This paper gives an account of Anderson and Belnap’s selection criteria for an adequate theory of entailment. The criteria are grouped into three categories: criteria pertaining to modality, those pertaining to relevance, and those related to expressive strength. The leitmotif of both this paper and its prequel is the relevant legitimacy of disjunctive syllogism. Relevant logics are commonly held to be paraconsistent logics. It is shown in this paper, however, that both E and R can be extended to explosive logics (...) which satisfy all of Anderson and Belnap’s selection criteria, provided the truth-constant known as the Ackermann constant is available. One of the selection criteria related to expressive strength is having an “enthymematic” conditional for which a deduction theorem holds. I argue that this allows for a new interpretation of Anderson and Belnap’s take on logical consequence, namely as committing them to pluralism about logical consequence. (shrink)

It is known that many relevant logics can be conservatively extended by the truth constant known as the Ackermann constant. It is also known that many relevant logics can be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. This essay, however, shows that a range of relevant logics with the Ackermann constant cannot be conservatively extended by a Boolean negation.

This paper presents a range of new triviality proofs pertaining to naïve truth theory formulated in paraconsistent relevant logics. It is shown that excluded middle together with various permutation principles such as A → (B → C)⊩B → (A → C) trivialize naïve truth theory. The paper also provides some new triviality proofs which utilize the axioms ((A → B)∧ (B → C)) → (A → C) and (A → ¬A) → ¬A, the fusion connective and the Ackermann constant. An (...) overview over various ways to formulate Leibniz’s law in non-classical logics and two new triviality proofs for naïve set theory are also provided. (shrink)

This paper shows how to conservatively extend theories formulated in non-classical logics such as the Logic of Paradox, the Strong Kleene Logic and relevant logics with Skolem functions. Translations to and from the language extended by Skolem functions into the original one are presented and shown to preserve derivability. It is also shown that one may not always substitute s=f(t) and A(t, s) even though A determines the extension of a function and f is a Skolem function for A.

One of the standard manoeuvres in contemporary moral philosophy is to present Kant's ethics and utilitarianism as alternative ethical theories. New students learn that there are two main types of ethical theory, those which are consequence-based and those which are not. The first type is called teleological ethics, the second one is called deontological ethics. As typical examples of teleological ethical theories, one refers to classical utilitarianism and such 20th-century developments as rule utilitarianism and preference utilitarianism . As typical examples (...) of deontological ethical theorists, one refers to Immanuel Kant and W.D. Ross.To illustrate and clarify the difference between teleological and deontological ethics, students are often submitted to exercises which ask for Kantian and utilitarian solutions to philosophical dilemmas of various sorts, drawn both from literary classics like Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment and from other sources. A typical example will run along the following lines. There is unrest in the population. The government authorities think that order can be restored if a certain person is condemned for things which he hasn't done.But the people believe he is the culprit. Would it be morally right to sacrifice a human scapegoat in such a case? What would a utilitarian say to this, and what would a Kantian say? Usually, the exercises are presented in such a way that the students will tend to think that Kantians would always condemn punishing the innocent, whilst utilitarians might come to different conclusions, depending on how they estimate the long-term consequences of punishing the innocent. (shrink)

This chapter draws on Ayn Rand's esthetic discourse, especially her essay collection The Romantic Manifesto: A Philosophy of Literature and her lecture course on fiction‐writing, edited and published as The Art of Fiction: A Guide for Writers and Readers. First, it looks briefly at Romanticism in its historical context. Next, the chapter discusses how plot enables a writer to show the events of a story as following logically from the values and premises of the characters, and how this method implies (...) a specific approach to characterization. Then, the chapter looks at plot in relation to a story's theme; to the author's projection of his/her own unique values and personality; and to the distinctive use of imagination typical of Romantic art. Finally, it addresses the question of how Rand's advocacy of plot relates to her concept of objectivity. (shrink)

This introduction describes the background and reasons why the Mercator-Hondius atlas analysed in this issue became part of the library collection of the Donner Institute.

Die Eule der Minerva beginnt ihren Flug bekanntlich in der einbrechenden Dämmerung. Doch steht uns demnächst eine Morgen- oder eine Abenddämmerung bevor? Auf Thomas Wendts Frage hin haben sich im März 2019 dem Institut für Philosophie der Universität Leipzig verbundene Philosophen zu einer Arbeitstagung versammelt, um die theoretische und praktische Reichweite epochenbezogener Reflexionen in der Philosophie auszumessen. Ihre systematischen wie historischen Positionen, die dieser Sammelband vereinigt vorlegt, können unterschiedlicher kaum sein. Von der nachdrücklichen Forderung nach einem eingreifenden Denken bis hin (...) zu bedächtiger Reflexion vergangener Epochen, von Platon über Hegel bis Jaspers geben die Beiträge eine Bandbreite philosophischer Perspektiven wieder, die geradezu nach weiterer Diskussion ruft"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

We analyze the transition of central banks from lenders to market makers of last resort. The adoption of unconventional monetary policies characterizes this transition. In their new role as market makers, central banks engage in the latter by extending and reinforcing interventions in other markets than the traditional bank reserves market. We then explain that the difference between the two roles is one of degree rather than kind. In both cases, the prevention of liquidity shortages is a primary concern. As (...) conventional policies become inadequate, central banks resort to unconventional policies to escape a general liquidity shortage at the zero lower bound. However, these unconventional policies do not solve the structural problems in financial and real markets. Both conventional and unconventional monetary policies cause price distortions, in particular on asset markets. The policies of the market maker of last resort prevent necessary readjustments of cyclical divergences between real and financial markets. (shrink)

En el mundo actual, en el que se está reduciendo la abundancia y la inalterabilidad de la diversidad cultural, nuestras barreras culturales se pueden salvar —aunque no adulterar— si todo el mundo en todas partes se acoge a los derechos humanos. En el presente artículo intento defender la idea de que, para conseguirlo, tenemos que elaborar una pluralidad de aprobaciones de los derechos humanos universalmente aplicables que sea diversa pero bien cimentada culturalmente; en resumidas cuentas, deberíamos adoptar una justificación plural (...) de los derechos humanos. (shrink)

This paper shows that the relevant logics E and Π′ are strongly sound and complete with regards to a version of the “simplified” Routley-Meyer semantics. Such a semantics for E has been thought impossible. Although it is impossible if an admissible rule of E – the rule of restricted assertion or equivalently Ackermann’s δ-rule – is solely added as a primitiverule, it is very much possible when E is axiomatized in the way Anderson and Belnap did. The simplified semantics for (...) E and Π′ requires unreduced frames. Contra what has been claimed, however, no additional frame component is required over and above what’s required to model other relevant logics such as T and R. It is also shown how to modify the tonicity requirements of theternary relation so as to allow for the standard truth condition for both fusion – the intensional conjunction◦ – as well as the converse conditional ←. (shrink)

Many relevant logics can be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. Mares showed, however, that E is a notable exception. Mares’ proof is by and large a rather involved model-theoretic one. This paper presents a much easier proof-theoretic proof which not only covers E but also generalizes so as to also cover relevant logics with a primitive modal operator added. It is shown that from even very weak relevant logics augmented by a weak K-ish modal operator, and up to the strong (...) relevant logic R with a S5 modal operator, all fail to be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. The proof, therefore, also covers Meyer and Mares’ proof that NR—R with a primitive S4-modality added—also fails to be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Cognitive Linguistics Jahrgang: 27 Heft: 4 Seiten: 573-585.

Relevant logics have traditionally been viewed as paraconsistent. This paper shows that this view of relevant logics is wrong. It does so by showing forth a logic which extends classical logic, yet satisfies the Entailment Theorem as well as the variable sharing property. In addition it has the same S4-type modal feature as the original relevant logic E as well as the same enthymematical deduction theorem. The variable sharing property was only ever regarded as a necessary property for a logic (...) to have in order for it to not validate the so-called paradoxes of implication. The Entailment Theorem on the other hand was regarded as both necessary and sufficient. This paper shows that the latter theorem also holds for classical logic, and so cannot be regarded as a sufficient property for blocking the paradoxes. The concept of suppression is taken up, but shown to be properly weaker than that of variable sharing. (shrink)

Democratic backsliding and autocratisation tendencies raise the question of what liberal democracy can do to defend itself. Of particular concern are populists, who are often perceived to have an ambiguous commitment to the principles of liberal democracy. The defence of liberal democracy has often been conceived in legal terms, for example, with party bans and propaganda restrictions. However, legal means are criticized for being elitist because they are directed against irrational and emotionally driven masses and because they allegedly violate the (...) very values that they are supposed to protect by limiting the democratic freedom of some groups. Instead, critics have proposed cultural and socio-economic means as non-elitist and non-exclusionary alternatives more in line with the values of democracy. This article discusses whether the employment of cultural and socio-economic means against groups – in casu populists – who are perceived as a challenge to liberal democracy can avoid the charge of elitism and exclusion by analysing whether these means are consistent with the publicity constraint. It finds that the use of education and money to defend democracy against such groups relies on a form of elitism and exclusion similar to the one that the defence by legal means is charged with. (shrink)

Many relevant logics are conservatively extended by Boolean negation. Not all, however. This paper shows an acute form of non-conservativeness, namely that the Boolean-free fragment of the Boolean extension of a relevant logic need not always satisfy the variable-sharing property. In fact, it is shown that such an extension can in fact yield classical logic. For a vast range of relevant logic, however, it is shown that the variable-sharing property, restricted to the Boolean-free fragment, still holds for the Boolean extended (...) logic. (shrink)

This article provides a normative framework for evaluating the moral permissibility of various defences of European Union (EU) values against their violation in EU member states. This requires, first, a coherent interpretation of EU values as the values of liberal democracy; second, a clear notion of when they are violated; third, a theory of how liberal democracy can be defended with measures that are consistent with the values of liberal democracy themselves; and, finally, a discussion of what the EU’s role (...) is in this defence. The article argues that it would be permissible for the EU to combine a number of political, cultural, socio-economic and legal responses in a concentric defence of liberal democracy as long as they respect the separation of powers doctrine and do not rely on problematic notions of collective responsibility. (shrink)

Restall set forth a "consecution" calculus in his "An Introduction to Substructural Logics." This is a natural deduction type sequent calculus where the structural rules play an important role. This paper looks at different ways of extending Restall's calculus. It is shown that Restall's weak soundness and completeness result with regards to a Hilbert calculus can be extended to a strong one so as to encompass what Restall calls proofs from assumptions. It is also shown how to extend the calculus (...) so as to validate the metainferential rule of reasoning by cases, as well as certain theory-dependent rules. (shrink)

Numerous studies have replicated the finding of mentation in both rapid eye movement (REM) and nonrapid eye movement (NREM) sleep. However, two different theoretical models have been proposed to account for this finding: (1) a one-generator model, in which mentation is generated by a single set of processes regardless of physiological differences between REM and NREM sleep; and (2) a two-generator model, in which qualitatively different generators produce cognitive activity in the two states. First, research is reviewed demonstrating conclusively that (...) mentation can occur in NREM sleep; global estimates show an average mentation recall rate of about 50% from NREM sleep – a value that has increased substantially over the years. Second, nine different types of research on REM and NREM cognitive activity are examined for evidence supporting or refuting the two models. The evidence largely, but not completely, favors the two-generator model. Finally, in a preliminary attempt to reconcile the two models, an alternative model is proposed that assumes the existence of covert REM sleep processes during NREM sleep. Such covert activity may be responsible for much of the dreamlike cognitive activity occurring in NREM sleep. Key Words: cognition in sleep; dreaming; NREM sleep; REM sleep; sleep mentation. (shrink)

We argue that people may resist temptations not only with the aim of acquiring more self-control, but also because they want to convince others that they are patient and already possess self-control.

Artificial intelligence receives attention in media as well as in academe and business. In media coverage and reporting, AI is predominantly described in contrasted terms, either as the ultimate solution to all human problems or the ultimate threat to all human existence. In academe, the focus of computer scientists is on developing systems that function, whereas philosophy scholars theorize about the implications of this functionality for human life. In the interface between technology and philosophy there is, however, one imperative aspect (...) of AI yet to be articulated: how do intelligent systems make inferences? We use the overarching concept “Artificial Intelligent Behaviour” which would include both cognition/processing and judgment/behaviour. We argue that due to the complexity and opacity of artificial inference, one needs to initiate systematic empirical studies of artificial intelligent behavior similar to what has previously been done to study human cognition, judgment and decision making. This will provide valid knowledge, outside of what current computer science methods can offer, about the judgments and decisions made by intelligent systems. Moreover, outside academe—in the public as well as the private sector—expertise in epistemology, critical thinking and reasoning are crucial to ensure human oversight of the artificial intelligent judgments and decisions that are made, because only competent human insight into AI-inference processes will ensure accountability. Such insights require systematic studies of AI-behaviour founded on the natural sciences and philosophy, as well as the employment of methodologies from the cognitive and behavioral sciences. (shrink)

Lautemann et al. (1995) gave a descriptive characterisation of the class of context-free languages, showing that a language is context-free iff it is definable as the set of words satisfying some sentence of a particular logic (fragment) over words. The present notes discuss how to specialise this result to the class of linear languages. Somewhat surprisingly, what would seem the most straightforward specialisation actually fails, due to the fact that linear grammars fail to admit a Greibach normal form. We identify (...) an alternative specialisation, based on an alternative characterisation of context-free languages, also noted by Lautemann et al. (1995). (shrink)

Norwegian philosophy of science right after the war was empiricistic, scientistic, rather undogmatic and heavily dominated by Arne Næss. The positivistic conception of science has been severely criticized in the last two decades, and the attempts to find viable alternatives have led to a broadening of the perspective, philosophically as well as scientifically. This survey tries to map the main lines of that development. After an account of the rise and fall of Næss' programme for a behaviouristic theory of science, (...) we outline first the development of the internal philosophical critique and then the parallel story on the social science scene. (shrink)