We present a mathematical approach to defeasible reasoning based on arguments. This approach integrates the notion of specificity introduced by Poole and the theory of warrant presented by Pollock. The main contribution of this paper is a precise, well-defined system which exhibits correct behavior when applied to the benchmark examples in the literature. It aims for usability rather than novelty. We prove that an order relation can be introduced among equivalence classes of arguments under the equi-specificity relation. We also prove (...) a theorem that ensures the termination of the process of finding the justified facts. Two more lemmas define a reduced search space for checking specificity. In order to implement the theoretical ideas, the language is restricted to Horn clauses for the evidential context. The language used to represent defeasible rules has been restricted in a similar way. The authors intend this work to unify the various existing approaches to argument-based defeasible reasoning. (shrink)

Many states offer generous provision of fertility treatment, but this article asks whether and how such state funding can be justified. I argue that, at most, there is limited justification for state funding of fertility treatment as one good among many that could enable citizens to pursue valuable life projects, but not one that should have the privileged access to funding it is currently given. I then consider and reject reasons one might think that fertility treatment has (...) a special claim to funding, over the other goods that might enable life projects. First, I deny that fertility treatment has a special claim to funding on the grounds that infertility is a disease or disability. Second, I argue that individuals do not have a right to assistance with the project of having a child of their own. Third, I deny that providing fertility treatment is a special case on the grounds that having children is good for society. However, there may be one exception: states have a reason to fund fertility treatment for same sex couples that does not apply to heterosexual couples. (shrink)

Withholding and withdrawing treatment are widely regarded as ethically equivalent in medical guidelines and ethics literature. Health care personnel, however, widely perceive moral differences between withholding and withdrawing. The proponents of equivalence argue that any perceived difference can be explained in terms of cognitive biases and flawed reasoning. Thus, policymakers should clear away any resistance to accept the equivalence stance by moral education. To embark on such a campaign of changing attitudes, we need to be convinced that the ethical (...) analysis is correct. Is it? In this article, I take a closer look at the moral relation between withholding and withdrawing. My conclusion is that withholding and withdrawing are not in general ethically equivalent. Thus, medical guidelines should be rewritten, and rather than being “educated” away from their sound judgments, medical professionals and patients should have nuanced medico-ethical discussions regarding withholding and withdrawing treatment. (shrink)

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) has been regarded as an efficient and safe treatment for Parkinson’s disease (PD) since being approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1997. It is estimated that more than 150 000 patients have been implanted, with a forecasted rapid increase in uptake with population ageing. Recent longitudinal follow-up studies have reported a significant increase in postoperative survival rates of patients with PD implanted with DBS as compared with those not implanted with DBS. Although (...) DBS tends to increase life expectancy for most patients with PD, this medical benefit does not come without attendant negative consequences. For example, emerging forms of iatrogenic harms are sometimes induced—harms which were not initially expected when clinicians proposed neurosurgery and patients or their guardians consented to the treatment. We report and discuss the clinical case of a patient who was implanted with DBS more than 20 years ago (at the time of writing) and is now experiencing unexpected stages of PD. This case illustrates how extending the life span without improving quality of life may introduce a burden of harms for patients and families. As well, this case shows why we should prepare for the expanding numbers of PD-implanted patients experiencing a gain of longevity but with severe stages of disease leading to diminution in quality of life. This newly observed effect of DBS treatment requires us to explore ethical questions related to iatrogenic harms, informed consent, end of life and caregivers’ burden. (shrink)

ABSTRACT It is accepted that treatment of previously competent, now incompetent patients can be limited if that is what the patient would desire, if she were now competent. Expressed past preferences or an advance directive are often taken to constitute sufficient evidence of what a patient would now desire. I distinguish between desires and rational desires. I argue that for a desire to be an expression of a person's autonomy, it must be or satisfy that person's rational desires. A (...) person rationally desires a course of action if that person desires it while being in possession of all available relevant facts, without committing relevant error of logic, and “vividly imagining” what its consequences would be like for her. I argue that some competent, expressed desires obstruct autonomy. I show that several psychological mechanisms operate to prevent a person rationally evaluating what future life in a disabled state would be like. Rational evaluation is difficult. However, treatment limitation, if it is to respect autonomy, must be in accord with a patient's rational desires, and not merely her expressed desires. I illustrate the implications of these arguments for the use of advance directives and for the treatment of competent patients. (shrink)

Ethical analyses, professional guidelines and legal decisions support the equivalence thesis for life-sustaining treatment: if it is ethical to withhold treatment, it would be ethical to withdraw the same treatment. In this paper we explore reasons why the majority of medical professionals disagree with the conclusions of ethical analysis. Resource allocation is considered by clinicians to be a legitimate reason to withhold but not to withdraw intensive care treatment. We analyse five arguments in favour of non-equivalence, (...) and find only relatively weak reasons to restrict rationing to withholding treatment. On the contrary, resource allocation provides a strong argument in favour of equivalence: non-equivalence causes preventable death in critically ill patients. We outline two proposals for increasing equivalence in practice: (1) reduction of the mortality threshold for treatment withdrawal, (2) time-limited trials of intensive care. These strategies would help to move practice towards more rational treatment limitation decisions. (shrink)

In English law there is a strong (though rebuttable) presumption that life should be maintained. This article contends that this presumption means that it is always unlawful to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from patients in permanent vegetative state (PVS) and minimally conscious state (MCS), and that the reasons for this being the correct legal analysis mean also that such withdrawal will always be ethically unacceptable. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, the medical uncertainties inherent in the definition and (...) diagnosis of PVS/MCS are such that, as a matter of medical fact, it can never be established, with the degree of certainty necessary to rebut the presumption, that it is not in the patient’s best interest to remain alive. And second (and more controversially and repercussively), that even if permanent unconsciousness can be unequivocally demonstrated, the presumption is not rebutted. This is because there is plainly more to human existence than consciousness (or consciousness the markers of which can ever be demonstrated by medical investigations). It can never be said that the identity of the patient whose best interests are at stake evaporates (so eliminating the legal or ethical subject) when that person ceases to be conscious. Nor can it be said that the best interests of an unconscious person do not mandate continued biological existence. We simply cannot know. That uncertainty is legally conclusive, and (subject to resource allocation questions and views about the relevance of family wishes and the previously expressed wishes of the patient) should be ethically conclusive. (shrink)

Developmental Dyslexia significantly interferes with children’s academic, personal, social, and emotional functioning. Nevertheless, therapeutic options need to be further validated and tested in randomized controlled clinical trials. The use of transcranial direct current stimulation has been gaining ground in recent years as a new intervention option for DD. However, there are still open questions regarding the most suitable tDCS protocol for young people with DD. The current crossover study tested the effectiveness of a short and intensive tDCS protocol, including the (...) long-term effects, as well as the influence of age and neuropsychological processes at baseline on reading improvements. Twenty-four children and adolescents with DD were randomly assigned to receive active tDCS during the first slot and sham tDCS during the second slot or vice versa. Five consecutive daily sessions of left anodal/right cathodal tDCS set at 1 mA for 20 min were administered over the parieto-occipital regions. Reading measures and neuropsychological measures were collected before, immediately after, 1 week and 1 month later the treatment. Our results showed that only the active tDCS condition improved non-word reading speed immediately after and 1 month later the end of the treatment compared with baseline. In addition, the improvement in non-word reading speed was significantly correlated with age and with neuropsychological measures at baseline but only in the active tDCS condition. The current crossover study contributed to enforce previous effects of tDCS, including long-term effects, on non-word reading speed and to understand the effect of age and neuropsychological processes on reading outcomes. Our findings showed that tDCS could be a low-cost and easy-to-implement treatment option with long-term effects for children and adolescents with DD. (shrink)

There is a concern that as a result of COVID-19 there will be a shortage of ventilators for patients requiring respiratory support. This concern has resulted in significant debate about whether it is appropriate to withdraw ventilation from one patient in order to provide it to another patient who may benefit more. The current advice available to doctors appears to be inconsistent, with some suggesting withdrawal of treatment is more serious than withholding, while others suggest that this distinction should (...) not be made. We argue that there is no ethically relevant difference between withdrawing and withholding treatment and that suggesting otherwise may have problematic consequences. If doctors are discouraged from withdrawing treatment, concern about a future shortage may make them reluctant to provide ventilation to patients who are unlikely to have a successful outcome. This may result in underutilisation of available resources. A national policy is urgently required to provide doctors with guidance about how patients should be prioritised to ensure the maximum benefit is derived from limited resources. (shrink)

The article analyses the concept of indirect discrimination, arguing first that existing conceptualisations are unsatisfactory and second that it is best understood as equal treatment that is disadvantageous to the discriminatees because of their group-membership. I explore four ways of further refining the definition, arguing that only an added condition of moral wrongness is at once plausible and helpful, but that it entails a number of new problems that may outweigh its benefits. Finally, I suggest that the moral wrongness (...) of indirect discrimination is best accounted for in terms of the harm it does to discriminatees, and sketch three ways in which it may do so. I conclude that the analysis provides both a clearer understanding of the concept of indirect discrimination as well as indirect support for a harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination, while suggesting that our moral obligations qua non-discrimination may be more extensive than is frequently assumed. (shrink)

What if neurofeedback or other types of neurotechnological treatment, by itself or in combination with behavioral treatment, could achieve a successful “rewiring” of the psychopath’s brain? Imagine that such treatments exist and that they provide a better long-term risk-minimizing strategy compared to imprisonment. Would it be ethical to offer such treatments as a condition of probation, parole, or prison release? In this paper, I argue that it can be ethical to offer effective, non-invasive neurotechnological treatments to offenders as (...) a condition of probation, parole, or prison release provided that: the status quo is in no way cruel, inhuman, degrading, or in some other way wrong, the treatment option is in no way cruel, inhuman, degrading, or in some other way wrong, the treatment is in the best interests of the offender, and the offender gives his/her informed consent. (shrink)

Abstract The infantilization of older adults seems morally deplorable whereas very young children are appropriate recipients of such treatment. Children, we argue, are not mentally capable of acting autonomously and reasoning clearly. However, we have difficulty reconciling this justification with the fact that many of the elders whom we respect are mentally deficient in those very same ways. In this paper, I try to make sense of this asymmetry between our justifications for infantilizing the young and our conviction that (...) our elders ought to be respected. I argue that our intuitions against adult infantilization are non-consequentialist (i.e., deontic). I consider several candidates for the deontic factor that might explain the asymmetry of our judgments and practices. I argue that a very specific kind of dignity (one that is socially constructed and reified) grounds our disparate judgments and treatments of very young and very old persons with similar needs. (shrink)

Fairness and justice are core issues in stakeholder theory. Although such considerations receive more attention in the ‘normative’ branch of the stakeholder literature, they have critical implications for ‘instrumental’ stakeholder theory as well. In research in the instrumental vein, although the position has seldom been articulated in significant detail, a stakeholder’s inclination to take action against the firm or, conversely, to cooperate with it, is often taken to be a function of its perceptions concerning the fairness or unfairness of the (...) treatment it receives in its relationship with the firm. Thus, from various works in this domain can be distilled what might be termed a ‘fairness-based perspective on stakeholder behaviour’. This perspective, as it currently stands, assumes a high degree of homogeneity in stakeholders’ responses to fair, unfair, or munificent treatment by the firm. This supposition is itself typically based on a presumption that stakeholders consistently and uniformly adhere to norms of equity and reciprocity in their relationships with firms. However, research developments in equity theory and social exchange theory suggest that such assumptions are likely untenable. Accordingly, in this work, after outlining the fairness-based perspective on stakeholder behaviour, I undertake to augment it by presenting propositions concerning the possible influences of stakeholders’ equity preferences and exchange ideologies on their propensities to sanction or support the firm. Incorporating these stakeholder traits into the fairness-based perspective should enhance the predictive validity of its propositions concerning stakeholder behaviour in response to fairness or unfairness in the firm–stakeholder relationship. (shrink)

This paper reframes the futility debate, moving away from the question “Who decides when to end what is considered to be a medically inappropriate or futile treatment?” and toward the question “How can society make policy that will best account for the multitude of values and conflicts involved in such decision-making?” It offers a pragmatist moral epistemology that provides us with a clear justification of why it is important to take best standards, norms, and physician judgment seriously and a (...) clear justification of why ample opportunity must be made for patients, families, and society to challenge those standards and norms. (shrink)

본 논문은 의료기술이 발달하면서 등장하게 된 다양한 도덕적 문제 가운데 하나로, 회복 불가능한 환자에 대한 심폐소생술 결정 문제 및 최근 제정된 연명의료결정법 의 자기결정권에 대해 살펴보고자 한다. 연명의료결정법 이 제정되기 이전 한국사회에서는 회복불가능한 환자의 심폐소생술 시행 여부를 가족이 결정하는 특징을 보였으며, 이는 한국사회 특유의 유교적 정서로 논의되곤 했다. 연명의료결정법 의 등장 이후, 연명의료결정의 주요 주체는 환자 자신으로 전환되었으며 그 주요 근거는 자기결정권이다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 한국사회에서 가족결정 중심의 심폐소생술 금지 논의에서 자기결정권 중심의 연명의료결정법 으로의 전환을 살펴보고, 자기결정권과 관련하여 보충되어야 할 (...) 논의들과 연명의료결정법 의 철학적 근거가 되어야 할 生의 문제, 죽음에 대한 관점 등을 『周易』을 통해 살펴보고자 한다. 특히 주역의 연대적 生철학, 죽음이 아닌 마무리지어가는 과정을 중시하는 終始에 기반 한 死生觀을 통해, 연명의료결정법 에 보완되어야 할 사유를 논의해 보고자 한다. (shrink)

Is it ever right to prescribe placebos to patients in clinical practice? The General Medical Council is ambivalent about the issue; the American Medical Association asserts that placebos can be administered only if the patient is (somehow) ‘informed’. The potential problem with placebos is that they may involve deception: indeed, if this is the case, an ethical tension arises over the patient's autonomy and the physician's requirement to be open and honest, and the notion that medical care should be the (...) primary concern. This paper examines the case of depression as an entry point for understanding the complexities of the prescription of placebos. Recent important meta-analyses of antidepressants claim that they are not significantly more effective in a clinical setting than placebos. Given that antidepressants have numerous adverse side effects and are hugely expensive, this provocative research has serious potential ethical and practical implications for patients and medical providers. Should placebos be prescribed in place of antidepressants? The case of depression highlights another important issue which medical ethical codes have hitherto overlooked: well-being is not synonymous with being realistic about oneself, one's circumstances and the future. While severely depressed individuals are unduly pessimistic about themselves and the world around them, treatment of depressed individuals can be deemed successful when patients have successfully attained those positive illusions that are indicative of psychological health. This is exactly what successful psychological treatments of depression seem to achieve. It is therefore possible that there may be a limited unavoidable role for deception in medicine. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 7, July 2019, Page 58-59.

The Australian state of Victoria introduced new legislation regulating medical treatment and associated decision-making in March 2018. In this article we provide an overview of the new Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Act 2016 and compare it to the former Medical Treatment Act 1988. Most substantially, the new Act provides for persons with relevant decision-making capacity to make decisions in advance regarding their potential future medical care, to take effect in the event they themselves do not have (...) decision-making capacity. Prima facie, the new Act enshrines autonomy as the pre-eminent value underlying the state’s approach to medical treatment decision-making and associated surrogate decision-making. However, we contend that the intention of the Act may not accord with implementation of the Act to date if members of the community are not aware of the Act’s provisions or are not engaged in advance care planning. There is a need for further research, robust community advocacy, and wider engagement for the intention of the Act—the promotion of “precedent autonomy” in respect to surrogate medical treatment decision-making—to be fully realized. (shrink)

RESUMO O tema do artigo é a proliferação de más condutas na ciência que vem ocorrendo nas últimas décadas, designada ao longo do texto pelo termo "a epidemia". As más condutas são violações de normas éticas da ciência, sendo os tipos mais importantes as várias modalidades de fraude, e de falsidades autorais. O artigo divide-se em seis seções. Na primeira, apresenta-se o tema e alguns esclarecimentos terminológicos. Na segunda, são expostas as evidências que corroboram a existência da epidemia. A terceira (...) versa sobre a reação à epidemia, caracterizando sua dinâmica, marcada pelo conflito entre duas posições: a moralizadora, que aplica o tratamento moralizador no combate à epidemia; e a negacionista, que tende a negar a existência da epidemia e que resiste às medidas moralizadoras. A quarta seção versa sobre as causas da epidemia, introduz uma distinção entre produtivismo e producionismo e propõe uma análise das formas como o produtivismo fomenta as más condutas. A quinta consiste em uma crítica ao tratamento moralizador, fundamentada em suas inadequações, principalmente sua ineficácia. Na conclusão, procura-se dar uma ideia de qual seria uma alternativa satisfatória ao tratamento moralizador. ABSTRACT The article deals with the proliferation of violations of ethical norms of science, that started to develop a few decades ago. It will be referred to as "the epidemic". The most important types of these violations are varieties of fraud, and such forms of author misconduct as plagiarism, self-plagiarism, etc. The article is divided into six sections. In the first, the topic is introduced and some terminology clarified. In the second, evidence is presented which corroborates the existence of the epidemic. The third deals with the reaction to the epidemic, by characterizing its dynamics in terms of being dominated by conflict between two positions: the moralizing one - which promotes the application of the moralizing treatment to combat the epidemic; and the negationist one - which tends to deny the existence of the epidemic, and resists the moralizing measures. The fourth explores the causes of the epidemic. A distinction is introduced between productivism and productionism, and an analysis is proposed of the ways productivism fosters violations of ethical norms of science. The fifth consists of a critique of the moralizing treatment, based on its inadequacies, mainly its inefficacy. The conclusion points to an alternative to the moralizing treatment. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

A growing elderly population, dwindling health care resources, and intense and widespread fear of dementia have forced an uncomfortable question: should patients with dementia be slated as off‐limits for life‐sustaining treatment?

While substantial progress has been made in reaching a moral and policy consensus regarding forgoing life-sustaining treatment, several holes exist in that consensus where more public discussion and moral analysis is needed. First, among patients who have not been found to be legally incompetent there is controversy over whether certain treatments can be refused. Controversies also remain over damages for treatment without consent, limits based on third-party interests and the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and cases where (...) it cannot be agreed whether the patient is competent. Even greater dispute exists over care of incompetent patients. Perhaps the greatest gap in the consensus arises over limits to the use of the best interests standard. This article proposes replacing it with a "reasonableness standard" that takes into account disputes about what is literally the best for the patient and conflicts of interest between the patient and others. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo responde algunas críticas planteadas por Ignacio Ávila a mi interpretación de la epistemología davidsoniana. Presento argumentos en contra de: a) que sea necesario distinguir entre representaciones epistemológicamente “peligrosas”e “inofensivas”; b) que el empirismo mínimo sea un tipo de realismo directo; c) que mi uso de la expresión “evidencia distal” y el interés por la teoría de la correspondencia sean asuntos ajenos a Davidson. Finalmente, sostengo que la triangulación es un elemento fundamental de la epistemología davidsoniana, pues permite (...) sortear la ansiedad realista manteniéndose en una postura no representacionalista. ABSTRACT In this article, I respond to some of Ignacio Ávila's criticisms of my interpretation of Davidson’s epistemology. I argue against: a) the need to distinguish between epistemologically “dangerous” and “harmless” representations; b) the idea that minimal empiricism is a kind of direct realism; and c) the claim that my usage of the expression “distal evidence” and interest in the theory of correspondence are issues that do not pertain to Davidson. Finally, I claim that triangulation is a key element in Davidsonian epistemology since it allows us to deal with the realist anxiety while maintaining a non-representationalist viewpoint. (shrink)

Abstract.This paper is devoted to a logical and algebraic treatment of conditional probability. The main ideas are the use of non-standard probabilities and of some kind of standard part function in order to deal with the case where the conditioning event has probability zero, and the use of a many-valued modal logic in order to deal probability of an event φ as the truth value of the sentence φ is probable, along the lines of Hájek’s book [H98] and of (...) [EGH96]. To this purpose, we introduce a probabilistic many-valued logic, called FP(SŁΠ), which is sound and complete with respect a class of structures having a non-standard extension [0,1]⋆ of [0,1] as set of truth values. We also prove that the coherence of an assessment of conditional probabilities is equivalent to the coherence of a suitably defined theory over FP(SŁΠ) whose proper axioms reflect the assessment itself. (shrink)

Normal interpersonal treatment is often based on the existence of the rational nature of both the agent and the target of the treatment, and their relationship is reciprocal and mutual. However, when the rational person confronts the irrational person, such as the mentally retarded or vegetative person, the reciprocal relationship cannot be maintained because the targeted person loses his or her rational capacity. But this inequality does not deprive the object of action of the right to be treated (...) rationally, because people treat the irrationally disabled not according to the principle of reason but according to the principle of emotion - specifically, the principle of love. The principle of love often disregards the specific conditions of the object of treatment and still treats them reasonably. Thus, the emotional principle has a broader application in interpersonal treatment. (shrink)

Recent evidence confirming that the administration of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) to HIV-infected persons may effectively reduce their risk of transmission has revived the discussion about priority setting in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The fact that the very same drugs can be used both for treatment purposes and for preventive purposes (Treatment as Prevention) has been seen as paradigm-shifting and taken to spark a new controversy: In a context of scarce resources, should the allocation of ARVs be prioritized based (...) on the goal of providing treatment, or on the goal of preventing the spread of the HIV epidemic? Contributions to this discussion tend to assume that treatment and prevention constitute two divergent goals that entail conflicting priorities. We challenge that assumption on the basis of both conceptual and empirical examination. We argue that, as far as the provision of ARVs to HIV-infected persons is concerned, the goals of treatment and prevention do not entail conflicting priorities; to the contrary, they dictate converging strategies for the optimal allocation of ARVs. In light of the current evidence, the concept of Treatment as Prevention can indeed be seen as paradigm-shifting, yet in a novel way: Rather than extending the tension between the goals of treatment and prevention to the level of drug-allocation, it dissolves this tension by providing a rationale for a unified strategy for allocating ARVs. (shrink)

In this paper we focus on the psychiatric approach of Open Dialogue and seek to explain why the intersubjective process of dialogue, one of OD’s core clinical principles, is effective in schizophrenia treatment. We address this question from an interdisciplinary viewpoint, by linking the OD approach with a theoretical account of the self as endorsed by enactive cognitive science. The paper is structured as follows: first, we introduce the OD approach and focus in particular on the principles that are (...) characteristic of the dialogical therapeutic attitude. Second, we clarify our stance on the concept of schizophrenia by relying on insights from phenomenological psychiatry. Third, we introduce an enactive perspective on mental disorders, which elaborates on phenomenological psychiatry and conceives of the self as a self-organizing system, brought forth through interactional processes. Based on this enactive approach, we draw clinical implications for schizophrenia. In the fourth and final part, we propose conceptual bridges between the OD and the enactive approach by bringing to attention the intersubjective nature of the human self and the inherent vulnerability entailed in both the self’s maintenance and in the practice of dialogue. We then propose that the dialogical stance adopted by OD is effective in supporting the recovery of a balanced sense of self precisely because it provides an intersubjective space in which clients can safely experience and maintain the basic structures underlying the socially constituted self. Since our analysis touches upon fundamental structures of the therapeutic relationship, we hope that it will also be useful to inform general psychiatric practice and help advancing a more integrative understanding of psychotherapy for schizophrenia. (shrink)

Research has shown that addressing and integrating the existential dimension in treatment settings reduce symptoms like anxiety, depression and substance abuse. Healthcare chaplains are key personnel in this practice. A nationwide, cross-sectional survey influenced by a mixed-methods approach was used to examine the attitudes, practices, understanding and perceptions of mental health professionals, including healthcare chaplains, regarding the value of addressing the existential dimension in treatment programmes. The existential group practice was led by the healthcare chaplains as an integrated (...) part of specialist mental health services. A positive and open attitude towards addressing the existential dimension was identified among the informants. Despite this, a small gap between attitude and practice was reported. Existential, religious and spiritual concerns are reported as part of the existential dimension and as relevant topics to be discussed in specialist mental health services. The findings indicate that the existential group practice could have a positive influence on the co-leaders’ competence to address existential, religious and spiritual concerns; however, this should be further investigated. (shrink)

In many disciplines, mediating processes are usually investigated with randomized experiments and linear regression to determine if the treatment affects the outcome through a mediator. However, randomizing the treatment will not yield accurate causal direct and indirect estimates unless certain assumptions are satisfied since the mediator status is not randomized. This study describes methods to estimate causal direct and indirect effects and reports the results of a large Monte Carlo simulation study on the performance of the ordinary regression (...) and modern causal mediation analysis methods, including a previously untested doubly robust sequential g-estimation method, when there are confounders of the mediator-to-outcome relation. Results show that failing to measure and incorporate potential post-treatment confounders in a mediation model leads to biased estimates, regardless of the analysis method used. Results emphasize the importance of measuring potential confounding variables and conducting sensitivity analysis. (shrink)

Since the late 1990s, the use of contralateral prophylactic mastectomy to treat unilateral breast cancer has been on the rise. Over the past two decades, dozens of studies have been conducted in order to understand this trend, which has puzzled and frustrated physicians who find it at odds with efforts to curb the surgical overtreatment of breast cancer, as well as with evidence-based medicine, which has established that the procedure has little oncologic benefit for most patients. Based on the work (...) of Annemarie Mol and John Law, this paper argues that these efforts to understand increased CPM use are limited by the “epistemology problem” in medicine, or, in other words, the tendency to view healthcare controversies and decision making exclusively through the lenses of objective and subjective forms of knowledge. Drawing on public discourse about rationales for choosing CPM, we argue that this surgical trend cannot adequately be understood in terms of what doctors and patients know about breast cancer risk and how CPM affects that risk. In addition, it must be recognized as the outcome of how specific practices of screening, detection, and treatment do or enact the bodies of patients, producing tensions in their lives that cannot be remedied with better or better communicated information. Recognizing the embodied realities of these enactments and their effects on patient decision making, we maintain, is essential for physicians who want to avoid the paternalism that haunts breast cancer treatment in the US. (shrink)

Background: Despite procedural innovations and increasing numbers of uterus transplant attempts worldwide, the perspectives of uterus transplant (UTx) trial participants are lacking. Methods: We conducted a mixed-methods study with women with absolute uterine factor infertility (AUFI). Participants included women who had previously contacted the Cleveland Clinic regarding the Uterine Transplant Trial and met the initial eligibility criteria for participation. In-depth interviews were conducted in conjunction with FertiQoL, a validated and widely used tool to measure the impact of infertility on the (...) quality of life of infertility patients. Results: All (n = 19) rated their overall health as good; some experienced grief and social isolation. AUFI is a life-framing experience that influences acceptance by family, partners, peers, and one’s self. UTx is a means to gain control of reproductive autonomy. UTx allows family-building and the ability to play an active role in prenatal health and well-being. Establishing and maintaining a supportive relationship is a key issue of AUFI and when considering UTx. Risks of UTx are perceived relative to risks to self/child/family posed by adoption/surrogacy. Participants had no overall preference regarding living or deceased donor. Conclusions: The ways in which women with AUFI conceptualize this condition in their lives and choices around UTx and participating in a study of the procedure are multifaceted and textured. These perspectives are critical to understanding its ethical, legal, and social implications. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 6, June 2019, Page W5-W9.

Some argue that it is ethically justifiable to unilaterally withdraw life‐sustaining treatment during crisis standards of care without the patient's consent in order to reallocate it to another patient with a better chance of survival. This justification has been supported by two lines of argument: the equivalence thesis and the rule of the double effect. We argue that there are theoretical issues with the first and practical ones with the second, as supported by an experiment aimed at exploring whether (...) the Knobe effect, which affects the folk concept of intention, applies to situations of unilateral withdrawal. Fifty‐two critical care physicians from one university were asked to ascribe intention in two hypothetical scenarios A and B in which outcomes differ—the patient from whom life‐sustaining treatment is withdrawn dies in scenario A but survives in scenario B—but the intention, to save the other patient regardless of the outcome of the other, is the same. The survey was administered via a web‐based survey and all answers were anonymous. A paired proportion test was used to compare responses to both questions. All 52 surveyed individuals responded in scenario A and 30 (57.7%) ascribed intention when outcomes were unfavorable, whereas 50 responded in scenario B and 8 (16%) ascribed intention when outcomes were favorable, a difference that was statistically significant (p < 0.001). There are theoretical and practical issues with the arguments proposed to justify the unilateral withdrawal of life‐sustaining treatment based on the equivalence thesis and the rule of double effect. (shrink)