The bioeconomy is becoming increasingly prominent in policy and scholarly literature, but critical examination of the concept is lacking. We argue that the bioeconomy should be understood as a political project, not simply or primarily as a technoscientific or economic one. We use a conceptual framework derived from the work of Karl Polanyi to elucidate the politically performative nature of the bioeconomy through an analysis of an influential Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development initiative, The Bioeconomy to 2030. We argue (...) that this initiative is a response to some of the most acute challenges facing the current neoliberal-capitalist accumulation regime, which seeks to protect and extend that regime, through both what it occludes and what it promotes. Rather than taking the bioeconomy as a description of some subset of economic activity, we regard it as a promissory construct that is meant to induce and facilitate some actions while deterring others; most explicitly, it is meant to bring about a particular set of political–institutional changes that will shape the parameters of possible future action. The bioeconomy concept highlights the potential dangers of failing to situate ethnographic examinations of horizontal micro-relations within a political–economic macro-context that enables and constrains. Scholarly work in science and technology studies and elsewhere that does not recognize the wider politics of the bioeconomy risks unintentionally contributing to the legitimation of this political project. (shrink)

Una prima parte del saggio sintetizza le linee principali di un recente libro dell’autore: Per un paradigma del corpo: una rifondazione filosofica dell’ecologia, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2019. Viene sostenuto un paradigma in cui corpo e biologia mantengano la loro irriducibilità nei confronti della cultura e in cui il cosiddetto “linguistic turn”, che ha dominato la filosofia del XX secolo, viene fortemente criticato; in coerenza con questo, la riflessione di Merleau-Ponty sul concetto di natura viene considerata lo strumento più adeguato e più (...) attuale per ripensare la questione ecologica; ne vengono esaminate le conseguenze nel campo della filosofia della tecnologia e del problema del soggetto. Una seconda parte del saggio, che si concentra sull’incontro che ebbe luogo nel 1961 fra Adorno e Merleau-Ponty, cerca di abbozzare un paradigma materialistico per l’ecologia, correggendo l’avvicinamento che alla fine della sua vita vi fu fra Merleau-Ponty e Heidegger. (shrink)

The emergence of ecology as a fundamental horizon not only of politics, but also of contemporary philosophy, pushes us to rethink the relationship that currents of thought such as Kuturkritik and phenomenology, especially the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, can maintain with it. After a preliminary consideration of post-structuralist and postmodern positions from this perspective, the essay focuses on the French philosopher, and in particular on his courses on Nature and on his elaboration of the Husserlian concept of Stiftung. This results (...) in Merleau-Ponty’s original position on the Kultur – Civilization alternative: critique of unlimited productivism, respect for the environment, and, at the same time, defense of the variety of cultures and traditions from a homogenizing globalization are valuable tools that his philosophy offers to the debates of our time. (shrink)

The Dunning–Kruger effect focuses our attention on the notion of invisibility of ignorance, i.e., the ignorance of ignorance. Such a phenomenon is not only important for everyday life, but also, above all, for some philosophical disciplines, such as epistemology of sciences. When someone tries to understand formally the phenomenon of ignorance of ignorance, they usually end up with a nested epistemic operator highly resistant to proper regimentation. In this paper, we argue that to understand adequately the ignorance of ignorance phenomenon (...) we have to understand satisfactorily the concept of disbelief and, as we call it, the concept of “radical ignorance”. We propose also prerequisites that a notion of radical ignorance useful for the philosophy of science ought to fulfill, and we sketch a possible formalization of this notion. Finally, we propose some comments on the problem of propagation of ignorance proposed by Fine. (shrink)

In his mature works, Kuhn abandons the concept of a paradigm and becomes more interested in the analysis of the conceptual structure of scientific theories. These changes are interpreted as resulting from a ‘linguistic turn’ that Kuhn underwent sometimes around the 1980s. Much of the philosophical discussions about Kuhn’s post-‘linguistic turn’ philosophy revolves around his views on taxonomic concepts. Apart from taxonomy, however, the mature Kuhn introduces other concepts, such as conceptual networks and lexicons. This article distinguishes these three concepts (...) and shows that adopting each one of them has different impacts on Kuhn’s model of science. After distinguishing and assessing the concepts of taxonomy, network, and lexicon, it will be argued that the latter not only fits the Kuhnian model of science better, but it also helps capture the wide sense of Kuhn’s early concept of a paradigm. (shrink)

This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account, which rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one hand, it departs from the material reading of ‘if then’ exactly in the way we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it significantly differs from the non-material accounts which (...) hinge on the Ramsey Test, advocated by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others. (shrink)

This paper develops a probabilistic analysis of conditionals which hinges on a quantitative measure of evidential support. In order to spell out the interpreta- tion of ‘if’ suggested, we will compare it with two more familiar interpretations, the suppositional interpretation and the strict interpretation, within a formal framework which rests on fairly uncontroversial assumptions. As it will emerge, each of the three interpretations considered exhibits specific logical features that deserve separate consideration.

Epistemologists and philosophers of science have often attempted to express formally the impact of a piece of evidence on the credibility of a hypothesis. In this paper we will focus on the Bayesian approach to evidential support. We will propose a new formal treatment of the notion of degree of confirmation and we will argue that it overcomes some limitations of the currently available approaches on two grounds: (i) a theoretical analysis of the confirmation relation seen as an extension of (...) logical deduction and (ii) an empirical comparison of competing measures in an experimental inquiry concerning inductive reasoning in a probabilistic setting. (shrink)

This article aims at sketching a philosophical theory of sound based on the perspective of sound designers: unique agents blurring the boundaries between engineering, music, acoustics and sound-based art. After having introduced the general framing in Section 1, focusing on a short history of the theory and practice of sound design, in Section 2 we propose a reading of sound as monad. We derive such intuition from the technology of digital sampling of audio signals, based on the decomposition of complex (...) sound waves in a number of elementary sinusoidal waves. Thus, in Section 3, we attempt at grounding the resulting “sound-atom” on Leibniz’s notion of monad, intended both as a “simple substance without parts” and as a “nucleus of forces in statu possibilitatis.” The insight is resumed and further discussed in Section 4, where we draw our conclusions by demonstrating the fitness of such framing with regards to the standpoint of sound design, while accounting for the work of sound artists Carsten Nicolai and Ryoji Ikeda. (shrink)

"Meeting strangers" is a metaphor for the increasingly common experience of working with diversity in family therapy. This book offers a model of cultural family therapy for working with families across cultures, particularly immigrants, refugees, and minorities in mainstream society. -/- The author draws together several emerging trends in therapy and the human sciences: narrative approaches, transcultural psychiatry, studies of autobiographical memory and the distributed and saturated self, translation theory and sociolinguistics. He offers an understanding of the "situated nature" of (...) human problems and tools for translating the family's culture and idioms into a common language in a culturally responsive and collaborative way. -/- Each chapter is both theoretical and practical, far-reaching and grounded in the experiences of families in therapy. The chapters of Part I, Meeting Strangers, introduce themes of cultural family therapy, a synthesis of family therapy and transcultural psychiatry that reframes the presenting issue in therapy as the "presenting culture." Here DiNicola both critiques family therapy's unexamined use of cultural concepts and introduces fresh conceptual tools, such as spirals, masks, and roles, that facilitate the therapist's engagement with the family culture. -/- Part II, On the Threshold: Language, Identity, and Cultural Change, introduces a number of "changelings," "liminal people," and "orphans." Between or on the thresholds of two or more cultures, they struggle with issues around language and translation, identity and cultural change. The overbearing influence of Western concepts is seen in DiNicola's examination of the psychological, social, and cultural implications of the myth of independence. -/- Part III, Families as Storying Cultures, demonstrates in extended cases the power of narrative and of metaphor to transform experience. The final chapter is a moving memoir of the author's fascinating journey to Brazil to meet his father for the first time. -/- The author's aim is "to open space for people who have been treated like minor characters in the drama of family therapy." In doing so, he puts onto center stage all sorts of strangers in society, families of diversity, and their human predicaments, inviting his readers to engage in the full richness and complexity of culture, families, and therapy. (shrink)

This paper investigates the logic of reasons. Its aim is to provide an analysis of the sentences of the form ‘p is a reason for q’ that yields a coherent account of their logical properties. The idea that we will develop is that ‘p is a reason for q’ is acceptable just in case a suitably defined relation of incompatibility obtains between p and ¬q. As we will suggest, a theory of reasons based on this idea can solve three challenging (...) puzzles that concern, respectively, contraposing reasons, conflicting reasons, and supererogatory reasons, and opens a new perspective on some classical issues concerning non-deductive inferences. (shrink)

The paper lists several editions of Euclid’s Elements in the Early Modern Age, giving for each of them the axioms and postulates employed to ground elementary mathematics.

According to the view of conditionals named 'inferentialism', a conditional holds when its consequent can be inferred from its antecedent. This paper identifies some major challenges that inferentialism has to face, and uses them to assess three accounts of conditionals: one is the classical strict account, the other two have recently been proposed by Douven and Rott. As will be shown, none of the three proposals meets all challenges in a fully satisfactory way. We argue through novel formal results that (...) a variation of the evidential account of conditionals suggested by Crupi and Iacona is the most promising candidate to develop inferentialism in a coherent formal framework. (shrink)

This paper outlines an account of concessive conditionals that rests on two main ideas. One is that the logical form of a sentence as used in a given context is determined by the content expressed by the sentence in that context. The other is that a coherent distinction can be drawn between a reading of ‘if’ according to which a conditional is true when its consequent holds on the supposition that its antecedent holds, and a stronger reading according to which (...) a conditional is true when its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will suggest, the logical form of concessive conditionals can be elucidated by relying on this distinction. (shrink)

Probability ratio and likelihood ratio measures of inductive support and related notions have appeared as theoretical tools for probabilistic approaches in the philosophy of science, the psychology of reasoning, and artificial intelligence. In an effort of conceptual clarification, several authors have pursued axiomatic foundations for these two families of measures. Such results have been criticized, however, as relying on unduly demanding or poorly motivated mathematical assumptions. We provide two novel theorems showing that probability ratio and likelihood ratio measures can be (...) axiomatized in a way that overcomes these difficulties. (shrink)

Harrigan and Spekkens, introduced the influential notion of an ontological model of operational quantum theory. Ontological models can be either “epistemic” or “ontic.” According to the two scholars, Einstein would have been one of the first to propose an epistemic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Pusey et al. showed that an epistemic interpretation of quantum theory is impossible, so implying that Einstein had been refuted. We discuss in detail Einstein’s arguments against the standard interpretation of QM, proving that there is a (...) misunderstanding in Harrigan and Spekkens’ attribution of an epistemic perspective to Einstein, whose point of view was actually statistical, but in a quasi-classical sense. (shrink)

We prove that the unification type of Łukasiewicz logic and of its equivalent algebraic semantics, the variety of MV-algebras, is nullary. The proof rests upon Ghilardiʼs algebraic characterisation of unification types in terms of projective objects, recent progress by Cabrer and Mundici in the investigation of projective MV-algebras, the categorical duality between finitely presented MV-algebras and rational polyhedra, and, finally, a homotopy-theoretic argument that exploits lifts of continuous maps to the universal covering space of the circle. We discuss the background (...) to such diverse tools. In particular, we offer a detailed proof of the duality theorem for finitely presented MV-algebras and rational polyhedra—a fundamental result that, albeit known to specialists, seems to appear in print here for the first time. (shrink)

Both in the bibliography and in the citation in the text, Michelle Gibbons’ article below has been mistakenly attributed to “Gibson.” The proper reference to the article should be: Gibbons, M.. Reassessing discovery: Rosalind Franklin, scientific visualization, and the structure of DNA. _Philosophy of Science, 79_, 63–80.

We offer a proof of the duality theorem for finitely presented MV-algebras and rational polyhedra, a folklore and yet fundamental result. Our approach develops first a general dual adjunction between MV-algebras and subspaces of Tychonoff cubes, endowed with the transformations that are definable in the language of MV-algebras. We then show that this dual adjunction restricts to a duality between semisimple MV-algebras and closed subspaces of Tychonoff cubes. The duality theorem for finitely presented objects is obtained by a further specialisation. (...) Our treatment is aimed at showing exactly which parts of the basic theory of MV-algebras are needed in order to establish these results, with an eye towards future generalisations. (shrink)