We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences - pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory (...) of causality that unifies its mechanistic and probabilistic aspects. We argue that the epistemic theory of causality provides the required unification. (shrink)

O principal objetivo deste artigo é acompanhar o diálogo dos filósofos György Lukács e Carlos Nelson Coutinho acerca do legado literário de Franz Kafka. O núcleo de nossos esforços consiste na análise da tentativa de superação da abordagem lukacsiana por parte de Coutinho. Na realização dessa tarefa, conferimos atenção às dicas oferecidas pelo mestre húngaro ao discípulo baiano quanto aos limites de sua própria leitura de Kafka.

The anti-causal prophecies of last century have been disproved. Causality is neither a ‘relic of a bygone’ nor ‘another fetish of modern science’; it still occupies a large part of the current debate in philosophy and the sciences. This investigation into causal modelling presents the rationale of causality, i.e. the notion that guides causal reasoning in causal modelling. It is argued that causal models are regimented by a rationale of variation, nor of regularity neither invariance, thus breaking down the dominant (...) Human paradigm. The notion of variation is shown to be embedded in the scheme of reasoning behind various causal models: e.g. Rubin’s model, contingency tables, and multilevel analysis. It is also shown to be latent – yet fundamental – in many philosophical accounts. Moreover, it has significant consequences for methodological issues: the warranty of the causal interpretation of causal models, the levels of causation, the characterisation of mechanisms, and the interpretation of probability. This book offers a novel philosophical and methodological approach to causal reasoning in causal modelling and provides the reader with the tools to be up to date about various issues causality rises in social science. (shrink)

Causal analysis in the social sciences takes advantage of a variety of methods and of a multi-fold source of information and evidence. This pluralistic methodology and source of information raises the question of whether we should accordingly have a pluralistic metaphysics and epistemology. This paper focuses on epistemology and argues that a pluralistic methodology and evidence don’t entail a pluralistic epistemology. It will be shown that causal models employ a single rationale of testing, based on the notion of variation. Further, (...) I shall argue that this monistic epistemology is also involved in alternative philosophical theories of causation. (shrink)

According to Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007, Hist Philos Life Sci 33:389–396, 2011a, Philos Sci 1(1):47–69, 2011b ), in order to establish a causal claim of the form, ‘_C_ is a cause of _E_’, one typically needs evidence that there is an underlying mechanism between _C_ and _E_ as well as evidence that _C_ makes a difference to _E_. This thesis has been used to argue that hierarchies of evidence, as championed by evidence-based movements, tend (...) to give primacy to evidence of difference making over evidence of mechanisms and are flawed because the two sorts of evidence are required and they should be treated on a par. An alternative approach gives primacy to evidence of mechanism over evidence of difference making. In this paper, we argue that this alternative approach is equally flawed, again because both sorts of evidence need to be treated on a par. As an illustration of this parity, we explain how scientists working in the ‘EnviroGenomarkers’ project constantly make use of the two evidential components in a dynamic and intertwined way. We argue that such an interplay is needed not only for causal assessment but also for policy purposes. (shrink)

This paper is a defence of Lacan’s ontological interpretation of Freud’s theory of drive or instinct as being compatible with certain aspects in the way which Freud deals with the problem of drive or instinct in his own theory. According to Lacan, a negative ontology is the necessary compliment to Freud’s own considerations.

Este artigo analisa o conceito de fetichismo no interior da filosofia da música adorniana, a fim de mostrar como ele visa dar conta de uma ampla crítica aos processos de racionalização do material musical na modernidade ocidental. Para que o teor da crítica seja medido de maneira correta, devemos perceber como, no conceito adorniano de "fetichismo", convergem deliberadamente motivos de suas tradições de crítica ao fetichismo: a marxista e a psicanalítica. Tal estratégia nos permitirá compreender a razão pela qual o (...) conceito de mimesis é resgatado enquanto dispositivo de crítica ao fetichismo. (shrink)

This paper deals with causal analysis in the social sciences. We first present a conceptual framework according to which causal analysis is based on a rationale of variation and invariance, and not only on regularity. We then develop a formal framework for causal analysis by means of structural modelling. Within this framework we approach causality in terms of exogeneity in a structural conditional model based which is based on (i) congruence with background knowledge, (ii) invariance under a large variety of (...) environmental changes, and (iii) model fit. We also tackle the issue of confounding and show how latent confounders can play havoc with exogeneity. This framework avoids making untestable metaphysical claims about causal relations and yet remains useful for cognitive and action-oriented goals. (shrink)

Loewer (in: Physicalism and its discontents, 2001; Philos Phenomenol Res 65:655–663, 2002; in: Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, 2007) has argued that the nonreductive physicalist should respond to the exclusion problem by endorsing the overdetermination entailed by their view. Kim’s (Physicalism, or something near enough, 2005; in: Contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind, 2007) argument against this reply is based on the premise that mental causation must be a productive relation in order to sustain human agency. In this (...) paper, I challenge the premise that mental causation is a productive relation by appealing to the underlying double prevention structure of the physiological mechanisms of human action. Since the causal pathways from an agent’s mental events to bodily movement involves an absence, mental causation is not productive. This places Kim in a troublesome dilemma in his debate with Loewer: either surrender mental causation or deny that causation is a productive relation. With the support offered for productive mental causation undermined, responses to the exclusion problem based on accepting overdetermination remain viable options for the nonreductive physicalist. (shrink)

Critical Data Studies explore the unique cultural, ethical, and critical challenges posed by Big Data. Rather than treat Big Data as only scientifically empirical and therefore largely neutral phenomena, CDS advocates the view that Big Data should be seen as always-already constituted within wider data assemblages. Assemblages is a concept that helps capture the multitude of ways that already-composed data structures inflect and interact with society, its organization and functioning, and the resulting impact on individuals’ daily lives. CDS questions the (...) many assumptions about Big Data that permeate contemporary literature on information and society by locating instances where Big Data may be naively taken to denote objective and transparent informational entities. In this introduction to the Big Data & Society CDS special theme, we briefly describe CDS work, its orientations, and principles. (shrink)

In this paper we study interpretations and equivalences of propositional deductive systems by using a quantale-theoretic approach introduced by Galatos and Tsinakis. Our aim is to provide a general order-theoretic framework which is able to describe and characterize both strong and weak forms of interpretations among propositional deductive systems also in the cases where the systems have different underlying languages.

Il testo affronta, alla luce delle più recenti pubblicazioni, il tema del rapporto storia e natura in Hegel; e offre una sintesi del corso di Filosofia della storia tenuto da Russo A. nel corrente anno accademico.

Questo libro suggerisce d'inserire il nome di Arthur Schopenhauer nella tradizione della filosofia come stile di vita. Sulla scia dei pioneristici lavori di Paul Rabbow, Michel Foucault e soprattutto Pierre Hadot, si argomenta come anche nei libri di Schopenhauer questa tradizione sia viva. In particolare, è negli "Aforismi sulla saggezza della vita", contenuti nei "Parerga e paralipomena", che è possibile trovare traccia di quelle pratiche che Hadot ha proposto di chiamare esercizi spirituali. Ciò che ne emerge è un "altro" Schopenhauer. (...) Non più, non tanto, non solo il grande campione del pessimismo, il negatore della volontà di vita, il filosofo del dolore e della noia. Ma un prezioso suggeritore su come sia possibile vivere una vita se non proprio più felice, certamente il meno infelice possibile. (shrink)

Il titolo individua un argomento che per la sua vastità, qualunque sia il taglio con cui si decide di affrontarlo, risulta impossibile nelle logiche spazio-temporali di un convegno. È stato affettuosamente “estorto”, ma innanzi tempo, quando foggetto doveva ancora essere concepito. Si sa: le parole hanno la capacità, con piccoli aggiustamenti, di adattarsi a cose diverse e apparire, di volta in volta, persino appropriate, come se fossero state ritagliate proprio per quella o quel- raltra cosa...

Causal claims in biomedical contexts are ubiquitous albeit they are not always made explicit. This paper addresses the question of what causal claims mean in the context of disease. It is argued that in medical contexts causality ought to be interpreted according to the epistemic theory. The epistemic theory offers an alternative to traditional accounts that cash out causation either in terms of “difference-making” relations or in terms of mechanisms. According to the epistemic approach, causal claims tell us about which (...) inferences (e.g., diagnoses and prognoses) are appropriate, rather than about the presence of some physical causal relation analogous to distance or gravitational attraction. It is shown that the epistemic theory has important consequences for medical practice, in particular with regard to evidence-based causal assessment. (shrink)

According to the worm theory, persons are (maximal) aggregates of person-stages existing at different times. Personites, on the other hand, are non-maximal aggregates of stages that are very much like persons. Their existence appears to make instances of prudential self-sacrifice morally problematic: the personites that exist at the time of the sacrifice but not at the time of the reward seem not to receive future compensation for their sacrifice. Instances of punishment appear to give rise to a similar problem. We (...) argue that these impressions arise from a mistaken assumption about the primary bearers of properties such as suffering, receiving compensation (in the future) and having (previously) committed a crime. According to the worm theory, stages, rather than persons or personites, possess these properties. Persons and personites have these properties only derivatively. As we show, once this clarification and related ones are made, the apparent moral problems raised by the existence of personites dissolve. (shrink)

How should probabilities be interpreted in causal models in the social and health sciences? In this paper we take a step towards answering this question by investigating the case of cancer in epidemiology and arguing that the objective Bayesian interpretation is most appropriate in this domain.

Current research in molecular epidemiology uses biomarkers to model the different disease phases from environmental exposure, to early clinical changes, to development of disease. The hope is to get a better understanding of the causal impact of a number of pollutants and chemicals on several diseases, including cancer and allergies. In a recent paper Russo and Williamson address the question of what evidential elements enter the conceptualisation and modelling stages of this type of biomarkers research. Recent research in causality (...) has examined Ned Hall’s distinction between two concepts of causality: production and dependence. In another recent paper, Illari examined the relatively under-explored production approach to causality, arguing that at least one job of an account of causal production is to illuminate our inferential practices concerning causal linking. Illari argued that an informational account solves existing problems with traditional accounts. This paper follows up this previous work by investigating the nature of the causal links established in biomarkers research. We argue that traditional accounts of productive causality are unable to provide a sensible account of the nature of the causal link in biomarkers research, while an informational account is very promising. (shrink)

El presente artículo analiza la recepción de la _Germania_ de Tácito como documento histórico fidedigno en la Alemania nazi, y las operaciones de lectura que el régimen nacionalsocialista realizó sobre la obra con el objetivo de instalarla como fuente de su ideología. De allí, se demostrará cómo se subvirtió la función primordial de la _Germania_, de ficción a historia mediante el recorte, la traducción sesgada, la cita apócrifa y la desvinculación con su contexto de producción inmediato. Esto produjo una interpretación (...) de la _Germania_ como espejo de la ideología oficial de conflicto racial en la Alemania de la década de 1930. (shrink)

Recensione critica, e analitica, del testo di A.Gehlen.

A shared problem across the sciences is to make sense of correlational data coming from observations and/or from experiments. Arguably, this means establishing when correlations are causal and when they are not. This is an old problem in philosophy. This paper, narrowing down the scope to quantitative causal analysis in social science, reformulates the problem in terms of the validity of statistical models. Two strategies to make sense of correlational data are presented: first, a 'structural strategy', the goal of which (...) is to model and test causal structures that explain correlational data; second, a 'manipulationist or interventionist strategy', that hinges upon the notion of invariance under intervention. It is argued that while the former can offer a solution the latter cannot. (shrink)

Epistemic diversity is the ability or possibility of producing diverse and rich epistemic apparati to make sense of the world around us. In this paper we discuss whether, and to what extent, different conceptions of knowledge—notably as ‘justified true belief’ and as ‘distributed and embodied cognition’—hinder or foster epistemic diversity. We then link this discussion to the widespread move in science and philosophy towards monolingual disciplinary environments. We argue that English, despite all appearance, is no Lingua Franca, and we give (...) reasons why epistemic diversity is also deeply hindered is monolingual contexts. Finally, we sketch a proposal for multilingual academia where epistemic diversity is thereby fostered. (shrink)

First-person accounts of people labeled mad have become an object of increasing interest for nonsurvivor scholars with backgrounds in psychology and psychiatry. In the early stages of my PhD research, I set out to gain a deeper understanding of this expanding body of academic work in the hope of better situating my own project. My PhD explores the possibility of a model of madness collectively developed by the direct owners of the experiences in question. Although a detailed description of that (...) project, which is still evolving, is beyond the scope of this paper, I want to offer some reflections here on ‘conventional narrative research’ in psychiatry and mental health. I use this phrase to describe studies based on... (shrink)

In celebration of the centenary of the Italian philosopher Cornelio Fabro’s birth (1911–1995), this paper investigates the essential theoretical traits that undergird the framework of Fabro’s 1941 texts, by comparing them with Franz Brentano’s (1838–1817) project of renewing Thomism through a new understanding of Aristotle. The secondary literature concerning the comparison of both these authors is almost nonexistent. Our goal is to clarify some of the central issues regarding the relation between Fabro and Brentano through direct textual analysis of unpublished (...) letters exchanged between Fabro and Agostino Gemelli about Brentano and his pupil Carl Stumpf. (shrink)

For my own work in philosophy of science, I find of utmost importance to exchange ideas with practicing scientists. The author of this book, Peter Rabins, is a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry. With much regret, I have not met Professor Rabins in person yet, but I’m hoping to do so soon, as his recent book The Why of Things: Causality in Science, Medicine, and Life has been a most enjoyable read and source of inspiration. The book constitutes a noteworthy (...) addition to Professor Rabins’ academic production—which has been mainly in the area of medicine and psychiatry—as it goes to the heart of two deep, everlasting philosophical quarrels: causation and explanation.The Why of Things is written with expertise, the expertise of a doctor that devoted time and effort to reflecting upon the philosophical underpinnings of an important aspect of his own profession : how to establish causal relations and to provide causal explanations. This is not a ‘ .. (shrink)

In this paper, I will present how film, and especially science fiction, illustrates and considers the theme of genetic engineering in its ethical implications. Drawing from the work of Thomas Wartenberg, I suggest that movies can be read as philosophy, since they present philosophical argumentations in the form of narrative. I will discuss popular science fiction films that address this theme, showcasing some of the most recurrent reflections and representations of future scientific and technological developments in the field of genetic (...) engineering. Finally, I will focus on the movie Gattaca in an analysis that presents its philosophical argument. Quoting Wartenberg’s categories, I will argue that Gattaca is both a thought experiment, illustrating a possible society where it is possible to decide the genetic code of one’s children, and a critique of genetic determinism. (shrink)

Il testo analizza alcuni studi sul problema della poesia nell'ambito del Neoidealismo italiano, ossia Croce e Gentile.

Mark Johnston (2016, 2017) has raised concerns that a worm-theoretic account of persistence through time is incompatible with ethical singularity: that within the life of any actual person, there is only one morally considerable being, namely that person. To deny ethical singularity is to deny a core feature of our ordinary ethical and prudential thinking. The worm theory, Johnston concludes, proves to be “disastrous … for our ordinary moral outlook”. This paper defends the worm theory from Johnston’s argument. Though I (...) agree that the worm theory must deny ethical singularity, it can nevertheless be squared with our ordinary ethical thinking by adopting a temporal counterpart analysis of temporal predication (‘x will be F’, ‘x was previously F’, etc.) for those morally considerable beings involved in a person’s life that are not the person. (shrink)

The need for fair and just AI is often related to the possibility of understanding AI itself, in other words, of turning an opaque box into a glass box, as inspectable as possible. Transparency and explainability, however, pertain to the technical domain and to philosophy of science, thus leaving the ethics and epistemology of AI largely disconnected. To remedy this, we propose an integrated approach premised on the idea that a glass-box epistemology should explicitly consider how to incorporate values and (...) other normative considerations, such as intersectoral vulnerabilities, at critical stages of the whole process from design and implementation to use and assessment. To connect ethics and epistemology of AI, we perform a double shift of focus. First, we move from trusting the output of an AI system to trusting the process that leads to the outcome. Second, we move from expert assessment to more inclusive assessment strategies, aiming to facilitate expert and non-expert assessment. Together, these two moves yield a framework usable for experts and non-experts when they inquire into relevant epistemological and ethical aspects of AI systems. We dub our framework ‘epistemology-cum-ethics’ to signal the equal importance of both aspects. We develop it from the vantage point of the designers: how to create the conditions to internalize values into the whole process of design, implementation, use, and assessment of an AI system, in which values (epistemic and non-epistemic) are explicitly considered at each stage and inspectable by every salient actor involved at any moment. (shrink)

In the last decades, Systems Biology (including cancer research) has been driven by technology, statistical modelling and bioinformatics. In this paper we try to bring biological and philosophical thinking back. We thus aim at making diferent traditions of thought compatible: (a) causality in epidemiology and in philosophical theorizing—notably, the “sufcient-component-cause framework” and the “mark transmission” approach; (b) new acquisitions about disease pathogenesis, e.g. the “branched model” in cancer, and the role of biomarkers in this process; (c) the burgeoning of omics (...) research, with a large number of “signals” and of associations that need to be interpreted. In the paper we summarize frst the current views on carcinogenesis, and then explore the relevance of current philosophical interpretations of “cancer causes”. We try to ofer a unifying framework to incorporate biomarkers and omic data into causal models, referring to a position called “evidential pluralism”. According to this view, causal reasoning is based on both “evidence of diference-making” (e.g. associations) and on “evidence of underlying biological mechanisms”. We conceptualize the way scientists detect and trace signals in terms of information transmission, which is a generalization of the mark transmission theory developed by philosopher Wesley Salmon. Our approach is capable of helping us conceptualize how heterogeneous factors such as micro and macro-biological and psycho-social—are causally linked. This is important not only to understand cancer etiology, but also to design public health policies that target the right causal factors at the macro-level. (shrink)

Il testo analizza e presenta i presupposti filosofici che sorreggono, a monte, la produzione dei maggiori esponenti del cosiddetto misticismo protestante dopo Martin Lutero.

Experiential evidence shows that pain is associated with common meanings. These include a meaning of threat or danger, which is experienced as immediately distressing or unpleasant; cognitive meanings, which are focused on the long-term consequences of having chronic pain; and existential meanings such as hopelessness, which are more about the person with chronic pain than the pain itself. This interdisciplinary book - the second in the three-volume Meanings of Pain series edited by Dr Simon van Rysewyk - aims to better (...) understand pain by describing experiences of pain and the meanings these experiences hold for the people living through them. The lived experiences of pain described here involve various types of chronic pain, including spinal pain, labour pain, rheumatic pain, diabetic peripheral neuropathic pain, fibromyalgia, complex regional pain syndrome, endometriosis-associated pain, and cancer-related pain. Two chapters provide narrative descriptions of pain, recounted and interpreted by people with pain. Language is important to understanding the meaning of pain since it is the primary tool human beings use to manipulate meaning. As discussed in the book, linguistic meaning may hold clues to understanding some pain-related experiences, including the stigmatisation of people with pain, the dynamics of patient-clinician communication, and other issues, such as relationships between pain, public policy and the law, and attempts to develop a taxonomy of pain that is meaningful for patients. Clinical implications are described in each chapter. This book is intended for people with pain, their family members or caregivers, clinicians, researchers, advocates, and policy makers. (shrink)

OElig;he thesis is sustained that the definitions of fundamental geometric entities which open Euclids Elements actually are excerpts from the Definitions by Heron of Alexandria, interpolated in late antiquity into Euclids treatise. As a consequence, one of the main bases of the traditional Platonist interpretation of Euclid is refuted. Arguments about the constructivist nature of Euclids mathematical philosophy are given.

The paper examines definitions of ‘cause’ in the epidemiological literature. Those definitions all describe causes as factors that make a difference to the distribution of disease or to individual health status. In the philosophical jargon, causes in epidemiology are difference-makers. Two claims are defended. First, it is argued that those definitions underpin an epistemology and a methodology that hinge upon the notion of variation, contra the dominant Humean paradigm according to which we infer causality from regularity. Second, despite the fact (...) that causes be defined in terms of ‘difference-making’, this cannot fixes the causal metaphysics. Causality in epidemiology ought to be interpreted according to the epistemic theory. In this approach relations are deemed causal depending on the evidence and on the available methods. Indeed, evidence to establish causal claims requires difference-making considerations; furthermore, those definitions of cause reflect the ‘variational’ epistemology and methodology of epidemiology. (shrink)

We argue that four-dimensionalists should adopt a contextualist semantics, according to which ordinary speakers’ judgments may concern person-stages, person-segments or person-worms, depending on the context. We explain how context helps select the boundaries of the temporal parts we refer to or quantify over and show that contextualism offers the best treatment of ordinary predications and ordinary counting judgments. Contextualism implies an error theory; however, we explain why this error theory is less problematic than those entailed by the worm and stage (...) theories. (shrink)