapter, I investigate Hobbes’s account of the metaphysics of powers and abilities. Section 1 considers three important aspects of Hobbes’s account of powers: the connection between powers and causes; the modal aspects of powers; and the connection between powers and motions. Sections 2 and 3 then consider interpretive arguments about whether Hobbes identifies powers with underlying corporeal features. (shrink)

This essay is an exegetical work, the primary intention of which is to present and interpret Hegel’s notion of the “understanding” in the first chapter of his Phenomenology of Spirit. The presentation and interpretation at hand takes as its starting point the work of Slavoj Žižek, who the author feels has begun a new and exciting era of scholarship on Hegel. The overall aim of the essay is modest: to develop the Žižekian reading of Hegel at the micro level. My (...) thesis is that Hegel’s initial development of the “understanding” demonstrates how, from the very first, subjectivity grabs a hold on the incompleteness of reality—a notion that is essential to Žižek’s work. Specifically, I show that the understanding realizes itself, against its will, as an accident of the world, upon which it previously depended for its illusory neutrality. The first chapter of the Phenomenology culminates in the problem of consciousness confronting itself as an accident. Ultimately, I show how Hegel’s accidentality of consciousness, since it is determined by the world, coincides with Žižek’s teaching about the identity of the subject precariously established on the incompleteness of reality. (shrink)

This thesis considers two allegations which conservatives often level at no-fault systems — namely, that responsibility is abnegated under no-fault systems, and that no-fault systems under- and over-compensate. I argue that although each of these allegations can be satisfactorily met – the responsibility allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that to properly take responsibility for our actions we must accept liability for those losses for which we are causally responsible; and the compensation allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that tort (...) law’s compensatory decisions provide a legitimate norm against which no-fault’s decisions can be compared and criticized – doing so leads in a direction which is at odds with accident law reform advocates’ typical recommendations. On my account, accident law should not just be reformed in line with no-fault’s principles, but rather it should be completely abandoned since the principles that protect no- fault systems from the conservatives’ two allegations are incompatible with retaining the category of accident law, they entail that no-fault systems are a form of social welfare and not accident law systems, and that under these systems serious deprivation – and to a lesser extent causal responsibility – should be conditions of eligibility to claim benefits. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nuclear Power after Fukushima 2011:Buddhist and Promethean PerspectivesGraham ParkesDuring 2010 many environmentalists previously opposed to nuclear power were deciding, in the face of anthropogenic climate change from burning fossil fuels, that the only way to prevent runaway global warming would be to build more nuclear power plants after all.1 There are risks involved—though fewer than with carbon-based sources of energy.2 When one compares the detrimental effects of nuclear power (...) with those of burning fossil fuel, it is clear that the human injury and death toll (not to mention environmental devastation) resulting from the former have been nothing compared to the damage caused by the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels, owing to mining accidents, oil spills, and so forth—not to mention the massive carbon dioxide emissions.On the other hand, the problem of how and where to store the growing amount of radioactive waste from nuclear power plants, which remains deadly for many thousands of years, has yet to be solved. Costly security measures have to be taken to guard against terrorist attacks and theft of materials usable for nuclear devices. When full safety features are included, nuclear power plants become ever more expensive to build, and the costs of insuring them against accidents are so prohibitive that governments have to subsidize them, which they are increasingly unwilling to do.Not long after the explosions and meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in March 2011, two dismal world records were announced: in 2010 we discharged a record amount of carbon dioxide (more than 30 gigatons) into the atmosphere, mainly by burning fossil fuels, and, as a direct consequence, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere (as measured at the Earth Systems Research Laboratory in Hawai'i) reached a record level of 395 parts per million. These figures suggest that we are continuing to generate a rise in global average temperatures that is already destroying the livelihoods of millions and will soon jeopardize the lives of hundreds of millions more.As a consequence of the 2011 Fukushima disaster, Japan—long a leading promoter of nuclear power—has begun to enforce some widely neglected safety regulations and is seriously reconsidering its reliance on nuclear energy. China has put construction of [End Page 89] new power plants on hold. Other nations (such as Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Thailand, and Malaysia) have decided to phase out or cancel plans to build more nuclear power stations. Yet the primary motivations remain unclear, since people's attitudes toward the dangers of nuclear radiation are anything but rational—as evidenced by the mass departure of foreigners from Japan after the catastrophe at Fukushima, when health dangers beyond the vicinity of the power station were minimal.In Europe, the reaction to the Fukushima disaster has clearly been aggravated by memories of the catastrophe at Chernobyl in 1986. While Chernobyl was a more widely destructive event than Fukushima, releasing a much greater amount of radioactivity, its effects on human health continue to generate disagreement. According to the third report on the effects of the Chernobyl catastrophe issued by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), among the 134 plant staff and emergency workers who suffered acute radiation syndrome (ARS), the condition proved fatal for twenty-eight of them. By 2006 another nineteen ARS survivors died, although their deaths were not directly attributable to the effects of ionizing radiation. Although the report attributes "a substantial fraction" of the six thousand cases of thyroid cancer in people who were children at the time of the accident to their consumption of milk contaminated with iodine-131, only fifteen cases had proved fatal by 2005, some twenty years later.3 The death toll, then, was fewer than fifty.By contrast, a study by a group of scientists from Belarus, Russia, and the Ukraine, Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment, estimates the number of deaths attributable to the meltdown at around 980,000—almost twenty thousand times greater than the estimate by the UN scientific committee.4 What are we to make of this vast discrepancy, especially since the UNSCEAR report "was prepared in close cooperation with... (shrink)

This paper questions the fairness of our current tort-law regime and the philosophical underpinnings advanced in its defense, a theory known as corrective justice. Fairness requires that the moral equality and responsibility of persons be respected in social interactions and institutions. The concept of luck has been used by many egalitarians as a way of giving content to fairness by differentiating between those benefits and burdens that result from informed choice and those that result from fate or fortune. We argue (...) that the theory of corrective justice, along with its institutional embodiment of tort law, is at odds with an egalitarian commitment to fairness because it allows luck an unjustifiable role in determining dissimilar liability for similar wrongs and dissimilar compensation for similar losses to bodily integrity. Many egalitarian political theorists have also recognized, if not defended, the notion of distinct forms of justice, namely corrective, retributive, and distributive. Although theorists of these different forms of justice have been concerned with negating unfair luck inside the operations of each form of justice, there has been little attention to the way in which luck operates to sort cases into each form of justice. We claim that there is a significant way in which luck operates to subject different people to principles of corrective, retributive, and distributive justicewhich flies in the face of the egalitarian value of fairness. After surveying the arguments put forward by theorists defending a categorical distinction between corrective justice and retributive and distributive principles, we argue that although analytical distinctions can be made between different forms of justice (although, we also suggest that the distinctions are not as sharp as some commentators suggest), there is no good reason to defend an acoustic separation between these forms of justice when doing so creates unfair outcomes. (shrink)

Recent simulations by Scanlon et al. showed seemingly spectacular results for the Waymo self-driving vehicle in simulations of real accident situations. In this paper, it is argued that the selection criteria for accident situations must be modified in accordance with the relevant policy alternatives. While Scanlon et al. compare Waymo with old human-driven vehicles, it is argued here that the relevant policy question is whether we ought to use self-driven vehicles or human-driven vehicles in the future, which means (...) that we need to consider whether other technological solutions, which are available but not broadly used in human-driven vehicles, could result in human-driven vehicles managing to avoid the same accidents. In this article, a proposal for a new standard of selection criteria is made. (shrink)