In his 2018 AJP paper, Shlomo Cohen hints that deception could be a distinct subset of manipulation. We pursue this thought further, but by arguing that Cohen’s accounts of deception and manipulation are incorrect. Deception under uncertainty need not involve adding false premises to the victim’s reasoning but it must involve manipulating her response, and cases of manipulation that do not interfere with the victim’s reasoning, but rather utilize it, also exist. Therefore, deception under uncertainty must be constituted by covert (...) manipulation. (shrink)

This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. (...) This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible. (shrink)

Sorensen says that my assertion that p is a knowledge-lie if it is meant to undermine your justification for believing truly that ∼p, not to make you believe that p and that, therefore, knowledge-lies are not intended to deceive. It has been objected that they are meant to deceive because they are intended to make you more confident in a falsehood. In this paper, I propose a novel account according to which an assertion that p is a knowledge-lie if it (...) is intended not to provide evidence that p but to make you stop trusting all testimonies concerning whether p, which is how they undermine your testimonial knowledge. Because they are not intended to provide evidence that bears on the truth of p, they are not intended to make you more confident in a falsehood; therefore, knowledge-lies are not intended to deceive. This makes them a problem for the traditional account, which takes the intention to deceive as necessary for lying, and an interesting example of Kant's idea that allowing lies whenever one feels like it would bring it about that statements in general are not believed. (shrink)

In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not correct. Indifferent lies, too, are (...) either intended to deceive or are not lies at all, since they do not involve genuine assertions. (shrink)

Arguably, the existence of bald-faced (i.e. knowingly undisguised) lies entails that not all lies are intended to deceive. Two kinds of bald-faced lies exist in the literature: those based on some common knowledge that implies that you are lying and those that involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that you are lying. I designed the tell-tale sign bald-faced lies to avoid objections raised against the common knowledge bald-faced lies but I now see that they are more problematic than what (...) I initially thought. Therefore, I will discuss these lies in more detail, refine the existing cases, and resolve some anticipated objections. I conclude that tell-tale sign bald-faced lies are genuine lies not intended to deceive. (shrink)

According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to (...) deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting. (shrink)

This paper argues that extant signalling-based analyses cannot explain a range of cases of biological (and psychological) deception, such as those in which the deceiver does not send a signal at all, but that Artiga and Paternotte’s (Philos Stud 175:579–600, 2018) functional and my (Krstić in The analysis of self-deception: rehabilitating the traditionalist account. PhD Dissertation, University of Auckland, 2018: §3; Krstić and Saville in Australas J Philos 97:830–835, 2019) manipulativist analyses can. Therefore, the latter views should be (...) given preference. And because we still do not have a satisfactory definition of manipulation, the functional analysis, according to which a state is deceptive iff its function is to mislead and it misleads, is currently our best theory of deception. This is not to argue that the signalling-based analyses have no value but only that they should not be used in general analyses of biological deception. We need to move on to some other interesting issues. (shrink)

Unavailability of published data and studies focused on young researchers in Europe and research integrity issues reveals that clear understanding and stance on this subject within European area is lacking. Our study provides information on attitudes and experiences of European researchers at early career stages, based on a limited sample of respondents. The study provides both quantitative and qualitative results for the examined issues. The data suggest that awareness and interest of the younger researchers surveyed in research integrity issues is (...) high, however, it is often based on self-initiatives, with many of the respondents not having adequate training or any possibility to obtain it. Our attitude survey conducted within the European Council of Doctoral Candidates and Junior Researchers indicates that only 22 % of respondents had an opportunity to obtain relevant training, and that only one third believed that institutions and supervisors regularly paid attention to it. Further, we noted certain differences between disciplines. The study also reveals that many younger researchers felt they faced problems due to the misconduct of their senior colleagues and the existing institutional culture. The results of the study indicate a need for better prevention mechanisms, training and raising awareness activities. Preferably, junior researchers should be given an active role in shaping the integrity culture. It should be noted that the presented results should be considered in the context of the limitations stemming from the small-scale survey. This paper encourages further research activities on research integrity practices to provide stronger evidence on the attitudes and experiences of young researchers in Europe and other parts of the world. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine a kind of delusion in which the patients judge that their occurrent thoughts are false and try to abandon them precisely because they are false, but fail to do so. I call this delusion transparent, since it is transparent to the sufferer that their thought is false. In explaining this phenomenon, I defend a particular two-factor theory of delusion that takes the proper integration of relevant reasoning processes as vital for thought-evaluation. On this proposal, which (...) is a refinement of Gerrans’s account of delusion as unsupervised by decontextualized processing, I can have all my reasoning processes working reliably and thus judge that my delusion is false but, if I cannot use their outputs when revising the thought itself, the delusion will persist. I also sketch how this framework explains some interesting cases of failed belief-revision in the general population in which people judge that ~p but nonetheless continue to believe that p. (shrink)

We conducted two experiments to determine whether common folk think that so-called _tell-tale sign_ bald-faced lies are intended to deceive—since they have not been tested before. These lies involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that the speaker is lying. Our study was designed to avoid problems earlier studies raise (these studies focus on a kind of bald-faced lie in which supposedly everyone knows that what the speaker says is false). Our main hypothesis was that the participants will think that (...) the protagonists from our examples lied without intending to deceive, and the results of our surveys confirmed this hypothesis: most of our participants rated tell-tale sign lies as lies not intended to deceive. Therefore, our analysis suggests that common folk think that some lies are not intended to deceive. (shrink)

Self-deception makes best sense as a self-defensive mechanism by which the self protects itself from painful reality. Hence, we typically imagine self-deceivers as people who cause themselves to believe as true what they want to be true. Some self-deceivers, however, end up believing what they do not want to be true. Their behaviour can be explained on the hypothesis that the function of this behaviour is protecting the agent's perceived focal benefit at the cost of inflicting short-term harm, which is (...) a basis for a unified account of the phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that this view is narrow. Cases of altruistic, benevolent, and even self-punishing self-deception also exist. There, the function is not the self-deceiver's benefit. In fact, self-deception may have no function at all. Therefore, I put forward a novel account that analyses the function of self-deception on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

This paper examines the connection between lies, deception, and self-deception. Understanding this connection is important because the consensus is that you cannot deceive yourself by lying since you cannot make yourself believe as true a proposition you already believe is false – and, as a liar, you must assert a proposition you believe is false. My solution involves refining our analysis of lying: people can lie by asserting what they confidently believe is true. Thus, self-deceivers need not replace one belief (...) with another; rather, they may just increase existing credence in a proposition they already believe is true. (shrink)

A satisfactory analysis of human deception must rule out cases where it is a mistake or an accident that person B was misled by person A's behavior. Therefore, most scholars think that deceivers must intend to deceive. This article argues that there is a better solution: rather than appealing to the deceiver's intentions, we should appeal to the function of their behavior. After all, animals and plants engage in deception, and most of them are not capable of forming intentions. Accordingly, (...) certain human behavior is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead. This solves our problem because if the function of A's behavior was to mislead, B's ending up misled was not an accident or a mere mistake even if A did not intend to deceive B. (shrink)

Inspiracija ili provokacija za ovaj clanak dosla je od onih teoreticara dobrobiti zivotinja i envajarmentalistickih filozofa koji su doveli u pitanje opravdanost nase - stvarne ali i simbolicke - prakse jedenja mesa i, odatle stavili na kusnju celokupnu nasu mesozdresku i, uopste, prozdrljivu kulturu. Autor priloga taj motiv - motiv jedenja, gutanja, zdranja - nastoji da propita na tragu onih njegovih manifestovanja, izlaganja, nalaza ili dalekoseznijih tematizacija koji su se vise ili manje usputno odigravali u nekim tekstovima pojedinih stozernih mislilaca (...) moderne i savremene filozofske tradicije. Sugerise se da je pronicanje figure prozdiranja, sagledane iz perspektive njenog neprimetnog i vremenom gotovo obrednog prerastanja u samorazumljivi gest teorije - i niukoliko ne samo teorije - jedan u najmanju ruku instruktivan i inspirativan aktuelni momenat samosvesti celokupnog misljenja, odnosno vid njegove kriticke rekonstrukcije i dekonstrukcije. (shrink)

The present research examines how children’s time spent online is associated with their perceived life satisfaction accounting for their age, gender, socio-economic status (SES), emotional problems, country, and family environmental factors. This article is based on the data of the large scale cross-sectionalEU Kids Onlinesurvey from 16 European countries with nationally representative samples of children aged 9–17 (N= 11,200,Mage= 13.3, SD = 2.36; 50.6% boys, 49.4% girls). The results indicated that the time children spent online appeared to have no considerable (...) negative effect on their self-reported life satisfaction (SRLS). Comparatively, the positive effects of children’s SES and family environment accounted for 43% of the overall 50% of the variance in children’s SRLS scores. Considering that children’s SES alone accounted for 42% of the variance, children’s emotional problems, country of residence, and enabling parental mediation accounted for the remaining 3, 4, and 1% of the variance, respectively. In line with previous studies that urge caution when discussing the negative influence of time spent online on children’s mental health and overall wellbeing, the current findings suggest that social-ecological characteristics and how children use the Internet, need to be examined further. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue (1) that the contents of some delusions are believed with sufficient confidence; (2) that a delusional subject could have a conscious belief in the content of his delusion (p), and concurrently judge a contradictory content (not-p) – his delusion could be transparent, and (3) that the existence of even one such case reveals a problem with pretty much all existing accounts of lying, since it suggests that one can lie by asserting what one consciously and (...) confidently believes is true, and (4) sincerity, since it suggests that asserting a proposition you believe is true is neither sufficient nor necessary for sincerity. If I am right about (1) and (2), then (3) and (4) follow easily. Therefore, the paper is mainly devoted to an analysis of transparent delusion and defending (1) and (2). (shrink)

In his article, Grossmann argues that, in the context of human cooperative caregiving, heightened fearfulness in children and human sensitivity to fear in others are adaptive traits. I offer and briefly defend a rival hypothesis: Heightened fearfulness among infants and young children is a maladaptive trait that did not get deselected in the process of evolution because human sensitivity to fear in others mitigates its disadvantageous effects to a sufficient extent.

This paper rejects an argument defending the view that the boundary between deception and manipulation is such that some manipulations intended to cause false beliefs count as non-deceptive. On the strongest version of this argument, if a specific behaviour involves compromising the victim’s reasoning, then the behaviour is manipulative but not deceptive, and if it involves exposing the victim to misleading evidence that justifies her false belief, then it is deceptive but not manipulative. This argument has been consistently used as (...) a reason to reject the traditional analysis of human deception, according to which intentionally causing someone to acquire a false belief is sufficient for deception. And because the traditional analysis is also consistent with our most basic intuitions about deception, it does matter whether this argument succeeds. (shrink)

This paper aims to describe the development of the recent wave of interest in memory and the past in general, as well as the overall cultural climate that encouraged this?invasion? of the past in both public and scientific discourses. While the first wave of memory boom was supposed to legitimate the emerging nation-states, the second boom signified the exhaustion of the old paradigm of nationalism, decline of the nation-state, as well as the emergence of a new paradigm: globalization.

Traditionalists affirm that in self-deception I intend to deceive myself; but, on the standard account of interpersonal deception, according to which deceiver intend to make their target believe a falsehood, traditionalism generates paradoxes, arising from the fact that I will surely know that I want to make myself believe a falsehood. In this thesis, I argue that these well-known paradoxes need not arise under my manipulativist account of deception. In particular, I defend traditionalism about self-deception by showing that what causes (...) paradoxes is not the idea that self-deception is an intrapersonal analogue of interpersonal deception but rather our incorrect conceptions of deception, interpersonal deception, and lying. I show, by way of counterexamples, that the essence of deception is not ending up epistemically worse off but rather being intentionally manipulated into forming or retaining a certain truth-evaluable mental state. Vitally, contra the standard view, the deceiver need not hold that the mental state he intends to produce in the deceived involves a falsehood; in fact, the targeted effect may involve a proposition believed by the deceiver to be true or about whose truth the deceiver suspends belief. Any phenomenon rightly called self-deception, I argue, involves an action in which the person intentionally manipulates (by way of a trick) her own way of forming or retaining some truth-evaluable mental state of her own (belief or a belief-like thought). Thus, on the manipulativist view, a self-deceiver may non-paradoxically intend to deceive himself: the relevant intention is to affect a particular truth-evaluable thought by way of non-deviantly manipulating his agential use of his own cognitive capacities. While all cases of self-deception involve intentional manipulation of the self by the self, how this manipulative trick works out varies in different kinds of cases. In some cases, the self-deceptive manipulative trick is not intentional under that description, a description that captures the so-called deflationary view. Although the manipulativist account allows for numerous different strategies of self-deception, and is consistent with both traditionalism and deflationism, it cannot, by itself, vindicate the idea of lying to oneself. On the standard conception, lying to myself is practically impossible (if the mind is not partitioned) and this is because the very forming the intention to lie to myself – as including the intention to make myself believe my own lie – seems very unlikely. Arguably, people will not φ if they think that φ-ing is impossible. I argue that some kinds of behaviour typically understood as self-deception are actually cases in which the person is lying to herself without the intention to deceive herself; rather, she avoids legitimising an unfavourable state of affairs by openly affirming its contrary. It may also be the case, however, that some lies to oneself are aimed at deceiving – this is because, as I argue, liars need not assert what they believe is false; hence, by lying to myself, I may intend to increase my confidence in the belief I already hold. Finally, the motive for self-deception is always a matter of preserving the person’s endorsed idealised picture of reality. This account allows me to explain all possible cases of self-deception. In the last chapter, I apply my theory to some paradigmatic cases first outlined in my introduction. (shrink)

Dvesta dvadeset godina nakon Francuske revolucije, problem odredjenja pojma prosvetiteljstva i dalje istrajava. U radu ce se pokazati da odredjenje ovog pojma nikada i nije bilo sasvim jasno. Stoga se predlaze pravljenje distinkcije izmedju prosvecenosti i prosvetiteljstva. Prosvetiteljstvo kao period koji se vezuje za Evropu XVIII veka, moze se tumaciti kao deo sireg procesa prosvecenosti, ili, bolje, prosvecivanja. Videcemo da se prosvetiteljstvo ne moze posmatrati kao homogen, jedinstven proces, vec da bi ga pre trebalo videti kao tkivo, koje i dalje (...) utice na misao i kulturu Zapada. Medjutim, utvrdice se i da optuzbe na racun?naknadnog projektovanja prosvetiteljstva? nisu narocito korisne, buduci da osujecuju mogucnost razumevanja jednog slozenog fenomena i veoma znacajnog pokreta u evropskoj povesti. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 149029: Prosvecenost u evropskom, regionalnom i nacionalnom kontekstu - istorija i savremenost. (shrink)

U ovom radu autor nastoji da svoju knjigu Filozofska zivotinja: zoografski nagovor na filozofiju izlozi vlastitoj bespostednoj analizi ne bi li je preventivno odbranio od potencijalnih kritika drugih. Na taj nacin, s druge strane, on veruje da upravo otvara prostor za takav govor o knjizi i temama koje ona provocira koji ne bi bio tek nakanadno uredno registrovanje i/ili prigodna pohvala, vec njome inspirisan samosvojni prilog koji joj nazad odjekuje.

In this paper the author is attempting to establish the relationship - or the lack of it - of the Critical Theory to the "Jewish question" and justification of perceiving signs of Jewish religious heritage in the thought of the representatives of this movement. The holocaust marked out by the name of "Auschwitz", is here tested as a point where the nature of this relationship has been decided. In this encounter with the cardinal challenge for the contemporary social theory, the (...) particularity of the Frankfurt School reaction is here revealed through Adorno installing Auschwitz as unexpected but lawful emblem of the ending of the course that modern history has assumed. The critique of this "fascination" with Auschwitz, as well as certain theoretical pacification and measured positioning of the holocaust into discontinued plane of "unfinished" and continuation and closure of the valued project, are given through communicative-theoretical pre-orientation of J?rgen Habermas?s Critical Theory and of his followers. Finally, through the work of Detlev Claussen, it is suggested that in the youngest generation of Adorno?s students there are signs of revision to once already revised Critical Theory and a kind of defractured and differentiated return to the initial understanding of the decisiveness of the holocaust experience. This shift in the attitude of the Critical Theory thinkers to the provocation of holocaust is not, however, particularly reflected towards the status of Jews and their tradition, but more to the age old questioning and explanatory patterns for which they served as a "model". The question of validity of the enlightenment project, the nature of occidental rationalism, existence of historical theology and understanding of the identity and emancipation - describe the circle of problems around which the disagreement is concentrated in the social critical theory. U ovoj studiji autor nastoji da ustanovi odnos - ili manjak odnosa - Kriticke teorije drustva prema "jevrejskom pitanju", te opravdanost uvidjanja eventualnih tragova jevrejskog religijskog nasledja u misljenju njenih predstavnika. Pritom se holokaust, amblematicki naznacen u imenu "Ausvic" iskusava kao tacka na kojoj se odlucivalo o karakteru tog odnosa. U tom susretu sa kardinalnim izazovom za savremenu drustvenu teoriju, posebnost reakcije Frankfurtske skole izlaze se preko Adornovog instaliranja Ausvica u neoCekivano ali zakonito znamenje kraja onog toka koji je moderna istorija poprimila. Kritike ove "opcinjenosti" Ausvicom, kao i izvesna teorijska pacifikacija i odmereno smestanje holokausta u diskontinuiranu ravan jednog "nedovrsenog" i nastavljanja i dovrsenja vrednog projekta, date su kroz komunikativno teorijsku preorijentaciju Kriticke teorije Jirgena Habermasa i nastavljaca. Najzad se preko dela Detlefa Klausena sugerise da u najmladjoj generaciji Adornovih ucenika postoje signali revizije jednom vec revidirane Kriticke teorije i jednog prelomljenog i diferenciranog povratka izvornim uvidima u odlucnost iskustva holokausta. Ova mena u stavovima Kritickih teoreticara drustva prema provokaciji holokausta se, medjutim, ne ogledu u nekakvoj partikularnoj usmerenosti na status Jevreja i njihove tradicije, vec radije u onim vec dugovekim nedoumenjima i eksplanatornim matricama za koja su posluzili kao "model". Pitanja validnosti projekta prosvetiteljstva prirode okcidentalne racionalnosti, postojanja istorijske teleologije i razumevanja koncepcija identiteta i emancipacije - opisuju onaj problemski krug oko kojega se, i kada je o holokaustu rec, koncentrisu nesaglasja Kriticke teorije drustva. (shrink)

This paper tries to extricate philosophical education from the restrictions of social and school systems and to commend some independent and subversive views. This is to be accomplished through a conceptual dissection of the term?education?. On the one hand, there is education seen as transmitter of the tradition, where to be educated is seen as being able to fit into an established community. There is also another education to which the authority of tradition is a permanent target of resistance, always (...) trying to undermine any educational uniformity. This second history of education, genuinely philosophical, is radically opposed to the history of institutionalized mass-education. However, intention of this paper is not to proclaim this as an "alternative" model, or to build it up as a new mythology. On the contrary, it is being written as a history of continuous subversion. Viewed from this vantage point, autonomous philosophical education is not a subsystem of a social system. This education has itself as a measurement, and always resists the wider community that has accidentally befallen it. Its honor is exactly in this attitude of resistance, in being watchful against any conscription and integration. Understood in this manner, philosophical education is not a useful "implemented" function of society, but is rather its dysfunction. Rad nastoji da izdvoji filozofsko obrazovanje iz ogranicenja drustvenog i skolskog sistema i da sugerise mogucnost njegovog nezavisnog i "subverzivnog" sagledavanja. Potonje se postize pojmovnim razlaganjem termina "obrazovanje". S jedne strane, postoji obrazovanje kao transmisija tradicije, u kom slucaju se obrazovanost vidi kao sposobnost da se uklopi u ustanovljenu zajednicu. Postoji, medjutim, takodje i jedno drugacije obrazovanje, u cijem registru je autoritet tradicije permanentna tacka otpora. Ono istrajno pokusava da potkopa svaku obrazovnu jednoobraznost. Ova druga istorija obrazovanja, radikalno je suprotstavljena istoriji institucionalizovanog masovnog obrazovanja. Namera ovog rada nije, medjutim, da nju proglasi "alternativnim" modelom ili da je uspostavi kao novu mitologiju. Naprotiv, ona je pisana kao istorija neprestanih diverzija. Sa ovog stanovista sagledana, autonomna filozofska obrazovanost nije podsistem drustvenog sistema. Ovo obrazovanje ima svoju meru u samom sebi i uvek se odupire zajednici koja ga okruzuje i koja ga slucajem dopada. Njegova cast je upravo u ovom stavu otpora, u budnosti prema svakom podvodjenju i integraciji. Na ovaj nacin shvaceno, filozofsko obrazovanje nije tek na jedan odredjeni nacin "implementirana" funkcija drustva, vec pre njegova disfunkcija. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to the status and perspectives of critique in the theory of education. Detecting that it is either a social criticism in which education appears as a convenient culprit and an investment currency, or a criticism of a small scope that corrects didactic strategies within predetermined frameworks, the author articulates two axiomatic beliefs that prevent a radical critique of education in modern times. The first belief or the first methodological dogma refers to the necessary but unjustified privileged (...) epistemic position of the critic, which makes the critique either unfounded or, if it is at all theoretically responsible, regenerates the system it aims to undermine. The second dogma refers to the preconceived notion that education should achieve something that goes beyond the immediate scope of education, something that its current organization does not achieve, and which supposedly cannot be achieved by any other means. It is concluded that this normative dimension that society imposes on education can have disastrous effects. (shrink)

Led by Adorno and Horkheimer’s understanding of the three conceptual orienteers - subject, reason and emancipation - this work attempts to sketch a status that they have attributed to the Enlightenment. Ulysses and Oedipus are here used not only in the way those two authors have done, not only to illustrate dialectical contradictions that this "project" falls into and is marked by, but also in a way that signalize possibilities of different interpretations that have relied upon them. Adorno and Horkheimer’s (...) "to enlighten the enlightenment about itself" is thus displayed, extended and examined also in the fields of contemporary thought where they have, in different ways, inspired and provoked new generation of Critical theory, and on the other hand, the postmodern authors. (shrink)

The article critically analyses the recent discourse on “post-truth” and addresses the long-term current efforts to determine the epistemic and social status of truth. The first part of the article attempts to define the reason for the appearance and scope of conceptual intervention of the recently popular term “post-truth”. The second part of the paper is devoted to the “prehistory of post-truth” and the introduction of the concept of one authoritative truth in the monotheism of early Judaism. The author then (...) presents contemporary critiques of the fixation of thinking on truth and proposals for a “different thinking”. In the last part of the paper, the author points out the contradiction of situating truth between the extremes of its absolutisation and relativisation, and the necessity of philosophy to dwell in it. (shrink)

Ovaj rad želi u dilemama s kojima se suočavaju suvremene društvene znanosti pri nastojanju artikuliranja koncepcije kolektivnog identiteta prepoznati motive mišljenja identiteta koje je već iskušavala spekulativna filozofska tradicija. Čini se da jednim zaobilaznim i tako reći »empirijskim« putem prve ponavljaju paradokse potonje: udarajući na samu granicu diskurzivnog poimanja identiteta, svjedoče o unutrašnjoj proturječnosti i, istovremeno, neophodnosti njegovog instaliranja. Oba pristupa ustanovljuju neizbježnu »dijalektičku« suigru identiteta i razlike, koji se, čak i u svojim radikalnim samoafirmacijama, međusobno podrazumijevaju, konstituiraju i podržavaju. (...) Upitno, međutim, ostaje koliko je takva njihova »apstraktna« strukturalna su-upućenost operativna, kao i je li moguće misliti mimo ili preko nje.In confronting dilemmas of contemporary social science when attempting to articulate the concept of collective identity, this paper would try to recognize the motives of thinking the identity that has already been tried by the speculative philosophical tradition. It appears that in roundabout, so called “empirical” way the former are repeating the paradox of the latter: aiming at the boundary of the discursive understanding of the identity, they testify inner contradictions, and at the same time, necessity of establishing it. Both approaches ascertain unavoidable “dialectical” inter-play of the identity and the difference, that even in their radical self affirmation, imply, constitute, and endorse one another. However, there is still the question of how much is this “abstract” structural co-dependency operative, and also, is it possible to think past it or over it. (shrink)

The notion of the Gesamtkunstwerk as a modern political phenomenon – the merging of art and life and the artistic transformation of life in its totality – has been limited to public political spectacle and the theatrical enactments of state programs. In contrast, this article about the Soviet 1920s and 1930s looks at everyday life or, in Russian, byt, as the primary domain of modern aesthetico-political intervention. The successful ordering of everyday life according to the principles of communism would mean (...) that even the most intimate aspects of citizens’ lives become part of a total work of art, which now encompasses not only the public but also the private sphere. The author traces the evolution of byt reform from the aesthetic associations between bureaucrats and artists of the 1920s to the 1930s mobilization of ordinary citizens as artists who mould their everyday environments in accordance with Stalinist politics. (shrink)

The epistemic attitudes of scientists, such as epistemic tolerance and authoritarianism, play important roles in the discourse about rivaling theories. Epistemic tolerance stands for the mental attitude of an epistemic agent, e.g., a scientist, who is open to opposing views, while epistemic authoritarianism represents the tendency to uncritically accept views of authorities. Another relevant epistemic factor when it comes to the epistemic decisions of scientists is the skepticism towards the scientific method. However, the question is whether these epistemic attitudes are (...) influenced by their sociopolitical counterparts, such as the researcher’s degree of conservatism. To empirically investigate the interplay between epistemic and sociopolitical attitudes of scientists, we conducted a survey with researchers (N = 655) across different disciplines. We propose scales for measuring epistemic tolerance and epistemic authoritarianism, as well as a scale for detecting the participants' readiness to question the scientific method. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between epistemic tolerance and epistemic authoritarianism on the one hand, and career stage and sociopolitical views on the other hand. Interestingly, our study found only small correlations between the participants' degree of conservatism and their epistemic attitudes. This suggests that political views, against common argumentation, actually do not play an important role in one’s scientific decisions. Moreover, social scientists scored higher on the epistemic tolerance and lower on the epistemic authoritarianism scale than natural scientists. Finally, the results indicate that natural scientists question the scientific method less than social scientists. (shrink)

Deceptionism about lying is the view that all lies are intended to deceive. This view sits uneasily with some cases that seem to involve lies not intended to deceive. We call these lies bald-faced because the liar lies while believing that the hearer knows that they are lying. The most recent deceptionist argument put forward by Rudnicki and Odrowąż-Sypniewska (this journal) defends the view that all genuine bald-faced lies are intended to deceive some of their hearers. I argue that this (...) argument is interesting but problematic: its premises do not support the view that all bald-faced lies are intended to deceive but rather only that some people who bald-faced lie to institutions or large audiences intend to deceive someone. Also, genuine bald-faced lies addressed at institutions are intended to (non-deceptively) manipulate institutions rather than deceive anyone. (shrink)

The paper seeks to integrate Theodor W. Adorno’s observations about upbringing and education, scattered throughout his almost entire opus. The intention, however, is not doctrinal: loyalty to the author would be betrayed and it would fall short of his criticism if such integration would sought to reconstruct some uncollected or unspoken Adorno’s “educational doctrine”. With a sworn antisystematist, even visions of educational theory and practice must not grow into a system. It is rather about an attitude that insists on trying (...) to bring the antinomy of education – by non-free means to the goal of freedom, by manipulation to the point of impossibility to be manipulated – into school and not only school tasks, as a goal that will prevent Auschwitz’s repetition, enable autonomy and empower for self-reflection. (shrink)

According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to (...) deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting. (shrink)