How much should we know about the underlying structure of a technological artifact in order to understand its history? Quite a bit, according to the authors of The First Computers: History and Architectures. This book, a collection of papers presented at the International Conference on the History of Computing in 1998, is aimed at computer scientists and programmers as well as historians of science and technology. The term “architecture” is used in computing to refer to the structure and capabilities of (...) a computer; it includes both logical design and physical design . Architecture is an abstraction that helps the authors make comparisons between computers from different countries and eras.The First Computers brings together a wealth of information on computers from the 1940s and 1950s, which the editors present in five main sections. Part 1, “History, Reconstructions, Architectures,” addresses general themes in the history of computing. Michael Mahoney's chapter, “The Structures of Computation,” examines the relationship between computer science and “pure” mathematics. Even in its most theoretical aspects, Mahoney notes, computer science has always focused pragmatically on feasible implementations of mathematical ideas, thus “blurring commonly made distinctions among science, engineering, and craft practice” . Robert W. Seidel examines the rationale for reconstructing historic computers, an activity that has engaged many of the book's contributors. Seidel notes that “as the artifacts of modern computing become invisible, older, larger computers supply a symbol of computing to practitioners, the public, and patrons which is not only visible, but comprehensible” .The four remaining parts cover computing developments in America, Germany, Britain, and Japan. The American computers include the Atanasoff‐Berry Computer, Aiken Mark I, ENIAC, and the Institute for Advanced Study computer. The section on Germany contains several chapters on Konrad Zuse as well as on such developments as the Göttingen machines, which may not be that well known. Britain is represented by the Colossus, Manchester Mark I, Atlas, and EDSAC. Perhaps least familiar to historians are the Japanese computers: Seiichi Okoma surveys nine early Japanese computers, and Eiiti Wada describes the PC‐1, which he helped build. Many of the chapters, especially those written by engineers, begin with a brief history of the machine followed by a detailed technical description of its design and operation. The contributions by historians tend to describe the computer's features in more general terms and discuss the intellectual, organizational, and economic context in which the machine was built.Because so many of the authors are technically trained, they are able to offer in‐depth information on the theoretical underpinnings and design of early computers. But often the discussion is difficult to follow, even for historians working in this area. Tony Sales's chapter on the Colossus, a British code‐breaking computer, exemplifies the strengths and weaknesses of accounts written by technical specialists. Sales begins with a clear and engaging narrative of the origins of the Colossus, its method for decoding messages, and its significance to the Allied effort in the Second World War. He then veers into a highly technical discussion that will likely be opaque to readers unfamiliar with terms such as “thyratron rings.” The final section is a personal story of Sales's successful effort to have the machine rebuilt. Like the book as a whole, Sales's chapter can be read for a quick introduction to a milestone in the history of computing or for insight into the meanings embedded in technological artifacts—but readers should be prepared to decipher some formidable technical jargon along the way. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes two versions of the guise of the good in Anscombe’s Intention and raises some doubts about Francesco Orsi’s recent proposal for how these two versions hang together. While Orsi’s interpretation of the two versions are separately insightful and illuminating, Orsi’s “Anscombean argument” for connecting Anscombe’s two versions of the guise of the good is at odds with Anscombe’s own approach.

I var tid ar ambitionen att sa mycket verksamhet som mojlig skall vila pa vetenskaplig grund. Darmed utokas vetenskapens domaner, samtidigt som begreppet som sadant forflackas. Filosofen Karl Poppers syn pa vetenskapen ar mera subtil. Enligt honom kan vi ingenting veta med sakerhet, ingenting bevisa, endast falsifiera, det vill saga visa att nagot ar oforenligt med faktiska forhallanden. Det som undandrar sig falsifieringen kan vi acceptera tillsvidare. Ulf Persson provar i denna bok Poppers teori pa ett antal vetenskapsomraden, daribland ekonomi, (...) pedagogik och evolutionsbiologi. (shrink)

Moral disengagement was initially conceptualized as a process through which people reconstrue unethical behaviors, with the effect of deactivating self-sanctions and thereby clearing the way for ethical transgressions. Our article challenges how researchers now conceptualize moral disengagement. The current literature is overly liberal, in that it mixes two related but distinct constructs—process moral disengagement and the propensity to morally disengage—creating ambiguity in the findings. It is overly conservative, as it adopts a challengeable classification scheme of “four points in moral self-regulation” (...) and perpetuates defining moral disengagement via a set of eight psychological mechanisms, narrowing our understanding of the phenomenon. To address these problems, we propose to define process moral disengagement intensionally (specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for correct application of the term) as intrapsychic cognitive reasoning processes through which people selectively reconstrue a moral judgment “behavior B by actor A is morally wrong” and shift it toward becoming “behavior B is not morally wrong” or “actor A is not responsible for behavior B.” This definition achieves disambiguation and increased concept clarity. We leverage the definition to motivate a classification scheme for psychological mechanisms of moral disengagement along two dimensions—reconstruing morality and reconstruing agency—and to initiate an open inventory of psychological mechanisms that specify how process moral disengagement operates. (shrink)

In this paper, William Alston's argument from religious experience in Perceiving God is characterized and assessed as an indirect analogy-argument. Such arguments, I propose, should establish two similarities between sense perception (SP) and religious experience (CMP): a structural and a functional. I argue that Alston neglects functional similarity, and that SP and CMP actually perform different functions within the practices they belong to. Alston's argument is therefore significantly weaker than generally assumed. Finally, I argue that regardless of whether an increased (...) emphasis on fruits could strengthen indirect analogy-arguments or not, this is not a strategy available to Alston as long as he retains his commitments to religious exclusivism and a religious metaphysical realism. (Published Online July 10 2006). (shrink)

To define the determinants of impaired facial emotion recognition (FER) in patients with mesial temporal lobe epilepsy associated with hippocampal sclerosis (MTLE-HS), we examined 76 patients with unilateral MTLE-HS, 36 prior to antero-mesial temporal lobectomy (AMTL) and 40 after AMTL, and 28 healthy control subjects with a FER test consisting of 60 items (20 each for anger, fear, and happiness). Mean percentages of the accurate responses were calculated for different subgroups: right vs. left MTLE-HS, early (age at onset <6 years) (...) vs. late-onset, and before vs. after AMTL. After controlling for years of education, duration of epilepsy and number of antiepileptic drugs (AEDs) taken, on multivariate analysis, fear recognition was profoundly impaired in early-onset right MTLE-HS patients compared to other MTLE patients and control subjects. Happiness recognition was significantly better in post-AMTL MTLE-HS patients compared to pre-AMTL patients while anger and fear recognition did not differ. We conclude that patients with right MTLE-HS with age at seizure onset <6 years are maximally predisposed to impaired fear recognition. In them, right AMTL does not further worsen FER abilities. Longitudinal studies comparing FER in the same patients before and after AMTL will be required to refine and confirm our cross-sectional observations. (shrink)

This book casts new light on the application of the principle of proportionality in international law. Proportionality is claimed to play a central role governing the exercise of public power in international law and has been presented as the 'ultimate rule of law'.

This book presents pragmatist humanism as a form of anti-authoritarianism and sheds light on the contemporary significance of pragmatist aesthetics and the revival of humanism.

Taking the pragmatic insistence on the primacy of practice seriously, this book argues for the fruitfulness of a pragmatic philosophy of religion by bringing it to bear on a number of classical topics within the philosophy of religion: miracles, religious diversity, and what it is to be religiously mistaken.

This book presents a philosophical conception of logic -- "logical expressivism"-- according to which the role of logic is to make explicit reason relations, which are often neither monotonic nor transitive. It reveals new perspectives on inferential roles, sequent calculi, representation, truthmakers, and many extant logical theories.

I argue that logic is unlike science in its methodology, thus rejecting anti-exceptionalism about logic. Logic has a mathematical and a philosophical part. In its mathematical part, the methodology of logic is like that of mathematics, and no need to choose between theories arises in that part. In its philosophical part, the methodology of logic is like that of philosophy. Philosophy and mathematics are both unlike the empirical sciences in their methodology. So logic is unlike the empirical sciences in its (...) methodology. I end by looking at disagreements about the liar paradox as an example. (shrink)

I am presenting a sequent calculus that extends a nonmonotonic consequence relation over an atomic language to a logically complex language. The system is in line with two guiding philosophical ideas: (i) logical inferentialism and (ii) logical expressivism. The extension defined by the sequent rules is conservative. The conditional tracks the consequence relation and negation tracks incoherence. Besides the ordinary propositional connectives, the sequent calculus introduces a new kind of modal operator that marks implications that hold monotonically. Transitivity fails, but (...) for good reasons. Intuitionism and classical logic can easily be recovered from the system. (shrink)

This paper comprises a critical examination of foundationalist conceptions of comprehensive doctrines in the religion in politics-debate. I argue that John Rawls, the towering figure of this debate, operates with a foundationalist conception of comprehensive doctrines that has shaped the debate’s view of relevant alternatives (often referred to as exclusivism and inclusivism). However, there are several problems with foundationalist conceptions, and the most serious is that they are empirically inadequate in relation to modern Western societies. I conclude that participants of (...) the exclusivist/inclusivist debate ought to look closer at alternative, non-foundationalist conceptions, and I supply a brief sketch of one such approach, inspired by American pragmatism. (shrink)

The extensive, profound and influential oeuvre of Charles Taylor has inspired generations of thinkers. But how can we explore such a body of work? As we try to show in this Special Issue: by understanding him literally and making use of his notion of moral maps – or, differently put, by ‘mapping’ Charles Taylor. As he is far too modest a person to reveal to us his own moral atlas, we have decided to seize the occasion of his 85th birthday (...) to ask several of his renowned colleagues, students and interlocutors to contribute to the reconstruction of such a map. This introduction develops three ‘mountain ridges’ in this cartography – a philosophical anthropology in spatial terms, the indispensable motif of dialogue, and the role of political life –, around which the following 24 illuminating appraisals are grouped. (shrink)

Seit nunmehr vier Jahrzehnten beschäftigt die Renaissance des Pragmatismus Philosophen und Theoretikerinnen. In verschiedenen Fächern, von der Philosophie und den Literaturwissenschaften bis zur Soziologie und Jurisprudenz, haben die sich um den Pragmatismus zentrierenden Diskussionen zu interessanten neuen Einsichten geführt. Allerdings ist es bisher nicht gelungen zu erhellen, auf welch komplexe Art und Weise Pragmatismus, Humanismus, Antiautoritarismus und die Idee einer genuin post-metaphysischen Kultur zusammenhängen. Seine Version des Pragmatismus als Antiautoritarismus verstehend, sucht Richard Rorty den antiautoritären Gestus aus den praktischen Bereichen (...) der Ethik und Politik auf die Epistemologie zu übertragen. Sein Antiautoritarismus besagt, dass es keine nicht-menschliche Autorität gibt, deren Befehlen Menschen zu gehorchen hätten; weder die Wahrheit oder der Wille Gottes noch die Vorstellung einer objektiven Realität oder die Idee des wirklich Realen können als Autoritäten wirken. Die Vorstellung, es gäbe so etwas wie menschliche Verantwortlichkeit gegenüber etwas Nicht-Menschlichem, gilt es zu verabschieden. Dieser Aufsatz gliedert sich in drei Teile. Der erste sucht dazulegen, inwiefern der Pragmatismus als Antiautoritarismus zu verstehen ist. Der zweite Teil diskutiert die folgende Frage: Wie lässt sich innerhalb eines antiautoritären Rahmens, der bestimmt ist von Kontingenz, Antiessentialismus und der Praxis einer radikalen Historisierung, die Idee der Solidarität denken? Es wird argumentiert, dass die Literatur, und insbesondere der Roman, eine wichtige Rolle bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage spielt. Dieser Teil konzentriert sich auf Rortys Position. Ein kurzer abschließender Teil beschäftigt sich mit der Frage von Antiautoritarismus und ästhetischer Form. (shrink)

The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning draws on Bayesian formal frameworks, and some advocates of the new paradigm think of these formal frameworks as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference. I argue that Bayesian theories should not be seen as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference, where by “Bayesian theories” I mean theories that claim that all rational credal states are probabilistically coherent and that rational adjustments of degrees of belief in the light of (...) new evidence must be in accordance with some sort of conditionalization. The problems with the view I am criticizing can best be seen when we look at chains of inferences, rather than single-step inferences. Chains of inferences have been neglected almost entirely within the new paradigm. (shrink)

This article seeks to contribute to the discussion of how the gender gap in foreign and security policy issues can be explained by examining how early the gender differences manifest themselves. All told, 251 Swedish children between the ages of six and nine were interviewed about their views on foreign aid, refugee policy, weapons exports, armed resistance, self-defense, and concern or fear about the outbreak of war. Opinion differences between boys and girls were then compared to the differences between adult (...) men and women. The results showed that the differences between boys and girls were very small or nonexistent. Only in the question of fear about the outbreak of war did girls differ significantly from boys, displaying a much higher degree of worry. In the conclusion, these results are discussed in relation to different theories about the causes of the gender gap in foreign policy issues. (shrink)

Group solidarity requires that members are committed to solidarity norms. Addressing the question of how such commitments are socially produced, the starting point of this article is Lindenberg's Theory of Social Rationality and its notion of solidarity frames. These frames consist of solidarity as a goal of action and associated stocks of knowledge and moral feelings. TSR makes it clear that solidarity frames are fragile and precarious. They must be regularly recharged with motivational energy and symbols in order to prevail (...) over compet-ing motives. However, TSR cannot satisfactorily explain how this works. This shortcoming is addressed by Collins' Interaction Ritual Chains Theory. It is argued that solidarity frames are a potential outcome of interaction rituals and it is clarified under which conditions this can be expected. A distinction is made between three essential types of rituals: identity rituals, governance rituals, and exchange rituals. (shrink)

This paper explores two different strategies that may be useful to give substance to Deweyandemocracy’s claim that in order for democratic associations to develop into communities, citizens needto learn how to conduct inquiry in a social setting. The two strategies reflect a principal division amongviews of public deliberation. The first strategy, the separation strategy, closely resembles Rawls’political liberalism by advocating the development of a separate sphere of public deliberation, guidedby factual and normative assumptions that we need not accept anywhere outside (...) that sphere.Comprehensive doctrines are to be held outside of public deliberation, a move which makes possible arather straightforward application of Dewey’s theory of inquiry. The second strategy, theembeddedness strategy, stresses the fact that public deliberation is inevitably embedded in broaderspheres of social life, and that the development towards community must be piecemeal, and go hand inhand with developments in social life as a whole. I argue that there are weighty reasons for doubtingthe feasibility of the separation strategy, and I also argue that these reasons are relevant for ourevaluation of all versions of the separation strategy, including political liberalism. I conclude that oneof Deweyan democracy’s most important assets, which deserves further examination, is its insight thatreflection on public deliberation needs to take its embedded character into account. (shrink)

Richard Rorty never cared much for religion, to say the least. Faithful to his own philosophical and political outlook, he did, however, abandon atheism in favor of anticlericalism—the view that religion should play no role in the public life of democratic societies.1 This shift sets him apart from advocates of New Atheism (and their opponents), who consider the arguments for atheism a crucial component in the overall case against religion,2 but also from the growing group of religious and nonreligious intellectuals (...) who argue that democratic societies need more, not less, religious contributions to public life.3Rorty also came to articulate—particularly in the last volume of his Collected Papers—his .. (shrink)

When confronted with the question of which philosophical conception of religion to consider most adequate, many philosophers appeal to what I call the adequacy-argument: that we should prefer the one that looks most adequate from the perspective of religious believers. In this paper, I provide a critique of the adequacy-argument based on a pragmatic analysis of adequacy-judgments according to which reflective adequacy-judgments are forward-looking, and hence include considerations of the consequences of adopting different judgments as guides for conduct. It is (...) this forward-looking character that is virtually absent within the current adequacy-debate. The major advantage of a pragmatic analysis of adequacy is itself forward-looking: it would enable philosophers of religion to play a more critical and constructive role vis-à-vis religious practices than presently. (shrink)

Organizations routinely make choices when addressing conflicting stakes of their stakeholders. As stakeholder theory continues to mature, scholars continue to seek ways to make it more usable, yet proponents continue to debate its legitimacy. Various scholarly attempts to ground stakeholder theory have not narrowed down this debate. We draw from the work of Juergen Habermas to theoretically advance stakeholder theory, and to provide practical examples to illustrate our approach. Specifically, we apply Habermas’ language-pragmatic approach to extend stakeholder theory by advancing (...) seven sets of normative axioms. We conclude that a deliberative approach, with its focus on the conditions of legitimation and deliberative democracy, has the potential to become a cornerstone of stakeholder theory. The need for global stakeholder discourse and its internalization in corporate structures and institutions is exemplified by a multitude of CSR and stakeholder initiatives that have mushroomed in response to global risk scenarios such as climate change, nuclear warfare, or terrorism. Further research may help to build a functioning global governance system in order to provide guidance for management in the 21st century. (shrink)

Applying the sensemaking perspective in the field of corporate social responsibility is a recent but promising development. Using an in-depth exploratory case study, we analyze and discuss the CSR character of British American Tobacco Switzerland. Our findings indicate that BAT Switzerland does not follow traditional patters of building CSR. BAT Switzerland can be classified as a “legitimacy seeker,” characterized mainly by a relational identity orientation and legitimation strategies that might provide pragmatic and/or cognitive legitimacy. We conclude that understanding the cognitive (...) processes underlying the CSR decision-making process is of fundamental value when analyzing and changing the CSR approach of a firm. We discuss boundary conditions of the CSR character framework and expand it by differentiating between process and product legitimacy, as both perspectives have important but possibly different implications for the firm. (shrink)

Justice at Nuremberg traces the history of the Nuremberg Doctors' Trial held in 1946-47, as seen through the eyes of the Austrian bliogemigrbliogé psychiatrist Leo Alexander. His investigations helped the United States to prosecute twenty German doctors and three administrators for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The legacy of Nuremberg was profound. In the Nuremberg code--a landmark in the history of modern medical ethics--the judges laid down, for the first time, international guidelines for permissible experiments on humans. One of (...) those who helped to formulate the code was Alexander. Justice at Nuremberg provides a detailed insight into the origins of human rights in medical science and into the changing role of international law, ethics and politics. (shrink)