Problems, Phenomena, Explanatory Approaches Who is a German-Jewish Scientist? 1. The Einstein case and its paradoxes On 14 March 1929, Albert Einstein's ...

The volume contains the papers presented to the Schleiermacher Congress held in Berlin from 26th to 29th March 2006. The theme of the congress was “Christianity – State – Culture”, and it was organized by the International Schleiermacher Society in association with the Berlin Humboldt University Faculty of Theology and the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities. The appendix contains the first edition of a reconstruction of the confirmation instruction given by Schleiermacher in 1831/32.

Focusing on the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, this article argues that there is or can be a form of reciprocity between the victims of a catastrophe and society at large to the extent that victims become the occasion and rationale for social reforms. The victims’ contribution to society in this case is the simple fact of being victims. Such a form of reciprocity requires a particular relation to time which Jean-Pierre Dupuy has recently analyzed. In the case of (...) modern risks such as nuclear risk, the contribution of the victims is not only to a better future, but also takes place in the present by rendering patent risks which, as Ulrich Beck argued, though they are known tend to remain socially invisible. (shrink)

Ulrich Beck, Jean-Marc Ferry et Jürgen Habermas voient dans l’Union européenne la réalisation d’une démocratie postnationale, capable de se hisser au niveau des enjeux actuels. Les signes de cette réalisation ne se font toutefois pas jour dans des valeurs abstraites, mais dans l’expérience de l’européanisation, lors des commerces transfrontaliers. Après avoir présenté ce paradoxe dans les textes, nous suggérons que l’accent mis sur les expériences ordinaires tient à la place occupée par le droit dans la construction européenne. Le contrôle (...) des libertés de circulation par la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, caractéristique du marché intérieur, est à l’origine d’une intégration plus large, qui a étendu les droits des opérateurs économiques et forgé le statut de citoyen européen. La jurisprudence de la CJUE a en effet permis d’élargir la portée des droits transnationaux, dans la continuité du droit cosmopolitique kantien, sans dissoudre les États membres dans une association supranationale. Une affiliation postnationale, alternative au modèle de la souveraineté étatique classique, semble ainsi se concrétiser dans l’Union européenne. Cependant, nous suggérons que le crédit accordé à la construction, par la jurisprudence de la CJUE, de la citoyenneté postnationale, risque d’occulter les effets problématiques d’une intégration judiciaire vouée à être essentiellement négative. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Humanism and Truth: Valla Writes against the Donation of ConstantineRiccardo FubiniTranslated by Anastasia Ananson and William ConnellThere has existed for a long time now in studies of Renaissance humanism (and not only as these have developed in a single country or disciplinary area) a tendency to consider from a prevalently formalist point of view what was instead an innovative and complex cultural experience. A particularly privileged position has been (...) reserved for the ars rhetorica, which, considered in its “purely formal instrumentality,” has been treated as though immune from ideological contamination. 1 The fear of becoming entangled in matters of ideological interpretation may, in turn, give rise to new and more seriously flawed readings. Although this is a matter which I shall not now emphasize, it should be clear that when the interpretation of a text is limited to its “purely formal instrumentality,” the vacuum that results can be filled more easily with matter that is new and different. Ideology chased from the doorstep may yet sneak in through the window, sometimes completely stripped of its real historical context. However, what is more important to note here as a premise to my discussion is that, along with the formalism already referred to, one finds in recent studies a tendency to diminish or minimize the significance of writings that were celebrated by the historical traditions of the last century and felt to belong to a shared cultural, religious, or political legacy.Among such writings the De falso credita et ementita Constantini donatione of Lorenzo Valla has certainly played an important part, beginning at least with the clamor that was raised on its behalf by Ulrich von Hutten and Martin Luther. Yet it is quite typical that the work’s most recent [End Page 79] editor, who has dedicated much careful research to Valla’s treatise and its reception, should have attempted to disconnect the meaning of Valla’s treatise in its own time from the influence it would later have, concluding that “the influence [of Valla’s work] manifested itself in accents quite different from those that have resulted from [current] interpretation.” 2 In the view of this scholar, at the time of the composition of Valla’s work, Constantine’s alleged “donation” was no longer a matter of contemporary relevance; rather, it furnished the theme for a brilliant exercise in legal rhetoric. He writes: “By then the Donation of Constantine was no longer an urgent theme for political theory. (Die Konstantinische Schenkung war damals kein beherrschendes Thema der politischen Theorie mehr.)” 3My discussion takes its cue from this point. Without dwelling at length on the various contributions of other scholars, I shall begin first by trying, on the basis of documentary evidence, to restore Valla’s treatise to life, to the climate of its day, in order then to gather and present its meaning along interpretative lines I have already laid out elsewhere. 4According to that usually trustworthy Florentine chronicler, Giovanni Cavalcanti, Filippo Maria Visconti, duke of Milan, at the end of 1443 made a diplomatic avance toward Florence. Principal among the issues dividing the two powers had been the protection afforded by the regime of Cosimo de’ Medici to Francesco Sforza, then holed up in his fiefdoms in the March of Ancona. The Duke now proposed that they should unite in common defense against the Pope, insofar as the latter was sovereign lord of the March. Beyond these particular circumstances, the accord was supposed to find its warrant in the partners’ shared interest in affirming the superiority of civil over ecclesiastical jurisdiction. So the Duke, according to Cavalcanti, advanced his proposal with words that allow us to suspect an early but not surprising echo of Valla’s treatise (first circulated in that very year): “It so happens that even if Constantine consigned to Sylvester so many and such rich gifts—which is doubtful, because such a privilege can nowhere be found—he could only have granted them for his [Sylvester’s] lifetime, [because] the Empire takes precedence over any lordship.” No differently from Valla, Duke Filippo Maria thought the sovereign impersonality of the [End Page 80] law was the prerogative only of the Empire (and... (shrink)

This article differentiates between three different axes of conflict in world risk society. The first axis is that of ecological conflicts, which are by their very essence global. The second is global financial crises, which, in a first stage, can be individualized and nationalized. And the third, which suddenly broke upon us on September 11th, is the threat of transnational terror networks, which empowers governments and states. Two sets of implications are drawn: first, there are the political dynamics of world (...) risk society. In an age where trust and faith in God, class and progress have largely disappeared, humanity's common fear has proved the last - ambivalent - resource for making new bonds. Second, the methodological nationalism that preoccupies the sociological imagination has to be overcome and a `methodological cosmopolitism' has to be created. (shrink)

Berger, U., Total sets and objects in domain theory, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 60 91-117. Total sets and objects generalizing total functions are introduced into the theory of effective domains of Scott and Ersov. Using these notions Kreisel's Density Theorem and the Theorem of Kreisel-Lacombe-Shoenfield are generalized. As an immediate consequence we obtain the well-known continuity of computable functions on the constructive reals as well as a domain-theoretic characterization of the Heriditarily Effective Operations.

This paper argues that the four most plausible arguments compatible with public reason for an outright legal ban on all forms of polygamy are unvictorious. I consider the types of arguments political liberals would have to insist on, and precisely how strongly, in order for a general prohibition against polygamy to be justified, while also considering what general attitude towards "marriage" and legal recognition of the right to marry are most consistent with political liberalism. I argue that a liberal state (...) should get out of the "marriage business" by leveling down to a universal status of "civil union" neutral as to the gender and affective purpose of domestic partnerships. I then refute what I regard as the four most plausible rational objections to offering this civil union status to multi-member domestic partnerships. The most common objection to polygamy is on grounds of gender equality, more specifically, female equality. But advancing this argument forcefully often involves neglecting the tendency of political liberalism (by whatever name it goes in contemporary, complex, multicultural societies) to tolerate a certain amount of inequality in private, within the bounds of robust and meaningful freedoms of choice and exit. Properly understood, polygamy involves no inherent statement about the essential inferiority of women, and certainly not more than many other existing practices and institutions (including many expressions of the main monotheistic religions) which political liberals regard as tolerable, even reasonable. Arguments from the welfare of children, fairness in the spousal market, and the abuse of family subsidies are also considered and found insufficient for excluding polygamy. (shrink)

The criticism of neoliberalism is omnipresent. The term is seemingly self-explanatory, but its original use in public has been forgotten. Its form originated in the international movement of ordoliberalism in the 1930s, which used neoliberalism to describe its distinction from laissez-faire capitalism. This conceptual confusion has created considerable consequential problems that overlay today’s debate on the future of the market economy. The fact that the neoliberalism of the ordoliberals is today equated by its critics with the capitalism of the libertarians (...) raises questions. Since the economic dogma of Milton Friedman, who was the inspiration for the so-called Chicago Boys in Chile, whose economic policy was first captured by today’s negatively connoted term neoliberalism, this approach needs to be looked at more closely. Should the ideas of the Chicago school of thought substantially distinguish themselves from the other currents of economic liberalism, a solution to the confusion of terms could be possible, giving a new twist to the debate on the market economy. Such a clarifiation would be of fundamental importance for the ethical question of the social orientation of the economic order, since ordoliberalism was in turn the godfather of the social market economy. Furthermore, this would have consequences for applied political ethics in the context of political theories of justice, whose theoretical constructs reflect the existing economic order as a fact of experience. (shrink)

The paper presents a refined method of extracting reasonable and sometimes unexpected programs from classical proofs of formulas of the form ∀x∃yB . We also generalize previously known results, since B no longer needs to be quantifier-free, but only has to belong to a strictly larger class of so-called “goal formulas”. Furthermore we allow unproven lemmas D in the proof of ∀x∃yB , where D is a so-called “definite” formula.

Auf Thomas Hobbes geht die Feststellung zurück, Absurdität sei ein Privileg des Menschen: Nur ein rationales Wesen ist offensichtlich der Irrationalität fähig.

Der Band versammelt 29 Aufsätze, die Walter Haug in seinen letzten Lebensjahren geschrieben hat. In ihnen entwickelt er die großen Themen seines Lebenswerkes - insbesondere seine Beschäftigung mit dem höfischen Roman und der Mystik - weiter und führt sie zusammen unter dem titelgebenden Aspekt der Negativität, d.h. des Scheiterns, des Verlustes, der Trennung. Die erotische Liebe wie die mystische Gottesbegegnung, deren absoluten Anspruch die Wirklichkeit nie ganz zu erfüllen vermag, können durch Literatur in ihrem Scheitern dargestellt und gerade dadurch erfahrbar (...) gemacht werden. Literaturtheoretische und philosophiegeschichtliche Überlegungen bilden einen Schwerpunkt des Bandes, dessen Themenkreis über den höfischen Roman und die Mystik hinaus Heldenepik, Märendichtung, Lyrik und anderes mehr umfasst. Der Band spiegelt die Lebendigkeit und Vielseitigkeit von Haugs Denken und erlaubt zuletzt, über sechs Reden und Nachrufe, einen sehr persönlichen Blick auf diesen herausragenden Wissenschaftler und Menschen. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die dreiwertige Logik der Sprache" verfügbar.

Some scholars have argued that religiously injurious speech poses a serious problem for secular liberal thought. It has been suggested that secular liberal thought and political practice often misrecognize the nature of the injury involved in speech that violates the sacred and that much secular thought about religious injury (and free exercise more generally) is premised on unacknowledged Protestant conceptions of what real religion is. In this essay, I argue against the ideas that secular liberalism tends to treat religion only (...) as a matter of freely chosen belief and that the unchosen, habituated nature of much religious experience raises a problem for the defense of speech that violates the sacred. I argue that secular thought and practice should remain very concerned about the social and political harms of speech directed unambiguously at social groups but need not eliminate the gap between religious attachments and religious persons. (shrink)

The phenomenon of “Muslim Democracy” has been analyzed by scholars for a number of years, at least since the mid-1990s. The standard view about Muslim Democracy is that (perhaps like its European counterpart Christian Democracy) it represents a nonideological, or postideological, pragmatic approach to electoral politics. The purpose of this article is to advance two primary arguments. The first is that the turn to Muslim Democracy as an ideology and practice should first be understood as a way of thinking about (...) politics that breaks with the sovereigntist imaginary that dominated modern Islamic political thought. Second, Muslim Democrats do not forswear the use of democratic means to advance goals derived from religious commitment as part of their recognition of pluralism and constitutional democracy. Their attitude toward politics should thus be seen as a form of agonistic pluralism. This article thus proposes an interpretation of Muslim Democracy as post-sovereigntist agonistic political Islam. (shrink)

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff was one of the most prominent German philologists of his time and his work is still well regarded. This book, originally published in 1893, is a detailed analysis of the The Constitution of the Athenians, then usually regarded as a work of Aristotle. Wilamowitz accepts Aristotle's authorship of the famous treatise on the history of the constitution that restored democracy after the oligarchy of the Thirty. Volume 2 reconstructs Athenian constitutional history on the basis of the (...) work. A number of essays addressing topics on Athenian constitutional history and drawing on such figures as Solon, Peisistratus, Lysias and Isocrates are also included. (shrink)

Both immanent and non-immanent (transcendent) factors related to philosophy, its nature, subject-matter, aims, objectives and methods are discussed from a meta-philosophical perspective, It will be noticed that original- and creative-thinkers in the socio-cultural practice of philosophy present us with their own, new and original ideas and patterns, sets or models of such ideas. Paradigms or models that are arrived at through the processes of theorizing. Processes that consist of a number of smaller steps or stages, stages that are multi-dimensional and (...) many-levelled. -/- All kinds of techniques and practices are employed in the contexts on these levels and in these dimensions. Some of these will be philosophical tools. These tools contribute to the doing of philosophy. This process of philosophizing forms one aspect, dimension or feature of the process/es of theorizing. -/- Some of the features will resemble and employ familiar, already existing and institutionalized ideas, models, tools, practices and techniques - usually from the discourse of philosophy, but also from other socio-cultural practices. -/- In the case of original/creative-thinkers these things will be ‘intuitive’ or ‘devised’ by the the individual himself while in the case of lesser original- and creative-thinkers these things (ideas, insights, tools, techniques, the ways they are arrived at or being constituted, employed to devise or express sets of new ideas or insights or models) will be obtained from the ideas, insights, statements, hypotheses and theories of other thinkers. The latter employs insights and ideas of others as ‘facts or factual ideas’ as ‘truths’ so as to argue for, establish, validate and legitimize their own derivative ideas resembling a kind of empirical research and the presentation of data in lectures and conferences and it is far removed from the approach of original thinkers. -/- . (shrink)

In resisting attempts to explain the unity of a whole in terms of a multiplicity of interacting parts, quantum mechanics calls for an explanatory concept that proceeds in the opposite direction: from unity to multiplicity. Being part of the Scientific Image of the world, the theory concerns the process by which (the physical aspect of) what Sellars called the Manifest Image of the world comes into being. This process consists in the progressive differentiation of an intrinsically undifferentiated entity. By entering (...) into reflexive spatial relations, this entity gives rise to (i) what looks like a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality of the relations is not taken into account, and (ii) what looks like a substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is reified. If there is a distinctly quantum domain, it is a non-spatial and non-temporal dimension across which the transition from the unity of this entity to the multiplicity of the world takes place. Instead of being constituents of the physical world, subatomic particles, atoms, and molecules are instrumental in its manifestation. These conclusions are based on the following interpretive principle and its more direct consequences: whenever the calculation of probabilities calls for the addition of amplitudes, the distinctions we make between the alternatives lack objective reality. Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between regions of space, this principle implies that, owing to the indefiniteness of positions, the spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete: the existence of a real-valued spatiotemporal background is an unrealistic idealization. This guarantees the existence of observables whose values are real per se, as against “real by virtue of being indicated by the values of observables that are real per se.” Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between things, it implies that, intrinsically, all fundamental particles are numerically identical and thus identifiable with the aforementioned undifferentiated entity. (shrink)

If a state with liberal political and justificatory commitments extends benefits of various kinds to persons forming families, what qualifications may such a state place on the right to access to those benefits? I will make two assumptions for the purposes of this paper. The first is the political and justificatory terrain of some form of political or otherwise non-perfectionist liberalism. The assumption is that we are considering the resources and limitations of a community of persons who accept moral pluralism (...) (if not a specific doctrine like the "burdens of judgment"), some priority for individual freedom, and the obligation to justify public coercion and exclusion in terms accessible and fair to all members of morally and culturally diverse society. The second is that it is justified for a liberal state to recognize some forms of domestic partnerships or families in the first place and extend further benefits to them such as tax credits or laws extending (or facilitating the extension of) medical or social insurance. It is, of course, possible to imagine the argument that the liberal state gets out of the marriage business by getting out of it entirely - by extending no recognition or positive rights to families whatsoever beyond negative non-interference rights. I am interested in the dilemma of a society broadly like existing liberal ones which is committed both to subsidizing families and also to justificatory neutrality (expressed in American constitutional legal terms as the requirement of providing a "rational basis" for unequal treatment). Given these assumptions, I believe that the most justifiable policy on liberal grounds is not the institution of "marriage" increasingly open to new constituent relationships but rather a status of "registered domestic partnership" which fulfills the social and moral aims behind subsidizing the family but is entirely neutral not only to the gender or even to the numbers of the partners, but also to the affective and emotional content of domestic life and the purposes behind contracting domestic partnerships. So is there a right to polygamy and incestuous marriage? There is not a specific right to either and thus there is no a priori reason why some restrictions or even prohibitions on them might not be justified, but the same is true for every specific act where a general right to the freedom exists. I argue in this paper, however, that the arguments compatible with public reason for prohibiting them outright, or even for excluding them from the permissible types of legally registered partnerships, are quite weak. I argue that objections to polygamy from (1) female autonomy, (2) damage to children, (3) fairness in the marital market, and (4) the unfair burdening of society are serious and worth refuting, but do not establish a victorious case against multi-member relationships. As to incest, there are two separate questions. The first is whether the new institution of "registered domestic partnerships" should be open to them. The answer to that, given the state's lack of interest in citizens' reasons for forming partnerships and in what they do whilst being registered in one, is clearly "yes." The second is whether, entirely separate from the issue of legal recognition of domestic partnership, the state has a legitimate rational interest in deterring, preventing or punishing consanguineous sexual relations between close blood relations (first-degree incest). Here, the objections to allowing such relations are those from (1) child abuse; (2) unfair burdening of society; and (3) the creation of bad lives. I argue that while rape and other forms of child abuse would be no more legal or tolerated than they are now, the concern about any form of weakening a society's legal and political resources to combat such abuses does indeed register on the justificatory scale, but does not prove that such first-degree incestuous sexual relations are inherently bad enough to warrant intervention. I then argue that the concern about unfairly burdening society with unhealthy persons is not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, but nor is it strong enough to justify an outright prohibition. Finally, I argue that a concern to dissuade persons from creating certain kinds of lives (children with extreme birth defects) is also not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, and in fact goes further towards explaining why we might have a legitimate interest in intervening. Nonetheless, I argue that the criminalization of such acts only make sense when they are indicators of other offenses, namely negligence or abuse, and it thus seems that the act of consanguineous reproduction is itself insufficient. (shrink)

In this article I consider whether there a right to incestuous marriage. I begin by suggesting that the liberal state get out of the "marriage" business by leveling down to a universal civil union or "registered domestic partnership" status. Removing the symbolism of the term "marriage" from political conflict, privatizing it in the same way as religion, would have the advantage of both consistency and political reconciliation. The question is then whether incestuous unions should be both legal and eligible for (...) this status. I argue that the arguments compatible with public reason for prohibiting them outright, or even for excluding them from the permissible types of legally registered partnerships, are quite weak. The objections to allowing such relations are those from (1) child abuse; (2) unfair burdening of society; and (3) the creation of bad lives. I argue that while rape and other forms of child abuse would be no more legal or tolerated than they are now, the concern about any form of weakening a society's legal and political resources to combat such abuses does indeed register on the justificatory scale, but does not prove that such first-degree incestuous sexual relations are inherently bad enough to warrant intervention in their own right. I then argue that the concern about unfairly burdening society with unhealthy persons is not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, but nor is it strong enough to justify an outright prohibition. Finally, I argue that a concern to dissuade persons from creating certain kinds of lives (children with extreme birth defects) is also not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, and in fact goes further towards explaining why we might have a legitimate interest in intervening. Nonetheless, I argue that the criminalization of such acts only make sense when they are indicators of other offenses, namely negligence or abuse, and it thus seems that the act of consanguineous reproduction is itself insufficient. One potentially surprising conclusion of this inquiry is that far from creating strong reasons for tolerating these practices, religious or cultural reasons for valuing incest (as well as polygamy) actually seem to count against tolerating them. The reason is that from a liberal perspective, tolerating polygamy and incest involves the assumption that it is possible to disassociate polygamy and incest simpliciter from abusive practices associated with them, including environments where children are raised to devalue their own sexual (and other) autonomy. However, the presence of comprehensive doctrines which include polygyny or incest as part of a good life actually makes it harder to justify disassociating polygamy and incest themselves from the likely abuse and coercion practiced by those who would value polygyny or incest. (shrink)

In this article I consider whether the legalization of sex-same marriage implies a right to incestuous marriage. I begin by suggesting that the liberal state get out of the 'marriage' business by leveling down to a universal civil union status. The question is then whether incestuous unions should be both legal and eligible for this status. I argue that the arguments compatible with public reason for prohibiting them outright, or even for excluding them from the permissible types of legally registered (...) partnerships, are quite weak. The objections to allowing such relations are those from (1) child abuse; (2) unfair burdening of society; and (3) the creation of bad lives. I argue that while rape and other forms of child abuse would be no more legal or tolerated than they are now, the concern about any form of weakening a society's legal and political resources to combat such abuses does indeed register on the justificatory scale, but does not prove that such first-degree incestuous sexual relations are inherently bad enough to warrant intervention in their own right. I then argue that the concern about unfairly burdening society with unhealthy persons is not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, but nor is it strong enough to justify an outright prohibition. Finally, I argue that a concern to dissuade persons from creating certain kinds of lives (children with extreme birth defects) is also not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, and in fact goes further towards explaining why we might have a legitimate interest in intervening. Nonetheless, I argue that the criminalization of such acts only make sense when they are indicators of other offenses, namely negligence or abuse, and it thus seems that the act of consanguineous reproduction is itself insufficient. (shrink)

How did the reception of Aristotelian logic in the Arabic and Latin Middle Ages shape the development of theology? And how did theological issues influence the debates about logic and theories of argumentation? The contributions in this volume examine these questions on the basis of key texts, thus shedding new light on the problematic relationship between logic and theology.

Mit dieser Edition wird erstmals ein Vorlesungszyklus aus Helmuth Plessners wissenschaftlichem Nachlaß der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht. Das klar und übersichtlich gegliederte Kolleg "Elemente der Metaphysik" präsentiert in leicht verständlicher Sprache und gut nachvollziehbarer Gedankenentfaltung die Grundzüge von Plessners Anthropologie, die dieser in seinem nur schwer rezipierbaren Hauptwerk, den "Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch" von 1928, entwickelt hatte, und stellt sie in einen umfassenden philosophischen Kontext. Die Vorlesung umfaßt drei Hauptteile: Im 1. Teil, der "Metaphysik des Bewußtseins", zeigt Plessner, daß (...) der klassische bewußtseinsphilosophische Ansatz zur Beantwortung zentraler metaphysischer Probleme nicht in der Lage ist. Die entscheidende Frage nach dem Sein des Bewußtseins ist - wie Plessner nachweist - im Rahmen der Bewußtseinsproblematik, wie sie von der neuzeitlichen Philosophie seit Descartes entfaltet wurde, nicht zu beantworten. Die Bewußtseinsphilosophie muß daher - so Plessners Grundthese - durch einen lebensphilosophischen Ansatz überwunden werden. Dieser Übergang zur Problematik des Lebens und die breite Ausführung des neuen philosophischen Zugriffs steht im Mittelpunkt des 2. Teils ("Metaphysik des Lebens"). Plessner unternimmt hier vor allem den Versuch, das Wesen des Lebens durch das Verhältnis des Körpers zu seiner Grenze zu bestimmen und hält fest, daß solche Körper, die ihre Grenzen realisiert haben, "Positionaliät" besitzen. Dieser Begriff der Positionalität wird zum Zentralbegriff von Plessners Biophilosophie, die im Fortgang dieses Teils der Vorlesung ausführlich dargestellt wird. Im Zentrum der Darlegung, die Plessner im engen, kritischen Kontakt mit der biologischen Forschung hält, steht u.a. die Beziehung von Organismus und Umwelt, die Organisationsformen des Lebens (Pflanze und Tier), die Struktur der tierischen Umwelt, die Bestimmung des Bewußtseins, das Verhältnis von Bewußtsein und körperlichem Sein und das Problem des Gedächtnisses. Im abschließenden 3. Teil ("Der Mensch") skizziert Plessner die Grundzüge seiner philosophischen Anthropologie, wobei er den Menschen als dasjenige Lebewesen bestimmt, das - in Abhebung vom Tier, dem eine zentrische Organisationsform zukommt - eine "exzentrische Positionalität" besitzt, und das in einem dreifachen Bezug zur Außenwelt, zur Innenwelt und zur Mitwelt steht. Die besondere Bedeutung dieser Vorlesung liegt einerseits in ihrem Charakter als leicht nachvollziehbare Hinführung zu Plessners Philosophie des Lebendigen. Andererseits enthält sie neue Inhalte - insbesondere im 1. und 2. Teil - und trägt dadurch zur Erweiterung unserer Kenntnis von Plessners Philosophie bei. (shrink)

Our understanding of epithelial development in Drosophila has been greatly improved in recent years. Two key regulators of epithelial polarity, Crumbs and DE‐cadherin, have been studied at the genetic and molecular levels and a number of additional genes are being analyzed that contribute to the differentiation of epithelial cell structure. Epithelial architecture has a profound influence on morphogenetic movements, patterning and cell‐type determination. The combination of embryological and genetic/molecular tools in Drosophila will help us to elucidate the complex events that (...) determine epithelial cell structure and how they relate to morphogenesis and other developmental processes. (shrink)

For the first time in his Doctrine of Right, Kant employs an expanded, three dimensional concept of public law. In addition to constitutional law, it also includes international law and cosmopolitan law. Each of these concepts of law is assigned its own principle of reason: constitutional law declares that a republic is the only rightful constitution for an individual state; international law requires at least an association of states with higher level instruments of coercion; and cosmopolitan law primarily defines the (...) basic rights of stateless peoples or individuals with respect to existing states. For the principles of reason for constitutional and international law, Kant formulates permissive laws, which allow for imperfections in an effort to promote the optima which the legal principles of reason dictate. Kant justifies these less perfect solutions not only with pragmatic considerations but also with reasons relating to the theory of the sovereignty of nations. Kants Rechtslehre verwendet erstmals einen erweiterten, dreidimensionalen Begriff des öffentlichen Rechts, der neben dem Staatsrecht nun auch das Völkerrecht und das Weltbürgerrecht umfaßt. Jeder dieser Begriffssphären wird ein eigenes vernunftrechtliches Prinzip zugeordnet: das Staatsrecht erklärt die Republik zur einzig rechtmäßigen Verfassung, während das Völkerrecht mindestens eine Staatenassoziation mit höherstufiger Zwangsgewalt erfordert und das Weltbürgerrecht in der Hauptsache die elementaren Rechte von staatslosen Völkern oder Einzelpersonen gegenüber Staaten definiert. Für das staatsrechtliche und das völkerrechtliche Prinzip formuliert Kant Erlaubnisgesetze, die zur Beförderung der vernunftrechtlichen Optima Minderformen zulassen, zu deren Rechtfertigung Kant nicht allein pragmatische, sondern ebenso volkssouveränitätstheoretische Gründe anführt. (shrink)